Portuguese counterinsurgency campaigning in Africa 1961-1974 : a military analysis.

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Portuguese Counterinsurgency Campaigning in Africa - 1961-1974: A Military Analysis

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ABSTRACT

Portuguese Counterinsurgency Campaigning in Africa - 1961-1974: A Military Analysis

This thesis makes a comparative analysis of the counterinsurgency campaign fought by the Portuguese government in its African colonies from the time of the Angola uprisings in 1961 until the military coup in 1974. It describes how Portugal defined and analysed its insurgency problem in light of the available knowledge on counterinsurgency, how it developed its military policies and doctrines in this context, and how it applied them in the African colonial environment. The study compares and contrasts this effort with the experiences of other governments in similar insurgencies and thus seeks to determine whether there was a particular Portuguese approach to counterinsurgency warfare. In analysing Portuguese counterinsurgency campaigning, the study begins with the development of Portuguese doctrine and proceeds to focus on its application to the conflict. It relates the doctrinal impact on Portuguese command structure, organisation of the armed forces, recruiting at home and in the colonies, military and social operations, and logistics to the progress of the war. It views each of these facets in the context of the Portuguese perspective of Africa, comparable contemporary counterinsurgencies, conditions in Africa at the time of the conflict, and resources available both at home and in the colonies, all conditions that led to Portugal's adopting a distinct approach to counterinsurgency. This thesis aims to make an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the Portuguese approach from the military perspective.

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I

Introduction

This thesis is a thematic military analysis of the counterinsurgency effort made by the Portuguese government in its African colonies from the time of the Angola uprisings on 4 February and 15 March 1961 until the military coup in Lisbon on 25 April 1974. It describes how Portugal defined and analysed its insurgency problem, how it developed its own particular military policies and doctrines, and how it applied them in the African colonial environment.

Portugal's Counterinsurgency Challenges

Between 1961 and 1974, Portugal faced the extremely ambitious task of conducting three simultaneous counterinsurgency campaigns in Guiné, Angola, and Mozambique. It was at the time neither a rich nor a well developed country. In fact, as a Western European nation, it was the least wealthy among its neighbours by most standards of economic measure. Thus, for Portugal in 1961 to have mobilized an army, transported it many thousands of kilometres to its African colonies, established large logistical bases at key locations there to support it, equipped it with special weapons and matériel, and trained it for a very specialized type of warfare was a remarkable achievement. It is made even more noteworthy by the fact that these tasks were accomplished without any previous experience, or doctrine, or demonstrated competence in the field of either power projection or counterinsurgency warfare and thus without the benefit of any instructors who were competent in these specialities. To put this last statement in perspective, other

than periodic colonial pacification efforts, Portugal had not fired a shot in anger since World War I, when Germany invaded northern Mozambique and southern Angola.

The object of this thesis is to show how Portugal's national strategy to husband and preserve its meagre resources was translated into policies and practises at the campaign and tactical level, and how this strategy was effective in permitting Portugal to conduct a sustained and lengthy campaign in three distant colonies. In following both broad and narrow campaign strategies, Portugal attempted to disrupt the organisation of the nationalist movements through the operations of agents and to counter their armed action with appropriate military force and diplomatic pressure. Concurrently, it sought to protect its people from insurgent contact and to win their loyalty by elevating their standard of living and redressing their grievances. These elements, their particular combination, and their style of execution reflect what may be termed a Portuguese way of war. This thesis seeks to analyse each of these factors, to examine their coordinated and synergistic application, to compare them to other contemporary counterinsurgency experiences, and to emphasise their uniqueness.

The immediate and largest obstacle to conducting the campaigns was the geographic distance that separated Lisbon from its battlefields. Angola, the scene of the initial action in 1961, is located on the southwest coast of Africa. Luanda, its principal city and resupply point, is approximately 7,300 kilometres by air from Lisbon. Guiné, the scene of the second insurgency from January 1963, is located on the west coast of Africa about 3,400 air kilometres south of Portugal. Mozambique was the scene of the third insurgency in September 1964, and its principal resupply airfield of Beira is some 10,300

kilometres from Lisbon. These distances compounded the problem of logistics and produced an associated strain on transportation resources.

The British were forced to fight in Malaya and Kenya, which from London were about 9,300 and 5,700 kilometres distant respectively. French Indochina was 10,600 kilometres from Paris, and Vietnam was half-way around the world from the U.S. Only Algeria was a close 800 kilometres from southern France. Except for Algeria, all of these insurgencies were far from the home of the defending power. Regarding multiple fronts, only Britain had to face three separate insurgencies simultaneously in Malaya (1948-1960), Kenya (1952-1956), and Cyprus (1954-1983), and in the latter instances had severe difficulty mustering adequate troops for the conflicts.[1] France and the U.S. did not have a multi-fronted conflict and the associated strain on resources that such a situation would impose. When France had been faced with this problem in 1956 while fighting in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco were being granted independence. This development removed the problem of multiple fronts for which it did not have sufficient manpower.[2]

Not only were these colonies distant from Portugal, but they were also distant from one another. This separation added another dimension to the conduct of the African campaigns and exacerbated difficulties in the logistical support of Portuguese forces.

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[1]Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer M. Taw, *Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: The Development of Britain's "Small Wars" Doctrine During the 1950s* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1991), 6-7 and 38.

[2]Alf Andrew Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 158. Even with the single front of Algeria France was forced to rely on conscription.

While Bissau (Guiné) is 3,400 kilometres south of Lisbon, Luanda (Angola) is an additional 4,000 kilometres south of Bissau, and Lourenço Marques (Mozambique) a further 3,000 kilometres southeast of Luanda. For the most modern intertheatre transport aircraft in the Portuguese fleet of the time, these distances represented a hard several days work for both aircrew and machine.

Not only were these territories distant from Lisbon and each other, but Angola and Mozambique were vast by any standard, further complicating their defense. Angola covers 1,246,314 square kilometres, an area which is about fourteen times the size of Portugal or as large as the combined areas of Spain, France, and Italy. Its land frontier with its neighbours of the Belgian Congo (Zaïre), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), and South West Africa (Namibia) extends 4,837 kilometres.[3] Mozambique, the second largest territory, covers an area of 784,961 square kilometres or about nine times the size of Portugal. Its land border of 4,330 kilometres is shared with Tanganyika (Tanzania) in the north, Malawi, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), the Republic of South Africa, and finally Swaziland in the extreme south.[4] Guiné, the smallest of the three, is a tiny tropical enclave about the size of Switzerland. It covers an estimated 36,125 square kilometres, but because of tidal action that affects 20% of the country only about 28,000 square kilometres remain above the mean high tide mark.[5] This tidal delta and its characteristics further complicated its defense. Its land frontier

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[3]Estado-Maior do Exército (EME), *Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)* [Historical-Military Report of the African Campaigns (1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exército, 1988), Vol. II, 27.

[4]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. IV, __.

[5]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. III, 17-18.

is about 680 kilometres, of which 300 comprise the northern border with Senegal, and 380 the eastern and southern borders with the Republic of Guinea, both former French colonies.

By contrast only Algeria was larger with 2,204,860 square kilometres, about 200,000 of which were economically usable.[6] French Indochina was only 750,874, Malaya 333,403, and South Vietnam 174,289 square kilometres. With the exception of the French in Algeria, no other counterinsurgency campaign was waged over such vast territories as the Portuguese had to address in Angola, Mozambique, and Guiné together, and this factor had a significant bearing on the Portuguese way of conducting counterinsurgency.

Distance was not the only obstacle. Terrain features posed unusual problems as well. Topographically Angola is bordered on the west by the Atlantic Ocean, where a coastal belt runs the length of the approximately 1,650 kilometre shoreline, rising to a central highland 50 to 200 kilometres inland that covers about sixty percent of the country. Further inland there is a plateau rising as high as 1,600 meters. The climate is tropical. Particularly important was the vulnerable frontier between Angola and the Belgian Congo to the north. It was immensely long and consisted of over 2,000 kilometres of mountain, swamp, jungle, and elephant grass. The Congo River, which comprised part of the border, remains full of thickly wooded islands which provided excellent cover for

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[6]Robert Aron, François Lavagne, Janine Feller, and Yevette Garnier-Rizet, *Les Origines de la Guerre D'Algérie* (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1962), 176.

guerrillas. Crossings could be made undetected at virtually any point.[7] In this area the Portuguese security forces faced approximately 25,000 guerrillas scattered throughout an area the size of the Iberian Peninsula. The terrain from the border southward was also covered with dense jungle, thick elephant grass eight to ten feet tall, swamp, and mountain. The few roads were beaten earth and were little better than tracks in a limitless ocean of elephant grass, an ideal environment for guerrillas and a difficult one for security forces.[8]

Guiné also had a difficult topography that presented its own set of problems. It can be roughly divided into two distinct geographical areas. The western area is characterized by a forbidding stretch of mangrove and swamp forests covering the coastal inlets and deltas of half a dozen rivers. Tidal action floods these deltas twice daily, submerging land and creating vast tracts of impenetrable swamp. The thousands of miles of rivers and tributaries are obscured from the air by mangroves and thick foliage, making clandestine guerrilla movement simple and its interdiction a difficult military problem. These rivers are navigable deep into the country, providing vital lines of communication. The coast also has many small islands, the most important of which form the Bijagos Islets. The land rises in the northern and eastern interior areas of the country, where the coastal forests gradually disappear as the terrain changes into the sub-Sahara savanna plain of grasslands and scattered scrawny trees. Elevation does not

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[7]Ronald Waring, "The Case for Portugal," in *Angola: A Symposium, Views of a Revolt*, ed. Philip Mason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 41.

[8]"Report on Angola," *Intelligence Digest* (November 1961): 16.

exceed 300 meters.[9]

Mozambique presented yet a third and different topography. Physically it is largely a 1,000 kilometre-long coastal belt, rising in the north and northwest to forested areas. The vast, open and sparsely populated northern areas are difficult to police, particularly in the northern regions where the wide ranging, often nomadic, and isolated population was vulnerable to insurgent intimidation and difficult to protect. It shares a tropical climate with Angola.

The population diversity posed yet another obstacle. Angola's population according to the 1960 census was 4,830,283, or about 4 people per square kilometre, which was 95.2% black, 3.5% white, and 1.1% *mestiço* or mixed, and 0.2% others.[10] The black population consisted of 94 distinct tribes divided into nine primary ethno-linguistic groups, each of which had its own degree of loyalty to Portugal.[11] The population was concentrated in the coastal west and central plateau of Angola. The arid eastern desert and steamy northern jungle were only sparsely populated. It was in these remote areas that the guerrillas operated and posed a severe military challenge.

Guiné had a population in 1960 of 525,437 or an average of 15 people per square kilometre.[12] However, because of a concentration of the population in the western

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[9]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. III, 18.

[10]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. II, 27.

[11]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. II, 29.

[12]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. III, 26.

coastal delta, the figure there rose to 100 people per square kilometre. This situation left the arid eastern half quite remote with about 1 person per square kilometre, and it was here that guerrilla infiltration occurred with the least opposition. Ninety-nine percent of the population was black, and this division too was fragmented into two primary groupings covering 28 ethno-linguistic groups, each exhibiting various degrees of loyalty to Portugal.[13]

Mozambique's population in 1960 was 6,603,653 or about 8 people per square kilometre, 97 percent of which was black. This segment was fragmented into approximately 86 distinct tribes in ten ethno-linguistic groupings, each with its own conviction of loyalty to Portugal.[14] The north and northwestern regions of open, sparsely populated bush country next to Tanganyika (Tanzania) and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) were the most vulnerable to guerrilla infiltration. Here the isolated and sparse population was vulnerable to insurgent intimidation from these sanctuary countries.

The mosaics represented in these populations were at once a problem and a source of strength to Portugal because of their varying loyalties both to Portugal and to each other. Portugal was able to exploit these differences to its advantage in that the guerrillas were often from a group that had little in common with other groups. The reverse of this coin was that Portugal found it necessary to adjust its psychosocial program to each group and to tailor its appeal to various and different cultures.

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[13]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. III, 27.

[14]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. IV, 27-28.

The French faced a similar situation in Algeria, where the 1966 census showed 11,833,000 people concentrated along the northern coast of its 2,332,164 square kilometres, leaving the mountains and the arid desert sparsely populated. The guerrillas operated in both the urban and rural areas to the extent that there was a population to be won. Territory beyond the coast was forbidding and remote and was used mostly for transit and concealment. The guerrillas were part of the local Arab population and were as difficult to identify as those in Portuguese Africa.

In Malaya the 10,500,000 population was concentrated in and around the cities, principally Singapore, as the 333,403 square kilometre area was largely jungle. British security efforts were concentrated at the jungle margins where the Chinese guerrillas could make contact with the Chinese squatter population. The guerrillas were exclusively Chinese, and once the squatter population was removed to and isolated in the New Villages, identifying the Chinese communists was simplified, as Malays and Chinese are distinctly different in appearance. The guerrillas were confined almost exclusively to jungle concealment, and the military was forced to pursue them in this forbidding and difficult medium. Of all recent counterinsurgencies this environment most parallels that of the Portuguese in Guiné and northern Angola.

Indochina represented a similar concentration of people where the small rural populations of Laos (3,000,000 estimated) and Cambodia (7,000,000 estimated) were evenly scattered over 236,800 and 181,035 square kilometres respectively. This dispersion yielded a low 38 people per square kilometre for Laos and 12 for Cambodia. The bulk of Indochina's population was concentrated along the coast with North

Vietnam's 21,150,000 (1970) population in the eastern portion of its 158,750 square kilometres, and South Vietnam's 17,400,000 (1971) also living in the southern delta and eastern coastal regions of its 174,289 square kilometres. In the Mekong Delta population densities ranged from 750 to 2,000 people per square kilometre. This situation was a constant problem in that with these high densities indiscriminate use of firepower by any security force was bound to endanger the population and consequently the government's cause. The war was for both the French and the U.S. concentrated along the coast of Vietnam, where the guerrillas tended to blend easily with the population and represented a difficult problem in separating the two.

Each of these counterinsurgency sites had its own characteristics, some similar to those of Portugal and others not. The difficulties that each security force faced varied considerably, but in no case did a force face an enemy scattered over three widely separated and distant fronts in such difficult terrain with a population of such varied demographics, a situation largely unique to the Portuguese conflict and one that imposed enormous demands on its defense machinery.

The Military Balance

On 15 March 1961 approximately 5,000 poorly armed men crossed the northern border of Angola at numerous sites along a 300 kilometre strip and proceeded to create mayhem. This number is thought to have been increased to as much as 25,000 through forced recruiting.[15] These incursions and attacks were instigated by Holden Roberto,

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[15]Willem S. van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Angola 1961-1974* (Rivonia: Ashanti Publishing (Pty) Limited, 1993), 64.

who had founded the nationalist movement of the UPA (*União das Populações de Angola*, or Union of Angolan Peoples) in the mid-1950s based on the trans-border Bakongo population and the premise that Angola should be fully independent. He had been influenced by events in the Belgian Congo, where violence against the whites had delivered independence, had held the view that a militant approach was required with the Portuguese, and had acted accordingly. The death toll in the first week was estimated at 300 whites and 6,000 blacks, and this figure is thought to have risen to about 500 whites and perhaps 20,000 blacks by the time that it was checked by local militias of farmers and loyal blacks.[16]

Portuguese forces in Angola at the time numbered 6,500 troops, of which 1,500 were European and 5,000 locally recruited. They were spread across Angola in various training roles and unprepared to repel a full-scale invasion. Equally unprepared was the Portuguese war machine which was unable to bring troops to the area in appreciable numbers until 1 May 1961, and it took until 13 June to reoccupy the first small administrative post of Lucunga.[17]

The Portuguese Armed Forces at the time numbered 79,000, of which the Army accounted for 58,000, the Navy 8,500, and the Air Force 12,500, with a defense budget

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[16]René Pélissier, *La Colonie du Minotaure, Nationalismes et Révoltes en Angola (1926-1961)* (Orgeval: Editions Pélissier, 1978), 657-660; and van der Waals, 58-61.

[17]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 109 and 126.

of $93 million.[18] Compared to others who had fought or were fighting counterinsurgencies, Portugal's armed force was physically small and underfunded. Britain had an armed force of 593,000 and a defense budget of $4,466 million.[19] With conscripts France had an armed force of 1,026,000, the greater part of which was fighting in Algeria, and a defense budget of $3,311 million.[20] The U.S. had an armed force of 2,489,000 and a defense budget of $41,000 million.[21] Alongside these powers Portugal had meagre resources. Britain's manpower was 7.5 times that of Portugal, and its defense budget 48 times. France was about the same multiples, and the U.S. was 32 times in manpower and 441 times greater in funding. In summary, Portugal's armed force was dwarfed by those who had fought or were fighting counterinsurgencies.

Portugal's commitment at the time was to NATO and the majority of its forces were in Europe. By the end of 1961 it had moved 40,422 of its European troops to the three colonies, a figure that represented about half of its armed force. At the end of the conflict in 1974 Portugal had an armed force of 217,000, of which 149,000 or 69% were located in the three African theatres.[22] Its defense budget had grown to $523 million, almost six times the earlier figure, but it remained meagre in comparison to these three

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[18]Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1960), 11-12.

[19]*The Military Balance*, 12.

[20]*The Military Balance*, 10.

[21]*The Military Balance*, 13.

[22]Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974), 25; and *Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 261.

other powers.

Portugal faced an intimidating array of insurgent organisations. These forces were in the beginning quite fragmented, but to the extent that they could mend their relationships with one another, they presented a solid and formidable front. In Angola at the commencement of the war the primary opposition was centred in three nationalist movements. The first was the *Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* (FNLA), or the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, which was frequently referred to by its old initials of UPA and had an active force of about 6,200 men based in the Belgian Congo.[23] This number remained largely unchanged throughout the war. The second was the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA), or the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. The MPLA operated from various sites until 1963, when it settled in Congo (Brazzaville), the former Middle Congo of French Equatorial Africa. The bulk of its effective force moved to Lusaka in Zambia in 1966 to open an eastern front and is estimated to have been about 4,700 strong from that time until 1974.[24] Finally, the UPA/FNLA breakaway movement of *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA), National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, was formed in 1966 with only about 500 fighters.[25]

In Guiné the only credible movement was the *Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde* (PAIGC), African Party for the Independence of Guiné and Cape

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[23]Neil Bruce, "Portugal's African Wars," *Conflict Studies* (March 1973): 19.

[24]Bruce, 22.

[25]Bruce, 22.

Verde, which began to field a force in 1962 and built it to about 5,000 regular troops and 1,500 popular militia by 1973.[26] In Mozambique the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO), Mozambique Liberation Front, began with a disorganised force of uncertain strength and by the early 1970s had an active force of 7,200 regulars and 2,400 popular militia.[27]

The internal struggles within these movements frustrated their effectiveness throughout the campaigns in all of the theatres. Leadership in the MPLA changed hands three times in its early years and blunted its capability to wage war until 1966, when it found an opportunity to open an eastern front from the sanctuary of Zambia. Splitting the headquarters between Lusaka and Brazzaville also hampered its direction. While the UPA/FNLA continued under Holden Roberto, his "foreign minister," Jonas Savimbi, broke away to form UNITA, creating a disruptive cross current in its momentum. Also Roberto married into the family of his host nation's president and became more attracted to a comfortable life in Leopoldville than the rigours of aggressively leading a nationalist movement. Eduardo Mondlane, the founder of FRELIMO, was assassinated in 1969, and PAIGC founder Amílcar Cabral was assassinated in 1972, both in part because of internal power struggles that were fostered by the activities of the Portuguese secret police. These leadership changes altered the posture of both movements. In these cases polarisation against the Portuguese was the result of each successor's strategy to reduce internal party friction.

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[26]Bruce, 22.

[27]Bruce, 22.

Despite these shortcomings, 27,000 insurgents spread over the three theatres was a problem for Portugal in that it was difficult to prevent their entry, and once across the border, it was difficult to locate them. Their ability to cross the long unpatrolled borders in the remote areas of Africa and to make contact with the population represented a dangerous threat. In no other modern insurgency was there such a multiplicity of national movements across such a wide front in three theatres.

In contrast, Britain's security forces at the height of the 1948-1960 Malayan emergency numbered 300,000 police and British and locally recruited troops in 1952, and faced Chinese communist guerrillas numbering 8,000, giving a numerical superiority of 37.5 to one.[28] In Kenya from 1952 to 1960 British security forces numbering 56,000 faced 12,000 Mau Mau terrorists, a ratio of 4.6 to one.[29] In Cyprus from 1955 to 1959 British security forces of 24,911 faced 1,000 EKOA guerrillas, a ratio of 25 to one.[30] The nearly 400,000 French troops in Algeria faced 8,000 FLN guerrillas at the close of 1956, a ratio of 50 to one.[31] The U.S. in its Vietnam experience held a ratio of 4 to one prior to 1964, and in 1968 it had elevated to 8.75 to one.[32] Portuguese security forces of about 149,000 faced 27,000 guerrillas at the close of the war in 1974, giving

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[28]Hoffman and Taw, 38.

[29]Hoffman and Taw, 38.

[30]Hoffman and Taw, 38.

[31]Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), 113 and 382; and Heggoy, 157.

[32]Frank N. Trager, "Military Requirements for a U.S. Victory in Vietnam," in *Viet-Nam: History, Documents, and Opinions on a Major World Crisis*, ed. Marvin E. Gettleman (Greenwich: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1965), 347.

a nominal superiority of about 6 to one, although this ratio was increased somewhat through local militias. Nevertheless, few contemporary insurgencies went against such odds. That Portugal believed it could overcome the numerical shortcoming through its own particular strategies and undertook to do so with military success makes this counterinsurgency unique.

The Economic Equation

The fact that Portugal was prepared to initiate and sustain a comparatively large military campaign was impressive in that it appeared to have few national resources for such a venture. By European standards Portugal did not have a powerful economic engine that could readily support a large and distant military venture. Compared to its Southern European peers both on the eve of the war and a decade later, Portugal showed strong economic growth, but nevertheless, failed to displace its neighbours in its peer group rankings. The most helpful comparison is seen in the *per capita* gross domestic products (GDP) of these countries and their changes over the 1960-1970 period.[33]

***Per Capita* GDP in U.S. Dollars**

Country	1960/61	1970	Percent Change
Greece	364	1,090	199%
Spain	274	1,020	272%
Yugoslavia	246	650	164%
Portugal	270	660	144%

None of these countries were, however, undertaking major counterinsurgency campaigns. Members of this club were Britain, France, and the U.S. Alongside these

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[33]Richard Robinson, *Contemporary Portugal* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1979), 140 and 144.

counterinsurgency campaigners Portugal's economy was truly anaemic and raised serious doubts about its ability to mount any such military enterprise. Portugal's GDP on the eve of the war in 1960 was $2.5 billion. Britain's at $71.0 billion was 28 times Portugal's. France's at $61.0 billion was 24 fold greater. The U.S. economy at $509.0 billion was 203 times greater than Portugal's.[34] When these numbers are reduced to per capita GDP, which is an indicator of the ability of wealth to be generated and taxed to support a war, Portugal's relative economic weakness is so apparent as to call into question its ability to mount and wage any war.

Given the statistical short-fall in resources that Portugal faced in conducting its counterinsurgency, it would have to adopt different strategies from those of the British, French, and U.S. It would have to address these serious limitations by devising ways to work around them and to avoid their full impact on its ability to wage war. There were two key elements that underpinned Portugal's effort in this sphere. The first was to spread the burden of the war as widely as possible, and the second was to keep the tempo of the conflict low enough so that the expenditure of resources would itself remain affordable. The counterinsurgency practises that Portugal adopted and that reflected these two national policies in conducting the campaigns can be termed the Portuguese way of war.

In the first instance the burden would be spread to the colonies. Portugal's capacity to support a distant military campaign perforce must include the large and dynamic

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[34]United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook* (New York: United Nations, 1972), 602 and 605.

economies of Angola and Mozambique. These additions, which are not reflected in the figures above, are important in that they supplied a significant share of the military budget and manpower for the wars. At the beginning of the conflict in 1962 European Portugal's GDP was $2.88 billion.[35] To this figure must be added the $803.7 million GDP of Angola, a similar $835.5 million for Mozambique, and $85.1 million for Guiné.[36] This fuller picture reveals a nation with a GDP of $4.6 billion and alters the equation of wealth significantly. It also reveals why Portugal had such a strong commitment to its colonies.

Also during the 1961-1974 period both the economies of Angola and Mozambique were growing rapidly at 11% and 9% respectively. The following data compiled from various official sources traces the overall expansion:[37]

	GDP (Millions of U.S. Dollars)			*Per Capita* GDP (U.S. Dollars)		
Colony	1962	1965	1970	1962	1965	1970
Angola	803.7	1,099.0	1,888.5	161	210	333
Mozambique	835.5	1,213.4	1,872.0	121	165	228
Guiné	85.1	97.6	125.8	166	194	258

With the exception of Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa, per capita GDP in Portuguese Africa during the wars exceeded that of all other countries in sub-Saharan Africa.[38]

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[35]United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook* (New York: United Nations, 1971), 577.

[36]Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Portuguese Africa, An Introduction* (Lisbon: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1973), 76.

[37]*Portuguese Africa, An Introduction*, 76.

[38]*Portuguese Africa, An Introduction*, 76.

In 1965, some four years into the war, the defense budget amounted to 48% of European Portugal's national budget. Comparatively this allocation was greater than any other European nation, Canada, or the U.S. The next highest was the U.S. at 42%, followed by the United Kingdom at 34%.[39] However, observers tended to overlook the contribution that the colonies made to their own defense. The addition of colonial resources enabled Portugal not only to reach an apparently high level of expenditure but also to sustain it over a lengthy thirteen years. The three colonies contributed approximately 16% of the defense budget over the term of the conflict.[40] This contribution along with the inclusion of the colonial economies in the broader consideration meant that Portugal was spending only about 28% on the average of its national budget on defense and reached a peak of 34% in 1968.[41] These percentages reflect a more readily sustainable expenditure and place it proportionately equal to similar national defense budgets. It should also be noted that a great portion of the defense budget was allocated to social programs that benefitted the population in the areas of health, education, and agriculture, and contributed directly to the planned economic expansion in Portuguese Africa. Thus while the fiscal resources were seemingly modest from a traditional perspective, in fact they were adequate for the low-technology campaign Portugal envisioned.

If the colonies were thought to contribute relatively modestly to the defense budget,

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[39]David M. Abshire and Michael A. Samuels, *Portuguese Africa, A Handbook* (London: Pall Mall Press Ltd., 1969), 350.

[40]Joaquim da Luz Cunha, *et al*, *África, A Vitória Traída* [Africa, Betrayed Victory] (Lisbon: Editorial Intervenção Lda., 1977), 58.

[41]Luz Cunha, 61.

they conversely shouldered an increasingly important manpower burden that gradually replaced metropolitan Portugal's soldiers with African ones. The population of continental Portugal in 1960 was 8,889,392, and that of the three African colonies was aggregately 11,959,373.[42] The potential of the African population to supply troops was thus about a third greater than that of European Portugal.

Local recruitment began at modest levels in 1961, where it represented 14.9% of the forces in Angola, 26.8% in Mozambique, and 21.1% in Guiné.[43] By the end of the wars in 1974 and with the expansion of the security forces into militia and other paramilitary organisations, Africans represented fully 50% of the force in Angola, 50% in Guiné, and 70% in Mozambique.[44] This shift accelerated following 1968, for after seven years Portugal had exhausted its European manpower pool and increasingly sought recruits from the larger colonial pool. While there were problems inherent in this shift, such as the low educational level of the recruits, these shortcomings were addressed with enough success to mould an effective fighting force. Officially the troop level exceeded 149,000 men in the three theatres of operations; however, with the consideration of paramilitary forces, the level approached twice that number. Official records of these forces were difficult to maintain at the time and following the conflict were largely lost or destroyed.[45] Thus, only approximations can be made. Nevertheless, the impact of

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[42]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 214.

[43]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 261.

[44]Luz Cunha, 130 and 159; and General Kaúlza de Arriaga, interview by the author, 8 November 1994, Lisbon.

[45]General José Manuel de Bethencourt Rodrigues, interview by the author, 9 November 1994, Lisbon.

using this broader manpower pool for recruiting enabled the Portuguese Armed Forces to maintain adequate force levels almost indefinitely. This unique capability was critical in extending the conflict for thirteen years, and is developed in Chapter V.

The Portuguese Way of War

The Portuguese had had the benefit of earlier British, French, and U.S. experiences in the twentieth century prior to 1961 and proceeded to develop their military policies accordingly. Their early adaption of the counterinsurgency principles was relatively straightforward, and this point will be developed fully in Chapter III. Portuguese uniqueness came in their understanding of the struggle and adaptation to it at the theatre level and in successfully converting national strategy to battlefield tactics. With comparatively few resources and no army trained in this type of fighting initially, Portugal had to improvise. While it anticipated employing the standard types of counterinsurgency operational practices, it also sought innovations that were able to play upon the unique terrain and demographic characteristics in each of its three theatres. The concept might be borrowed from others and modified so extensively as to be nearly unique, or it might be purely Lusitanian. Some of the broader challenges and solutions characterising the Portuguese way of counterinsurgency warfare were:

- The complete reorientation of the entire Portuguese Armed Forces from a conventional force to one for counterinsurgency, thus focusing this resource on a single campaign;

- The realignment in recruiting for this force to the indigenous colonial manpower pool to a degree not seen in modern times, thus allowing the colonies to shoulder a substantial portion of this burden;

- The shift to small unit tactics and associated training based on experience in the wars, thus matching Portugal's force with that of the insurgents and keeping the tempo of fighting low and cost effective;

- The implementation of an economic and social development program that raised the standard of living of Portuguese Africans and in doing so, largely preempted insurgent arguments and raised the ability of the colonies to shoulder part of the war burden; and

- The extensive psychological operations that rationalised the Portuguese presence in Africa to the population.

Despite the retarded state of Portugal's economy, the enormous geographical challenges, and an unprepared armed force, Portugal felt confident that it understood the job at hand and could overcome these difficulties. Out of this national self-confidence Portugal developed its own style of counterinsurgency warfare through a synthesis of the experience of similar conflicts and of its own experience in Africa since the fifteenth century. The application of this systematic thinking to the threat posed by the nationalist movements was made with both a view to the national strategy of containing the cost and spreading the burden, and addressing the battlefield situation. The object of this thesis is thematically to examine the Portuguese military's understanding of these problems and its search for solutions to them. It will be argued that the Portuguese developed their own unique way of fighting in executing their national strategy and the practises that followed from it - the Portuguese way of war. In order to highlight this Portuguese way, it will be compared on a thematic basis with other contemporary counterinsurgencies, and this categorical silhouetting will emphasise the uniqueness. The fact that Portugal lost the war because it failed to find a political solution to the conflict does not negate its military achievements and the fact that they may still hold lessons for others in future conflicts.

Literature on Portuguese Counterinsurgency

There is a very limited amount of literature that addresses the object of this thesis. The reasons for this dearth stem from three factors of the time: Portugal's attempt to run a low-profile war and its overshadowing by the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the Portuguese revolution of 1974 and the new government's negative view of Portugal's involvement in Africa, and the subsequent intimidation of those involved in the conflict. This section reviews the existing literature as it relates to the thesis and these factors, and describes the new material identified.

During the period of Portuguese colonial conflict, Vietnam dominated the headlines. Little world attention was paid to these African wars. In 1977 Thomas Henriksen made the observation that "Portugal's thirteen years of counterinsurgency operations on the African continent have received little comparative analysis."[46] In 1988 William Minter argued:

> Even in Portuguese the written material available for a more careful judgment is sketchy. The gaps in the history of the Angolan conflict are larger than the patches of reliable information or systematic analysis. This is true for the pre-1975 war against Portuguese colonialism and even more so for the complex postindependence strife.[47]

Today Portuguese and U.S. defense officials continue to confirm the void in this area.[48]

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[46]Thomas H. Henriksen, "Portugal in Africa: Comparative Notes on Counterinsurgency," *Orbis* (Summer 1977): 395.

[47]William Minter, ed., *Operation Timber: Pages from the Savimbi Dossier* (Trenton, New Jersey: African World Press, Inc., 1988), 2.

[48]Chester A. Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,Inc., 1992), 145. On 23 September 1993, the newly appointed United States Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Frank G. Wisner, in conversations with the author stated, "The Portuguese military record in Africa is little known, poorly documented, and badly understood."

This situation was reinforced during the early years of the war by Portugal's imposition of strict control and censorship over any media that were permitted in its war zones.[49] During and after the war access to its archives were and continue to be restricted for purposes of researching the 1961-1974 period.[50] In the revolution of 1974, many records were destroyed and on decolonisation many more were abandoned in Africa.[51] Because of these voids analysis of Portugal's counterinsurgency planning and particularly the development of its own brand of counterinsurgency warfare are lacking.

A broad review of literature in English pertaining to the entire 1961-1974 period reveals that, as a general rule, virtually all of the known work represents historical

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Mr. Wisner is a veteran of the U.S. effort to negotiate Cuban withdrawal from Angola, having worked as the assistant to Ambassador-at-large General Walters, who led the mission, and to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker.

[49]René Pélissier, "Private War," *The Geographical Magazine* (November 1971): 78; and Al J. Venter, *Portugal's Guerrilla War: The Campaign for Africa* (Cape Town: John Malherbe Pty Ltd, 1973), 30. Al Venter, a South African journalist, also commented that "the reticence on the part of the Portuguese to allow newsmen to cover the conflict" had existed until 1971, and even then it took months to obtain a visa to any of the war zones.

[50]Lieutenant Colonel Aniceto Afonso, Portuguese Army, Director of the Arquivo Histórico Militar, Lisbon, interview by the author 21 February 1994, Lisbon. Lieutenant Colonel Afonso indicated that the political stance and acts that political and military figures took during the African colonial wars are not necessarily those that would be popular in Portugal today. Consequently, those portions of the archives associated with the conflict will not be opened until there is considerably more distance between the wars and the individuals involved, a distance that perhaps only their death will bring.

[51]José Manuel de Bethencourt Rodrigues, General, Portuguese Army (Retired), interview by the author, 9 November 1994, Lisbon, and Renato F. Marques Pinto, Brigadeiro, Portuguese Army (Retired), interview by the author, 30 March 1995. General Bethencourt Rodrigues stated that the Commission for the Study of the African Campaigns (1961-1974) had borrowed his personal papers as well as those of others in an attempt to reconstruct certain events because of destroyed records. Brigadeiro Marques Pinto described instructions to him as the Portuguese Military Attaché in London to destroy certain records and volumes on the Portuguese Armed Forces.

accounts of events during this period or of general studies of the Portuguese empire in Africa with summaries of the modern colonial wars. In none of this material is there more than a token treatment of military operations or counterinsurgency. For instance, Malyn Newitt in *Portugal in Africa, The Last Hundred Years* devotes fourteen pages in 247 to the events of the wars.[52] The most recent and thorough book devoted exclusively to the war in Angola, Willem van der Waals' *Portugal's War in Angola 1961-1974*, accords eight pages of text in 277 to counterinsurgency action and the balance to historical narrative.[53]

The literature pertinent to this thesis can be divided into four broad categories: (1) relevant publications, documents, and papers of the Portuguese government and its various arms (primary), semi-official papers written for discussion of war-related issues (primary), and interviews with participants in the conflict (primary); (2) general background information on Portugal and its colonies (secondary); (3) specific literature on the African wars in the 1961-1974 period (secondary); and (4) writings on counterinsurgency warfare and specific campaigns (secondary).

The first category contains Portuguese official and semi-official publications, documents and papers. These represent the key primary literature and thus the main pillar on which this thesis will develop and judge the Portuguese way of fighting these wars. They also represent a source of material which has yet to be mined by either

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[52]Malyn Newitt, *Portugal in Africa, The Last Hundred Years* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1981), 228-242.

[53]Willem van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Angola 1961-1974* (Rivonia: Ashanti Publishing (Pty) Limited, 1993), 109-112 and 114-121.

Portuguese or English scholars.

The number of publications by the Portuguese government on the wars and particularly on counterinsurgency has been relatively few. This modest productivity possibly stems from the fact that the political stance that people took and the things that they did during the wars are not perceived as acts or positions that they would want aired in Portugal today.[54] Domestic interest in the African Campaigns of 1961-1974 has been officially dampened since 1974. The abandoning or destruction of many records occurred in the closing months of the conflict and was apparently motivated not so much to shield past activities but rather to foreclose any reappraisal of the revolutionary government's African policy. This policy advocated the precipitous granting of independence at the expense of practical considerations that would limit the chaos following an abrupt Portuguese withdrawal.

The most recent publication is a series of volumes written in the 1988-1989 period by the Commission for the Study of the African Campaigns (1961-1974), a special body established by the Army General Staff in 1980. The work is titled *Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de Africa (1961-1974)*, [*Historical-Military Report of the African Campaigns (1961-1974)*], establishes the background and general framework of the wars in the first volume, and gives the order of battle and its rationale over the various

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[54]Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Director, Institute for Strategic and International Studies, Lisbon, interview by the author, 23 February 1994, Lisbon.

campaigns in the subsequent volumes.[55] It provides an historical account of the disposition of forces throughout the wars with a broad description of the operations, representing the Portuguese Army's official view of events. But most importantly it provides information from depositions that detail the problems faced in the field and the solutions taken within the limitations of resources available, and as such is particularly valuable in showing how Portugal worked within its limitations.

The official Portuguese doctrine on counterinsurgency is contained in its Ministry of the Army publication of five volumes, *O Exército na Guerra Subversiva*, [The Army in Subversive War], (1963).[56] It is the basic foundation for the conduct of the war and addresses the nature of insurgency, small unit tactics, the Army's psychosocial program, psychological operations, and logistics. This doctrine was produced and refined following two years of experience fighting in northern Angola and drew heavily on French and British thinking. From the beginning of the wars in 1961 until it was formally published in its five volume form in 1963 sections were released as guides for conducting the war. It articulates the procedures and rationale for Portugal's fighting a low-technology, limited, small unit, infantry action. It is the tactical doctrine that implements the Portuguese policy of maintaining a low tempo, subdued conflict, as when the tempo escalates, so follows the cost in both money and casualties. This volume describes the methods used to implement this Portuguese philosophy and embodies the

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[55]Estado-Maior do Exército (EME), *Resenha Historico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)* [Historical-Military Report of the African Campaigns (1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exército, 1988).

[56]Ministério do Exército, *O Exército na Guerra Subversiva* [The Army in Subversive War] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exército, 1963).

Portuguese principle of applying resources to the conflict to provide the greatest yield in achieving the goal of militarily defeating the insurgents.

In the early phases of the war the *Guia para Emprego Táctico das Pequenas Unidades na Contra Guerrilha*, [Guide to the Tactical Employment of Small Units in Counter-Guerrilla Operations], which was at the time in development as the chapter on small unit tactics in the counterinsurgency doctrine, was published in 1961 and rushed into the field.[57] It is a sound manual for the soldier and reflects much of the thinking that was to follow in 1963 in the more elaborate five-volume series for broader consumption, as described above. This book became the soldier's bible in the early years of the conflict and reflected the Portuguese way of fighting initially. It was subsequently refined with the issue of the formal doctrine in 1963 and later revised again in 1966.

The book, *Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, [Aid to the Study of Doctrine Applicable in the African Campaigns (1961-1974)], was published in 1990 by the Army General Staff and is used in staff college courses and other similar fora.[58] The work traces the development of Portuguese doctrine for the African Campaigns of 1961-1974 (or Campaigns) and comments on a number of problems encountered and their solutions in its implementation. It is a very key book written by those who played a part in initially formulating the doctrine as staff

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[57]Ministério do Exército, *Guia para Emprego Táctico das Pequenas Unidades na Contra Guerrilha*, [Guide to the Tactical Employment of Small Units in Counter-Guerrilla Operations] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exército, 1963).

[58]Estado-Maior do Exército (EME), *Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, [Aid to the Study of Doctrine Applicable in the African Campaigns (1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exército, 1990).

officers and later wrestling with its imperfections. While it tends to skirt the sensitive topics, such as Africanisation of the conflict, it provides insights into Portuguese policy development and implementation in the area of applying Portuguese strengths against the weaknesses of the enemy and Portugal's relationship with the population, including the ethical behaviour of its armed forces.

In addition to the foregoing there are some 32 lesser official publications garnered in interviews, copied from the library at the Institute for Higher Military Studies (IAEM), discovered through antique and used book dealers specialising in Portuguese Africa, or purchased from the Portuguese government's obsolete publication office in Lisbon. There are also 22 semi-official academic studies copied from the Institute's collection. Together this material provides extended detail on the problems of applying limited resources in seeking solutions to large problems. To the extent that there remained unclear or unexplained issues in this literature, these voids were clarified through a series of interviews with officers who had personal knowledge of that particular aspect of the campaign.

The secondary literature cited in the second category provides supporting background information on the problems facing the Portuguese and helps to establish the rationale for certain decisions and practises that were unique to Portugal's way of fighting in Africa. The most prominent is James Duffy's *Portuguese Africa*, published in 1959.[59] This work is certainly not definitive; however, for English readers it is a very sound effort. Complementing Duffy is Newitt's *Portugal in Africa, The Last Hundred Years* (1981),

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[59]James Duffy, *Portuguese Africa* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959).

a seemingly reasoned and balanced account of the modern colonial period.[60] Gervase Clarence-Smith's *The Third Portuguese Empire 1825-1975: A Study in Economic Imperialism* is a similar work that parallels Newitt in scholarly achievement.[61] Two specific volumes on the principal colonies are Wheeler and Pélissier's *Angola* (1971) and Henriksen's *Mozambique* (1978).[62] Both of these tend to give cursory treatment to the earlier periods and to concentrate on the modern developments, particularly the nationalist uprisings and the colonial wars, and for this perspective they are particularly useful as a source of examples of wartime practises and insurgent dynamics centred on the population, an important aspect in the object of this thesis. Gerald Bender in his *Angola under the Portuguese, The Myth and the Reality* (1978) contributes by detailing population resettlement practises during the wars, a controversial program to shield the population from the insurgents and to raise its standard of living.[63] John Marcum's *The Angolan Revolution, Volume I: The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950-1962)* is the most comprehensive description of the genesis of the war in Angola from the insurgent side.[64] Vail and White's *Capitalism and Colonialism in Mozambique: A Study of the Quelimane*

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[60]Malyn Newitt, *Portugal in Africa, The Last Hundred Years* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1981).

[61]Gervase Clarence-Smith, *The Third Portuguese Empire 1825-1975: A Study in Economic Imperialism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985).

[62]Douglas L. Wheeler and René Pélissier, *Angola* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971); and Thomas H. Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History* (London: Rex Collins Ltd., 1978).

[63]Gerald J. Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese, The Myth and the Reality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

[64]John A. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume I: The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950-1962)* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1969).

District (1980) is a complementary volume on Mozambique.[65]

The secondary literature cited in the third category serves as a source of examples of Portuguese doctrine in action, planning the effective application of resources in the conflict. These examples represent failed as well as successful practises and support either the change or continuation of Portuguese policy. As a key part of Portuguese strategy was to create confusion in the enemy camps, literature on the insurgents showing the results of these policies is an important facet of this thesis. John Marcum's second volume on Angola: *The Angolan Revolution: Volume 2, Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962-1976)* is most valuable in this regard, as it describes the effort of the guerrillas to defeat the Portuguese and details their difficulties.[66] It further describes how the Portuguese had since their early presence in Africa been adept at playing the various ethno-linguistic groups against one another, an important facet of their way of war. *Le Naufrage des Caravelles* [The Shipwreck of the Caravels] (1979) is the third volume of René Pélissier's collection of articles on Portuguese Africa.[67] It provides editorial and historical comment on certain statistical figures for the 1961-1975 period, and as such, is a most useful reference in explaining or supporting Portuguese policy. The most recent history on the wars in English is *Portugal's War in Angola 1961-1974*, which appeared in 1993 by Willem van der Waals, and while much of it is a recasting

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[65]Leroy Vail and Landeg White, *Capitalism and Colonialism in Mozambique: A Study of the Quelimane District* (London: Heinemann Educational Books Limited, 1980).

[66]John A. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume II: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962-1976)* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1978).

[67]René Pélissier, *Le Naufrage des Caravelles, Etudes sur la Fin de L'Empire Portugais (1961-1975)* [The Shipwreck of the Caravels, Studies on the End of the Portuguese Empire] (Orgeval: Editions Pélissier, 1979).

from secondary sources, it introduces new material from the South African military archives that provides insight into Portugal's military problems in Angola and their solutions.[68]

The thesis cites insurgent views whenever possible as a counterpoise to Portuguese activity. These citations reflect the success or failure of Portuguese policies, and as such, support the thesis in examining Portuguese reaction to insurgent activity. For Mozambique these sources are Henriksen's *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of Independence* (1983), and in the case of Guiné, Chabal's *Amílcar Cabral* (1983) and Basil Davidson's *The Liberation of Guiné* (1969).[69] Basic texts from the insurgents themselves are Mondlane's *The Struggle for Mozambique* (1969) and Amílcar Cabral's *Revolution in Guiné* (1969).[70]

Again, a source of examples of Portuguese policies and operational practices are journalistic writings. Al Venter, a journalist close to the South African Defense Force, has made valuable contributions in his *The Terror Fighters* (1969), *Portugal's War in*

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[68]Willem S. van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Angola 1961-1974* (Rivonia: Ashanti Publishing (Pty) Limited, 1993).

[69]Thomas H. Henrikson, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of Independence, 1964-1974* (London: Greenwood Press, 1978); Patrick Chabal, *Amílcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); and Basil Davidson, *The Liberation of Guiné* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1969).

[70]Eduardo Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1969); and Amílcar Cabral, *Revolution in Guiné: An African People's Struggle* (London: Stage 1, 1969).

Guiné-Bissau (1973), and *The Zambesi Salient* (1974).[71] Each of these volumes is a report of his visits with Portuguese forces in the respective war theatres. Consequently, their primary limitation is a Portuguese bias. His views and reporting is not seen through the eyes of a military expert, and thus his views are frequently moulded by his Portuguese contacts. These books contain many examples of Portuguese counterinsurgency doctrine and training in effect and are used to highlight the success or failure of such activity

Similar journalistic reflections on the war in Mozambique in Portuguese are Maier's *Revolution and Terrorism in Mozambique* and Rocha's *Guerra em Moçambique*, [War in Mozambique].[72] Both serve as good sources of illustrative examples of numerous counterinsurgency operations. Hélio Felgas's *Guerra em Angola*, [War in Angola], (1968) provides a further survey of the Angola front in Portuguese.[73] It is a considerably more scholarly work and balances the journalistic approach well. Additional Portuguese books are Artur Maciel's *Angola Heróica* [Heroic Angola], Horácio Caio's *Angola, Os Dias do Desespero* [Angola, The Days of Desperation], and Amândio César's *Guiné 1965: Contra-Attaque* [Guiné 1965: Counterattack], which give emotional

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[71]Al J. Venter, *The Terror Fighters: A Profile of Guerrilla Warfare in Southern Africa* (Cape Town: Purnell and Sons (S.A.) (Pty.) Ltd., 1969); *Portugal's War in Guiné-Bissau* (Pasadena: California Institute of Technology, 1973); and *The Zambesi Salient* (London: Robert Hale & Company, 1975).

[72]F. X. Maier, *Revolution and Terrorism in Mozambique* (New York: American African Affairs Association, 1974); and Nuno Rocha, *Guerra em Moçambique* [War in Mozambique] (Lisbon: Editora Ulisseia Limitada, 1969).

[73]Hélio Felgas, *Guerra em Angola* [War in Angola] (Lisbon: Livraria Clássica Editora, 1961).

descriptions of the opening months of the conflict.[74] They are valuable in following these early developments. *The Portuguese Answer* (1973), published by General Kaúlza de Arriaga privately in England, is an account of the Portuguese reaction to the guerrillas in Mozambique.[75] He reviews the underlying Portuguese view of the communist grand strategy and follows this with his personal game plan for reform and guerrilla containment as Commander-in-Chief Portuguese Forces Mozambique.

General Luz Cunha, General Kaúlza de Arriaga, General Bethencourt Rodrigues, and General Silvério Marques, all former commanders-in-chief in one of the three theatres, jointly wrote *Africa, a Vitória Traída*, [Africa, the Betrayed Victory], (1977) in which they describe the situation in 1974 and provide a rationale for continuing the wars to a satisfactory conclusion rather than abandoning the colonies to the insurgents.[76] This book suggests how their country might capitalise on this foundation of military success and social development, key aspects of the entire campaign. Two additional memoirs of equal importance are Marcello Caetano's *Depoimento*, [Deposition], and Silva Cunha's *O Ultramar, a Nação e o "25 de April,"* [The Overseas Provinces, the Nation and the

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[74]Artur Maciel, *Angola Heróica: 120 Dias com os Nossas Soldados* [Heroic Angola: 120 Days with Our Soldiers] (Amadora: Livaria Bertrand, 1963); Horácio Caio, *Angola, Os Dias do Desespero* [Angola, The Days of Desperation] (Lisbon: Edition of the author, 1966); and Amândio César, *Guiné 1965: Contra-Attaque* [Guiné 1965: Counterattack] (Braga: Livraria Editoria Pax, 1965).

[75]Kaúlza de Arriaga, *The Portuguese Answer* (London: Tom Stacy Ltd, 1973).

[76]Joaquim da Luz Cunha, Kaúlza de Arriaga, José Manuel de Bethencourt Rodrigues, and Silvino Silvério Marques, *África: A Vitória Traída* [Africa: The Betrayed Victory] (Lisbon: Editorial Intervenção, Lda., 1977).

"25th of April"].[77] Dr. Caetano became Portugal's Prime Minister following Dr. Salazar's stroke in 1968, and his reflections are particularly important, for they show his obstructionist posture to any political solution, bringing greater pressure for a military solution. Professor Silva Cunha was initially Dr. Caetano's Minister of Overseas Territories before becoming Minister of Defense prior to the 1974 coup. The portion of the book addressing defense issues describes the problems facing the military engine and the methodology employed to reach solutions. The description of this thought process at the highest levels is an important facet in the development of the Portuguese way of counterinsurgency.

From the final category the writings on counterinsurgency warfare and modern campaigns represent a comprehensive body of thought covering the theory of counterinsurgency both before 1961 and afterwards. This literature is important in that it is key to making an appraisal of the Portuguese understanding of counterinsurgency warfare and the extent to which it was embraced in the conduct of the wars.[78]

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[77]Marcello Caetano, *Depoimento* [Deposition] (Rio de Janeiro: Distribuidora Record, 1974); and J. M. da Silva Cunha, *O Ultramar, a Nação e o "25 de April"* [The Overseas Provinces, The Nation and the "25 of April"] (Coimbra: Atlântida Editora, 1977).

[78]This secondary literature on small wars and insurgencies is well established and has its origins in Lord Wolseley's 1886 edition of his *Soldier's Pocket Book*. The term "small wars" describes operations conducted between a highly trained, armed, and organized force and, broadly speaking, irregulars. The orientation of the term is toward counterinsurgency, although today the U.S. government in its study of this form of war has grouped all of the aspects of small wars under the term "low-intensity conflict." This term includes insurgent warfare, wars of national liberation, revolutionary warfare, and guerrilla warfare, and makes no distinction between them. It also encompasses all of the elements used to counter these threats.

The classic volume on the counterinsurgent aspects of small wars is Colonel C. E. Callwell's *Small Wars, A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers* published in 1896. This volume was considered definitive in its field until after World War II, when parts of it

The aim of this thesis is to show how Portugal with its meagre resources developed a national strategy to husband and preserve them that was translated into policies and practises at the campaign and tactical level. Portugal's deployment of its resources was in such sympathy with the dynamics of the conflict that it was able to conduct a sustained and lengthy campaign in three distant colonies. The thesis also examines the successes and failures of these policy implementation measures as they were introduced in response to developments in the theatres and analyses their appropriateness through a comparison to other contemporary counterinsurgencies. Because of a lack of literature addressing this topic, it is necessary to make this examination and analysis from the facts and situations described largely in Portuguese military documents and publications and to compare them to and test them against similar contemporary counterinsurgency experiences.

Methodology

As Portugal's war to retain its colonies ended in failure, there is a national shame and embarrassment about this outcome. The mood in Portugal today is one of putting Africa

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were overcome simply by the fact that prevailing conditions had changed almost beyond recognition. The political awareness of opponents, the introduction of the press with its high technology news reporting capability, the addition of the helicopter to the logistical equation, and advent of air power itself combined to outmode many parts of the book. In a similar vein, the U.S. Marine Corps published its *Small Wars Manual* in 1940. It sets forth a military strategy and tactics for small wars, including counterinsurgency, based on its experiences in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Vera Cruz, and other policing expeditions of the late 1800s and early 1900s.

Following World War II, insurgencies became the vehicle of choice for proxy warfare, often between the communist and Western powers. As few published materials were available, the Portuguese had to begin nearly from scratch. Their thinking was developed primarily from a series of case studies conducted by the Portuguese Army's Institute of Higher Military Studies, and the Army's General Staff. It was the thinking developed from this effort that provided the basis for Portuguese counterinsurgency theory.

behind it and looking to a future with the European Union.[79] Because of this semi-official "non-interest" in the topic of the wars, there is little literature openly available as secondary sources in either Portuguese or English that performs any analysis of Portugal's military operations in Africa. Except for a very few official publications, little has been written since 1974. Consequently, it was necessary to rely on Portuguese military sources for the primary research information.

The interview process yielded the largest amount of information on the thesis topic in that not only was the oral history and insight useful in developing research, but it led to other sources. Over 40 individuals were interviewed, including many of the key military figures, and a list of those contributing is detailed in the bibliography. During the interview process many private and personal papers were made available by the interviewees, including unpublished memoirs and other documents describing the situations in which they were involved. They also contacted their friends and acquaintances and sought answers to questions in the form either of further interviews or of access to additional material. Archival material was irregularly limited because of secrecy. The Portuguese Army was quite protective in certain arbitrary areas of original documents and depositions; however, outside of these sensitive areas all services were forthcoming in disclosing their wartime activities and releasing what documents were available.

A most lucrative source proved to be the library files and the faculty at the IAEM, where Portuguese counterinsurgency doctrine was conceived and written in the 1960-1963

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[79]Colonel António Rosas Leitão, interview by the author, 16 November 1994, Lisbon.

period. The library contained analyses of most significant issues raised in the conduct of the wars, and copies of these papers were made available. The faculty was free to answer questions and arrange interviews with those who had participated directly in the issues under examination. Taken together this material provides a firm basis to assess and develop an analysis of Portugal's counterinsurgency campaign.

Chapter Organisation

This thesis is organized around Portugal's development of its counterinsurgency doctrine and its implementation, beginning with an explanatory background to the wars and then expanding on the various thematic aspects of the Portuguese way of fighting in Africa.

Chapter II sets the stage for an analysis of Portugal's war effort by showing why Portugal was ready to fight a long and arduous campaign. It explains the economic, political, and emotional importance of the colonies to Portugal, the development of the government's posture toward Africa in contrast to that of the other colonial powers at the time, and the commitment that this policy entailed. It concludes with a summary of the events of 1961 that with each sequential one hardened Portugal's pursuit of its colonial policy and produced an intransigence that led to an irrevocable commitment to the conflict.

Chapter III traces the Portuguese analysis of its insurgency problem and examines the development of its counterinsurgency doctrine in the period just prior to and during the opening phases of the wars. It reviews the origins of this effort and analyses the doctrine

in terms of its relevance and applicability to the colonial situation. It considers their understanding of the problem, how their philosophy differed from or was similar to established British, French, and U.S. thinking, and how it was refined through experience.

Chapter IV examines the changes in the command structure and organisation of the Portuguese Armed Forces to address the requirement of mobilising, training, and directing a revamped army in Africa. It further identifies the problems encountered in this process and the adjustments made to produce the desired results. These efforts are compared and contrasted with armies fighting similar, contemporaneous wars.

Chapter V examines the dynamics of the recruiting problem in metropolitan Portugal and how it led to a pragmatic shift to local recruiting in the theatres of operations. It examines the unique Portuguese aspects of this Africanisation and concludes with an analysis that places it in the context of other similar contemporary struggles.

Chapter VI describes the organisation and development of Portugal's systematic intelligence effort and examines its effective link in denying the insurgents initiative. It addresses the problems encountered with these operations in selected areas and follows the solutions adopted, comparing and contrasting them with other similar ones in contemporary counterinsurgencies to highlight the Portuguese strengths and weaknesses.

Chapter VII examines helicopter operations and the impact that they had on Portuguese counterinsurgency warfare. Helicopter operations were relatively new in this

period, having been introduced in counterinsurgency operations for the first time by the British in Malaya, and thus their use was still in the exploratory stages. The chapter traces the development of Portuguese helicopter tactics, their effect on operations, and their integration into Portuguese tactical doctrine, highlighting this effort with those in comparable situations.

Chapter VIII examines the psychosocial program that the Portuguese initiated to raise the standard of living of the local population, to protect them from the guerrillas, and to persuade them that these benefits far exceeded anything that the insurgents might offer. It contrasts these aspects with other similar efforts in contemporary counterinsurgencies to highlight the Portuguese strengths and weaknesses.

Chapter IX examines the logistics problem that Portugal faced in procuring the necessary matériel and in distributing it to the forces in the field on three fronts. It discusses the building of infrastructure, particularly the extensive airfield network and road systems, the operation of the logistical pipeline, and the impact of medical support. It contrasts these problems and their solutions with other similar efforts in contemporary counterinsurgencies to highlight the Portuguese strengths and weaknesses.

Chapter X synthesises the broad themes of the thesis. It seeks to underline the major factors that comprise the uniqueness of the Portuguese way of fighting counterinsurgency with its very limited resources and multiple fronts and to show that its flexible thinking and readiness to absorb lessons were the key to staying ahead of the insurgents.

II

Commitment to the *Ultramar*

Portugal's commitment to the defense of its colonies, or the *ultramar*, had its origins in their economic promise and in Dr. António Salazar's emotional African policy of Lusotropicalism.[1] Portugal had been in Africa since 1497, which on the eve of the wars amounted to over four and a half centuries, longer by far than any other colonial power. With the progressive decline of its trading position in the Indian Ocean beginning in 1578, the loss of its colony of Brazil in 1822, and the missed opportunity of a coast-to-coast possession in austral Africa in 1890, Portugal's colonial empire was left with only the potential of the large but incompletely developed colonies of Angola and Mozambique. These colonies in Portuguese minds held the promise of a renewed prosperity and greatness. Further with the heritage of having been Portuguese for so long their ownership was to be defended at all costs.[2] For this small European nation, the importance of the colonies was captured in an editorial by Dr. Marcello Caetano in *O Mundo Português* [Portuguese World] that appeared in 1935, "Africa is for us a moral justification and a *raison d'être* as a power. Without it we would be a small nation; with it, we are a great country."[3] Expanding on this concept was Dr. Salazar's notion of

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[1]James Duffy, *Portugal in Africa* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1962), 150-151. See also James Duffy, *Portuguese Africa* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 271-272.

[2]John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962-1976)* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1978), 125-126.

[3]Dr. Marcello Caetano, "Editorial," *O Mundo Português* [Portuguese World] (II-1935): 218.

Lusotropicalism, which was an attempt to combine colonial ownership with Portuguese pride in their heritage, culture, and civilising responsibility.[4] Dr. Salazar believed that this emotional formula would bind the colonies to the nation and help to maintain Portugal's position as the third largest colonial empire after those of Britain and France. With this concept of empire Dr. Salazar sought to dispel the world image of Portugal as a small country. Also the colonies in becoming an extension of Portugal were more for Dr. Salazar than a sentimental bond:[5]

> Angola, Mozambique, and our possessions in India are equally with our provinces of Minho or Beira under the same single authority of the State. We are one juridical and political unit, and we desire to advance towards an economic unity as complete and perfect as possible by developing production and by extending our trade in raw materials in food and manufactured articles between the various parts of this "whole."[6]

The growth of revolutionary climate in the *ultramar* clashed with this philosophy and the country's refusal to break the colonial bond and to decolonise in 1961.[7] Dr. Salazar and

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[4]James Duffy, *Portuguese Africa* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 271.

[5]Duffy, 271. The author quotes from an article on Dr. Salazar's colonial view by António Leite de Magalhães, "Na Estrada do Império" [On the Road of Imperialism], which appeared in *O Mundo Português* in 1937. He notes that the translation did not do justice to the original work: "Empire and Liberty were incompatible concepts. Empire means Authority - and there is no Authority where Power is divided and diluted. It is the duty of the New State to reestablish the force of Power. With it will be revived all the power-concepts of the Past. One of these power-concepts was the unity of territory and of the Grail, as though there were no seas or races separating the constituent elements of the national Whole."

[6]António de Oliveira Salazar, trans. Robert Edgar Broughton, *Doctrine and Action: Internal and Foreign Policy of the New Portugal 1928-1939* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1939), 175-176.

[7]Gervase Clarence-Smith, *The Third Portuguese Empire 1825-1975, A Study in Economic Imperialism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), 185-186. See also John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of and Explosion (1950-1962)* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), 120; and Basil Davidson, *In the Eye of the Storm* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1972), 17-19. By the end of the 1950s grievances in the colonies had reached dangerous levels. The creole elite were

European and Muslim challenges to their new monopoly and proceeded to establish a systematic arc of enclaves strategically ringing the Indian Ocean. These bases commanded both the sources of trade as well as the sea routes themselves. As the Portuguese secured their dominance in this area, so profits from their localized trade as well as the Cape route increased accordingly.[9] Portugal reached its height of power and influence during the first half of the sixteenth century. Its decline can be marked from June 1578 and its disastrous North African campaign in which King Sebastião and his army were destroyed in four hours by Moroccan forces at El-Ksar el-Kebir.[10] The might of Portugal was wasted with this disaster, and the next year Portugal's great epic poet and inspirer of nationalistic sentiment, Luís Vaz de Camões, wrote to a friend from his deathbed in Lisbon, "All will see that so dear to me was my country that I was content to die not only in but with it."[11]

While leaving an indelible imprint on the European perspective of the world, the Portuguese had exhausted themselves in the process. They were never able to regain their sixteenth century stature, and from that period until 1961 Portugal experienced an irregular path of decline with episodes of partial recovery. As a nation, the Portuguese have historically looked back on this time, which they call *O Século Maravilhoso* [The

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[9]C. R. Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415-1825* (London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1969), 39-64.

[10]William C. Atkinson, "Introduction" to Luis Vaz de Camões, *The Lusiads*, trans. William C. Atkinson (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1952), 19-20. King Sebastião's force totalled some 15,000 foot and 1,500 horse with 9,000 camp-followers. Five hundred vessels were required to transport the force. Eight thousand were killed, 15,000 were taken prisoner and sold into slavery, and perhaps one hundred eventually reached the safety of Portugal.

[11]Atkinson, 20.

Marvellous Century], and longed to regain the former height of glory and greatness. Although this first empire was short-lived, it created a permanent nostalgia that gave Dr. Salazar a "vibrant chord of imperial grandeur" around which to rally colonial support.[12] In the period between 1497 and 1578 the Portuguese had established a new concept of empire based on a mastery of the ocean routes. Trade, not territory, was the prime objective. Portugal was unable to sustain such a grand enterprise with its very limited resources, particularly in manpower, and when Spain annexed it in its depleted state between 1580 and 1640, this trade dominance was effectively lost. When Portugal recovered its independence in 1640, it was a wonder that it retrieved so much of its overseas holdings as well, particularly Brazil. As spices were the single most lucrative commodity of the sixteenth century, so Brazilian sugar replaced them in the seventeenth century. When West Indian sugar production threatened to supplant that of Brazil, Gold was discovered there in 1694. In 1728 diamonds were also discovered. The revenue from this colonial wealth maintained the continuity of Portuguese prosperity, until Brazil declared its independence in 1822.[13] It was the memory of Brazil and the wealth that it had provided that generated a twentieth century hope for a similar prosperity from the African colonies. This Brazilian model, where "Portuguese language and culture were firmly entrenched" became a far more influential guide for the development of Angola

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[12]Clarence-Smith, 1. The author argues that while politicians and colonial ideologues were able to play strongly on this vibrant chord of imperial grandeur throughout the history of the Third Portuguese Empire (1825-1975) by recalling the great days of the discoveries and Asian conquests, the Portuguese citizens themselves were never unanimous in their attitudes toward Portuguese Asia, and many saw it as a hollow triumph that drained the country of resources and left it impotent in its defense against Spain.

[13]Perry Anderson, "Portugal and the End of Ultra-Colonialism," *New Left Review* (May-June 1992): 94.

and Mozambique than *O Século Maravilhoso*.[14] These two colonies were seen on the eve of the wars potentially as modern-day Brazils and the prized keys to renewed prosperity and greatness. This view was both part of a strong nationalism that had cemented a peculiar alliance of class and political forces loyal to Dr. Salazar and an increasing component of Portugal's expanding post-World War II economy.[15] In the 1950s the colonial economies exhibited steady growth and were no longer a financial burden on the *metrópole*. This colonial expansion and economic momentum, as viewed in 1961, supported the case for their retention.[16]

Elusive domestic prosperity also reinforced the commitment to the African colonies and their economic promise. Metropolitan Portugal from the earliest times remained economically underdeveloped and was dependent on overseas commerce and colonial wealth to maintain more than a subsistence standard of living. Lisbon in the first half of the sixteenth century was a spectacularly opulent city, yet Portugal as a whole did not produce enough goods to feed and clothe its population at the time, and staples had to be purchased abroad.[17] Slaves were imported from the Guinean Coast to supply labour

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[14]Clarence-Smith, 2. The author argues that Brazil was a far different enterprise than the earlier Asian experience in that it had provided raw materials and in turn Portugal had supplied manufactures. It also had been a colony of settlement rather than one where "immigrants died of tropical diseases and melted into the local population."

[15]Clarence-Smith, 15-16. The author argues that empire played a dual role in the Portugal of Salazar. The ideological role was a vital component of Lusotropicalism and assumed extreme overtones in its remote fantasy of imperial greatness. The economic role was a supporting adjunct to the domestic economy, and its utility was governed by "the most thorough and authoritarian methods" in modern Portuguese history.

[16]Clarence-Smith, 17.

[17]Anderson, 93.

while rural Portuguese emigrated to Western Spain in search of employment.[18] The wealth of Lisbon seemed useless to the population at large. As Portugal had never developed a domestic economy of any consequence during the years of plenty, there was no alternative to the stagnation at home when the wealth from abroad evaporated. Portugal's economy persisted at subsistence levels, and because it was so weak, it failed to participate significantly in the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century. This signal failure made the promise of Africa increasingly important.

Portugal began the nineteenth century with such an anaemic domestic economy that it could not convert the raw materials of its colonies into manufactured goods to the same degree that its European trading partners could. With the loss of Brazil and access to its readily saleable commodities, Portugal was left to survive on its weak economic capability. Portugal's trade patterns during this period give insight on its problem. Portugal's share of trade with its main European partners was a mere 1.20 percent in 1820 and experienced a steady erosion through the century to 0.78 percent in 1899. Portugal's relatively small share of world trade declined from 0.88 percent in 1820 to 0.53 percent in 1899. While world trade was expanding ten fold during this span, that of Portugal only expanded six fold from a very small base. It is instructive to note that the greatest relative increase in world-wide trade during the nineteenth century occurred with the 80 percent expansion in the 1850-1860 decade. Portugal lagged the averages with a 60 percent performance, while its European trading partners were beating the

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[18]David M. Abshire and Michael A. Samuels, *Portuguese Africa: A Handbook* (London: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1969), 93-94. The authors observe that African slaves were sold throughout Portugal and in the mid-sixteenth century comprised a tenth of Lisbon's population and a majority in the Algarve. By 1961 there were few pure-blooded Africans in Portugal, as the former slaves had been absorbed into the population.

average with a 100 percent increase during the period.[19] Because Portugal was not developing its economic engine, it was unable to employ the resources of its colonies on any appreciable scale and to exploit any relative trading advantage in international commerce.

The colonies may have had potential, but Portugal was unable to capitalise significantly on their promise in the traditional mercantilist sense to the betterment of its overall economy. Clarence-Smith explains that through poor colonial policies "the colonies became less important to the metropolis in economic terms (between 1910 and 1926), and colonial decline contributed to the downfall of the (republican) regime" in 1926 and the subsequent emergence of Dr. Salazar.[20] In Portuguese eyes they, nevertheless, continued to hold the ultimate potential for prosperity in their underdeveloped state. To this end Dr. Salazar in a speech delivered on 8 June 1936 opening the Economic Conference of the Colonial Empire explained his belief that "by virtue of their moral and political ties, the Mother Country and the colonies have as the basis of their economy a community of interests and a natural bond of union." Their "economic regimes...are established in harmony with the requirements of their development...and the legitimate needs of the Mother Country and the Portuguese Colonial Empire."[21] And while the long-held hope of regeneration had never

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[19]Michael G. Mulhall, *The Dictionary of Statistics*, 4th ed. (London: George Routledge and Sons, Limited, 1909).

[20]Clarence-Smith, 116. The late 1910s to the mid-1920s are noteworthy in that it is the only period between the 1890s and the 1950s during which the eleven-year running means of Portugal's proportional trade with its empire showed a decline. It had fallen from about 15% under the monarchy to about 10% under the republic.

[21]Salazar, 300-301.

materialised, Dr. Salazar sought it in this policy. He moved decisively to reinforce economic links between the *ultramar* and the *metrópole*, and on the eve of the wars the African colonies appeared finally to be realising their true promise.[22] It was at this point that Portugal deeply believed in its African colonial potential.

Dr. Salazar and the Colonies

Dr. Salazar saw the colonies as an important part of Portugal's ability to emerge from the fiscal chaos of the previous republican government.[23] If Portugal was to rediscover itself, then it would have to reestablish its identity. Dr. Salazar thus sought to promote a new imperial consciousness. It could not be born in an atmosphere of ignorance and disinterest. Consequently, it was based on the Portuguese ideology of imperial greatness with which everyone was familiar. This mentality was defined in terms of three elements: geography, heroism, and trade.[24] The first element was supported by the notion that the Portuguese flag flew over vast territories spreading over three continents and making a small European state the third largest colonial power. The second lay in the discoveries by Portugal's epic sailors and warriors during *O Século Maravilhoso*, and the third focused on the hardships that the Portuguese people had endured in carving the

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[22]Clarence-Smith, 146. The author argues that Dr. Salazar during World War II to reforged the colonial economic links, and it was this groundwork that led to the colonial expansion in the post-war period.

[23]Duffy, 268-269. The author argues that Portugal's economic plight in the 1930s precluded developing the colonies, but colonial legislation and theorising cost little and served to awaken a declining colonial interest. Most of this action was a synthetic creation designed to bolster confidence at home and prestige abroad.

[24]James Duffy, *Portugal in Africa* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1962), 150-151. Nationalistic sentiment found inspiration in Camões's *Lusíadas*, as quoted by Professor Duffy, "...the symbol of the moral unity of the Empire, whose discovery and conquest for civilisation it sings with imperishable lines..."

hidden riches from remote lands and establishing centres of production and profit there. Dr. Salazar articulated these ideas on the moral unity of the empire in his 8 June 1936 speech:

> It is only right that the efforts of the Portuguese should be given the place of honour, for they discovered, evangelised, and colonised the most distant and inhospitable regions....While other people...leave their settlements..., the Portuguese are even today obstinately rooted to their morsel of soil....with heroic obstinacy, they relinquish neither the possessions nor the occupation of their corner of the earth, because, above all, and even with the prejudice to their most legitimate interests, **Portugal is there.**[25]

He viewed the colonies as a vehicle to give Portugal stature in a world where the preceding republican government had removed all such standing with the number and volatility of its administrations.[26] In Lusotropicalism he attempted to create a colonial mentality within the Portuguese people by drawing on the sense of achievement in *O Século Maravilhoso* and relating it to the present colonial ownership. Dr. Salazar's Lusotropical vision embodied a sense of unity between the *ultramar* and the *metrópole* that had genuine foundations in national heritage and psychology and past colonial policy.[27]

The modern-day origin of this psychology can be traced to the British Ultimatum of

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[25]Salazar, 306.

[26]Duffy, 150. The author writes that Angola and Mozambique were simultaneously live exhibits in a museum of memories and a direct challenge to Salazar's new government. Portugal was determined to demonstrate that it was capable of recreating the glories of its African past and showing that the Portuguese colonial tradition was a vital and successful force in the development of Africa.

[27]James Duffy, *Portuguese Africa* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 271. The author argues that this Portuguese feeling of solidarity was an amorphous sentiment that grew out of the population's insular provincial personality and its celebrated sense of *saudade*. The best example remains the close sentimental ties that bind Brazil to Portugal.

1890. In the last two decades of the nineteenth century with the industrial machinery of the European economic powerhouses running competitively at full throttle, there occurred a spontaneous "scramble for Africa," a frantic rush to establish colonial claims. This "scramble" was prompted by an increasing awareness in Europe about Africa coupled with a speculative search for new opportunities by Europe's more prosperous powers. Approximately 80 percent of the territorial acquisitions in Africa during this time were made by the three most industrialized nations of Europe: Britain, France, and Germany. Despite Portugal's long-standing presence there, it was squeezed in the competitive race and in its search for a solution to its economic development crisis. Its confrontation with Britain over its coast-to-coast colonial ambitions in joining Angola and Mozambique through austral Africa potentially to form a second Brazil became a face-off that was to seal Portuguese national will and serve as a significant basis for the Salazar appeal to defend and retain the colonies in 1961.[28]

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[28]Clarence-Smith, 83-85. See also H. V. Livermore, *A New History of Portugal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 305-306; "Great Britain's Policy in Africa" by an African Explorer, *The Times* (London), 22 August 1888, 8; and Eric Axelson, *Portugal and the Scramble for Africa 1875-1891* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1967), 211-213. Portugal had launched expeditions by Serpa Pinto, Capelo, Roberto Ivens, and Henrique de Carvalho between 1877 and 1885 to explore its claimed territory in Central Africa and thus from the *de facto* perspective viewed itself as already in possession of this land. Consequently, following the treaties with Germany and France resulting from the Berlin Conference of 1885 on the ownership of Africa, Portugal published the "Rose-coloured Map" (*Mapa Cor de Rosa*), which showed Angola and Mozambique united in a coast-to-coast colony. Britain took strong exception, and in June 1887 Lord Salisbury stated that the British would "not recognize Portuguese sovereignty in territories not occupied with sufficient forces to maintain order." Portugal proceeded with its colonial expansion plans. On 11 January 1890 Salisbury demanded Portugal's immediate withdrawal from the questioned area and backed the demand with the threat of force. Portugal withdrew accordingly in great humiliation. This action became known as the "Ultimatum," and its consequences were to make Mozambique a coastal colony with no hinterland and British territory landlocked with no outlet to the sea. Mozambique remained separated from Angola by between 500 and 700 kilometres, and Portugal's ambition of a grand, coast-to-coast colony unrealized. The depth of this humiliation cannot be overemphasized. Colonialism was the centre of national discourse

On assuming power in 1933, Dr. Salazar had initially put the colonies on hold until he could get control of the national budget and navigate the country through the depression. By 1937 he had established the colonial development fund which would be financed primarily through colonial budget surpluses and other colonial monopoly profits. These measures enabled Portugal and its colonies to participate in the economic emergence from the depression of the 1930s and expansion associated with World War II. These programs were designed largely to improve colonial infrastructure and were in step with Dr. Salazar's neo-mercantilistic view of the empire. His theoretical aim was to construct a form of autarchy that allowed Portugal to develop its economy without the use of foreign investment, thus reducing the potential for any foreign obligation or intrusion.[29] Dr. Salazar was provincial in character and temperament despite his sophisticated education. In fact, he was so suspicious of foreigners and resistant to change that he refused U.S. aid under the Marshall Plan following World War II. The error in judgment was so apparent that he reversed himself.[30] He held the view that foreign sources of funding could dwarf Portugal's investment at home and in its colonies

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for almost a century following, and the country as a whole developed the notion that every portion of national territory was sacred. Portugal had long-established trading interests in the area questioned and felt totally cheated. If one views the territory that was lost to Britain and its imperial developer Rhodes from a twentieth century perspective, it is easy to understand that the hinterland wealth of the Rhodesias and the Belgian Congo, when connected to the Atlantic and Pacific outlets of Angola and Mozambique, would have given Portugal a second Brazil. The magnitude of this loss became a Portuguese preoccupation and steeled its national attitude in the absolute sacredness of its remaining territories abroad.

[29]Malyn Newitt, *Portugal in Africa, The Last Hundred Years* (London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., 1981), 190.

[30]José Calvet de Magalhães, Álvaro de Vasconcelos, and Joaquim Ramos Silva, *Portugal: Paradoxo Atlântico* [Portugal: Atlantic Paradox] (Lisbon: Institute for Strategic and International Studies, 1990), 54.

and that any such change, even for the sake of progress, would threaten both the economic and political *status quo*. This isolationist doctrine of self-reliance was unrealistic in a post-war system of increasing interdependence between states; however, Dr. Salazar saw any change as a potential threat to the forces that kept him in power. With economic freedom would come the desire for political freedom.

The initial rigidity of Dr. Salazar's position softened as he gained an understanding of the impact that foreign capital could make on Portugal's domestic and overseas economies. This softening allowed a significant but belated development of colonial industries. Expertise and supporting funds came from established firms for any significant or complicated undertaking, particularly mining.[31] Belgian (diamond mining), British (railroads), and U.S. (oil exploration) investments dominated and were largely exempt from exchange controls. They strengthened and stabilised the colonial economies in the years between 1945 and 1961, deepening Portugal's economic reliance on the colonies and its commitment to defend them. In 1961 private foreign investment accounted for about 15 percent of gross fixed capital formation in the *ultramar* and had grown to almost 25 percent in 1966.[32] By 1961 the colonies had finally become an economically worthy possession. Basil Davidson described the importance of this colonial goal: "...Now it was that the colony (of Angola) began to deliver for the first

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[31]Clarence-Smith, 171. The author cites an example in the unthreatening Belgian commercial penetration of the colonies, particularly Angola, as a notable feature of the pre-World War II years. Belgium, a small neutral power, was seen as the lesser of several evils in admitting foreign capital with its unofficial agreement not to challenge the Portuguese trading community.

[32]L. H. Gann, "Portugal, Africa, and the Future," *Journal of Modern African Studies* (March 1975): 2-3.

time on any scale....its exports began to play a critical part in saving from deficit the general Portuguese balance of payments with the rest of the world; as with Mozambique, this became Angola's principal 'national role.'"[33]

By 1961 Portugal's economy had shifted from a partial autarchy under orthodox economic practices to a fledgling but rapidly growing industrialised one. The shift away from an agriculturally based economy in the *metrópole* and the *ultramar* meant that there was a decreasing dependence on peasant labour and its attendant policies. As the *metrópole* developed in this direction, so the first moves were made to foster complementary development in the colonies. Mining, oil exploration and refining, textiles, and cashew processing were in place by 1961, and other basic industries were in the planning stages.[34] These activities reflected a break with the past and a new Salazar policy fuelled by colonial promise. Education received renewed and expanded attention, as literate workers with skills were in increasing demand. The paranoia of foreign investment had evaporated, and French, German, U.S., and South African participation in the economy was welcomed.[35] The gathering momentum of the colonial economies continued to accelerate well past 1961 and became a welcome support for the political element in the counterinsurgency campaigns. The colonies were thus developing into substantial economic engines in their own right, and not only were their citizens beginning to benefit individually but Portugal itself was also reaping substantial rewards

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[33]Basil Davidson, *In the Eye of the Storm* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1972), 124.

[34]Newitt, 220-221.

[35]Newitt, 220-221.

from this growing prosperity. Their historic potential was being realised, a fact that reinforced their long-time importance to Portugal and Dr. Salazar's commitment of the nation to their defense.

Colonial Resistance to Dr. Salazar's Vision

At the time when Portugal's colonial commitment was being strengthened, local resistance within its African population was increasing. During this period the democratised European powers in Africa were freeing their colonial possessions in step with the post-World War II trend. This development put increasing pressure on Dr. Salazar to move in line with the Western European forms of government and to allow the Portuguese colonies to do so as well. Revolts and the war enabled Dr. Salazar to exploit a tide of Portuguese nationalist fervour in preserving the *status quo* and his personal regime. Consequently, the nationalist resistance and its challenge to Dr. Salazar's colonial vision had the effect of reinforcing Portugal's commitment rather than the opposite. While the economy was deemed important, Dr. Salazar's personal position of authority was overriding.[36] Further Dr. Salazar's hatred and mistrust of communism played an important role. He was mindful of the Western powers' impotence to contain the economically bankrupt but politically ascendant communism.[37] In a speech to army and naval officers on 6 July 1936 Dr. Salazar described communism as "systems of ideals

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[36]Clarence-Smith, 193. Internal and external pressures to democratise Portugal and put it in step with Western Europe had increased since World War II, and Salazar's rule had become tenuous in the late 1950s.

[37]Hugh Kay, *Salazar and Modern Portugal* (London: Eyre and Spottswoode, 1970), 69 and 133. The author argues that even in England communism had become "the rallying cry of the revolutionary instincts of our age" and had done so "by power of words, by sheer bluff, perhaps by the voluptuousness of contrast." It was largely the success of communist "evangelism" that made Salazar so suspicious of it.

which are literally systems of crime" and was so convinced of the threat of this ideology that he believed "Western civilisation is at stake."[38] His worst fears were realised when Daniel Semenovich Solod, the "brilliant organiser and expert in the tactics of infiltration and subversion" was assigned to Guinea in 1960.[39] Ambassador Solod had established an impressive reputation for increasing Soviet influence in the Middle East and North Africa and now began to work on the Portuguese colonies and to nurture their long-standing dissident undercurrent of nationalism.

The nationalist movements and their military wings of guerrillas that challenged Portugal's ownership of its colonies had their origins in the 1930s. The emergence of modern-day black opposition to Portuguese rule began with the repressive practises of the *Estado Novo* towards any form of dissent, particularly political. This attitude extended from the *metrópole* to the colonies. Resistance began slowly, as there was a practical barrier to any such opposition in the ethnic and social fragmentation of the overseas non-white community.[40] Without strong leadership there would be no nationalist movement able to gain the necessary momentum in reconciling these divergent viewpoints and crystallising resistance to the Salazar regime. Local African grievances were longstanding and had come to the fore during the early twentieth century with the influx of white settlers and abusive labour practises. This indigenous resentment was publicly evident in 1932 when an independent Mozambican newspaper, *O Brado Africano* [The

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[38]Dr. Salazar quoted in Kay, 133.

[39]Kay, 238.

[40]Douglas L. Wheeler and René Pélissier, *Angola* (London: Pall Mall Press Ltd., 1971), 160-161.

African Cry] slipped through Salazar's censorship and published a scathing editorial titled "Enough."[41] Thereafter this feeling was never far below the surface, and the apparent calm was illusory.

Following World War II, nationalist sentiments grew among the *mestiços* (mixed race peoples) and *assimilados* (mostly *mestiços* who were legally assimilated to Portuguese culture). However, these groups were largely urban and thus did not represent the greater population. As they were located in cities, they were in a hostile environment for two reasons: the majority of their opponents, the white population, lived in cities, and the PIDE (*Polícia Internacional de Defesa do Estado*, or International Police for Defense of the State) operated most effectively there. Consequently, they were either short-lived or dormant.[42] By 1956 the young Marxists of the Angolan Communist Party contributed to the formation of the MPLA. The MPLA developed roots among Luanda's urban and largely radical intellectuals, among its slum dwellers, and to a lesser extent, eastward from the capital among the Mbundu, Angola's second largest ethno-linguistic group, and the Chokwe people.[43] These urban roots were composed largely of *mestiços*, who controlled the party. The movement had little in common with the rural peasants of the east and south of Angola and made little effort to gain their true devotion. In December 1956 the initial MPLA manifesto was openly published in a direct frontal assault on the

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[41]Duffy, 305-306. Professor Duffy selectively quotes in translation the long 27 February 1932 editorial.

[42]John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of and Explosion (1950-1962)* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), 347-351. Marcum lists some fifty-nine groups affecting Angola alone beginning in the 1940s and either merging with one another or vanishing by 1962.

[43]Newitt, 227. See also Marcum, 13-48.

government. Predictably the PIDE reacted adversely, and a number of the MPLA leaders were forced to flee into exile. From 1957 onward PIDE action was so successful "that the nationalists were not able to maintain more than the most rudimentary organisation inside the colonies and could not communicate with those cells that did exist."[44] The parties were forced to conduct their affairs from neighbouring states and were deeply influenced by their foreign connections.

The presidential election in May 1958 gave all of Portugal some opportunity to express its dissatisfaction with the *status quo*. Elections under the Salazar regime as a rule were perfunctory, colourless, cosmetic affairs with foreseeable results. In 1958, however, Humberto Delgado's high profile and emotionally charged challenge to Salazar's candidate, Admiral Américo Tomás, excited all of Portugal.[45] This taste of partial suffrage awakened dissatisfaction within the *mestiços* and *assimilados*, and a number of small parties were formed in Angola, only to be shattered through arrests in March, May, and July of 1959.[46] As the PIDE systematically wrecked the MPLA organization, it became progressively weaker and isolated from its leadership that was now abroad. In this deteriorating position it supported an uprising in February 1961 that stood no chance of a lasting success. It was doomed to be transient, for it occurred in

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[44]Newitt, 226.

[45]Marcum, 32. Delgado won approximately 18,000 of 92,000 colonial votes cast.

[46]Willem van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Angola 1961-1974* (Rivonia: Ashanti Publishing Limited, 1993), 51. See also Marcum, 33-37. Beginning on Easter Sunday, 29 March 1959 PIDE apprehended 52 individuals, including Dr. Agostino Neto and Father Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, the brother of Mario de Andrade. At the subsequent "trial of the fifty" (1960) long terms of imprisonment were given. Holden Roberto was tried and sentenced *in absentia*.

Luanda, centre of Portuguese police and military strength, and the MPLA had no constituency or bases elsewhere among the rural population.

The MPLA in exile established itself initially in Leopoldville and aligned itself not only with other independent African nations and their socialist philosophy but also with the communist block, including the Italian and French communist parties.[47] The leadership was consequently familiar with the communist theory in wars of national liberation and organised itself accordingly. The MPLA found that it was in competition with the other prominent Angolan nationalist group at the time, the UPA, for acceptance as the leading representative of the Angolan people. In 1962 the MPLA formed its military wing EPLA (*Exército Popular de Libertação de Angola*, or Popular Army for the Liberation of Angola) to project its influence into Angola. This nascent force numbered between 250 and 300 young men who had undergone military training in Ghana and Morocco.[48] The EPLA sought to expand the conflict with this force across Angola's northern border and penetrate the entire country, publicising the MPLA manifesto.[49] Recruiting proved to be difficult because of ethnic rivalries, and military action was thwarted by the competing UPA. The UPA through its influence with the Congo leadership forced the MPLA to leave Leopoldville in 1963 and reestablish itself

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[47]Hélio Felgas, *Os Movimentos Terroristas* [The Terrorist Movements] (Lisbon: Edition of the author, 1966), 9.

[48]John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962-1976)* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1978), 29-30. See also van der Waals, 102. Marcum states that the EPLA had been left adrift to operate as an uncoordinated "separate body" beyond political control. Neto consequently at the First National Conference in January 1963 placed it under the command and political control of Manuel Lima and made it answerable to the Political-Military Committee of the MPLA.

[49]van der Waals, 103.

in Brazzaville, from which it was difficult to conduct a campaign in Angola. As a result northern Angola proved to be barren, and it was not until 1966 with the opening of the second front from Zambia that some success would come to the MPLA. The most consequential development from the Portuguese perspective was the capture in July 1963 of various 35mm films which described the MPLA's military doctrine of revolutionary warfare.[50] It parallelled the Maoist creed by reiterating that the movement was a people's war and that the struggle would be protracted.[51] The first priority would be indoctrination and organisation of the masses, and next the establishment of rural bases and resistance areas.[52] This doctrine would serve the MPLA until 1974, and as we shall see in future chapters, the Portuguese correctly anticipated this guerrilla approach.

The UPA was formed in the mid-1950s from a number of small groups with conflicting goals by Barros Nekaka, who in 1958 passed leadership to his nephew Holden Roberto. UPA strength rested in the rural populations of the Bakongo ethno-linguistic region of Angola. These people straddled the border between the Belgian Congo and Angola and extended into Cabinda and the French Congo, the boundaries of the ancient Kongo kingdom. Roberto unequivocally held the view that not just the Bakongo kingdom

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[50]van der Waals, 103.

[51]van der Waals, 103. Dr. Neto is quoted: "If the enemy presently possesses more forces than we do, and this is so, then it is correct that we should prepare for a protracted war. The misconception that we should be able to execute a war of rapid decisions should be removed once and for all."

[52]Região Militar de Angola, *Supintrep* Nº *19: Guerra Revolucionária* [Supplemental Intelligence Report Nº 19: Revolutionary War], July 1963, Luanda, quoted in van der Waals, 103.

or some other entity but all of Angola must be freed.[53] An ardent anti-colonialist, Roberto had been born in Angola but had lived his adult life in the Belgian Congo. He had been educated in the Baptist Church missionaries and employed in the Belgian colonial economy as an accountant between 1941 and 1949.[54] Northern Angola was also an area that had become more politically aware in the 1950s through white settlement, Baptist missionary influence, and an easy access to the developing political activities of the Belgian Congo. He thus felt a close kinship with the peoples immediately across the border. The UPA was able to develop a following there because of the relatively open frontier, and this loyal cadre became the basis for the uprising in March 1961.[55] Portuguese presence in this area took the form of *chefes do posto* (heads of posts) and administrators, as opposed to PIDE, and these officials were so sparse that it was physically impossible for them to maintain anything but the most casual control over their districts.[56]

While Roberto was relatively well educated, he was a member of the Bakongo ethno-

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[53]van der Waals, 50.

[54]John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of and Explosion (1950-1962)* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), 65. Roberto was born in 1923 and graduated from the Baptist Missionary School (BMS) in Leopoldville in 1940. He also attended the BMS in his Angolan birthplace of São Salvador 1940-1941 to perfect his Portuguese and rediscover his roots.

[55]Marcum, 64-70.

[56]Wheeler and Pélissier, 167. The authors cite as an example the Congo district in 1960. For its 37,000 square miles it had fourteen *concelhos* (basic urban or semi-urban administrative unit) or *circunscrições* (basic rural administrative division) and thirty-seven posts, or an average of 725 square miles per administrative division. This presence would hardly be effective in controlling a frontier, as the posts would be dozens of miles apart. Large numbers of people could and did cross undetected.

linguistic group, was not a *mestiço*, and consequently did not share their more European cultural perspective. He was also tribally oriented in contrast to the non-tribal declarations of the MPLA. Consequently, the personality and leadership philosophy of the UPA contrasted clearly with the MPLA and its sophisticated *mestiço* leadership, which was left-wing, intellectual, and acculturally Portuguese.[57] Funding and support also glaringly contrasted, the MPLA actually being linked with the Eastern block. The UPA received financial support from the American Committee on Africa and from various diverse African governments, preponderantly that of Leopoldville.[58] Accordingly they were never able to resolve their differences and join forces effectively.

When the Belgian Congo became independent on 30 June 1960, its government began to give Roberto practical assistance, including permission to establish a radio station and a training camp within its borders. This sanctuary was an important facet of UPA operations in its early years. Roberto had witnessed the long series of Congolese crises that had begun with the violent political rioting on 4 January 1959 and had led to the accelerated Belgian push toward Congo self-government and independence in eighteen months. By December 1960 he believed that just as the Belgians had quickly grown weary of armed conflict, so would the Portuguese when it was initiated. He consequently used his Congo sanctuary and the porous common border to set the stage for an end to

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[57]Wheeler and Pélissier, 170. See also van der Waals, 50.

[58]Hélio Felgas, "Angola e a Evolução Política dos Territórios Vizinhos" [Angola and the Political Evolution of the Neighbouring Territories], *Revista Militar* (December 1965): 706.

relative colonial tranquillity for Portugal.[59]

The UPA formed its military wing, the ELNA (*Exército de Libertação Nacional de Angola*, or Army of National Liberation of Angola), in June 1961 after the March attacks did not achieve a Portuguese withdrawal. Roberto was its commander-in-chief and its other two leaders were Portuguese Army deserters, Marcos Xavier Kassanga, its chief of staff in Leopoldville, and João Batista, its operational commander in Angola with headquarters near Bembe.[60] This leadership was ineffective. Roberto was so autocratic that he would accept little more than arms and money. Without training the ELNA "set a demoralising example of politico-military incompetence and indiscipline."[61] The South African Defense Force Vice-Consul in Luanda noted that the ELNA "involved itself in military activities in the narrowest sense...but avoided contact with the Portuguese security forces as far as possible."[62] The training was so poor that despite the expansion of the ELNA to about 6,200 troops their deportment at such camps as Kinkuzu in the Congo was cause for alarm.[63] Andreas Shipango, South West Africa Peoples

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[59]John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of and Explosion (1950-1962)* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), 123-135.

[60]van der Waals, 63-64. See also Marcum, 157.

[61]van der Waals, 96.

[62]van der Waals, 97. The author argues that Portuguese propaganda and social work among the refugees in Angola persuaded most of these displaced people to move into controlled settlements. This development deprived ELNA of popular support. ELNA had concentrated on military action in a human desert and on preventing MPLA infiltration. It had neglected to indoctrinate, organise and win recruits among refugees returning to Angola and thus missed an opportunity to undermine Portuguese authority. Consequently no ELNA internal political infrastructure was established in Angola. Portugal gained the upper hand and maintained superior momentum until 1974.

[63]Neil Bruce, "Portugal's African Wars," *Conflict Studies* (March 1973): 22.

Organisation representative in Leopoldville, made an appraisal during a 1963 visit: "With representatives from a number of other liberation movements, I visited Holden Roberto's training camps near the Angolan border with a view to sending our young men there. But the atmosphere in Roberto's training camps was very bad, and I could not recommend such a course."[64] This lack of direction caused great rifts in the UPA leadership. Despite the UPA reorganisation in March 1962 to include additional groups, to rename itself FNLA, and to establish a government in exile named GRAE (*Governo da República de Angola no Exílio*, or Government of the Republic of Angola in Exile), little of substance was accomplished. A frustrated Jonas Savimbi, Roberto's "foreign minister," formally broke with the UPA/FNLA in July 1964 and eventually formed the third nationalist movement in Angola, UNITA. The next year Alexandre Taty, "minister of armaments," after challenging Roberto in an unsuccessful coup defected to the Portuguese in Cabinda with a substantial number of his followers.[65] John Marcum described the situation as it existed in 1963: "Whether by the inaction or heavy hand of shortsighted leadership, one opportunity after another was lost, one potential source of support after another was alienated."[66] The political crosscurrents within the UPA/FNLA, the lack of training for ELNA cadres, and major competition from MPLA and UNITA activities reduced the UPA/FNLA to a spent force within two years of initiating the conflict.

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[64]Sue Armstrong, *In Search of Freedom* (Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing, 1989), 71.

[65]John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962-1976)* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1978), 148 and 150. See also van der Waals, 99-100; and Joaquim Miguel de Mattos Fernandes Duarte Silva, *Lourenço* [Lawrence] (Lisbon: Edition of the author, 1974).

[66]Marcum, 113.

Roberto followed no sophisticated guerrilla creed other than the initiation of violence in the hope that the Portuguese would become weary with it and capitulate. This strategy was reflected in a statement by a 32-year-old ELNA commander named António Muandazi, who was interviewed by the *New York Times* reporter Lloyd Garrison in 1963 in the Serra de Canda of Angola: "The war here is like Algeria. We can't beat the Portuguese in the field but we can wear them down until the politicians are ready to talk. This is a war of the will. It took the Algerians seven years before the French gave in. We are just as determined."[67] There was only a weak military program unsupported by political indoctrination. There was no talk of winning the population to the UPA/FNLA point of view, which was simply that Angola should be an independent country with Roberto as head of state. The approach was amateurish and ineffective alongside that of PAIGC and the work of its founder, Amílcar Cabral.

Aside from Angola, there were also nationalist movements associated with Guiné and Mozambique that prior to the events of 1961 were hoping to negotiate concessions with the Portuguese on self-determination. In Guiné efforts by local nationalists to organize began in the early 1950s. The PAIGC was founded in September 1956 by local *assimilados* and educated Cape Verdians. Its initial political organisation prompted an aggrieved dock workers strike on 3 August 1959, which ended in a violent disaster when it was broken with excessive military force. Fifty workers were killed, and the incident became known as the "Pidjiguiti dock massacre." PAIGC leadership quickly realised that

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[67]Lloyd Garrison, "Revolt in Angola," *Army* (February 1964): 58.

peaceful protest would not achieve its objective of self-rule and independence.[68] Accordingly, it shifted its strategy to one of clandestinely organising the rural population for an insurgency.[69] PAIGC had learned hard lessons in 1959 well ahead of the MPLA and UPA/FNLA experiences of 1961, and had shifted its approach accordingly. It was not prepared to begin guerrilla war in Guiné until January 1963, when all of the elements for success were in place, including firm sanctuaries in adjacent countries.[70]

The driving force behind the PAIGC was Amílcar Cabral, who was born in Guiné of Cape Verdian parents. Cabral was an agronomist by profession, having been educated in Lisbon, served the Portuguese administration in Guiné (1952-1955), and worked for various agricultural institutions in the *metrópole* (1955-1959) with research trips to Angola. His political awareness came at an early age and matured during his academic time in Lisbon.[71] In June of 1960 Cabral published in English an article titled "The Facts about Portugal's African Colonies." The work was featured in a limited circulation brochure of the Union of Democratic Control and carried a preface by Basil Davidson. It was essentially a PAIGC manifesto and concluded:

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[68]Patrick Chabal, *Amílcar Cabral* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 56-57.

[69]Chabal, 57. The author describes a secret meeting held on 19 September 1959, in which Amílcar Cabral with the PAIGC leadership made the key decisions of shifting the focus of party effort from urban to rural mobilisation, of transferring the party headquarters to the neighbouring sanctuary country of Guinea, and of preparing to liberate Guiné by all means necessary, including war. The decision to mobilise the rural population was a practical move after the Pidjiguiti clash. The PAIGC could achieve little in the urban environment where the PIDE operated but stood a realistic chance of implementing its strategy in the countryside.

[70]Chabal, 58.

[71]Chabal, 30-31.

> We demand that Portugal follow the example of England, France and Belgium and recognise the right of the people to self-determination and independence....The African colonial organisations of the Portuguese colonies, which represent the legitimate aspirations of its people, seek to reestablish the human dignity of the Africans, their freedom, and the right to decide their future. The African organisations that fight against Portuguese colonialism believe in the existence of peaceful methods to gain independence. However, we have no illusions, and the instant that Portugal intends to use violence to defend its interests, we are obliged to respond with violence.[72]

While influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideas of the time, Cabral was primarily a nationalist and developed his own variant of both the PAIGC political message and its associated military dimension. In his own words:

> It is good (for all nationalist movements) to remember...that regardless of how similar are their struggles and their enemies to one another, national liberation and social revolution cannot be exported. They are...the products of local and national forces. While somewhat influenced by external factors, they are largely determined and tempered by the particular culture of a country's people and its unique local characteristics.[73]

It was in this context that Cabral began to prepare the political landscape for guerrilla warfare.

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[72]Amílcar Cabral, *Unidade e Luta* [Unity and Struggle] (Lisbon: Seara Nova, 1978), 65. "Exigimos que Portugal siga o exemplo de Inglaterra, da França e da Bélgica e reconheça o direito dos povos que domina à autodeterminação e à independência....As organizações africanas anticolonialistas das colónias portuguesas, que representam as aspirações legítimas dos seus povos, querem restabelecer a dignidade humana dos africanos, a sua liberdade e o direito de decidirem do seu futuro....As organizações africanas que lutam contra o colonialismo português acreditam na existência de meios pacíficos para a conquista da independência. No entanao, não temos ilusões, e, uma vez que Portugal quer utilizar a violência para defender os seus interesses, somos obrigados a responder com a violência.

[73]Amílcar Cabral, *Guiné-Bissau - Nação Africana Forjada na Luta* [Guiné-Bissau - African Nation Forged in Struggle] (Lisbon: Publicações Nova Auora, 1974), 39. Tricontinental Conference, Havana, January 1966. "É bom lembrar-se...que por grande que seja a similitude dos casos em presença e a identidade dos nossos inimigos, a libertação nacional e a revolução social não são mercadorias de exportação; são o produto duma elaboração local, nacional, mais ou menos influenciadas por factores externos favoráveis e desfavoráveis mas essencialmente determinadas e condicionadas pela realidade histórica de cada povo, e consolidadas pela vitória ou pela solução correcta das contradições internas entre as diversas categorias que caracterizam esta realidade."

Following his experience in the Pidjiguiti dock demonstration, Cabral realised that the Portuguese would not negotiate and that an armed struggle was the only way to achieve PAIGC ends. Cabral had received no known military training and had little interest in such affairs prior to 1959. It is possible that he had some such exposure during his visit to China in 1960, and certainly Chinese influence was seen in the training of his guerrilla army.[74] It was known that elements of PAIGC also underwent courses in guerrilla warfare and subversion in Algeria, Russia, and Czechoslovakia.[75] Not-withstanding this lack of military experience, the mantle of undisputed commander and tactician fitted him well, and his imagination and flexibility were evident in the conduct of his campaign.[76]

He became quite attuned to the requirement for population indoctrination and keenly aware of the need to bridge the gap between the urban intellectual and the traditional Guinean. His two year preparation of the political battlefield was classic in its effort to draw the population together in a common ideology that would transcend tribal and ethnic divisions. His investigation into local grievances was the most thorough of any of the nationalist movements. Cabral faced a difficult task in convincing the population that they were being oppressed. The land, for instance, already belonged to the peasants and was generally village property. Guiné had no concentration of foreign settlers that were seemingly exploiting the population. In Cabral's own words:

> We were not able to mobilise the people by telling them: "The land to him that works it." Because here land is not lacking. There is all the land that is needed.

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[74]Chabal, 98.

[75]Hélio Felgas, *Os Movimentos Terroristas* [The Terrorist Movements] (Lisbon: Edition of the author, 1966), 57.

[76]Chabal, 98.

> It was then necessary to find appropriate ways to mobilise our countrymen, instead of utilising terms that our folk were still not able to understand. We were never able to mobilise the people on a basis of the struggle against colonialism. This yielded nothing. To speak of the struggle against imperialism yielded nothing between us...This proved the necessity of having each peasant find his own formula to mobilise for the fight.[77]

He thus sought to couch his revolutionary message in terms that would address the daily concerns of the rural population:

> Remember always that the people do not fight for ideas, for things that only exist in the heads of individuals. The people fight and they accept the necessary sacrifices. But they do it in order to gain material advantages, to live in peace and to improve their lives, to experience progress, and to be able to guarantee a future to their children.[78]

This approach was far more fruitful than comparable activities in Angola.

Cabral met and worked closely with MPLA leaders and established his exile headquarters in Conakry, the capital of the ex-French Republic of Guinea. From here he conducted his campaign against the Portuguese. The other prominent nationalist movement in Guiné was FLING (*Frente de Luta pela Independência da Guiné*, or Front for the Struggle for the Independence of Guiné). Led by Benjamin Bull, J. Fernandes, and H. Labery, it was an amalgamation of a number of smaller movements and was

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[77]Amílcar Cabral, *Textos Políticos* [Political Texts] (Porto: Edições Afrontamento, 1974), 19-20. "Não podíamos mobilizar as pessoas dizendo-lhes: «A terra deve pertencer a quem a trabalha». Porque aqui a terra não falta. Há toda a terra de que se precisa. Era pois necessário encontrar formas apro priadas para mobilizar os nossas camponeses, em vez de utilizar termos que a nossa gente não podia ainda compreender. Nunca mobilizámos as pessoas com base na luta contra o colonialismo. Isso não dava nada. Falar da luta contra o imperialismo não dava nada entre nós...Isto prova a necessidade que tem cada povo de encontrar a sua própria fórmula de se mobilizar para a luta."

[78]Amílcar Cabral, *Palavras de Ordem Gerais* [Speeches on Overall Methods] (Bissau: PAIGC/Secretariado Geral, 1976), 34. "Lembrar-se sempre de que o povo não luta por ideias, por coisas que estão na cabeça dos homens. O povo luta e aceita os sacrifícios exigidos pela luta, mas para obter vantagens materiais para poder viver em paz e melhor, para ver a sua vida progredir e para garantir o futuro dos seus filhos."

given sanctuary in Senegal on Guiné's northern border. Again as in Angola, the philosophies of the leaders of these two movements were so disparate that there was little common ground for agreement and cooperation, although Cabral worked hard to compromise.[79]

Following the unsuccessful employment of autonomous guerrilla groups in the first year of the conflict, Cabral held the Cassacá Congress in February 1964 to reorganise the war effort and establish a national army in the FARP (*Forças Armadas Revolucionárias de Povo*, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People).[80] His organisation was so effective that, as we shall see in future chapters, the Portuguese copied it in 1968. Because the Portuguese had shown that they were not going to negotiate, Cabral's only option was to win in the field. He thoughtfully assembled and implemented the proper elements of guerrilla warfare, particularly that of political indoctrination, to achieve PAIGC ends.

In Mozambique there were a number of exile, very small, nationalist organizations prior to 1961. The Portuguese government made every effort to dampen the spirit of nationalism in its formative stages; however, there were at any one time perhaps half a million Mozambicans or about ten percent of the population working in neighbouring

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[79]Chabal, 84.

[80]Chabal, 99. The author explains that Cabral created the FARP to consolidate and gain control of the autonomous guerrilla bands operating independently in Guiné. The main issue at the Cassacá Congress was the gross abuse of military power by a number of the guerrilla commanders, and Cabral sought to ensure that military strategy would henceforth be governed by political goals and that the FARP would be subordinated to the political leaders of the party.

countries.[81] This group was exposed to new political ideas and in the period 1958-1960 began to organize themselves into associations with the goals of social contact, self-help, and ultimately national politics. The first true nationalist organization was UDENAMO (*União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique*, or the National Democratic Union of Mozambique) and was established in Southern Rhodesia in October 1960, moving to Dar-es-Salaam in February 1961. Two additional groups of note appeared at the time, MANU or UNAM (*União Nacional Africana Moçambique*, or Mozambican African National Union), depending on the English or Portuguese conformation, and UNAMI (*União Nacional do Moçambique Independente*, or National Union of Independent Mozambique). Both MANU and UDENAMO set aside their differences and attended the 1961 conference in Casablanca, where the nationalist movements in the Portuguese colonies consolidated their front to become a coalition.[82] Subsequently in September 1962 elements of MANU, UNAMI, and UDENAMO were united in FRELIMO (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*, or Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) at the urging of Julius Nyerere, the Tanganyikan leader, making it the strongest and most important

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[81]John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of and Explosion (1950-1962)* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), 195. The author quotes Dr. Eduardo Mondlane's words on the mid-1950s PIDE destruction of the *Associação dos Naturais de Moçambique*, an autonomist, pre-nationalist association, "One might venture the prediction that the Portuguese people, a European white group, will regret the emasculation of this organisation, for with its demise as a multi-racial nucleus may have gone all hopes of a radically tolerant Mozambique."

[82]The CONCP (*Conferência Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas*) met in Casablanca on 18-20 April 1961 in a meeting convoked by the MPLA. The UPA declined to attend. Other groups in attendance were the PAIGC, UNTA (*União Nacional dos Trabalhadores de Angola*), UDENAMO, MANU, CLSTP (*Comité de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe*), MLGC (*Movimento de Libertação da Guiné e Cabo Verde*), and four groups from Portuguese Goa.

movement.[83] Dr. Eduardo Mondlane assumed its leadership. He too absorbed the lessons of 1961 and was not prepared to launch a guerrilla war until some three years later in September 1964, after his small army was trained. Mondlane in coming late to the nationalist movements against Portugal was very much influenced by the trend in Angola and Guiné. His organisation initially developed similarly to the PAIGC and experienced the same sort of problems in subordinating military operations to political leadership. His doctrine parallelled that of the MPLA and particularly of the PAIGC with its emphasis on political indoctrination, and it was along these lines that he sought to conduct his military campaign.[84] Mozambicans had already tried peaceful demonstrations with the same consequences as occurred in Angola and Guiné. At Mueda in 1960 reputedly about 500 Africans were killed in a demonstration. FRELIMO felt that armed struggle was the only answer, as Portugal would not grant self-determination and would destroy those who demonstrated for political freedom.[85]

Political expression both in the *ultramar* and the *metrópole* was forbidden except in the narrow context of the Portuguese staged elections every four years. The airing of

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[83]Hélio Felgas, *Os Movimentos Terroristas de Angola Guiné Moçambique* [The Terrorist Movements of Angola Guiné Mozambique] (Lisbon: Edição do autor, 1966), 68. See also Colonel Donald H. Humphries, *The East African Liberation Movement*, Adelphi Paper Number Sixteen (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1965), 4. Other efforts to unite the various liberation groups continued but were only partially successful, as the rivalries between the leaders were traditionally intense and reflected ethnic animosities which were difficult to subdue. As a consequence, interparty violence and intimidation dissipated nationalist energies to such an extent that the Liberation Committee of the Organisation of African States (OAS) was continually striving to heal the breach.

[84]Chabal, 203. Professor Chabal observes that FRELIMO instituted a system of political control over the guerrillas much as the PAIGC had done.

[85]Eduardo Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique* (London: Zed Press, 1969), 125.

grievances or liberal political views attracted a heavy hand from the authorities. In the case of the 1959 strike by the Pidjiguiti dock workers, the PAIGC had hoped that it would lead to negotiations with the authorities and a redress of grievances. When this traditional procedure failed, Cabral had no choice but to seek an alternative in guerrilla warfare with the goal of opening negotiations or ultimately of gaining control of the country.[86] The same can be said for the MPLA and its earlier flight from Angola in 1956 and 1957.

Peasant populations are not normally a revolutionary force, and such was the case in Portuguese Africa.[87] They are conservative by nature and find security and comfort in the routine of their lives and the socioeconomic institutions that govern them. Change is resisted and outsiders are viewed with suspicion. The guerrillas of the various nationalist movements in Portuguese Africa represented change that the populations were not prepared to accept readily. Thus, despite the justified grievances of Portugal's black African citizens, overall they appeared to be loyal to Portugal and to suspect the activities of the nationalists. This apparent support reinforced Portugal's commitment to the colonies and their people. As Portugal entered 1961, its internal confidence in its position was as strong as ever. There occurred, moreover, a series of events that had the cumulative effect not only of reinforcing this attitude but of hardening it into an irreversible course of war. These events began with the affront of the attacks in the north of Angola and continued with an attempted coup against Dr. Salazar in an attempt to

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[86]Cabral, 9-12.

[87]Gerald J. Bender, "The Limits of Counterinsurgency: An African Case," *Comparative Politics* (April 1972): 357.

moderate the country's position toward the demands of the nationalist movements. This failure alongside the message from the UN served to silence moderate voices. The final blow was the debacle of Goa, which made any further loss unthinkable. Each of these and its role in moving Portugal to war is examined below.

Angola Uprisings of 1961

The Angola uprisings and the immediate events served as a warning of things to come and prompted Portugal to think more clearly about defending its colonies.[88] Sporadic agitation and unrest had occurred throughout 1960 at the time when Portugal began to realise the rich economic potential of Angola and Mozambique. Yet European troop strength in Angola numbered under 1,000 in early 1958, and was reinforced only to about 3,000 by mid-1960.[89] Overall strength was 8,000, of which at least 5,000 were African troops.[90] These forces, while scattered throughout Angola, were confined to the larger towns and accustomed merely to administering subjective rule.[91] This modest order of

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[88]John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of and Explosion (1962-1976)* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), 125-126. The author observed that in a 12 August 1963 address to the nation Dr. Salazar reaffirmed his government's commitment to its imperial mission. He would keep faith with Portugal's "sacred heritage," defend the West's true interests, and maintain the *ultramar* as "integral parts of the Portuguese nation." It was Portugal's duty to fight to the limit of its human and material resources to keep them so.

[89]Douglas L. Wheeler, "The Portuguese Army in Angola," *Modern African Studies*, vol. 7, no. 3 (October 1969): 430.

[90]Douglas L. Wheeler, "African Elements in Portugal's Armies in Africa," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1976): 237.

[91]Estado-Maior do Exército, *Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África, Volume II, Dispositivo das Nossas Forças Angola* [Historical-Military Report on the African Campaigns, Volume II, Disposition of Our Angolan Forces] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exército, 1989), 63-65.

battle was hardly adequate to face the uprisings in early 1961.

The opening challenge was made by the MPLA in Luanda on 4 February 1961 by a truly aggrieved group armed only with clubs and knives and driven by a frustration with their treatment. They entered the capital and attacked a number of police installations, a prison, and the radio station in an attempt to have fifty-two political prisoners released. Seven policemen and forty of the group were killed. During the funeral for the policemen, shots were fired on the mourners, and whites attacked blacks in a display that incensed Portugal. The prison was suicidally attacked again on 10 February. Government forces overreacted in quelling the disturbance because of the strong emotional feelings that had accumulated in Luanda. Several hundred Africans were killed indiscriminately, their bodies being left to rot in the streets as a warning sign to aspiring revolutionaries. The events gained international attention and put Portugal firmly on the UN agenda.[92] Race relations remained polarized in Luanda and would take years to rebuild. The MPLA instigated the mob action with little planning or consideration of the consequences.[93] Picking the capital with its troop and secret police concentration was an unfortunate choice, and the MPLA was quickly destroyed inside Angola.

These events were a prelude as well as a warning of further trouble. On 15 March

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[92]René Pélissier, *La Colonie du Minotaure, Nationalismes et Révoltes en Angola (1926-1961)* [The Colony of the Minotaur, Nationalist Movements and Revolts in Angola (1926-1961)] (Orgeval: Editions Pélissier, 1978), 335-392. See also John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of and Explosion (1950-1962)* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), 126-130; and van der Waals, 56-58.

[93]Hélio Felgas, *Guerra em Angola* [War in Angola] (Lisbon: Livraria Clássica Editoria, 1961), 55.

1961 shortly after the MPLA episode, the UPA seized on the confusion and launched a multi-pronged attack in northern Angola with a flood of 4,000 to 5,000 armed men.[94] Approximately 700 European farms plus additional trading settlements and government posts were overwhelmed.[95] This mob laid waste to whatever was in their path and killed men, women, black, white, young, and old. It was a senseless act of violence with only an amorphous political aim rather than a military campaign with a political goal. Roberto did not understand the difference.[96] All of Portugal was shocked at the horror.

This savage foray occurred in an area demarcated by the Congolese frontier, the Cuango river, the Malange-Luanda railroad and the Atlantic Ocean. The attackers pushed nearly to Luanda. Military leaders faced a situation in which:

> ...over 100 administrative posts and towns, in three districts of northern Angola from the Congo border to within 30 miles of Luanda, the capital, had been either wiped out, taken, or paralysed by African nationalist groups; over 1,000 Europeans were dead, and an unknown number of Africans; the economy of north Angola was crippled; communications were largely cut or damaged; and thousands of Portuguese refugees were camped in Luanda, or on their way back to Portugal. The internal situation in Angola was rapidly and sensationally projected to a large international audience over several months.[97]

For a month Portugal and Angola seemed paralysed and unable to act. Equally, the insurgents were incapable of sustained military engagement. Civil militia were formed,

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[94]Marcum, 130-147. See also Pélissier, 495-526; and van der Waals, 58.

[95]René Pélissier, *Le Naufrage des Caravelles: Etudes sur la Fin de L'Empire Portugais (1961-1975)* [The Shipwreck of the Caravels: Studies on the End of the Portuguese Empire (1961-1975)] (Orgeval: Editions Pélissier, 1979), 147.

[96]John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1978), 129.

[97]Wheeler, 431.

and loyal Africans armed. It was this patchwork of civil-military defense and its frenetic activity that brought UPA momentum to a halt. Formal military reoccupation began on 13 May and was intensified as troops arrived from the *metrópole*. During the July-August period approximately 20,000 reinforcements landed in Angola.[98] These troops behaved emotionally as they bombed and strafed areas that had not been affected by the uprising. This indiscriminate terror did enormous damage to Portuguese credibility and to race relations and drove over 150,000 refugees into the Congo over the next nine months.[99] On 7 October, General Deslandes, the Governor-General, announced that reoccupation was complete and that mop-up policing would begin. It has been estimated that 500 Europeans and about 20,000 local people died in this *jacquerie*.[100] This series of events deeply shocked all of Portugal and hardened its colonial commitment and the restoration of order in Angola. To the Portuguese it was unthinkable that such lawlessness should be tolerated, and a strong uncompromising reaction to the nationalist behaviour was widely supported. These events with their horror also diverted domestic attention from Dr. Salazar's political vulnerability.

The Coup of 1961

Dr. Salazar's vulnerability had been revealed in the Delgado challenge of 1958 and its strong message that it was time for Portugal to move toward democracy. The colonies were seen by many as a liability in that their ownership under the current arrangement

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[98]van der Waals, 62.

[99]René Pélissier, *La Colonie du Minotaure, Nationalismes et Révoltes en Angola (1926-1961)* [The Colony of the Minotaur, Nationalist Movements and Revolts in Angola (1926-1961)] (Orgeval: Editions Pélissier, 1978), 658.

[100]Pélissier, 657-660; and van der Waals, 58-61.

represented a major obstacle in Portugal's joining the European Economic Community and in trading with Third World nations.[101] The strength of this view was manifested in the coup of 13 April 1961, which was probably the closest that Salazar came to being removed.[102] The 1960 debacle in the Belgian Congo prompted heated debate in the Portuguese Supreme Council for National Defense (*Conselho Superior de Defesa Nacional*) about the security of its overseas territories. Colonel Kaúlza de Arriaga was notably vociferous in saying that the *ultramar* forces should be augmented, particularly in Angola. He was opposed by General Botelho Moniz and by fellow Colonels Almeida Fernandes and Costa Gomes, who advocated a dose of the "winds of change" for the colonial situation.[103] The uprisings themselves acted to bring the differing opinions into focus. Virtually the entire defense staff decided that a motion of no confidence in Dr. Salazar should be made at the approaching meeting of the Council on 8 April. Dr. Salazar, tipped to the plans by Colonel Arriaga, did not attend the meeting. As an alternative the plotters had asked President Tomás to dismiss Dr. Salazar. Tomás indicated that he would not dismiss the "greatest statesman of the century after Churchill." By then Dr. Salazar had identified the plotters, and on 13 April the relevant participants were detained. The inevitable reshuffle ensued in which Dr. Salazar assumed

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[101]Clarence-Smith, 193. The author argues that by 1968 the Portuguese economy was turning decisively from the colonies towards Europe. Portugal in the course of the 1960s and early 1970s became a booming and aggressive "newly industrialised country" and was described as a "Taiwan of southern Europe."

[102]Richard Robinson, *Contemporary Portugal* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), 77-78.

[103]Douglas Porch, *The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution* (Stanford: The Hoover Institution Press, 1977), 38.

the defense portfolio, and no change in policy was brooked.[104]

Dr. Salazar had managed over the years of his rule to control and manipulate the military through a strategy of cooption and "divide and rule."[105] Military pay was poor, and to advance in pay and promotion ambitious officers were removed from the immediate military environment by posting them to lucrative and prestigious special positions. Normally these were at high levels of government in both the *metrópole* and the *ultramar* and it was these postings, promotions, and pay which Dr. Salazar controlled. Allegiances were ambivalent. Colonel Arriaga's allegiance was to Dr. Salazar and not to his chain of command. This undermining of traditional military bonds enabled Dr. Salazar to create mistrust and fear within the armed forces to his advantage. Until 1974 when "no one chickened out," the Salazar regime would be safe from a military coup, and despite its enormous reservations and latent moral indignation, the armed forces would be forced to honour his commitment to the colonies and to fight his war in Africa.[106] With this event it became evident that the purpose of colonial policy was now to preserve the Salazar regime. The alternative colonial options had been neutralised and commitment to war reinforced through destruction of the coup. These events accented Portugal's increasing international isolation.

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[104]van der Waals, 68-69.

[105]Douglas L. Wheeler, "The Military and the Portuguese Dictatorship, 1926-1974: 'The Honor of the Army'," in *Contemporary Portugal*, ed. Lawrence S. Graham and Harry M. Makler (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), 199.

[106]Porch, 26.

UN Reversal of 1961

Portugal's international isolation had been growing ever since it had joined the UN in 1955 following a number of vetoes by the Soviet Union. There had been pressure building from the members of that body for it to grant self-rule to its colonies. This agitation had been fed by the newly independent states joining the UN and by the writings of several authors highlighting the human abuses in Lisbon's policy toward the colonies, most notably the Galvão report. Captain Henrique Galvão, Chief Inspector of Colonial Administration, wrote a report in 1947 describing the labour conditions in Angola and warning against their continuance.[107] Dr. Salazar had the report banned and in 1952 arrested Captain Galvão on treason charges.[108] This incident gained international attention. Portugal also refused to submit the periodic technical reports on its colonies, as required by the UN for non-self-governing territories.[109] While the other colonial powers were unhappy in disclosing facts about their colonies, they complied. Portugal attracted additional attention in its refusal.

In 1955 a group of nations advocating colonial independence with the support of the Soviet Union orchestrated the passage of a resolution condemning colonialism as a violation of human rights and the UN Charter. In response Portugal claimed that it had no colonies, as all of its overseas provinces were part of a single state with one constitution. It also claimed that the UN had no competence in this matter as it was an

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[107]Captain Henrique Galvão, *Report on Native Problems in the Portuguese Colonies* (Lisbon: Ministry of the Colonies, 1947).

[108]Duffy, 327. The author adds that in 1958 the Portuguese government sentenced Captain Galvão to sixteen years imprisonment for alleged political crimes.

[109]Duffy, 341.

internal affair. The issue was debated for four years, and finally on 15 December 1960 the UN General Assembly, again pushed by this group and the Soviets, ruled against Portugal. Portugal saw itself as victimized and refused to accept the resolution. The NATO alliance became Portugal's ally before the UN in preventing a catastrophe; however, this support began to fray in 1961.[110] Following the uprising, the UN Security Council convened in May and June to discuss among other agenda items the events in Angola. The U.S. under its new President John F. Kennedy reversed support in this forum and sided with the Soviet Union in condemning Portugal's African policy. This event was an enormous blow to Dr. Salazar, who criticized the U.S. for voting with the Soviet Union in the face of historical opposition to Soviet diplomatic and military activity. Portugal thus was destined to become a semi-pariah state, politically isolated along with its colonial neighbours, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, and was forced to fight the ensuing war hobbled by this isolation. It felt beleaguered and viewed its position as neither understood nor appreciated. This ostracism served to harden its commitment to its colonies. Portugal believed that it was acting properly and responsibly and had nothing of which to be ashamed.[111] It proceeded accordingly to defend its sovereign territory and interests.

The Collapse of Goa

This beleaguered colonial position was reinforced by the actual loss of the Indian colonies in what was an act of war that Portugal was powerless to prevent. The events

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[110]Joaquim Moreira da Silva Cunha, *O Ultramar, a Nação e o "25 de Abril"* [The Overseas Provinces, the Nation and the "25th of April"] (Coimbra: Atlântida Editora, 1977), 13-14.

[111]Abshire and Samuels, 381. See also van der Waals, 81.

surrounding Goa in 1961 again hardened Portugal's position by providing Dr. Salazar with a nationally distressing event to coalesce the population for war.[112] While Portuguese Indian territory was relatively small at 4,194 square kilometres, the Indian government's seizure was a blatant act of aggression against another state. Portugal had three trading enclaves there: Goa, Damão, and Diu. The fledgling Indian government had threatened to take these properties in the late 1940s, as it considered them an affront. Britain's Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, along with the U.S. forcefully intervened to moderate Indian ambitions. Later President Nehru emboldened by the outbreak of armed revolt in Angola made some very peremptory demands of the Portuguese.[113] When it became clear that Dr. Salazar did not intend to relinquish the territory and refused to negotiate, India massed 30,000 troops, supported by tanks, aircraft, and warships, on the borders of the three territories. Governor-General Vassalo e Silva could defend his territory with only about 3,000 ill-equipped troops without air cover or air defense, 900 Goan police, and an old frigate.[114] On 11 December Dr. Salazar attempted to invoke the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty without success. Great Britain had since 1954 refused to help, saying that the 600 year-old alliance had clear limitations, particularly since a member of the Commonwealth was involved.[115] Britain no longer needed Portuguese ports for the transit to its colonies, and Portugal no longer needed the protection of the dwindling British navy. New alliance structures, such as NATO, had

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[112]van der Waals, 84-86.

[113]Robinson, 103. Nehru announced that India was "not prepared to tolerate the presence of the Portuguese in Goa, even if the Goans want them to be there."

[114]Robinson, 104.

[115]Robinson, 104.

clearly replaced the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty in both intent and practice.

Dr. Salazar gave instructions that resistance must last at least eight days to mobilize international support. Should that not be forthcoming, then "total sacrifice" must be made to save Portuguese honour. Indian forces invaded in the morning of the seventeenth, and Vassalo e Silva capitulated in the pointless struggle on the nineteenth, far short of eight days and total sacrifice. Vassalo e Silva together with the other officers involved were dismissed from the Army in 1963 in what appeared to be an effort to shift blame for the loss of Portuguese India to the military and to set an example for officers in similar future situations, such as the approaching colonial wars. The military at large was resentful in the unjust punishment and in making soldiers the scapegoats for civilian mistakes. The armed forces carried into the African campaigns this "ominous message that the government was prepared to manipulate and sacrifice them in hopeless missions and to court-martial virtually all survivors."[116] General António de Spínola, who was to be the Commander-in-Chief of Portuguese Forces in Guiné (1968-1972), the Deputy Chief of the General Staff (1972-1974), and the first President of the new government following the revolution in 1974, described the anxiety permeating the entire Portuguese military on the eve of the African wars:

> India is a clear example of what we fear. Never was its inevitable loss believed possible. And yet when the tragedy happened, the Nation's attention was immediately focused on the narrow aspect of military conduct. The Armed Forces were accused of not having defended India heroically; when, in reality, no matter how effective its defense, India would have fallen in only a matter of days.[117]

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[116]Porch, 36.

[117]António de Spínola, *Portugal e o Futuro* [Portugal and the Future] (Lisbon: Editoria Arcádia, 1974), 235. "O exemplo da Índia é um precedente bem vivo do porvir que receamos. Nunca se acreditou que sucedesse o que, afinal, era inevitável; no

The punishment for the leaders of the Indian garrison carried the broad message that there would be no turning back from the government's decision to defend the colonies. Dr. Salazar's commitment to preserving his regime was unswerving in its purpose, and the events in Goa served to push Portugal further down the road to war.[118]

Portugal's commitment to the defense of the *ultramar* had its origins in a search for the renewed greatness of an earlier era as espoused by the Salazar government's vision of Lusotropicalism. The modern-day African colonies had largely been an irregular economic and political burden until the eve of the wars, and until after World War II had held only a promise of any substantial economic benefit. This tentative position was reinforced by the emotional colonial mystique of Lusotropicalism. Dr. Salazar in opening the first Imperial Conference on 13 June 1933 provided this political identity for the participants:

> The work for succeeding generations, and for the flower of our youth, is before us and claims our intelligence and a strong arm....It would be a glorious but heavy burden and capable of breaking the strongest shoulders and crushing the stoutest hearts, were it not that through a kind of historical predestination we have been accustomed for centuries to serve and toil and suffer in the realms of discovery and spread the blessings of civilisation. With that unruffled regularity which characterises our policy; with a conscience awake to our duties, as might be expected in a country with a long past, we will advance, on the one hand, by increasing, widening, and raising our work of colonisation, and, on the other hand by contributing to the peace and progress of the world.[119]

Lusotropicalism subsequently became more refined to serve Dr. Salazar's political causes

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entanto, a tragédia deu-se; e logo foi desviada a atenção da Nação para o campo circunstancial da conduta militar, acusando-se as Forças Armadas de não se terem batido heroicamente; quando, na realidade, qualquer que fosse a eficácia da defesa, o colapso seria sempre questão de dias."

[118]Marcum, 224.

[119]Salazar, 177-178.

that required a feeling of solidarity between the *ultramar* and the *metrópole*. Statements on this sense of unity had genuine foundations in past colonial policy and in national psychology, and were apparently embraced by the Portuguese people.[120] António Leite de Magalhães writing in *O Mundo Português*, describes the glue that held the Portuguese people together and thus the colonies to the *metrópole*, "One state, one Race, one Faith, and one Civilisation."[121] Dr. Salazar exploited these emotions to his own ends. Political opposition to him was tolerated neither at home nor in the *ultramar*. The longstanding abuses of Portugal's African populations thus created widespread dissatisfaction with no outlet. Between the intransigent Salazar and an aggrieved African population an explosion was inevitable. When it happened in 1961, the events in Angola along with the coup, the isolation in the UN, and the seizing of Goa pushed Dr Salazar to solidify the commitment of the Portuguese people to defend the colonies and preserve his regime. This national commitment was a reflection of his own personal commitment and his propensity to brook no opposition, particularly from seemingly upstart nationalist movements and elements of his military. So strong was this feeling that it defied any voice of reason. Portugal's armed forces and treasure were thus pledged in full as the ultimate manifestation of this promise to make the colonial system work in Dr. Salazar's concept of Lusotropicalism.

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[120]Duffy, 271.

[121]António Leite de Magalhães, "Raízes de Portugal" [Portuguese Roots], *O Mundo Português* [Portuguese World] (IV-1937): 363.

III

O Exército na Guerra Subversiva: Portuguese Counterinsurgency Doctrine on the Eve of War

In anticipation of the wars the Portuguese Army General Staff (*Estado-Maior do Exército*) began to write its counterinsurgency doctrine, *O Exército na Guerra Subversiva* [The Army in Subversive War], in 1960. This chapter will review the origins and methodology of this effort and analyse the doctrine in terms of its relevance and applicability to the colonial situation that the Portuguese faced in the 1958 to 1963 period. The process and its result are also compared to similar contemporary thinking by the British, French, and U.S.

Origins of Portuguese Doctrine

Dr. Salazar was particularly sensitive to the vulnerability of the Portuguese colonies in Africa to nationalist movements and had been so since the end of World War II.[1] He had witnessed the British experiences beginning in 1946 with Palestine and extending to Malaya, Borneo, Kenya, Cyprus, and a host of smaller ones. He was acutely aware of the French experience in Indochina and the war that was then being fought in Algeria. And finally, the liberating of much of Africa from its former colonial masters held grave warning signals for Portugal.[2]

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[1]Colonel Luís Alberto Santiago Inocentes, Staff Corps, Portuguese Army (Retired), interview by the author, 18 March 1994, London.

[2]Joaquim Moreira da Silva Cunha, *O Ultramar, a Nação e o "25 de Abril"* [The Overseas Provinces, the Nation and the "25th of April"] (Coimbra: Atlântida Editora, 1977), 19-22.

This sensitivity was reinforced by a very deep and ingrained anti-communist Cold War stance by Portugal. Dr. Salazar had sent a volunteer force in 1938 to fight on the anti-communist side of Generalissimo Franco in the Spanish Civil War, and was of the common view following World War II that with the German bulwark dismantled an unchecked Soviet Union would engulf Europe.[3] Portugal's place was alongside the democratic nations that had won the war, and a collective security arrangement was the only logical way to contain the threat.[4] This defense position prompted the intense study of Soviet policy, particularly that of sponsoring insurgent proxy wars, both by the general staffs of the various armed services and in the senior staff officer courses in Lisbon at the Institute of Higher Military Studies (IAEM).[5] This institute remains the premier forum for the study of defense issues in Portugal. By the late 1950s Fidel Castro's rise in Cuba along with the British and French insurgency experiences, among others, were included in the IAEM curriculum.[6]

The IAEM was founded in 1911 as the Central School for Officers (Escola Central de Oficiais, or ECO) with the purpose of preparing officers to be promoted to captain, major and colonel. In 1927 it was installed in the Palácio Real de Caxias outside of

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[3]Neil Bruce, *Portugal: The Last Empire* (London: David and Charles Ltd., 1975), 91.

[4]José Calvet de Magalhães, Álvaro de Vasconcelos, and Joaquim Ramos Silva, *Portugal: Paradoxo Atlântico* [Portugal: Atlantic Paradox] (Lisbon: Institute for Strategic and International Studies, 1990), 54.

[5]Estado-Maior do Exército, *Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)* [Aid to the Study of Doctrine Applied in the Campaigns of Africa (1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exército, 1990), 28.

[6]General Joaquim Chito Rodrigues, Portuguese Army, Director of the Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, interview by the author, 23 November 1994, Lisbon.

Lisbon, and its curriculum was expanded to prepare officers for staff duties and for promotion to general officer. At the same time it also assumed the related task of supporting the unification of military doctrine by acting as a centre for its study. In 1937 with the merging of the *metrópole* and the *ultramar* defense establishments, the name was changed to the Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, and it was assigned the mission of preparing staff officers through the General Staff Course (*Curso de Estado-Maior*, or CEM), senior officers through the Course for the Promotion to Senior Officer (*Curso de Promoção a Oficial Superior*, or CPOS), and general officers through the Course for High Command (*Curso de Altos Comandos*, or CAC) for their portending duties. In 1958 the IAEM was moved to new, expanded headquarters in Pedrouços, a suburb west of Lisbon.[7]

The creation of modern doctrine in the Portuguese military followed the merging of the *metrópole* and *ultramar* defense organisations and their further reorganisation, which included the creation of the Portuguese Air Force in 1952. These changes were begun in 1937 and required more than two decades to effect with their completion in 1960. Prior to 1950 the management of military affairs relating to national defense was coordinated in the political sphere through the routine conduct of government affairs. There was no elaborate defense hierarchy to oversee and plan military force structure and activities in accordance with an established national policy. Beginning in 1950 joint operational activity of the armed forces was channelled through the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and the various Commanders-in-Chief, and after 1956 the Prime Minister

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[7]Staff of the Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, *O Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares* [The Institute of Higher Military Studies] (Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1987), 8-11.

and the Minister for National Defense were supported by a defense hierarchy, including ministers for the various service arms.[8]

Until this reorganisation was completed, defense policy and force structure were promulgated in the form of decrees. Doctrine on the other hand was developed by the General Staff of the Army, or of the headquarters of the military region of each colony. There was a single navy, and later, one airforce, so a single doctrine for these forces extended service-wide. In 1938, for example, Decree 28 520 ordered a study of the military mission in the colonies. On its completion in 1939 and in accordance with its recommendations, Decree 29 686 fixed the composition of colonial forces in time of peace and remained in effect until 1953.[9] Prior to that time the colonial forces were the province of the governor of each colony and the Minister of the Colonies and not the command hierarchy in the *metrópole*.[10] These colonial armies were led by officers and sergeants assigned from the *metrópole*, and their troops were largely recruited and trained locally. It had been important at one point to have separate armies for each colony and its defense; however, with the advent of improved communications and command and control practises after World War II, it proved unnecessarily cumbersome. These forces and their guiding doctrine underwent major changes on Portugal's joining NATO and followed the U.S./NATO conventional war doctrine. This doctrine addressed the

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[8]Kaúlza de Arriaga, "Portuguese National Defense during the Last 40 Years and in the Future," Lecture delivered on 20 October 1966, Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, Lisbon.

[9]Estado-Maior do Exército, *Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)* [Historical-Military Report of the Campaigns of Africa (1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exército, 1988), Vol. 1, 176.

[10]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. 1, 176.

conventional-force-defense-of-Europe war and Portugal's contribution to it. It did not address subversive war.[11]

Portuguese doctrine was basically an authoritative, approved description of how to perform a task and was developed in several ways. Service institutes, such as the IAEM, certain commands, such as the Headquarters, Military Region of Angola, and professional journals, such as *Revista Militar* (Military Review), *Boletim Militar do Exército* (Military Bulletin of the Army), *Boletim do Estado-Maior* (Bulletin of the General Staff), *Jornal do Exército* (Journal of the Army), *Revista da Armada* (Naval Review), and *Revista do Ar* (Air Review), all contributed both formally and informally to the production and dissemination of doctrine.[12] The doctrine itself was written by the General Staff of the Army, Navy, or Air Force, as appropriate, and promulgated by that body. The institutes and schools were particularly important, as they were stewards of the doctrinal memory and presented the approved way of doing things to the officer corps that passed through their instruction as students. The propagation of doctrine depended on cycling the officers through the institutes so that the abstract concepts presented in manuals were understood and practised in the field, making them a part of accepted procedure and thinking.[13] In the event of war and the actual employment of doctrine under combat conditions, the institutes served as an agent for adjusting doctrine based on this experience. Military reversals would thus theoretically result in a corrective modification

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[11]Kaúlza de Arriaga, *Guerra e Política* [War and Policy] (Lisbon: Edições Refrendo, Lda., 1987), 119.

[12]Arriaga, 119-120.

[13]Arriaga, 119-120.

to doctrine.[14]

The IAEM had concentrated its efforts prior to 1961 on doctrine for conventional war in accordance with Portugal's role in NATO and the feared conflict in Europe.[15] This traditional focus, however, had not been to the exclusion of insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare, for a substantial amount of material had been accumulated on the topics. The Portuguese Armed Forces had for a number of years studied the development of subversive war as simply a form of popular revolt that was sporadic and isolated but not in the mainstream of worthy security topics.[16] Following World War II, the number and severity of insurgencies increased to the point that it became the most prevalent form of conflict in the world.[17] As nuclear war was an unlikely event in Portuguese eyes and one in which it would have only an indirect participation, it seemed appropriate for Portugal to prepare for the reality of a subversive war that would most likely require the mobilisation of large numbers of its troops and other national resources.[18]

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[14]Arriaga, 119-120.

[15]*Regulamento de Campanha* [Principles of Campaigning] (series), Estado-Maior do Exército, 1954.

[16]Arriaga, 119.

[17]Colin M. Beer, *On Revolutionary War* (Bromley, Great Britain: Galago Publishing Ltd., 1990), 7; and John Laffin, *War Annual 1* (London: Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1986), vii.

[18]Arriaga, 119-120.

Groundwork for Subversive War

The Portuguese Army took a number of initiatives in the 1950s that laid the groundwork in preparing for the conflict and in formulating its doctrine. The first occurred in 1953, when the IAEM conducted a course of 8 weeks for 53 officers known as the *Curso de Estado-Maior de Pequenas Unidades* (Staff Course for Small Units). This course was also known by the nickname of "*Curso dos SS*," from the word *secção* or section, a small unit being a "section of a section." It was designed to prepare officers for staff functions at the battalion and regimental level. The course was remarkable at the time for its innovation within the Portuguese Army and had its roots in the composite experience of officers who had primarily attended U.S. Army schools in the United States or visited U.S. Army units in West Germany. With the initiation of this course, the Portuguese Army began to build small, well-prepared staffs to support the battalion and regimental commanders.[19] From that year onward the preparation for small unit staffs was incorporated at the CPOS as well as the course for promotion to captain, which was given at the various practical schools of the Portuguese Army.[20] While the *Curso dos SS* was not especially designed for subversive warfare, it proved to be very important after 1961 and throughout the African Campaigns of 1961-1974.[21]

During 1958 and 1959 the Portuguese Army sent five officers to the Intelligence Centre of the British Army at Maresfield Park Camp, Uckfield, Sussex, to attend

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[19]Brigadeiro Renato F. Marques Pinto, Portuguese Army, correspondence with the author, 6 September 1995, Oeiras.

[20]Practical Schools of the Army: Infantry - Mafra; Engineers - Tancos; Artillery - Vendas Novas; Cavalry - Torres Novas and Santarem.

[21]Marques Pinto correspondence, 6 September 1995.

intelligence courses at the School of Military Intelligence.[22] These courses contained a strong component of subversive warfare, as the British were heavily influenced by their experiences in Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus. On their return two of these five officers, Captains Pedro Cardoso and Renato Marques Pinto, were appointed as instructors at the IAEM. Captain Cardoso brought with him from England a manual, *Keeping the Peace (Duties in Support of the Civil Power)*, which was rapidly translated by him and his fellow Captains Marques Pinto and Remígio dos Santos.[23] The volume generally treated insurgency as a communist inspired problem progressing from subversion to a seizure of base areas, and incorporated the lessons from the British experience in Malaya. It did not acknowledge that nationalist movements might be motivated by a simpler and more straightforward desire for independence, and the lack of this aspect reinforced the Portuguese theory of a communist conspiracy. With the completion of this translation which served as a text, the problems of subversive warfare and the support of civilian authorities were introduced into the staff courses of 1958-1959. While there had been earlier study of subversive warfare theory as part of the Soviet policy curriculum, this initiative marked the beginning of practical instruction in the problems of subversive warfare to the officer corps at large and shifted the course from the nearly exclusive focus on conventional warfare.[24]

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[22]Pedro Cardoso, *As Informações em Portugal* [Intelligence in Portugal] (Lisbon: Instituto da Defesa Nacional, 1980), 106.

[23]*Keeping the Peace (Duties in Support of the Civil Power)* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957). This manual was originally published in 1949 and was obsolete from the start, although the War Office did not see fit to revise it until 1957.

[24]Marques Pinto correspondence, 6 September 1995.

In 1959 a mission of six officers under Major Joaquim Franco Pinheiro was sent to Algeria. These officers spent 15 days at the Centre d'Instruction de Pacification et Contre-Guerrilla at Arzew in Oran province, where they took a stage of instruction with some 200 French officers. Founded in 1956, the Centre ran an arduous twelve-day program, normally accommodating 250 reserve officers who had been recalled to active duty, and attempted to prepare them for their command positions in Algeria.[25] Following this instruction, they were sent two to each of the three French corps stationed throughout Algeria for one month. On their return to Portugal, they produced a voluminous report of their experiences in and observations of insurgency or subversive warfare. The overwhelming message in this account was that the Portuguese Army must make the most urgent preparations to fight an insurgency.[26]

This sense of urgency was reinforced on 6 December 1960, when the "Congress of 81" communist countries concluded its three weeks of deliberations in Moscow. The meeting was widely publicised and followed closely by those with a vested interest in the politics of developing nations. The last such meeting had been held in 1957 and had hosted only 13 countries. The proceedings of this latest meeting were published in *NATO News* (*Nouvelles de l'OTAN*) and later extracted in an analysis in the May 1961 issue of *Revue Militaire Générale*. Subsequently French Army General Jean Valluy made a detailed study of the meeting declarations, which likewise appeared in the October 1961 issue of *Revue Militaire Générale*. The implications of these declarations were known

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[25]Alf Andrew Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 176.

[26]Marques Pinto correspondence, 6 September 1995.

to the Portuguese in December 1960, and worrisomely they announced the targeting of a number of countries for subversive activities. Portugal and its colonies were foremost on the list.[27] They asserted that the way to change Portugal's dictatorship was to disturb the colonial situation, and presented a plan to topple the authoritarian government of Dr. Salazar and to separate Portugal from its colonies. This plan was to be implemented simultaneously with the support of African nationalist organizations advocating the independence of the Portuguese colonies and by the infiltration of Portuguese universities with elements supporting this notion of colonial independence and espousing the communist doctrine.[28] As far as the strategy for colonial independence went, the newly independent nations being created from the former colonies of Belgium, Britain, and France were to be subverted and used to encircle and isolate Portugal's colonies, thus denying them friendly borders and local support.[29] This formula was designed to produce a debilitating colonial war for Portugal, a war which would both liberate the colonies and topple the anti-communist regime.

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[27]Jean Valluy, "Au Sujet du Manifeste des 81," *Revue Militaire Générale* (October 1961): 282.

[28]Jean Valluy, "Acerca do Manifesto de Guerra Fria," [About the Manifesto of the Cold War], trans. and ed. E. Q. Magalhães, *Boletim Militar* (Região Militar de Angola) (15 February 1963): 27; and Arslan Humbaraci and Nicole Muchnick, *Portugal's African Wars* (New York: The Third Press, 1974), 40-41: The authors quote Amílcar Cabral's citation of an Armed Forces General Staff report of the Psychological Section No. 15 dated September 1971 and showing the results of the Soviet policy: "The proliferation of anti-government organizations and the agitation that they create leads to an unsuitable psychological climate which, by affecting the activities of students, affects the country, which seems troubled and does not know what to do to lead its children back to the right path...In the metropolis generally, the population continues to show little interest in the war overseas and ignores the efforts being made by the armed forces. The student masses remain vulnerable to pacifist propaganda."

[29]Valluy, 26-27.

With respect to the other arm of Soviet strategy, they believed that Portugal could cope with the military situation initially, but as the wars expanded, its armed forces would need to recruit large additional numbers of temporary junior officers (*milicianos*) from the universities. Thus, the appropriately indoctrinated university graduates would in the meantime be entering government and particularly the military service and making their new views felt.[30] The plan then called for these forces to combine to create an opportunity for the installation of a communist government in Lisbon.[31] The ultimate aim was to replace the Salazar regime, which had refused even to establish diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, with a government friendly to the communist sphere. While the Portuguese authorities were largely concerned about the nationalist movements associated with their African possessions and the threat that they represented, this declaration of support for them and the direct threat to the Portuguese government and its policies were sources of concern even in its reemphasis of known Soviet intentions. The normal passivity of this forum had been replaced with an aggressive posture.[32] As Portugal was sensitive about its colonial situation, this noisy and threatening display, which had included a disturbing speech by Nikita Khrushchev on "wars of national liberation," was seen as a direct challenge.

At the same time Lieutenant Colonel Artur Henrique Nunes da Silva, who was

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[30]Humbaraci and Muchnick, 40-41.

[31]Inocentes interview, 2 September 1994. General unrest at the universities began in 1960 and by the fall of 1961 there were open demonstrations against military activity in Angola. The Soviet aim was to achieve optimally a negative attitude in the student population and minimally a passive attitude.

[32]Valluy, 294.

working in the Operations Branch of the Army General Staff and was also an instructor for the CEM, had read the report on Algeria and the French documents that accompanied it.[33] This development was propitious, as Lieutenant Colonel Nunes da Silva had been a student of the two-year "Cours Superieur de Guerre" at the Ecole Superieure de Guerre in Paris from 1958 to 1960. In his final year there he had a cycle of "Guerre Subversive." When he returned to Portugal in the summer of 1960 as a major, he was well acquainted with the French doctrine and had assumed new duties both as an instructor at the IAEM and as a staff officer on the General Staff of the Army.[34] He took these materials to the IAEM immediately following the 6 December 1960 meeting of communist countries. Working with the 1961-1962 CEM class of about 30 officers and using current additional information and documents, principally from the Headquarters, Military Region of Angola, he produced the publication *Apontamentos para o Emprego das Forças Militares em Guerra Subversiva* [Notes on the Employment of Military Forces in Subversive War].[35]

Lieutenant Colonel Nunes da Silva had the support of the IAEM, where traditionally the best minds in the Portuguese Armed Forces were sought as instructors. The instructors were mobilised with the approval of the Army Staff Headquarters to support the development of the new counterinsurgency doctrine and to supervise and coordinate

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[33]Marques Pinto correspondence, 6 September 1995.

[34]Marques Pinto correspondence, 13 November 1995, Oeiras. Major Nunes da Silva was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in November 1960.

[35]Marques Pinto correspondence, 6 September 1995; and Inocentes interview, 18 March 1994. Colonel Inocentes was enrolled in the CEM from 1959 to 1962 and worked on the subversive warfare doctrine.

the staff work performed by the coopted students. Virtually all of these instructors had served in the colonial armies and consequently represented a wealth of experience in Africa. Each also represented a speciality of warfare that would be required there: intelligence, tactics, engineering, and logistics. The experience and skill of these instructors was to give the doctrine a full orientation toward the *ultramar* and the special requirements for the likely wars that would be fought there. Many of the instructors were later to become noteworthy figures through their contributions to Portugal's military effort in its colonies.[36] On completion of this work, Lieutenant Colonel Nunes da Silva moved the project to the Army General Staff, where frenetic activity accompanied the now urgent need for a specialised and comprehensive doctrine. The doctrinal manual *O Exército na Guerra Subversiva* [The Army in Subversive War] was produced by the Army General Staff with support from the IAEM in stages until its completion in 1963.[37]

Development of *O Exército na Guerra Subversiva*

Lieutenant Colonel Nunes da Silva and the staff assigned to assist him in writing *O Exército na Guerra Subversiva* began with the information that had been assembled from various sources in the 1958-1960 period.[38] This material included the essential elements of the British and French doctrines and renditions of their experiences in Malaya, Kenya, Indochina, and Algeria, and a modest amount of U.S. material.

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[36]Inocentes interview, 5 September 1994, London.

[37]Marques Pinto correspondence, 6 September 1995.

[38]Estado-Maior do Exército, *O Exército na Guerra Subversiva* [The Army in Subversive War], 5 vols. (Lisbon: Ministério do Exército, 1963; revised, 1966).

Between 1945 and 1960 Britain had conducted campaigns in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus. Except for Palestine, these post-World War II campaigns were successful.[39] The conduct of these operations had not been based on formal doctrine but rather certain principles of English common law and policing experience:

1. Disorders were suppressed with a minimum of force;

2. Successful counterinsurgency had depended on a close cooperation between all branches of the civil government and the military, and this coordination had been the responsibility of a single individual;

3. Successful counterinsurgency had depended on good intelligence, and its gathering and collation had been coordinated under a single authority; and

4. Successful counterinsurgency had called for the adoption of highly decentralised, small unit tactics to defeat irregulars.[40]

Eventually these principles were brought together in a comprehensive strategy in 1960, when all were incorporated into a formal doctrine.[41] But until that time doctrine was individually crafted for each campaign after a lengthy apprenticeship. Drs. Hoffman and Taw argue in their study on British counterinsurgency doctrine that the two primary factors in British experience that expanded the cost of insurgencies significantly were (1) the belated identification or recognition of hostilities and the opportunity that this delay gave to the insurgents in gaining an unopposed foothold and developing their momentum, and (2) handicapping government counterinsurgency troops through a lack of proper

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[39]Thomas R. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919-1960* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990), 12.

[40]Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer M. Taw, *Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: The Development of Britain's "Small Wars" Doctrine During the 1950s* (Santa Barbara: Rand Corporation, 1991), vi and vii; and Mockaitis, 13-14.

[41]*Army Field Manual* (Series), British Army General Staff, (Year).

"small wars" training and equipment.[42] The Portuguese too saw these lessons in the British experiences and sought to avoid these pitfalls in part by developing a written doctrine ahead of their anticipated conflict.

When Captains Pedro Cardoso and Renato Marques Pinto took the staff intelligence course at Maresfield Park Camp in 1958-1959, the British experiences in counterinsurgency were just beginning to be part of the curriculum in the various service schools.[43] After over a decade of counterinsurgencies the British Army had finally come to realise that doctrine had to be formulated and taught. Given the unsettled situation in Portuguese Africa, these officers were attentive to the British experiences and absorbed its lessons keenly. The Portuguese Army General Staff knew that Portugal had little time before it must fight a campaign to retain its overseas possessions, and that it must fight its war correctly from the very first shot, if it were to succeed and contain the cost in doing so. If Portugal were forced to fight without a doctrine to guide its forces, and had to develop from scratch the necessary tactics that capitalised on the advantages accruing from the specific situations in each colony, then it would face a more difficult struggle with reduced chances of success. The British provided guidance, and its influence on Portuguese thinking was apparent in the development of *O Exército na Guerra Subversiva*.[44] The British theatre doctrine for Malaya (1952) and Kenya (1954)

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[42]Hoffman and Taw, vii.

[43]Mockaitis, 184-185.

[44]Estado-Maior do Exército, *O Exército na Guerra Subversiva* [The Army in Subversive War], 5 vols. (Lisbon: Ministério do Exército, 1963; revised, 1966).

were key references for the Portuguese Army General Staff.[45] These doctrines embodied the principles of minimum force, civil-military cooperation, intelligence coordination, and small unit operations that had proved so successful in British imperial policing. These principles fit the Portuguese Army's desire to develop an effective and inexpensive approach to counterinsurgency that was appropriate both to its means and to the circumstances in its colonies. This reasoning greatly influenced the development of the Portuguese way of war, in which a cost effective and sustainable approach was adapted to its African Campaigns.

The French like the British had had a successful history of pacification prior to World War II, but since then counterinsurgency doctrine had been built on lessons of defeat. Following France's debacle in Indochina (1946-1954), the concept of revolutionary war or *guerre révolutionnaire* was formulated by a group of officers whose experiences there led them to seek methods of countering anticolonial wars. This list included the prominent commanders and senior staff officers in General Lionel-Max Chassin, Colonel Lacheroy, and General Nemo, and noteworthy junior officers in Messrs. Hogard, Poirier, and Souyris.[46] These officers wrote prolifically on the topic, and their theories were widely debated but not readily accepted in the French staffs or service schools that wrote and taught doctrine.

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[45]*The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: Federation of Malaysia, 1952); and *A Handbook of Anti-Mau Mau Operations* (Nairobi: Government of Kenya, 1954).

[46]Peter Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), 7.

The central theme of *guerre révolutionnaire* theory lay in the argument that an inferior force could defeat a conventional army, if it could gain the tacit support of the population in the contested area. These theorists had also witnessed the strength that a truly unified politico-military command gave to the enemy Viet-Minh insurgents and argued that this structure must also exist in a counterinsurgent force. These assertions were reinforced by their own experiences with civil-military responsibilities in Indochina. These officers had also felt the impact of psychological warfare and had become convinced that this dimension could be exploited to reinforce the ideological cohesion of government civil and military forces and to counter the enemy's ideology.[47] The French doctrine also addressed intelligence coordination and small unit operations, but omitted the British principle of minimum force. Although the French too had limited resources, the cost sensitivity of the British was not a conscious part of the doctrine's thinking. With this concept of *guerre révolutionnaire*, modern counterinsurgency reverted to the *tache d'huile* principle that Marshall Lyautey and his contemporaries had successfully applied over half a century earlier.[48] The only difference was that the political techniques and military solutions to the problem of civil-military cooperation had been revised for modern times. From the mid-1950s this doctrine provided the theoretical framework for France's effort to retain Algeria.

By the time that Major Franco Pinheiro and his five colleagues visited Algeria in 1959, *guerre révolutionnaire* was the French *de facto* doctrine, although it had not at that time been promulgated in an official document. They saw parallels between Algeria and

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[47]Paret, 7.

[48]Paret, 103-106.

Portuguese Africa and assiduously recorded the French problems and solutions in the Maghreb. They were particularly intrigued by French psychological operations and saw an immediate benefit in its application to Portuguese Africa.[49] *Guerre révolutionnaire* espoused a sense of urgency in its approach to counterinsurgency, and it was this sense of immediacy that Major Pinheiro and his associates transmitted on their return to Lisbon.[50]

The U.S. contributed little to Portuguese counterinsurgency thinking and the development of *O Exército na Guerra Subversiva*. Despite the attempts of the U.S. Army to establish staffs to oversee this doctrinal need in the years following World War II, their fragmented lives resulted in a loss of continuant thinking on counterinsurgency. The irregularity of this work was reflected in the subsidiary manuals on counter-guerrilla operations prior to 1960, which were *FM 31-20 Operations against Guerrilla Forces*, published in 1951, and *FM 31-15 Operations against Airborne Attack, Guerrilla Action and Infiltration*, published in 1953, and were both flawed in that they discussed counterinsurgency in the framework of conventional war.[51] These doctrines were never able to reconcile the principle that counterinsurgency operations were based on protecting

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[49]General José Luís Almiro Canêlhas, interview by the author, 3 April 1995, Lisbon. General Canêlhas went to Algeria in the second group of observers of the 1959-1960 period.

[50]Charles Lacheroy, Colonel of Colonial Infantry, French Army, "Action Viet-Minh et Communiste en Indochine ou une Leçon de 'Guerre Révolutionnaire'," Paper presented at the Conference on the War in Indochina, Institut de Défense Nationale, Paris, July 1954, 1.

[51]Department of the Army, *Operations against Guerrilla Forces, FM 31-20* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951); and Department of the Army, *Operations against Airborne Attack, Guerrilla Action and Infiltration, FM 31-15* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953).

the population, and this premise went against the massive application of firepower in a conventional war. While they are listed as references in *O Exército na Guerra Subversiva*, they contributed little useful thinking on the Portuguese Army's anticipated problems in Africa. U.S. doctrinal literature during the 1950s was slow to materialise, and when it did so, tended to consider counterinsurgency as an adjunct to conventional war.[52] President Kennedy's advent caused some modification in this position, but it proved difficult to effect any change in the U.S. Army's stance.

Coincident with the activities of Lieutenant Colonel Nunes da Silva, the Centre for Instruction in Special Operations (Centro de Instrução de Operações Especiais, or CIOE) was established by the Portuguese Army at Lamego on 16 April 1960 to teach counterinsurgency (counter-subversion) tactics to its personnel. Both the CIOE and the IAEM became forums for exploring and developing the strategies and tactics that would be most effective against an insurgency in the Portuguese colonies.[53] Another valuable work and the most prominent private publication of the time on subversive war, *Guerra Revolucionária* [Revolutionary War], also appeared through Army sponsorship, explained the modern basis for subversive war from the Portuguese perspective, and provided the foundation for writing *O Exército na Guerra Subversiva*.[54] Its title and content were

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[52]Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 39.

[53]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, 138-139.

[54]Colonel Hermes de Araújo Oliveira, *Guerra Revolucionária* [Revolutionary War] (Lisbon: Edition of the author, 1960). The author visited Algeria alone prior to the 1959 mission of Major Franco Pinheiro and returned to duties as the Professor of Geography and Military History at the Academia Militar, where he gave 5 lectures on revolutionary war. These lectures were edited and published as this volume under the patronage of the

heavily influenced by the French *guerre révolutionnaire* theory.

As the doctrine was being developed, it was also being taught and refined. Each of the five sections were first released in a preliminary version and applied experimentally in Angola.[55] The preliminary sections were also taught in the Practical Schools of Arms, particularly that of the Infantry. It was here that small unit tactics were developed and the proper combat equipment identified. Their contribution to the elements of the doctrine were important not only as lessons learned from experiments and teaching but also from the experience of veterans returning as instructors from combat in Angola. The Military Region of Angola (RMA) also offered the experience of its officers and the intelligence that it had gathered to the General Staff of the Army. From the opening months of the conflict the RMA had gathered valuable information on the behaviour of the guerrillas, their order of battle, and Portuguese infantry tactics that had proved most effective against them. This experience was not only integrated into the doctrine but also made part of the curriculum at the practical schools for those being mobilised for duty in the colonies.[56] Throughout this process the Portuguese Army was attempting to compress the usual time required to develop a counterinsurgency doctrine, a process that normally represented a refinement of fighting experience from varied sources over many years. It was now at war and urgently needed such a document. Consequently, it

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Ministry of the Army.

[55]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, 138.

[56]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, 138.

worked feverishly to generate this valuable guidance.[57]

The original product, *O Exército na Guerra Subversiva*, began with the national policy and rationale for the deployment and use of the Portuguese Armed Forces to attain the political objective of maintaining the integrity of its empire:

> It was so clear that the politico-strategic philosophy of the Portuguese nation was always to consider the Portuguese territories of the Atlantic islands, of Africa, of Asia, and of Oceanus, as territories indissoluble from old Lusitania, in spite of contrary doctrines and practices which, following World War II, had spread everywhere.[58]

This statement reflects the purpose of the national policy as being one of survival and endurance. These goals were also reinforced with the use of such phrases as "sovereignty," "national unity," "national integrity," and "economic patrimony," which appear in Portuguese writings and propaganda and mirrored Dr. Salazar's Lusotropicalism.[59] The Portuguese empire was seen as a heritage and a promise of a richer future. In Portuguese eyes any fragmentation would not only betray the past but would reduce the empire to a modest European country. This potential catastrophe was to be avoided at all costs. National policy also was in step with the campaign strategy of keeping the conflict low key and inexpensive, so that Portugal could sustain the war for a long period and outlast the guerrillas.

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[57]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, 138.

[58]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, 34. "Fica assim claro que a filosofia político-estratégica da Nação Portuguesa foi, sempre, considerar os territórios portugueses das ilhas atlânticas, da África, da Ásia e da Oceânia, como territórios indissociáveis da velha Lusitânia, apesar das doutrinas e das práticas contrárias que, a partir da II Guerra Mundial, se espalharam por toda a parte."

[59]Douglas L. Wheeler, "The Portuguese Army in Angola," *Journal of Modern African Studies* (October 1969): 426.

Portugal's counter-subversive grand strategy evolved from this policy of maintaining the empire with all of its promise and considered the operational, social, administrative (logistical), and technological dimensions of war in fashioning its three-pronged effort:

1. Military action would maintain order in the colonies and defeat the insurgent in combat (operational);

2. Diplomatic efforts would seek to nullify the activities of Portugal's adversaries, strengthen ties with its allies, and forge new alliances, and while not accepting the legitimacy of the terrorist organisations, seek to open a dialogue with them toward a peaceful solution that did not compromise Portuguese sovereignty; and

3. Socio-economic development within the colonies would improve the lot of the colonial population and make it feel a part of greater Portugal (social).[60]

From the foregoing it is clear that the Portuguese saw the military and social aspects dominating among these four dimensions of war. The administrative (logistics) would present a severe challenge to the Portuguese Army with its long lines of communication; however, the ability to support Portuguese troops on the battlefield and to maintain their consequent operational flexibility was never anticipated to be an insurmountable problem. As guerrillas fight a low technology war, the Portuguese Army saw the technology aspect as only a minor factor, and consequently, it was not treated in the doctrine. *O Exército na Guerra Subversiva* is a reflection of this grand strategy at the tactical level, and the topics treated in its five volumes are analysed in the following sections according to the broader dimensions of war.

O Exército na Guerra Subversiva is a tactical doctrine with portions of military and operational doctrine bridging gaps to provide understanding to the instruction being given. This structure provides at times a panoramic view of counterinsurgency to support its

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[60]Silva Cunha, 31-32.

more specific aspects and illustrates that the Portuguese Army understood and possessed the tools to implement the elements of textbook counterinsurgency doctrine. The volume follows a logical sequence from the soldier's perspective in that it opens with a statement of the purpose of the war and the principles of insurgency (subversive war) and proceeds to explain the field techniques required to defeat the guerrillas and help the soldier survive. The Portuguese soldier is told emphatically that he is the key to winning the population and gaining its confidence in Portugal over that of the guerrillas. Equally as important and following from the psychological theme, the soldier is told of the need for military support to civil authorities and his role in this aspect of the war for the loyalty of the population. The doctrine is examined below according to the dominating military, social and logistical dimensions of war as applied to counterinsurgency.

Nature of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

O Exército na Guerra Subversiva begins with a description of the principles of subversive and counter-subversive war, and relates them to the unique considerations of the *ultramar*. Insurgency or subversive war represented to the Portuguese soldier an entirely new and different type of conflict, one which required a nearly complete reorientation of Portugal's armed forces. Hence the opening didactic was designed not only as an orientation in subversive war but also as a convenient reference. This entire section appears to be based on the earlier referenced publication *Guerra Revolucionária*.[61] It also reflected adjustments to accommodate the particular situation in Portuguese Africa. In their subversive war the Portuguese saw no promise of

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[61]Colonel Hermes de Araújo Oliveira, *Guerra Revolucionária* [Revolutionary War] (Lisbon: Edition of the author, 1960).

compromise in an enemy that sought a total displacement of authority.[62]

Prior to the beginning of the Portuguese African Campaigns, insurgencies generally followed the prescriptions developed by Mao Tse-tung in China and expanded by General Vo-Nguyen Giap in Vietnam.[63] This insurgency warfare doctrine and its execution were studied and analysed by the Centre for Political and Social Studies in Lisbon and subsequently became available as a publication in 1963 titled, *Subversão e Counter-Subversão* [Subversion and Counter-Subversion].[64] This document described this Third World phenomenon as evolving in five phases:[65]

Insurgency/Subversive War

I *Preparatory phase* or preparation of subversion;

II *Agitation phase* or the creation of a subversive environment;

III *Terrorism and guerrilla action phase* or the consolidation of the subversive organisation;

IV *Subversive state phase*, corresponding to the creation of bases, a rebel government, and pseudo-regular forces;

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[62]José Manuel de Bethencourt Rodrigues, General, Portuguese Army (Retired), interview by the author, 9 November 1994, Pedrouços (Lisbon).

[63]Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, II (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961), and Vo-Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962).

[64]Joaquim António Franco Pinheiro, Hermes de Araújo Oliveira, and Jaime de Oliveira Leandro, *Subversão e Counter-Subversão* [Subversion and Counter-Subversion], Estudos de Ciências Políticas e Sociais No. 62, Junta de Investigações do Ultramar (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Políticos e Sociais, 1963)

[65]Joaquim António Franco Pinheiro, Lieutenant Colonel, Portuguese Army, "Natureza e Fundamentos da Guerra Subversiva" [The Nature and Fundamentals of Subversive War], *Subversão e Counter-Subversão* [Subversion and Counter-Subversion], Estudos de Ciências Políticas e Sociais No. 62, Junta de Investigações do Ultramar (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Políticos e Sociais, 1963), 24-25.

V *Final phase* or general insurrection and regular war.

The study also provided the caveat that subversive campaigns develop along widely divergent lines, and that the phases may overlap one another and blend together. There was rarely a clear break between phases.

Because of this overlapping of one phase with another, the Portuguese Army departed from traditional thinking on the topic, as described above, and lumped the various phases of an insurgency into two larger phases, the pre-insurrection and the insurrection phase:[66]

	Portuguese Armed Forces		Traditional View
I	Pre-insurrectional phase:	I	Preparatory phase
		II	Agitation phase
II	Insurrectional phase:	III	Terrorism and guerrilla action phase
		IV	Subversive state phase
		V	Final phase

As the differences between the traditional Phases I and II are more theoretical than real, the Portuguese Army elected to combine them into a single, clandestine, pre-insurrectional phase. For the same reason the overt activity of the traditional Phases III, IV, and V were combined into a single, insurrectional phase. This simplification was designed to make the soldier's understanding of insurgency or subversive war an easier process. This approach has enormous merit in that treatment from the government's viewpoint is not altered by the academic classification but rather ruled by practicalities. The clandestine organisation of an insurgency could easily be part of the normal

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[66]*O Exército na Guerra Subversiva*, Vol. I, Chapter I, 11-15.

undercurrent of dissention within any society and as such is not directly a military responsibility. Once the use of violence is injected, however, it becomes something very different. This stark contrast as opposed to a blend is reflected in the Portuguese military's recognition of the problem and accordingly its application of solutions. Its counter-action is not necessarily linked to each of the five phases but rather concentrates on the broader two. Counter-subversion in the pre-insurrectional period is centred on preventive measures, and in the insurrectional period on reclaiming the population and destroying the insurgent infrastructure. In the second phase Portuguese doctrine calls for activities on the military, psychological, social, and political fronts.

The soldier's relations with the population that he is protecting is stressed constantly throughout the document, and particularly in this opening section. While this emphasis is not uniquely Portuguese, it is not generally highlighted to this degree in writings on counterinsurgency theory and practice. The Portuguese soldier is encouraged "to influence (the population) through his presence, calming the population and acting as a preventive measure against the growth of subversion."[67] He is also told that he is part of a psychosocial operation (*acção psicossocial*) in which his military and civilian skills should be used voluntarily to help the population. "The military forces thus have an important role to play despite acting uniquely in preventing subversion and in remaining alert to armed bands or attacking guerrillas."[68] This emphasis on the Portuguese

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[67]*O Exército na Guerra Subversiva*, Vol. I, Chapter II, 19. "Actuar pela sua presença, tranquilizando a população e servindo como prevenção contra o desenvolvimento da subversão."

[68]*O Exército na Guerra Subversiva*, Vol. I, Chapter II, 19. "As forças militares terão, portanto, um papel importante a desempenhar, a pensar de se tratar ùnicamente de evitar a subversão e de não haver ainda bandos armados ou guerrilhas a combater."

soldier's having a calming effect on the population reinforced the national strategy of keeping the conflict low key, and indeed calm, and thus inexpensive. His presence was designed primarily to gain the confidence of the local population and follows the British principle of minimum force in counterinsurgency. It contrasts with the initial French practise called *ratissage* or "raking over," which terrorised the Algerian population.[69] It also contrasted with the U.S. practise of conducting counterinsurgency as a subset of conventional war.[70] The massed firepower that had served the U.S. Army well in winning World War II and Korea was both expensive and inappropriate for a conflict in which the enemy mixed with the people and both became targets with conventional war practises. The indiscriminate use of firepower endangered the population and terrorised the very audience that the government was trying to win. Both of these styles also tended to remove the soldier from meaningful contact with the population and thus reduced his effectiveness in gaining its confidence and in winning its loyalty. The Portuguese sought to win militarily and to do so in a subdued, low tempo, affordable way.

The Military Dimension

The military dimension is the most detailed portion of the doctrine and is aimed almost exclusively at providing a guide for the conduct of light infantry, small unit patrols. It is a revision of the *Guia para o Emprego Táctico das Pequenas Unidades na Contra Guerrilha* [Guide for the Tactical Employment of Small Units in Counter

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[69]Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace, Algeria 1954-1962* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), 104; and Paret, 37.

[70]Krepinevich, 39.

Guerrilla Warfare] issued as a trial in 1961.[71] The "Guide" is a detailed tactical doctrine that was one of the earlier pilot sections tested in the field. It was rushed into service following the uprisings of 1961 and reflected the very thorough groundwork done by the Portuguese Army General Staff to prepare Portugal's troops for a "form of warfare in which most irregular warriors excel and in which regular troops are almost invariably seen at their worst."[72]

The military dimension is tactical, which provides the main body of doctrinal instruction and furnishes a common foundation on which to base plans. Such doctrine normally appears in the form of training and field manuals and is widely disseminated within the armed forces. It supports the tactical level of war, which is the world of combat and is focused on defeating the enemy at a particular time and place. This work builds on the comprehensive treatment given the methods of the insurgent and the principles of warfare used to counter his threat. The topic is addressed in two phases. The first is a compilation of the most important elements of tactical doctrine relating to the preparation and execution of the more typical operations of small units in counter-subversive war. The second details these operations in the simplest terms, an important factor in communicating with the soldier.

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[71]Estado-Maior do Exército, *Guia para o Emprego Táctico das Pequenas Unidades na Contra Guerrilha* [Guide for the Tactical Employment of Small Units in Counter Guerrilla Warfare], Part 1, *O Exército na Guerra Subversiva* [The Army in Subversive War] (Lisbon: Ministério do Exército, 1961).

[72]Charles E. Callwell, Colonel, Royal Artillery, British Army, *Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1896; reprint, London: Lionel Leventhal Limited, 1990), 125.

The entire focus of this military dimension centres on the uniqueness of counter-insurgency. While the armed forces must be prepared to fight with professional skill and dedication, it must do so in a non-traditional and innovative manner, one that avoids the conventional tactics likely to harm and thus alienate the population surrounded by the fighting. This requirement is neither easy nor simple in that it requires conventionally trained troops to modify their tactical practice in ways that run counter to much of their training. This product is the result of the early pilot programs at the CIOE and the doctrinal research done by the IAEM and the RMA and fully addresses this dilemma. It equally aims at keeping the tone of the conflict low key to avoid frightening the population. The military contribution is to subdue violent activity and to provide security so that the political process of winning the population can occur. Their organisation and training will have to be tailored to the unique task of counterinsurgency, and specialised troops employed as necessary.[73] "So, a total adaption must be made, not only in operational methods but also in the structuring of suitable tactical units - organisation, equipment and instruction - so that we can be poised at the opportune time in the area or actual location of the enemy."[74]

The instruction is related well to the strategic objectives in that it explains how the

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[73]Jaíme de Oliveira Leandro, First Lieutenant, Portuguese Army, "As Acções Contra-Revolucionárias e a sua Técnica" [Counter-Revolutionary Operations and its Technique], *Revista Militar* (January 1963): 54-55.

[74]Hermes de Araújo Oliveira, Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff, Portuguese Army, "A Reposta à Guerra Subversiva" [The Response to Subversive War], *Subversão e Counter-Subversão*, Estudos de Ciências Políticas e Sociais No. 62, Junta de Investigações do Ultramar (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Políticos e Sociais, 1963), 55. "Há, pois, que fazer uma adaptação total, não só nos métodos de acção, mas também na estruturação das próprias unidades - orgânica, equipamento e instrução - para podermos estar presentes em tempo oportuno na área ou no local de actuação do inimigo."

soldier through his tactical actions fits into the campaign goals of protecting the population and reducing the insurgent's access to it. It further explains how the guerrilla operates and stresses the importance of why he must be denied access to the population. Guerrilla contact with the population was to be prevented at all costs, and the Portuguese commanders and soldiers were very sensitive to guerrilla initiatives with the people.[75] It also reflects the national strategy of keeping the operations subdued and low tempo not only for the cost containment but to avoid terrorising the population.

The Social Dimension

As the military dimension talked about the nature of the war and told the soldier how to kill guerrillas and stay alive, so the social dimension talked about his relationship with the population and civil government and the messages that were being carried to the people both in Portuguese Africa and the neighbouring countries. This dimension is important both tactically and strategically and accordingly receives considerable treatment, as it is a prime consideration in all aspects of counterinsurgency.

When faced with an insurgency a government must respond as promptly and as positively as possible, particularly to redress grievances. Its response should address the root causes of the insurgency with a clear plan supported by a range of social, economic, legal, and administrative measures in addition to military activity. The words of General Sir Frank Kitson remind us that "insurgency is not primarily a military activity," and thus

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[75]Brigadeiro Renato F. Marques Pinto, interview by the author, 30 March 1995, Oeiras.

the Portuguese government's response could not be exclusively military.[76] The Portuguese authorities identified the social dimension as the key to retaining Africa and consequently oriented their doctrine and the soldier's duties in this direction. "National mobilisation must not then rely exclusively on the armed forces, but absolutely on a country's every resource: teaching and education, hygiene and health, public works and communications, agronomy and veterinary medicine, industry and mining...each and every one must be, as with the military, a force mobilised to intervene in the struggle when and where needed."[77] Writers of the Portuguese doctrine divided the social dimension into two parts, the Army's support of civil efforts and the promotion of these activities through a program of psychological operations.

The support for civic action was initially limited and focused on "providing intelligence, reinforcing police operations or acting in cooperation with them in maintaining order, guaranteeing control of the population, and assuring the maintenance of essential services, when necessary."[78] The initial thrust was to use the military to maintain law and order, and the doctrine consequently stresses as its central theme the

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[76]Frank Kitson, *Bunch of Five* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1977), 282.

[77]Hermes de Araújo Oliveira, Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff, Portuguese Army, "Guerra Subversiva: Subsídios para uma Estratégia de Reacção" [Subversive War: Information for a Strategy of Response], *Revista Militar* (November 1964): 672. "A mobilização nacional deve, pois, recair não apenas sobre as forças armadas, mas sim sobre todos os sectores da actividade do país: ensino e educação, higiene e saúde, obras públicas e comunicações, agricultura e veterinária, industrias e minas...tudo e tudos devem ser, como o militar, forças mobilizáveis, a fazer intervir na luta, quando e onde se torne indispensável."

[78]*O Exército na Guerra Subversiva*, Vol. IV, v. "prestando-lhes informações, reforçando a acção da Polícia ou actuando em cooperação com ela na manutenção da ordem, garantindo o controle da população e assegurando a manutenção dos serviços essenciais, quando necessário."

support of and coordination with all of the elements of the Portuguese civil arms, which were initially identified as police forces but later expanded to cover all civil authority.[79] As insurgencies are primarily wars for the people's loyalty, there were aspects beside the suppression of violence that demanded attention. The military was to effect a new psychosocial program, a program in which Portuguese soldiers provided not only local protection from insurgent intimidation but the manpower to build schools, teach in the schools, drill wells, and initiate basic medical, health, and sanitation services. This effort required coordination not only across common civil-military disciplines, such as the medical services, but also between every level within such a dichotomy.[80] This coordination was a particularly foreign concept and practise for the normal soldier, who regarded his duties primarily in the conventional war context of killing the enemy. It was thus vital for the doctrine to explain these aspects of counterinsurgency to him, as his awareness of and participation in civil-military measures was the key to victory within the population. The originators of the French *guerre révolutionnaire* theory had witnessed the strong civil-military coordination in the Indochinese insurgents and felt that it must be matched from the counterinsurgency side as well. The Portuguese Army had seen the benefits of this strong civil-military coordination on its visits to Algeria and its observation of *guerre révolutionnaire* principles in operation. In its doctrine the Portuguese Army adapted these French principles to its operation and reflected them in its doctrine.

Colonel Carlos da Costa Gomes Bessa commented on reorienting the Portuguese

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[79]*O Exército na Guerra Subversiva*, Vol. IV, Annex A, 1-5.

[80]*O Exército na Guerra Subversiva*, Vol. IV, Chapter I, 1.

soldier to civil support based on his later experience in implementing the doctrine as a staff officer responsible for civil-military coordination, "for the various organs which constituted the counter-subversive structure there were civil and military principals responsible at their respective levels."[81] Colonel Bessa also stressed the importance of not only having an interlocking relationship but also having a positive, cohesive one:

> With respect to civil-military collaboration, which is indispensable to the proper functioning of a counter-subversion structure, more than the organisation, all depends on the attitude and training of the people for the task of their respective functions, and is the reason for which their selection is the most important determinant factor.[82]

Colonel Bessa described the problem-solving process in this relationship as being one in which no problem was considered too difficult to solve and that it was the preferred method to make decisions at the lowest possible level, as it was here that people would be immediately affected and benefit most.[83] Elevating the decision-making to those without an immediate interest might evoke the wrong solution. Indeed the process should begin at the level of the local commissions (*comissões locais*) that had direct contact with the population, as they were "in a better position to understand, capture and transmit the

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[81]Carlos da Costa Gomes Bessa, Colonel, General Staff, Portuguese Army, "Angola: A Luta Contra a Subversão e a Colaboração Civil-Militar" [Angola: The Fight Against Subversion and the Civil-Military Collaboration], *Revista Militar* (August-September 1972): 421. "Dos vários órgãos da estrutura da contra-subversão fazem parte os principais responsáveis civis e militares existentes ao nível respectivo."

[82]Gomes Bessa, 424. "No que respeita à colaboração civil-militar, que é indispensável para o bom funcionamento de uma estrutura de contra-subversão, mais do que da orgânica, todo depende da mentalidade e preparação das pessoas para o exercício das respectivas funções, pelo que a sua escolha e orientação assume importância a sobrelevar o restante."

[83]Colonel Carlos da Costa Gomes Bessa, interview by the author, 18 November 1995, Lisbon.

true concerns and aspirations" of the people.[84] These commissions proved a valuable tool as a local level vehicle for political participation in countering the insurgent's promises. Through this process the doctrine was expanded to include the following broad programs in the Army's psychosocial operations:

- Social:
  - -Education
  - -Sanitary assistance
  - -Economic development in agriculture and cattle husbandry
  - -Local infrastructure improvements
- Communications
- Self-defense of localities and villages.[85]

The process in civil-military coordination was initially focused on augmenting the various police functions, as law and order were the primary concerns. The perspective was later widened from security concerns to include an extensive range of social programs and the need for a plan with a single point of responsibility and effective coordination at every level to achieve a unity of effort. Portugal in making dramatic changes in the treatment of its African population, instructed the soldier in his duties and explained his role in the social dimension.

The second aspect of the social dimension was Portuguese psychological operations (PSYOP, or in Portuguese, APSIC officially, or *Psico* unofficially), which were designed to promote the Portuguese socio-political efforts to the target audience of the African population in Portuguese Africa and its neighbouring states. The Portuguese also saw

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[84]Gomes Bessa, 427. "...em melhores condições para as compreender, captando e transmitindo superiormente os seus verdadeiros anseios e aspirações."

[85]Gomes Bessa, 435.

PSYOP as an important tool of warfare in that if an opponent's attitude can be influenced favourably, then his physical resistance will diminish. With this effect in combination with other military, diplomatic, or social operations, PSYOP acts as a "force multiplier" by enhancing the result of those operations on the target.[86] The nationalist movements and their soldiers were key targets of Portuguese PSYOP. The Portuguese also designed PSYOP to support the other elements of their counter-subversive strategy and became accomplished in this science.

At the outbreak of hostilities several PSYOP dynamics were apparent. First, prior to 1961 there was only a small PSYOP department in the Portuguese Army. In the 1958-1959 period the missions to Algeria observed the French application of PSYOP and saw immediate application to the *ultramar*. The reports of these officers and their experience with the Service d'Action Psychologique et d'Information (SAPI) in Algeria were thus the beginning of the Portuguese competence in this field.[87] SAPI had been established by Colonel Lacheroy in April 1956 and was a powerful agency for spreading the *guerre révolutionnaire* doctrine.[88]

The French position was that "proper psychological measures could create and

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[86]Glenn Curtis, *An Overview of Psychological Operations (PSYOP)* (Hurlburt Field, Florida: USAF Special Operations Command, 1990), 2. PSYOP is the generally accepted acronym within the NATO community for psychological operations. APSIC is the official Portuguese acronym, and *Psico* is the unofficial Portuguese nickname for *acção psicológica*.

[87]Estado-Maior do Exército, *Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)* [Historical Military Report on the African Campaigns (1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exército, 1988), Vol. I, 397.

[88]Paret, 55.

maintain ideological cohesion among fighters and their civilian supporters."[89] The Portuguese also believed this premise valid and elected to begin with its soldiers and expand the appeal to the population through him. The most effective medium in targeting the African people was the Portuguese soldier who was in daily contact with the population. The Army was to be during the wars "a psychological 'weapon' of overwhelming value both defensively and offensively."[90] Accordingly, PSYOP doctrine and principles were included in his instruction from the earliest stages of the war. The soldier's understanding of the PSYOP process was vital to its successful application, and his continuing awareness was emphasised through reports and writings that were circulated regularly in all of the military zones.

The Logistical (Administrative) Dimension

This dimension of administrative and logistic support is the preponderant factor in the efficiency of military forces in any campaign. As Colonel P. D. Foxton, a British Army logistician reminds us:

> It is logistics which moves armies to where they can fight. It is logistics which keeps weapon systems firing and maintained. Indeed, so important is logistics that it features as a principal factor in almost every soldier's appreciation of the task facing him, and in the plan that is finally made.[91]

Within NATO, logistics is defined as the science of planning the movement and

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[89]Paret, 7.

[90]*O Exército na Guerra Subversiva*, Vol. III, vi. "uma «arma» psicológica de valor preponderante e da sua aplicação tanto defensiva como ofensiva."

[91]P. D. Foxton, Colonel, British Army (Retired), *Powering War: Modern Land Force Logistics* (London: Brassey's (UK) Ltd., 1994), 2.

maintenance of forces.[92] These are essentially unglamorous activities generally lumped together by most armies under a catch-all title of "administration" or "administration and logistics." They comprise such functions as transportation, supply, medical evacuation and hospitalisation, and other smaller services. In grand wars logistics are the limiting factor to any campaign. In low-intensity conflict they are not normally as vital, causing Major General Julian Thompson, Royal Marines, to observe, "(Low-intensity operations) provided few examples where logistics played an important part in their success, or otherwise."[93] In this campaign, however, they were vital to Portugal in fighting a counterinsurgency as far as 10,300 kilometres from home.

Portugal believed that in subversive war this support was doubly important for two reasons:

- Morale of the troops assumes a much more elevated role in this environment and is thus more fickle to the functioning of support, and

- The level of this morale affects troop relations with the population and vice-versa, and thus, the psychosocial program.[94]

Consequently, the characteristics of subversive war in Portugal's case confer special relevance on administration and logistics as a factor of success in the conduct of operations. The topic is so complex that a subsequent chapter is devoted to examining the unique aspects of this support.

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[92]*The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Facts and Figures* (Brussels: NATO Information Services, 1989), 253.

[93]Julian Thompson, Major General, Royal Marines (Retired), *The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict* (London: Brassey's (UK) Ltd., 1991), xiv.

[94]*O Exército na Guerra Subversiva*, Vol. V, v.

Timeliness and Importance of *O Exército na Guerra Subversiva*

The Portuguese Army's development of its counterinsurgency doctrine is a reflection of Portugal's overall sensitivity to its colonies and their vulnerability and to its role in their defense. The advent of wars of national liberation with their Cold War undercurrent heightened this Army responsibility. The embroilment of France and Britain in Algeria (1954-1962) and in Malaya (1948-1960), Kenya (1952-1960), and Cyprus (1955-1960) further served as strong warning signals. Accordingly, the Portuguese Army began its earnest work in 1960 and accelerated this effort in the months just prior to and during the opening of the Campaigns.

The Portuguese Army had had a long history of and experience in African operations and knew the vagaries of the terrain and populations well. It had studied the theory and principles of subversive war for the better part of a decade and sought the French and British perspectives on this type of conflict to refine its own understanding. As it proceeded to write its doctrine for the coming wars, it drew heavily on the experiences and theories of these two colonial allies.

In neither of the foregoing cases was there a formal counterinsurgency doctrine on which the Portuguese Army could model its projected work. Although the British published theatre doctrines for Malaya (1952) and Kenya (1954), and these volumes were valuable to the Portuguese, the War Office did not issue a formal counterinsurgency doctrine until 1960. In France there was a substantial amount of material written on *guerre révolutionnaire* and its application to Algeria, but the French Ministry of the

Armies also did not issue an official written doctrine until 1960.[95]

The Portuguese Army assiduously gathered material from those militaries fighting counterinsurgencies, sifted through the information for its application to the portending conflict in Portuguese Africa, and created a timely doctrine for the Portuguese soldier. The concepts and practises in the preliminary doctrine were tested in the beginning months of the conflict in Angola and earlier at the CIOE in Lamego. Refinement and formal publication occurred in 1963, less than three years after the process had begun. The Portuguese Army through this methodology sought to avoid the lengthy and expensive problem that the British had faced in Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus in which troops sent to fight an insurgency arrived "not knowing what it was all about" and had no doctrine to guide them.[96] It had devoted considerable and thorough research into the type and style of counterinsurgency operations appropriate to Portuguese Africa, always appreciating the value of and need for effective and inexpensive tactics. As a result, *O Exército na Guerra Subversiva* is a counterinsurgency doctrine that was appropriate both to Portugal's means and to the circumstances in Africa that it faced and was delivered in time for the conflict. The basic tenets of this pre-war doctrine and thinking remained valid throughout the Campaigns, and as we shall see, these principles influenced and guided the entire Portuguese war effort.

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[95]Timothy Llewellyn Jones, *The Development of British Counterinsurgency Policies and Doctrine, 1945-1952* (London: Ph.D. Thesis, King's College, London, 1992), 373-375.

[96]Hoffman and Taw, 1 and 20.

IV

Portuguese Organisation, Education and Training for Counterinsurgency

In 1960 the Portuguese Army along with the entire defense establishment had completed a reorganisation begun in 1937 and designed to modernise its structure. The purpose of this lengthy evolution had been to unify the defense organisation and place the Portuguese Armed Forces on a conventional war footing with its NATO partners.[1] Portugal was now faced with a new and different type of war that required immediate adjustments, if it were to prevail over the nationalist movements and their military arms of guerrillas. The luxury of a two decade leisurely reorganisation could not be afforded. Portugal would have to restructure its military forces, and train and educate them in record time to become an effective counterinsurgency force that could meet the immediate challenge of a "war of national liberation." This chapter selectively describes this reorganisation and the search for solutions in implementing these wholesale changes. It compares this adjustment to that of other armies fighting contemporary counter-insurgencies as a measure of the Portuguese achievement.

Militarily Unprepared *Ultramar*

Prior to 1950 Portugal had in effect two distinct armies. The primary force was

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[1]Kaúlza de Arriaga, "Portuguese National Defense during the Last 40 Years and in the Future," Lecture delivered on 20 October 1966, Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, Lisbon, 12.

stationed in the *metrópole* and was the one on which the country depended for its defense and which was the responsibility of the Ministry of War. The other consisted of forces stationed in the *ultramar* and was the portfolio of the Ministry of the Colonies. In 1950 the responsibility for the entire armed forces was unified under the Ministry of National Defense, and the Ministry of War became the Ministry of the Army on an equal standing with its Naval and Air Force counterparts.[2] This change and subsequent ones occurred as a result of Portugal's post World War II integration into NATO and the influence that the Alliance had on its military thinking. The move at this level also began in 1953 from the "*Tipo Português*" methods to those of the "*Tipo Americano*".[3] This shift in organisational philosophy was reflected in a reshaped army, and as 1961 approached, it grew to look very much like the U. S. force structure, a conventional army trained and equipped to fight Soviet forces in Europe.

These reorganisations and expansions had had the effect of modernising the Portuguese Armed Forces within the limits of its national resources and had laid the foundation for the further expansion required to conduct the African Campaigns of 1961-

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[2]National Assembly (Ministry of War), Portugal, Decree-Law Nº 37 542 (2 September 1949); Decree-Law Nº 39 541 (16 February 1954); Decree-Law Nº 41 559 (15 March 1958); Decree-Law Nº 41 577 (2 April 1958); Decree-Law Nº 41 578 (2 April 1958); and Joaquim Moreira da Silva Cunha, *O Ultramar, a Nação e o "25 de Abril"* [The Overseas Provinces, the Nation and the "25th of April"] (Coimbra: Atlântida Editora, 1977), 292.

[3]Estado-Maior do Exército, *Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)* [Historical-Military Report of the African Campaigns (1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Ministério do Exército, 1989), Vol. I, 426; and Luís Alberto Santiago Inocentes, Colonel, Staff Corps, Portuguese Army (Retired), interviewed by the author, 18 March 1994, London. "*TP*" or *Tipo Português* was the earlier, pre-1953 method modeled largely on the French army, and "*TA*" or *Tipo Americano* reflected the U. S. Army organisation developed in World War II.

1974.[4] This modernisation included construction of an improved national infrastructure and acquisition of new weaponry for use in Europe as part of the NATO commitment. It also had the effect of developing the proficiency of Portugal's armed forces in the operational processes of waging modern war. The gains in new skills, equipment, and facilities put it on a par in force quality with the other front-line NATO militaries. This focus was European at the expense of the colonies.

After World War II and prior to the incidents of 1961 the troop disposition in Angola and the other colonies had been reduced to very modest numbers, and on 31 December 1960 there were approximately 6,500 military personnel in the colony, 1,500 European

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[4]General Kaúlza de Arriaga, Portuguese Army (Retired), interview by the author, 8 November 1994, Lisbon. The reorganisation and integration of the armies into a single structure was only completed in 1960. The Air Force was created as a separate service in 1952, and its extension to the *ultramar* completed in 1957. The Navy by 1958 had completed a restructuring as well to bring itself in step with NATO. General Arriaga observed that while the reorganisations had been based on very good principles, they had been applied sluggishly with a consequent delayed effectiveness. General Arriaga had been appointed when he was a Lieutenant Colonel to assume the duties initially as the Sub-Secretary of State for Aeronautics and later as the Secretary of State for Aeronautics in building the Portuguese Air Force. In 1952 the air arms of the Army and Navy were combined to form the Portuguese Air Force, and this new service was by 1957 organised and structured to be in step with its sister services and NATO and to extend its infrastructure and operations to the *ultramar*. While the number of aircraft of all types had grown from a beginning level of 200 in 1952 to nearly 600 at the beginning of the African Campaigns, the truly important achievement had been the construction of the aerial infrastructure both in the *metrópole* and particularly in the *ultramar*. This joint civil-military project produced about 750 airfields, of which 65 could accommodate medium aircraft and 22, the largest ones. In Angola there were about 400 fields, 27 of which could handle medium and in some cases large aircraft. In Mozambique the numbers were 300 and 20 respectively. It was at the time considered one of the "greatest construction projects on a national scale that had ever been undertaken in Portugal." This timely development was instrumental in mobilising Air Force support during the Angola uprisings of 1961 and in conducting the subsequent campaigns.

and 5,000 locally recruited troops.[5] In Guiné and Mozambique figures for this date are unavailable; however, one year later there were 4,736 troops in Guiné (3,736 European and 1,000 locally recruited troops) and 11,209 troops in Mozambique (8,209 European and 3,000 locally recruited troops).[6] In all cases the great majority of these were employed in local security and the recruiting and training of African and local European soldiers. They were consequently scattered throughout the territory of each colony rather than concentrated in any area of potential trouble. Further, the military commanders in each of the three theatres could not have brought these forces together quickly in countering a local threat because of the vastness of Angola and Mozambique and the difficult terrain of Guiné. The limited capability of infrastructure to serve military mobility requirements in each of the three colonies further inhibited any rapid concentration of troops. It cannot be surprising that these small numbers disbursed so widely in each theatre were unable to defend Angola or any other territory successfully against the likes of the March 1961 attacks. The most telling fact in the Angola incident was that, following these assaults, seventy-seven days elapsed until Battalion 88 under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Pinheiro arrived on 31 May at Damba, a city in the centre of the devastation, and assumed responsibility for securing an area of 12,000 square kilometres.[7]

The Portuguese proceeded to reinforce Angola throughout the year as well as Guiné

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[5]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. II (Disposition of Our Forces in Angola), 72.

[6]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 260-261.

[7]Hélio A. Esteves Felgas, *Guerra em Angola* [War in Angola] (Lisbon: Livraria Clássica Editora, 1961), 109.

and Mozambique in anticipation of additional trouble. By the end of 1961 there were 49,422 military personnel in the three colonies, as depicted in Table 1, and the *jacquerie* had been subdued. But Portugal's war machine had not been prepared, and much work lay ahead if it were to defeat the nationalists and regain the confidence and loyalty of its population.

Military Personnel in the Three Theatres of Operation
31 December 1961

	Angola	Mozambique	Guiné	Total
European	28,477	8,209	3,736	40,422
African	5,000	3,000	1,000	9,000
Total	33,477	11,209	4,736	49,422

Based on information in *Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 259.

Table 1

The immediate and obvious lesson that the Portuguese Army learned in this initial action was that its conventional force was ill-suited to wage a counterinsurgency. It lacked almost every quality that was necessary in this type of conflict. Britain had entered Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus unprepared, France had done the same in Algeria, and Portugal now found itself in similar circumstances.[8] Portugal set about the task of building an army tailored for combat against an unconventional enemy in a forbidding environment far from home.

Campaign Organisation for Counterinsurgency

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[8]Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer M. Taw, *Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: The Development of Britain's "Small Wars" Doctrine During the 1950s* (Santa Barbara: Rand Corporation, 1991), 1 and 20; and Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace, Algeria 1954-1962* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), 100.

The first serious events in Angola prompted a remodelling of the command structure in the territories in which the duties of the Commander of the Military Region for each theatre, who was part of the territorial organisation, and the Commander-in-Chief of each theatre were separated. The Commander-in-Chief assumed additional duties as the local Provincial Governor, bringing him closer to the people and their needs. This development came with a deeper recognition that the conflict was as much a struggle to gain the loyalty of the population through socio-economic activity as it was a military effort. The Commander of the Military Region was dependent through the administrative chain of command on the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Ministry of the Army, and the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces for support in effecting the preparation, mobilisation, administration, and discipline of elements under his command.[9] Somewhat later this same structure was implemented in Guiné (1963) and Mozambique (1964), as the conflict developed.

With the passage of time the Commanders-in-Chief played an increasing role in operational matters, until ultimately toward 1969 the Commanders of the Military Regions were withdrawn from this responsibility and assumed a support role for both military and civil efforts. The Commanders-in-Chief thus became responsible for intelligence and operations in an operational chain of command to the Chief of the General Staff, while the Commander of the Military Region continued to be responsible for administration, logistics, and instruction and reported to the Chief of Staff of the Army.[10] Below these levels were the Territorial Commanders and Intervention Zone

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[9]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 202.

[10]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 203.

Commanders. The Territorial Commanders were largely administrative, presided over a low-threat environment, and consequently reported through the Commander of the Military Region. Intervention Zone Commanders were largely operational, faced a combat situation, depended on the Commander of the Military Region for administrative and logistical support, but reported to the Commander-in-Chief. These adjustments reflect the assumption of an increasing pacification role by the military and were an attempt to respond to combat conditions as they evolved in the *ultramar*.

The Territorial Commanders and their organisation represented the original, pre-war structure responsible for the security of Portugal and its colonies. It was also a key part of the military organisation and formed part of the Army's organisational structure at the campaign and tactical levels. It oversaw the recruitment, formation, mobilisation, and logistic and administrative support of military contingents needed for the wars. While the territorial organisation had a long history and tradition, the modern organisation was a reflection of the experience gained in the 1895 Campaigns of Africa as well as the country's more recent participation in World War II and in NATO.[11]

In the *ultramar* at the beginning of the Campaigns, the territorial commands were subordinated to the general headquarters of their respective military region and were the purview of the Commander of the Military Region. Each of these commands was subdivided into zones. Each zone was further subdivided into sectors. Sectors were again divided into zones of operation (*zona de acção*) and assigned to a battalion commander and his companies. The battalion commander normally directed the activities

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[11]Inocentes interview, 22 October 1994.

within a *zona de acção*.[12]

This *quadrillage* concept had been modified from the French Army strategy of pacification in Algeria and introduced into Angola by General Carlos Miguel Lopes da Silva Freire.[13] The system entailed full cooperation between the military, the police, and the civil administration at all levels. The accent was traditionally on the prominent force in the area. In cities it was the police. In the rural areas it was the army. Each supposedly helped the other, and the entire effort was linked to a civil development program and the protection of the population from insurgent intimidation.[14]

During the period of transition in the status and duties of the Commander of the Military Region as dictated by the course of the wars, there was a division of responsibility according to enemy activity. In areas of little or no enemy activity, battalion operations would be coordinated through the Territorial Commander or at the regimental field command level. In a high threat environment, a special sector would be created to address the problem, and the senior battalion commander appointed as the sector commander (*comando de sector*) to oversee and coordinate battalion activity.[15] Often a battalion was the only one in a special sector, and its commander was also the *comando de sector*. In this case, he would report to the Commander-in-Chief,

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[12]Brigadeiro Hélio A. Esteves Felgas, Portuguese Army (Retired), interview by the author, 22 November 1994, Lisbon.

[13]Silva Cunha, 297.

[14]Edgar O'Ballance, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-1962* (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1967), 64-65.

[15]Felgas interview, 22 November 1994.

Commander of the Military Region, or Zone Commander, as assigned.[16]

From time to time, particularly in the early years of the campaigns when insurgent activity was comparatively widespread, several sectors would be combined in a zone of intervention (*zona de intervenção*). When the conflict began in Mozambique in September 1964, it was necessary to establish a zone there that extended north from the Zambezi River to the Tanzanian border on the Rovuma River.[17] Its commander was located in Nampula in a forward command post (*posto de comando avançado*), as the general headquarters of the military region was distant in Lourenço Marques. Similarly, in anticipation of insurgent activity that developed in the east of Angola in 1966 with the Chipenda faction of the MPLA, a comparable zone (*Zona de Intervenção Leste*) previously established in 1961 with its commander strategically relocated to Luso was augmented from battalion strength to command by a brigadier in 1966.[18] Because of the nature of the war in Mozambique and its concentration along the Tanzanian border, the general headquarters of the military region and of the Commander-in-Chief was moved to Nampula in November 1969, and the term "intervention zone" was changed to "operational zone" (*zona operacional*) in 1971 as a matter of the Commander-in-Chief's

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[16]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. 1, 203-204.

[17]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. 4, 103; and Estado-Maior do Exército, *Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)* [Aid for the Study of Doctrine Applicable in the Campaigns of Africa (1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exército, 1990), 116-117: The Northern Territorial Command (*CTN* or *Comando Territorial do Norte*) was changed to the Northern Intervention Zone (*ZIN* or *Zona de Intervenção Norte*) in late 1964.

[18]General José Manuel de Bethencourt Rodrigues, Portuguese Army (Retired), interview by the author, 9 November 1994, Lisbon; and *Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. 2, 65.

style.[19]

Each of the changes described represented an effort to protect the population as much as to destroy the enemy using a mutually supporting zone system. The British Army in Malaya (1948-1960) used a similar tactical organisation known as framework deployment, which was similar to the Portuguese arrangement. Malaya was divided into districts which were normally the responsibility of an infantry battalion. These districts would have corresponded to the Portuguese zones of operation (*zona de acção*) or later in the war, special sectors. The battalion's companies each occupied an assigned sector of the district. From time to time it was possible to retain one company as a reserve for unforseen circumstances, but normally the districts were so large that such reserves could be maintained only at the higher levels of command. Each company knew its assigned sector intimately and was thus able to hunt there effectively. Maintaining a fixed assignment for a company proved to be very important, as the troops would become familiar with the terrain and the habits of the local guerrillas (Chinese terrorists or CTs), and this acclimatisation would give them a proficiency that otherwise efficient units introduced to a strange sector could not duplicate. These infantry companies permanently assigned to a sector were able to act immediately on intelligence with devastating results.[20]

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[19]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. 4, 167; and Arriaga interview, 8 November 1994.

[20]Lieutenant Colonel Rowland S. N. Mans, "Winning in the Jungle - Malaya" in *The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him*, ed. T. N. Greene (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), 123.

The French in Algeria (1954-1962) addressed the concentration of guerrilla forces inside the country by covering it with a checkerboard of outposts. This *quadrillage* depended on the thorough knowledge of local conditions that the troops in each post possessed. The duties of these troops included routine security and police work, collecting intelligence, various construction projects, and limited military operations. Whenever possible the troops were permanently assigned to these posts to maintain the continuity of their relationship with the local citizens and knowledge of area operation conditions. These local garrisons were reinforced by mobile units that helped to foil guerrilla contact with the population. Larger offensive operations were performed by an intervention force, the *Reserve Générale*, composed of elite troops. In the latter stages of the war about 300,000 troops were committed to the *quadrillage* system and an additional 10% or 30,000 to the *Reserve Générale*.[21] This system worked well against a widely dispersed guerrilla force, and was adopted and modified by the Portuguese Army for certain situations in its Campaign.

The Portuguese had failures as well in limiting access to its people. The fact that they were not always successful, however, does not negate the effort. One such example occurred between 1968 and 1969, when the Portuguese stationed a company of infantry in the *posto* of Madina do Boé in the eastern expanse of Guiné next to its southern border with the Republic of Guinea. The area was isolated, remote and sparsely inhabited. Sent there to administer to and defend the civil population and to interdict the PAIGC incursions from Guinea, the troops found the situation impossible. There were very few

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[21]Peter Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), 103.

people who needed help, no structures of any importance to preserve, and dozens of kilometres of permeable frontier. Other than protecting the odd bridge and the occasional *tabanca*, its main job was that of defending itself.[22] There was a reluctance to withdraw the company from its untenable and overextended position, as the PAIGC would then declare the region "liberated." A similar situation had developed earlier in the more eastern zone of Beli, and upon Portuguese troop withdrawal the PAIGC had declared the area to be a "liberated zone." Eventually the same situation developed with the withdrawal of the company at Madina in 1969, and the PAIGC proceeded to entertain foreign journalists on Portuguese soil with the consequent unwanted publicity. The area was of no economic value, the sparse population was not strategically important to either side, and the Portuguese troops were better utilised in other duties. In hindsight it is apparent that the civil and military resources in this case were not part of a joint plan thoroughly coordinated. Then too the jungles and swamp of Guiné provided protective cover for the guerrillas that the *bled* of Algeria lacked. The French more easily dispersed and destroyed guerrillas in these areas and were able to protect their outposts more effectively than did the Portuguese at Madina do Boé.

While the Portuguese command structure was described in laws and regulations, their interpretation and the actual solutions differed from one theatre to another. These differences depended on various factors, such as the expanse of the theatre, the tempo of the conflict, the personalities of the Commanders-in-Chief, and their relations with Lisbon. Because of these factors each structure had evolved somewhat differently over

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[22]Felgas interview, 22 November 1994. "A Companhia de Madina estava lá para se defender a si propria."

the course of the Campaigns, but nevertheless, represented the command and control solution to the problems of each theatre and were effective in maintaining pressure on the enemy. Each is the result of a continuing reassessment in the midst of war and represents a willingness to learn and adapt.[23]

The Portuguese constantly sought to rethink and refine their command and force structure to address the execution of their counterinsurgency plan, which sought to maintain the initiative through the long-term patrolling of a small areas, operating extensively at night, acting on intelligence about the insurgent's infrastructure, and maintaining contact with the population. While mistakes were made, solutions were sought within their resources, and they never lost sight of the fact that the purpose of their armed forces was to cement this all important relationship with the people.[24] To this end the gradual and ponderous changes in the campaign command structure supported the implementation of established counterinsurgency principles adapted to the *ultramar*.

Organisation for Civil-Military Coordination

The Portuguese knew that this struggle was a war that the military could not win on its own. The intricate web of civil administration, police, and military had to be woven into a cohesive whole, capable of functioning as a war machine. The Portuguese honoured the concept explained by Sir Gerald Templer soon after being appointed High Commissioner for Malaya in 1951: "I should like it to be clearly understood that in

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[23]Christopher C. Harmon, "Illustrations of 'Learning' in Counterinsurgency," *Comparative Strategy* (January-March 1992): 29.

[24]Bethencourt Rodrigues interview, 9 November 1994.

Malaya we are conducting the campaign against communism on all fronts. We are fighting not only on the military front, but on the political, social, and economic fronts as well."[25] The Portuguese were no less emphatic in the definition of their own intent, as described by Lieutenant Colonel Oliveira of the General Staff of the Army: "National mobilisation must not rely exclusively on the armed forces, but absolutely on a country's every resource."[26]

The Portuguese wrestled with the proper method of integrating the military and civil structures in the most efficient way. During the wars they considered and used three:

- Parallel civil and military structures,
- A single military structure, and
- A mixed structure with a combination of civil and military organisations.[27]

They saw advantages and drawbacks to each of these systems. The first was employed in normal circumstances when the colonies were at peace and included the initial period of subversion in which preventive measures were being taken. The daily lives of the population remained largely unaffected. Because the two systems were separate, it was not easy to coordinate between the two structures at all levels, and there was always the

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[25]Mans, 120.

[26]Hermes de Araújo Oliveira, Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff, Portuguese Army, "Guerra Subversiva: Subsídios para uma Estratégia de Reacção" [Subversive War: Aid for a Strategy of Response], *Revista Militar* (November 1964): 672. "A mobilização nacional deve, pois, recair não apenas sobre as forças armadas, mas sim sobre todos os sectores da actividade do país."

[27]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, 113, and General Manuel Amorim de Sousa Menezes, interview by the author, 17 November 1994, Lisbon. General Menezes is one of the three authors of the referenced government document.

possibility of conflicting objectives and a duplication of effort.

The second was used when the civil government had lost control of the situation and was unable to function in the face of insurgent activity.[28] Military intervention became necessary and a military government was established to coordinate the civil and military functions. Military functions were substituted for civil ones, or civil functions were integrated into the military hierarchy. This system ensured a convergence of civil and military objectives, a unity of enforcement, and a close coordination at every level. The drawback was the suspension of certain civil liberties and the consequent inconvenience and disruption to the normal routine of the population.

The third was initiated once the situation had stabilised and was envisioned as the proper vehicle for pacification operations.[29] There was considerable debate over just how to establish the mixed structure, having one side dominate or having both the civil and military work together with each dominating certain sectors of government.[30] In Guiné, the system was unipolar with a single person responsible for both the civil and military functions. This system adhered to the principle of unity of command and was ideal for counter-subversion. In Angola and Mozambique the bipolar system was used. This system diluted the principle of unity of command but was adopted for political or

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[28]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, 113, and Menezes interview, 17 November 1994.

[29]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, 113, and Menezes interview, 17 November 1994.

[30]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, 114, and Menezes interview, 17 November 1994.

psychological reasons or as a concession to the civil government, and depended on a clear understanding and perfected coordination between the two authorities.[31] This coordination was achieved through the Provincial Defense Councils, which represented an integration of the duties of the Governors-General and Commanders-in-Chief. While in the unipolar system these two offices were embodied in one person and thus functioned as an executive organisation, the bipolar system was in comparison labour intensive in that it was a committee organisation in which many people needed to coordinate at each level. The decision-making process was slow and cumbersome because of the diverse nature and interests of these participants; nevertheless, all sought to overcome the inherent weaknesses of the bipolar system and to make it work.[32]

Probably the largest impediment to coordination in either system between civil and military authorities was the structural rigidity in each. The armed forces struggled internally in coordinating operations of the three services under a theatre commander-in-chief. Often the in-theatre service chiefs were senior to the theatre commander-in-chief and resented assigning operational control to a junior. If the armed forces suffered from organisational arteriosclerosis, then the civil departments were even more affected.[33] Health, education, public works, veterinary, agronomy, and the other departments were part of a rigid structure with a strong inbred resistance to change to cope with the war needs. This inflexibility manifested itself in conflict between the civil governor and the

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[31]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, 114, and Menezes interview, 17 November 1994.

[32]Menezes interview, 17 November 1994.

[33]Inocentes interview, 8 February 1995.

commander-in-chief in a bipolar system, and success only came when the posts were combined. In Guiné the system worked relatively well, as General António de Spínola held both offices. However, it was never easy to make the civilian departments understand the civil and military doctors could work side by side in civilian hospitals or that sergeants could teach alongside the civilian staff of the education departments.[34] The military tended to encounter civil problems more broadly because of its size and mobility and consequent increased contact with the population. The civilian departments tended to be office-bound, and because of their limited budgets, to be reduced in presence and authority. For instance, the Chief of the Health Department in Guiné had four doctors in the field while the Army Medical Corps had forty.[35] The Chief of Public Works and Communications had two engineers able to repair two miles of road per day, while the Army Engineering Corps had twenty engineers and a workforce adequate to rebuild twenty miles of road a day, including the repair of bridges.[36]

Notwithstanding the problems stemming from the differences in resources, structurally the military and civil systems were parallel. In the case of both the single and bipolar systems, the military commands equated to the political subdivisions in the continuing

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[34]Inocentes interview, 8 February 1995. This coordination was so important that every country in Africa facing difficulties with it was anxious to overcome them. In 1966-1967 the Rhodesians invited a large contingent of Portuguese officers to their headquarters for a briefing on civil-military coordination and on their solution to the problem. Not all of their solutions were applicable or transferable from the relative compactness of Rhodesia to the vastness of Angola or the thousand kilometre length of Mozambique. Nevertheless, the Portuguese were constantly trying to improve this coordination.

[35]Inocentes interview, 8 February 1995.

[36]Inocentes interview, 8 February 1995.

effort to coordinate activities and obtain a unity of effort, as shown below:

- *Província* (Province) = Military Region or Territorial Command
- *Distrito* (District) = Territorial Command or Military Command
- *Concelho* or *Circunscrição* = Military Command or battalion-size Unit
- *Postos*, *Freguesias* (Parish), or *Aldeias* (Settlement) = Units or Detachments[37]

In Mozambique, for example, in 1963 there were three Territorial Commands with limits coinciding with the boundaries of districts:

Northern Territorial Command (CTN):	All districts north of the Zambeze River: Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Moçambique, and Zambezia.
Central Territorial Command (CTC):	All districts between the Zambeze and Save Rivers: Tete and Manica e Sofala.
Southern Territorial Command (CTS):	All districts south of the Save River: Inhambane, Gaza, and Lourenço Marques.[38]

At the end of 1964 CTN was redesignated the Northern Intervention Zone (ZIN) and subdivided into three sectors corresponding to the three districts:

Sector A - District of Niassa

Sector B - District of Cabo Delgado

Sector C - District of Moçambique.[39]

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[37]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, 115.

[38]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, 116.

[39]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, 117.

As an example of the coordination required, it is helpful to examine the counter-subversion organisation at the provincial level for Angola as it existed in 1971. There were four levels of organisation:

- Provincial Council for Counter-Subversion (province level), which included the Governor-General, who acted as its president, the Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary General, the Provincial Secretaries, and the local commanders of the three military services;
- Counter-Subversion and Inspection Groups (there were three: 1. Silva Porto, 2. Luanda, and 3. Nova Lisboa);
- District Councils for Counter-Subversion (district level); and
- Local Commissions for Counter-Subversion (*concelho* and/or *posto* level).[40]

Each of these bodies had both civil and military members and addressed diverse problems at their respective levels. Often the Catholic Church, traditional local authorities, chiefs of militia, or agency heads for education or health were represented at their meetings to develop solutions and to provide insight into problems. In addressing such problems, each council or commission always made a supreme effort to find a solution at the local level rather than seeing the issue elevated to a higher one, where its importance was diluted in a crowded and less personal agenda. Those closest to the problem were invariably best fitted to craft a solution.[41] The work of coordinating these bodies with the different orientations of their members was tedious and time consuming and required a prodigious effort in all the participants. It was, however, a proven way to address an

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[40]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, 129-130; Carlos da Costa Gomes Bessa, Colonel, Staff Corps, Portuguese Army (Retired), interview by the author, 18 November 1994, Lisbon; and Gomes Bessa, "Angola - A luta contra a Subversão e a colaboração civil-militar" [Angola - The fight against subversion and civil-military collaboration], *Revista Militar* (August-September 1972): 421.

[41]Gomes Bessa, 425; and interview, 18 November 1994.

insurgency.[42]

This Portuguese system for civil-military coordination was similar in many ways to the British apparatus established in 1950 by Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, Director of Operations in Malaya. While the Portuguese system was a combination of committees and agency liaison, the British one was an elaborate committee system that was closely associated with the scheme for relocating its population. The committees were established at the district, state, and federation levels and provided liaison with all involved in counterinsurgency operations. The District War Executive Committee was the basic building block of the system. Chaired by the civilian district officer, it included representatives of military and civilian authorities. The next level was the State War Executive Committee, one for each of the nine Malay states and one for two of the three British colonies. The Federation Executive Council was the ultimate authority and chaired by the High Commissioner.[43] This three-tier system compares closely with the four-tier hierarchy in Angola in 1971, which was indicative of other Portuguese theatres as well. The Portuguese included the Catholic Church and traditional local authorities as a concession to their counterinsurgency environment. The British tended to keep membership to civil and military officials. Both were reflective of the counterinsurgency environment and government structure.

The Portuguese approach represented a blend of the British and French approaches.

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[42]Mans, 120.

[43]Thomas R. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919-1960* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990), 117-118.

As *guerre révolutionnaire* was almost wholly military in character, its application in Algeria to civil-military integration was met by extending the responsibility of the armed forces. The role of civilians in counterinsurgency remained largely unexplored in Algeria, and without this dimension a counterinsurgency cannot fully respond.[44] The Portuguese authorities likewise used their military to perform a bulk of civil duties simply because military manpower for such applications was readily available. The Portuguese were quite aware that an extension of civil authority was more appropriate than military in the case of counterinsurgency because the social, political, and economic dimensions dominated; however, Portugal was forced to use its available resources to respond. Their counterinsurgency organisation sought and integrated civilians into its decision-making process even though the military predominated, and this solution was indicative of the improvisation and compromise the Portuguese found necessary throughout the Campaigns to find the affordable means to achieve the desired ends.

Shifting to Small Units of Light Infantry

The Portuguese Armed Forces was well versed in the principles of counterinsurgency, was aware that its troops were not fighting a classic conventional war, and knew that its forces needed to be modified and adapted to the job at hand. There was substantial concern throughout the armed forces, and the Army in particular, in undertaking such a wholesale and radical change, as not only would it affect all aspects of tactics, techniques, and psychology, but it would also disturb professional career paths.[45]

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[44]Paret, 125.

[45]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, 124-125.

Portugal thus compromised between the creation of an entirely new army uniquely tailored to counterinsurgency and adapting its present army to the new type of struggle.[46]

From 1961 onward the names of Portuguese Army units did not necessarily indicate their duties. This situation reflects the counterinsurgency requirement that the majority of forces be trained as light infantry. Light infantry companies are the most effective counter-guerrilla force in a modern army, as they can "seek out and destroy the enemy on his terrain, using initiative, stealth and surprise."[47] Thus, infantry companies, artillery batteries, and cavalry squadrons, as such, did not necessarily lend themselves to counter-subversive war. In order to fulfil the counterinsurgency requirement, almost all units, whatever their original designation and purpose, were effectively suborned as light infantry companies and functioned as such. While these units were organised into infantry companies (*companhias de caçadores*), they often retained their old designations and were subdivided into "combat groups" instead of infantry platoons. The fact that they still retained their artillery or cavalry designations, for instance, meant that unit members did not necessarily forsake their traditions, and intimated that when the war was concluded, they would resume the career path in their chosen field of warfare. These designations were particularly important, as unit *esprit de corps* was very closely tied to a unit's original function and consequently had a large influence on the type of

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[46]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, 126.

[47]Lieutenant Colonels James K. Bruton and Wayne D. Zajac, *Cultural Interaction: The Forgotten Dimension of Low-Intensity Conflict*, Paper presented as a part of the syllabus for the seminar "Introduction to Special Operations" at The U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Florida, March 1990, 1. The authors quote from General John Wickham's 1984 White Paper on the primary role of the U.S. Army's light infantry divisions.

individuals that it attracted. It should also be noted that cavalry squadrons and artillery batteries in some cases did not shift to the infantry function. The cavalry exception and its unique role in Portuguese counterinsurgency will be addressed in a forthcoming chapter.

Reorganised Battalion of Infantry

- Battalion Commander
- Command and Service Company, with:
  - -Battalion Formation
  - -Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoon/Combat Group
  - -Signals (Communications) Platoon/Combat Group
  - -Sapper Platoon/Combat Group
  - -Maintenance Platoon/Combat Group
- Three Infantry Companies, each with a:
  - -Commander
  - -Staff/Administrative Platoon/Combat Group
  - -Three Infantry Platoons/Combat Groups

Based on information from *Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I; *Subsídios Para O Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)* and interviews with General Menezes, Brigadeiro Marques Pinto, and Colonel Inocentes.

Table 2

The reorganisation of a battalion of infantry and its companies of combat groups is depicted in Table 2. Each infantry company of about 120 men was comprised of three platoons of infantry and a support platoon, providing four identical elements or combat groups of 30 men each. This structure allowed one platoon or combat group in reserve, one for immediate support to the company, and two always ready for mounting a patrol.[48] In the event of high-tempo operations, the command and service company would supply security and reserve platoons or combat groups for the other infantry companies to the extent of its resources. This flexible organisation represented a

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[48]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, 131.

departure begun in 1953 from the former French pattern of three platoons per company (*Tipo Português* or "*TP*") to that of the U.S. with four to five platoons per company (*Tipo Americano* or "*TA*"). This more powerful structure provided the local commander with additional options in addressing a guerrilla threat.

These units would also need augmentation in both manpower and special skills from time to time. This reinforcement would come from reserve forces comprised of normal units or of special forces (*comandos*, *fuzileiros especiais*, *tropas pára-quedistas*, *et cetera*), depending on the skills needed. These reserve forces were called intervention forces (*força de intervenção*) and were used as the Commander-in-Chief saw fit to adjust for deficiencies in a particular sector or zone.

The creation of elite, special purpose forces that operated in small units with the attendant flexibility proved particularly valuable. This augmentation was embraced by all three services with the formation of the Army *comandos* (commandos),[49] Air Force *tropas pára-quedistas* (paratroops),[50] and the reestablishment of the Navy *fuzileiros especiais* (special marines).[51] The Portuguese Army began training *Cacadores Especiais* (Special Hunters) in 1960 at its new CIOE and deployed four companies to Angola that same year. The training was subsequently modified and extended to all units after 1961

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[49]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 329-331, and Vol. II, 73.

[50]Arriaga interview, 8 November 1994.

[51]Vice Admiral Nuno Gonçalo Vieira Matias, Portuguese Navy, Superintendent of Material Services, Lisbon, interview by the author, 23 November 1994, Lisbon. Admiral Matias is a former detachment commander of *Fuzileiros Especiais* (Special Marines) in Guiné.

with the *Cacadores Especiais* name no longer applying. *Comandos* (commandos) were formed in Angola beginning in 1962 on the recommendation of the Chief of Staff of the Military Region, Colonel Bethencourt Rodrigues.[52] In 1963 the first of these new troops were deployed in small numbers and in September 1964 the *1.ª Companhia de Comandos* (1st Company of Commandos) began operations from Belo Horizonte, Angola. Subsequently *comando* units and training centres were established in Guiné and Mozambique, which produced *Comandos Africanos*.

The *tropas pára-quedistas* were established on 14 August 1955 through the sponsorship of General Arriaga when he was Sub-Secretary of State for Aeronautics. First offered to the Army, which did not appreciate the need for such exotically-trained troops, the *pára-quedistas* were then assigned to the new Air Force and trained as a quick-reaction force that could be rapidly applied to a security problem.

The Portuguese *fuzileiros* have a long history dating from 1618 and are the most ancient of Portuguese infantry troops. Disbanded in 1890 and activated for a short period from 1924 to 1926, the *fuzileiros* were reactivated in 1961 for naval contingencies in the *ultramar*. Admiral Armando Reboredo, Chief of the General Staff of the Navy at the time, sponsored the reactivation, believing that patrol craft and small ships with infantry detachments would be indispensable in counterinsurgency. Initial training was conducted in the United Kingdom through the Royal Marines, while the *Escola de Fuzileiros* (School for Marines) was established at Vale do Zebro. Subsequent experience enabled the Portuguese to modify the training there to fit their specific theatre and way of

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[52]Marques Pinto correspondence, 9 August 1995.

fighting. *Companhias de Fuzileiros* (Marine Companies with a complement of about 180 men) were used in defense of Naval installations, in maritime and riverine security patrols, and in supporting Army operations by water. *Fuzileiros Especiais* (Special Marines) were formed in detachments of 70/80 men and trained in special operations techniques. Each detachment had expertise in a particular geographical area and operated there. Detachment personnel were usually inserted into their operating area by rubber boats for a normal two-day operation, always travelling cross country and avoiding roads because of mines.[53] The normal range of a patrol was about 30 kilometres because of the difficult terrain and tidal action.[54] They complemented the Army's commandos in the type of operations undertaken and were similar in capability to Royal Marine Special Boat Units and U.S. Navy SEAL teams.

These troops were all used in counterinsurgency operations and were widely respected by ally and enemy alike.[55] The paratroops and special marines were employed as intervention forces in areas where air mobility or water assault was appropriate and were generally operated with Army forces. Both the air and naval forces normally supported Army operations, as that service had primary responsibility for the war. Air Force support comprised primarily transportation, reconnaissance, and combat air support. Naval support involved protecting the riverine lines of communication, transporting and inserting troops by water, and water-borne fire support.

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[53]Corpo de Fuzileiros, *Fuzileiros Especiais* (Lisbon: Ministério da Marinha, unpublished history written in 1987), 14.

[54]Matias interview, 23 November 1994.

[55]Brigadier Michael Calvert, "Counterinsurgency in Mozambique," *Royal United Services Institute Journal for Defense Studies* (March 1973): 82.

Portugal had thus changed its Army to fit the war rather than trying to change the war to fit its Army. This complete restructuring from top to bottom of a nation's armed forces to fight a counterinsurgency was uniquely Portuguese and stands in stark contrast to the U.S. force structure in Vietnam, the British force structure in Malaya, Kenya, and Greece, and the initial French force structure in Algeria, all of which began as conventional forces untrained in counterinsurgency. The U.S. seemed particularly insensitive to the requirements of a counterinsurgency force. Ambassador Maxwell Taylor, when he learned that the U.S. intended to introduce ground forces into Vietnam, made the observation in a series of cables to Washington on 22 February 1965 that the American soldier, "armed, equipped, and trained as he is, (is) not suitable as (a) guerrilla fighter for Asian forests and jungles."[56] Later on 8 March 1965 witnessing the initial U.S. Marine Battalion Landing Team come ashore at Da Nang, Ambassador Taylor was distressed to note the accompanying tanks and self-propelled artillery that would be of little use in a counterinsurgency.[57]

The British Army entered each of its conflicts, Malaya, Kenya, and Greece, with poorly trained and inexperienced troops. The lack of a proper command structure meant that authority was disbursed, and there was no counterinsurgency doctrine to guide the soldiers. Eventually the deployed troops were restructured and trained for

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[56]Cables, Maxwell D. Taylor to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 220620Z, 1-5, and 220545Z, 1-3, February 1965, Center for Military History, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

[57]Krepinevich, 141.

counterinsurgency, but much time had been lost and the insurgencies gained momentum.[58] France in approaching the war in Algeria made the same mistakes in 1954 that had cost it Indochina. It required until 1956 to develop a collective counterinsurgency force and plan. Alistair Horne has described the initial French experience:

> Deployed in the Aurés, "Babar" Cherrière's ponderous, N.A.T.O.-style forces found themselves at an impossible disadvantage. Beyond clearing the road to, and liberating, Arris and T'kout, tanks and armoured troop-carriers proved useless. As the colonel commanding an armoured regiment remarked despondently to Jean Servier, "All that I can do is to hold the road...and as for the rest...," he shrugged his shoulders; to which Servier commented, "If in 1830 the French Expeditionary Force had had tanks, they would not have gotten beyond the beach at Sidi-Ferruch!" There were no mules or horses available and one solitary helicopter in all Algeria, and neither Cherrière - a fifty-eight-year-old veteran of the First World War and a disciple of Weygand - nor his area commander, General Spillmann, had any experience of guerrilla warfare. The troops under their command were equally untrained.[59]

The Portuguese had studied these British and French campaigns at the IAEM and had noted the errors of improper troop deployment. Acting to avoid these costly mistakes, the Portuguese Army strove to field a force properly structured, equipped, and trained early in its campaign.

Education and Training for Counterinsurgency

Portugal's preparation of its armed forces for counterinsurgency was constantly rethought and adjusted to reflect experience not only gained from others but also in its conflict. The Army had studied the medium extensively and had organised its education and training based on both the theoretical approach and on its practical experience in the

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[58]Hoffman and Taw, v.

[59]Horne, 100.

early days of the 1961 Angolan uprising. The British experience in Malaya held lessons that were absorbed by the Portuguese Army mission to Maresfield Park Camp in 1958-1959:

> Thousands of troops had to be indoctrinated in the art of fighting an elusive enemy and at the same time taught that living in the jungle was no mystery of eating roots and drinking out of bamboo but rather the understanding of an unofficial but well-tried principle of war....(S)uccess was due to a well-trained Security Force team able to kill and harry their enemy until he was exhausted. They fought their opponent in the jungle and out of it, and beat him.[60]

The Portuguese approach attempted to emulate this British success and represented a stark contrast to the U.S. Army's training exercises and service school instruction, which was generally *pro forma* in nature. Even when the U.S. Army made serious attempts to train, the effort was more often a bastardised form of conventional operations than a reflection of counterinsurgency doctrine.[61] This misplaced training emphasis and doctrinal confusion left the U.S. Army unprepared for its entry into Vietnam in 1965. The French in Indochina (1946-1954) were similarly oriented and seemed to have forgotten their counterinsurgency principles and the teachings of Joseph Gallieni and Hubert Lyautey. They did not implement programs reflecting their heritage until much later in Algeria (1954-1962). As one historian explained:

> The fall of Dien Bien Phu marked the fall of an empire in South east Asia - and the demolition of much military dogma. Here a notably backward Oriental country triumphed smashingly over one of the most technically advanced Western countries, well supplied with airpower, tanks, artillery, and graduates of the Ecole de Guerre.[62]

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[60]Mans, 127-128.

[61]Krepinevich, 53.

[62]Mans, 145.

Even as the campaign was closing, Colonel Charles Lacheroy, a veteran of Indochina, asserted, "Without delay we must examine the degree to which the War of Indochina was for us a lesson and how it has turned our doctrine and 'military practises' topsy-turvy."[63]

Portuguese education and training of troops for counterinsurgency was lifted from British experience and addressed four interrelated issues:

- The educational function of attuning men's minds to understand subversion and insurgency - the way in which force is employed to achieve political ends, and how political considerations affect the use of force.

- Instruction on the integration of military and civil measures to achieve a single government aim.

- Development of leadership skills in the context of counterinsurgency warfare.

- Instruction in the tactics used in combat in a counterinsurgency environment.[64]

These four issues were taught on the three levels of officer, sergeant, and soldier. At each level the instruction was tailored to the duties and responsibilities of the audience. While the initial contingent of forces entering Angola in March 1961 had little such training, they fully briefed their replacements and the new troops arriving while a more formal program of instruction was being established. This situation was not uncommon in the opening phase of a counterinsurgency and is reflected in a British officer's

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[63]Colonel Charles Lacheroy, Colonial Infantry, French Army, *Action Viet-Minh et Communiste en Indochine ou une Leçon de "Guerre Révolutionnaire,"* paper given at the "Conference on the War in Indochina," Institut de Défense Nationale, Paris, July 1954, 2: "C'est sans retard qu'il faut examiner dans quelle mesure la guerre d'Indochine a été pour nous une leçon et comment elle a bousculé nos doctrines et nos 'habitudes militaires'."

[64]General Sir Frank Kitson, *Low-Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1971), 165-167.

comment on arriving in Malaya in 1954: "If I was going to have to lead jungle-patrols in what seemed a strangely hypnotising kind of half-war, then it looked as if I would have to start learning all over again, from the beginning."[65] By 1962 troops entering the war zone had the benefit of special courses in counterinsurgency warfare.[66] By 1965 the course of instruction on all levels was refined and capable of supporting the accelerating increase in troop deployment, including the establishment of training facilities in the *ultramar* for local recruiting and, later in 1968, for acclimating new arrivals.[67]

Development of Specialised Counterinsurgency Instruction

There was a sequence of specialised instruction activities established early in the wars to address specific problems and situations in the *ultramar*, and these programs sought to provide an improved overall understanding of the operational requirements there. Most were administered at the CIOE; however, certain technical training was located elsewhere at other specialised centres.[68] Their establishment and demise reflect the changes both in the course of the wars and in the seasoning of the training regimen and of the armed forces. The establishment of each was not only a reflection of the changing face of the war but of necessary adjustments to the maturation of the Portuguese Army in the conflict. Training sites were also progressively shifting from the *metrópole* to the *ultramar* both in response to the increased recruiting there and in recognition of the need

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[65]Oliver Crawford, *The Door Marked Malaya* (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1958), 17.

[66]Estado-Maior do Exército, 5.ª Repartição, Circular Nº 1020/IP, 10 March 1961.

[67]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 313.

[68]National Assembly (Ministry of War), Portugal, Decree-Law Nº 42 928 (16 April 1960).

to train in the combat environment. More importantly this entire evolution was indicative of the principle that without sufficient counterinsurgency training for the troops engaged, the conflict will last longer and be more costly to fight.[69] These adjustments acknowledged this premise and the sustainability of the Campaigns that it implied.

Training in the *ultramar* sought to accomplish two objectives: (1) training locally recruited troops, and (2) acclimatising new arrivals from the *metrópole* in the ways of counterinsurgency in Africa. In the first instance, basic instruction in the *ultramar* parallelled that in the *metrópole* with adjustments to accommodate the differences in the local orientation of recruits. Reconciling local culture and language with the military requirements of a soldier presented the greatest challenges, and adjustments were necessary for both the Portuguese and the local recruits. Local education was irregular. As a result the Army adopted a policy of making all recruits complete the four-year equivalent of primary school.[70] Soldiers attended the Regimental School each day after training to satisfy this requirement.[71] Many of the recruits spoke only rudimentary Portuguese, and consequently, it was necessary to include a language course in the first phase of training. After 1954 the introduction of relatively modern armament and equipment outstripped local language capabilities for instruction in its use. Consequently, the Portuguese language became so important to train in technical matters that the European instructors were no longer allowed to speak the local dialects in classrooms.[72]

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[69]Hoffman and Taw, 35.

[70]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 336.

[71]Inocentes interview, 22 October 1994.

[72]Inocentes interview, 22 October 1994.

Portuguese lessons became mandatory for everyone not proficient in the language. With these exceptions, training in the *ultramar* was little different than in the *metrópole*. In Angola in the early 1960s a training officer's comment on the aptitude of local recruits could have been made in the *metrópole*:

> It seems to me then, that as a general rule, the native of Angola is favourably disposed to military life; he has the aptitude to be instructed and educated simultaneously with development of his organisation and intellect, especially to the degree in which, parallel and progressively, he matures into an intellectual and moral human being.[73]

This officer further commented on the reaction of these recruits to their initial brush with Portuguese military culture and could have been made of any military service:

> It is understood, nevertheless, that as much as he will be frightened by the mundane things in life to which he will be subjected; as much as he will be disconcerted by the difference in his new surroundings and their effect on him; as much as he will be perturbed with the new practices of hygiene, of diet, of new clothes, of closeness with men from other villages; of the chance contact with a new language with different forms of expression; of the discipline of a schedule and rigid customs and rules; he will in the end overcome these and a number of other difficulties in completing his training.[74]

The training system was theoretically well conceived; however, in practise there were

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[73]Captain A. J. Reis Pereira, "Educação e Instrução do Soldado Indígena" [Education and Instruction of the Indigenous Soldier], *Boletim Militar* (Região Militar de Angola) (15 September 1960): 35. "Afigura-se-me, pois, que de um modo geral, o nativo de Angola apresenta-se para a vida militar em condições favoráveis; poderá ser instruído e educado num desenvolvimento simultâneo do organismo e do intelecto, sobretudo na medida em que, paralela e progressivamente, adquirir conhecimentos e se consciencializar como ser mental e moral."

[74]Pereira, 35. "Compreende-se, no entanto, quanto o atemorizará a mudança de vida a que vai sujeitar-se; quanto o embaraçará a diferença de ambiente em que vai prosseguir a sua existência; quanto o perturbarão as novas práticas de higiene, de alimentação, o novo vestuário, o convívio com homens de outros povos; o contacto, por vezes, com nova língua de diferentes formas de expressão; a obediência a um horário e a regras e normas rígidas - enfim: um sem número de dificuldades que terão de ser vencidas, para cumprimento de um programa."

shortcomings. The Portuguese troops originally assigned to a *zona de acção*, for instance, while indoctrinated in subversive war, were not specifically prepared to engage the enemy aggressively. They tended to confine themselves to the local encampment and simply reacted to enemy attacks, thereby abdicating the initiative.[75] With the experience gained from this initial disappointment, the military leaders shifted to a new organisational concept in 1968 based on small unit operations at the company and platoon or "combat group" level.[76] This shift became most apparent in Guiné following General António de Spínola's arrival in 1968 and his vigourous implementation of the reformed organisation. Not only did General Spínola implement this new concept, but he also modelled it after that of the guerrilla units in Guiné. These PAIGC units were called *bi-grupos* (bi-groups) and were similar to a reinforced Portuguese sub-company platoon or "combat unit."

The PAIGC armed forces (FARP) had originally had a basic unit of 21 men divided into three groups of seven each. The bi-group or *bi-grupo* was a subsequent development from the February 1964 Cassacá Congress in which the FARP was reorganised. The *bi-grupo* was formed by combining two of these three groups into a single unit.[77] The size of the unit consisted of about 20 to 25 men optimally aligned as follows: the leader, the

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[75]Silva Cunha, 298.

[76]Silva Cunha, 299. This change was endorsed by the Minister of National Defense (General Sá Viana Rebelo), the Minister of the Army (Brigadier Bethencourt Rodrigues), the Sub-Secretary of State for the Army (Colonel João Pinheiro), the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (General Venâncio Deslandes), and the Chief of the General Staff of the Army (General Cámara Pina) in March 1968.

[77]Patrick Chabal, *Amílcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 99.

political commissar, 3 bazooka aimers, 3 bazooka loaders, 3 light machine gun aimers, 3 light machine gun loaders, 9 riflemen, and 3 snipers.[78] Normal supporting arms were two mortars and two heavy machine guns. The *bi-grupo* could, however, be divided, and each of the *grupos* could operate independently. "This basic structure of the small commando group was maintained within the (PAIGC) army throughout the war. Flexibility was added so that *bi-groupos* could quickly be brought together into units of 200 to 300 men."[79] General Spínola's new emphasis in 1968 on small, aggressive units swung the initiative in Guiné to the Portuguese. The smaller units were much more mobile than a company or a battalion and were thus able to concentrate their firepower on the enemy with greater effectiveness than the larger, more cumbersome entities, given the limitations of the combat environment.

In conjunction with this emphasis on small unit operations, General Spínola faced another problem. Despite the best efforts of the training facilities in the *metrópole*, soldiers arriving in the *ultramar* were decreasing in quality and enthusiasm from 1966 onwards.[80] It consequently became obvious to the commanders in the *ultramar* that this deficiency needed to be corrected *in situ*. The British were faced with a similar situation in Malaya, where they created an elaborate program to acclimate arriving units to the operational environment.[81] General Spínola borrowed the concept from the CIOE,

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[78]John Biggs-Davison, *Portuguese Guinea* (London: Congo Africa Publications, 1970), 21-22.

[79]Chabal, 99.

[80]Thomas H. Henriksen, "Portugal in Africa: Comparative Notes on Counterinsurgency," *Orbis* (Summer 1977): 404.

[81]Mans, 128-129.

adapted the course syllabus to Guiné, and called it Operational Proficiency Instruction (*Instrução de Aperfeiçoamento Operacional*, or IAO).[82] It had been proposed earlier that IAO training be established in the *ultramar*; however, budget constraints had precluded this move.[83] IAO addressed the retraining and sensitising of all new troops arriving from the *metrópole* and focused entirely on counterinsurgency warfare as it was fought in the operational theatre. It also extended to local recruits and represented new basic instruction for them. The establishment of IAO was a recognition that soldiers familiar with the people, culture, and geography of their operational theatre are indispensable to a successful counterinsurgency program. Its obvious appropriateness in response to a problem made it a permanent fixture for the duration of the wars. IAO proved extremely effective and once the teething problems were resolved, it was also adopted in Angola.[84] For unexplained reasons it was never implemented in Mozambique.[85] In both Guiné and Angola the nationalist movements became a standoff militarily by 1970 and reflected the effectiveness of these changes among other factors.[86]

This type of adaptation was a factor in the military effectiveness of troops in other counterinsurgencies. The British Army found local IAO-type training to be indispensable, and veterans of the British Emergency in Malaya endorsed its importance

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[82]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 331-334.

[83]Marques Pinto correspondence, 9 August 1995.

[84]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 331-334.

[85]Silva Cunha, 299.

[86]Willem van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Angola 1961-1974* (Rivonia: Ashanti Publishing Ltd., 1993), 140.

in training new arrivals. Lieutenant Colonel Roland Mans stressed its value from personal experience:

> As a preamble to any discussion of minor tactics against guerrillas, I must emphasize my belief that troops should never be introduced "cold" to such operations. A carefully coordinated training program, preferably carried out in a comparatively safe area within the country in which they are going to fight, enables them to learn their trade in the right locale and at the same time become thoroughly acclimatized. In Malaya, all incoming units were initiated into antiguerrilla tactics at the Far East Training Centre in Southern Johore.[87]

First Lieutenant Oliver Crawford, a graduate of Johore, amplified the value of its instruction: "The School drew on the accumulated experience of the whole Army. Its theory of jungle-warfare was quite possibly the most advanced in the world - particularly for Malaya, where every month of the past seven years' fighting had helped to test and refine it."[88]

Theatre indoctrination was also deemed important by the French, who in Algeria in 1956 established and ran an extensive program at the Centre d'Instruction de Pacification et Contre-Guerrilla at Arzew.[89] Conversely, this in-theatre indoctrination was not treated seriously by the U.S. Army in Vietnam with disastrous results:

> (T)he Army's conduct of the war was a failure, primarily because it never realized that insurgency warfare required basic changes in Army methods to meet the exigencies of this "new" conflict environment....(T)he changes that did occur were too little to make a significant impact on the Army or its approach to the war, implemented too late in the war to achieve results, and retained for too brief a period in the service to have an impact on preparations for future low-intensity

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[87]Mans, 128.

[88]Crawford, 74.

[89]Alf Andrew Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 176.

wars.[90]

The Portuguese implementation of IAO largely parallelled that of the British with commensurate dividends.

Adapting to Counterinsurgency

Portugal had faced a wholesale shift in the mission of its armed forces from a conventionally-oriented force to one of counterinsurgency. This conventional organisation had to be dismembered and reoriented to face an insurgency in Africa, and not only required a huge conceptual leap by Portugal's military leadership, but also the establishment of a completely new doctrine with associated tactics and training. At the campaign and tactical levels Portugal's uniqueness in organising itself for the African Campaigns lay in its learning from the earlier experiences of others, and as the conflict progressed, both adapting these practises and applying the lessons of its own observations to its conduct of the wars. Following the initial uprising and the use there of largely conventional troops to restore order, Portugal demonstrated that it could learn in the face of adversity and in doing so gained the initiative after some difficult homework. By 1970 the insurgents in Angola had been stalemated militarily and "reduced to little more than nuisance value by efficient Portuguese security action, geographical limitations and leadership conflicts."[91] In Guiné the military reorganisation and the new operating concepts and methods of General Spínola led to the stabilising of a deteriorating situation

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[90]Krepinevich, 259-260.

[91]van der Waals, 140.

and negotiations for talks with the PAIGC in the closing months of 1972.[92] Mozambique was quiescent until 1970 because of internecine struggles and purges within the nationalist movements. Thereafter, the conflict became "slow-moving shadowboxing with hardly any punches landing on the opponents."[93]

The Portuguese had always been close to the British commercially and militarily and believed the British experience with counterinsurgency to be among the richest in the world. If the British forgot about counterinsurgency between wars, they always seemed to relearn quickly. Emphasis on tactical flexibility was a centrepiece in their counterinsurgencies, and one which the Portuguese sought to embrace.

> The British drew from their experience the principle of tactical flexibility. They proved willing and able to set aside their textbooks on conventional war, delve into the thin literature of the pamphlets, or the unconventional, draw extensively on personal experience and, as Clausewitz would have advised, draw on secondary experience garnered from colleagues who had been there.[94]

Although the Portuguese struggled in the early years to find the proper combination in Angola and Guiné, they followed this British flexibility and with the advent of small unit tactics and General Spínola's reemphasis of IAO in 1968 drew the earlier efforts together in a cohesive and effective force. Their experience in learning was not unlike that of the British in Malaya.

Our tactics in Malaya were by no means perfect. The gift of hindsight enables

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[92]Avelino Rodrigues, Cesário Borga, and Mário Cardoso, *O Movimento dos Capitães e o 25 de Abril* [The Movement of the Captains and the 25th of April] (Lisbon: Moraes editores, 1974), 244; and Guilherme de Alpoim Calvão, *De Conakry Ao M.D.L.P.* [From Conakry to the M.D.L.P.] (Lisbon: Editorial Intervenção Lda., 1976), 89-90.

[93]Thomas H. Henriksen, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of Independence 1964-1974* (London: Greenwood Press, 1978), 48.

[94]Harmon, 36.

many of us to see where we went wrong and how we can improve in the future. But this was a new sort of war fought over some of the most formidable terrain in the world. In the beginning, we had to improvise and gain experience, and this took time. Nevertheless, in the final event, we were able to devise methods that enabled all the varied forces involved to inflict a decisive defeat on militant Communism.[95]

French learning was prompted by their defeat in Indochina and resulted in the development of their *guerre révolutionnaire* concept as a new way of countering anticolonial insurrections.[96] This thinking became dominant in the strategy to retain Algeria and shaped overall defense policy. It was likewise a powerful influence on Portuguese thinking and was rigorously sifted for solutions to the problems in Africa. The Portuguese search also contrasted sharply with the U.S. attitude in Vietnam, where "their first mistake was a product of military arrogance, i.e. their complete rejection of any lessons that may have emerged from the French experience up to 1954."[97]

So the Portuguese, like the British, went to "small patrols of well-trained men who could penetrate rugged terrain to gather intelligence, kill guerrillas, disrupt food gathering and courier traffic, call down artillery or air strikes where appropriate, and above all, make contacts with the population."[98] This patrolling kept the initiative away from the insurgent. When the Portuguese followed these practises, as in Angola and Guiné, they were successful. When they deviated, as in Mozambique with Operation "Gordian

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[95]Mans, 143.

[96]Paret, 7.

[97]Michael Elliott-Bateman, *Lessons from the Vietnam War*, Report of a seminar held at the Royal United Services Institute in London, 12 February 1966, 4.

[98]Harmon, 36.

Knot," they suffered.

The foundation of the military dimension of Portuguese counterinsurgency was not the grand operation but the mundane infantry patrol, which would be routinely performed by a combat group of thirty men and would last four to five days, although it could extend to twice that duration. The troops would generally be taken to the target area by vehicle and would patrol from there by foot, carrying everything with them. During the period they would cover from 50 to 100 kilometres, depending on the nature of the country. For food there would be the normal packed combat ration. Apocryphally their rations consisted of a bag of beans, some chick peas and possibly a piece of dried codfish, all to be soaked in any water that could be found - probably infected with bilharzia - then cooked and eaten in the evening. Contact with the villagers was important not only to show military strength but also to gain intelligence on the insurgents.[99] On one such patrol in eastern Angola an observer reported shadowing an insurgent group for three days guided by a local tracker. Surrounding and ambushing the group at twilight, the Portuguese quickly overcame them with surprise and firepower. Immediately afterwards the Portuguese troops were offering the enemy water from their canteens, binding their wounds, and interrogating prisoners.[100]

In contrast, Operation "Nó Górdio" occurred in July 1970 in northern Mozambique, lasted 36 days, and with over 8,000 personnel involved was the largest operation

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[99]Duke of Valderano, interview by the author, 17 March 1995, London.

[100]Colin M. Beer, interview by the author, 14 March 1995, London.

undertaken in the *ultramar* during the African Campaigns (1961-1974).[101] By the end of 1969 the area around Mueda in the north of the Cabo Delgado district next to the Tanzanian border had become alarmingly infiltrated with insurgents. General Arriaga, as the Commander-in-Chief, had established a perimeter around the infected area and attempted to drive the insurgents into the waiting force with air-supported ground assaults in a modified hammer and anvil tactic.[102] While many guerrilla bases were destroyed and weapons captured, the enemy melted into the 20,000 strong local population fleeing the area to avoid the fight. FRELIMO moved eastward and escaped.[103] The operation could not be concealed because of its large scale, and other areas of Mozambique were denuded of troops to support it, leaving the population vulnerable elsewhere. It was not a counterinsurgency operation, and it predictably yielded disappointing results at great expense. Further, Sir Robert Thompson, the Secretary of Defense for Malaya, was emphatic about avoiding large scale operations in counterinsurgency.[104] They took much time, talent, and manpower to organise, and when launched, were no secret. The insurgent could avoid contact or choose the battlefield. The results for the government were generally disappointing. The constant pressure of small patrols was far more effective in its low key, low cost approach.

In addition to learning from others, the Portuguese learned by doing. While the

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[101]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, 181-185.

[102]Arriaga interview, 8 November 1994.

[103]Carlos Manuel Serpa de Matos Gomes, Colonel, Portuguese Army, interview by the author, 21 November 1994, Lisbon.

[104]Harmon, 36.

Portuguese had observed that the small unit tactics of the British in Malaya had worked well, it was necessary to adapt them to the African environment. Observing the PAIGC *bi-grupo* operations provided the Portuguese with an important demonstration that was to guide their force restructuring for counterinsurgency operations in Guiné and Angola. As the British in Malaya appreciated the value of in-theatre training, so Portugal learned to appreciate its importance as well. Development and implementation of its IAO proved a sound solution to irregular troop quality and fighting apathy in Africa.

The Portuguese Army had intensely studied the British and French methods for structuring and training a counterinsurgency force and sought to adapt the successful practises of these two to its situation in Africa. While the Army strove to shorten the period of adjustment necessary to train and deploy effective troops in reaction to the insurgencies, it still required an inordinately long time to field the proper force. Like the British, the French, and the U.S., the Portuguese had to overcome hidebound views on insurgency at the highest command levels to achieve the proper formula. Portugal seemed inordinately slow in this process and required about seven years to implement a fully coordinated approach. The French in Indochina and the U.S. in Vietnam never accomplished this feat. The French, following the lessons of Indochina, required two years in Algeria to implement the *guerre révolutionnaire* concept. The British experience varied from about four years in Malaya to two years in Kenya to make the needed adjustments.[105] Given that the reorganisation of the Portuguese Armed Forces for modern conventional war had required from 1937 to 1960, the seven year span for

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[105]Hoffman and Taw, 28-29.

counterinsurgency by comparison appears brief.[106] The delay, however, was unnecessarily costly in time, treasure, and manpower, and one of its important manifestations was the 1968 recruiting crisis, which compounded the difficulties of managing the war. This problem of implementing the doctrinal principles for counterinsurgency was acknowledged at the time and later described by the Army's Commission for the Study of the African Campaigns (1961-1974):

> However, the great problem surfaced much more in the implementation of doctrine rather than in its definition, which was understood. Its fulfilment faced a natural inertia and difficulty in rapidly adapting to the actual requirements demanded in an anti-subversive war, so different in doctrine, organisation, and training, which until then had been solely oriented to conventional warfare. Such adaptation went as far as to demand a mental predisposition toward acceptance which is normally slow.[107]

Nevertheless, the Portuguese Army solved these problems by 1968 and by 1970 had gained control of the conflict in all three theatres. It could then claim that it had the correctly structured force, properly trained and led, that it was successfully applying proven counterinsurgency concepts adapted to its situation in Africa, and that the insurgencies were under relative control. These achievements were no small accomplishment. The goal of attaining a subdued, low tempo conflict had been realised alongside an apparent indefinite sustainability. Forthcoming chapters will examine the

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[106]Kaúlza de Arriaga, "Portuguese National Defense during the Last 40 Years and in the Future," Lecture delivered on 20 October 1966, Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, Lisbon, 12.

[107]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, 138. "No entanto, o grande problema parece ter residido muito mais na aplicação da doutrina do que na sua definição, o que se compreende, face à natural inércia e dificuldade na adaptação rápida às formas de actuação que uma luta anti-subversiva exigia, tão diferente da doutrina, organização e treino até então voltados unicamente para a guerra convencional. Tal adaptação exigia, inclusivamente, uma predisposição mental de aceitação que é normalmente lenta."

specific components of recruiting, operations, and logistics in this accomplishment.

V

Portuguese Africanisation of Counterinsurgency

One of the most significant elements in the Portuguese conduct of the Campaigns was the Africanisation of its armed forces. By shifting the predominant burden of supplying manpower to run the wars from the *metrópole* to the *ultramar*, Portugal gained in four ways. First, it broadened the source of military manpower through an inclusion of the colonial population. Second, it reduced the cost of fielding troops through a reduction in transportation and training costs. Third, it gained a large measure of almost indefinite sustainability through the first two aspects. Last, it kept the conflict subdued and low tempo by moving a large portion of the conscription and casualties away from the *metrópole*. This chapter will review the origins of Portugal's recruiting problems and its experience in using local African troops, and examine the application of local recruiting in the theatres, analysing its implementation and comparing it with contemporary experiences in counterinsurgency.

Origins of the Manpower Shortage

After crafting its counterinsurgency doctrine and redesigning its armed forces for the Campaigns, Portugal faced the severe constraint of raising an army and maintaining it at the necessary levels. The *metrópole* presented a limited and fragile source of manpower to conduct the Campaigns. While there was an element of chauvinism in the initial years, by 1966 this patriotism had worn thin, and by 1968 Portugal faced a problem of

identifying manpower sources simply to run the wars.[1] Portugal proper with a population of just under 9 million was conducting a counterinsurgency campaign in three colonies whose populations aggregated about 12 million.[2] This distribution would seem to dictate that proportionately about 60 percent of the manpower should be supplied by the colonies. In 1966, 30 percent of the Army's manpower came from the *ultramar*.[3] In 1968 it had drifted upward to 32 percent.[4] Subsequently, this trend continued:

1969 - 31% 1970 - 32% 1971 - 40% 1972 - 40% 1973 - 42%.[5]

The data in Table 1 below supports the premise that European recruiting was displaced by colonial recruiting beginning in 1966 and increasing until 1971. During the 1971-1974 period in Angola local recruitment in the armed forces had stabilised at 42 percent. In Mozambique it exceeded 50 percent during the same period. In Guiné, where there was only a limited population from which to draw, local recruitment never exceeded 21 percent. It should also be noted that the Portuguese recruited African troops according to the same laws in effect in the *metrópole*, a code that required all able-bodied men (*efectivos*) between the ages of 20 and 45 to serve two years. In 1968 the two years

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[1]Estado-Maior do Exército, 1.ª Repartição, *Estudo sobre Problemas de Recrutamento 1968* [Study on the Problems of Recruitment 1968] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exército, 1968).

[2]The official Portuguese government census of 15 December 1960 showed the *metrópole* with a population of 8,889,392 and Angola, Guiné, and Mozambique together of 11,959,373.

[3]Estado-Maior do Exército, *Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)* [Historical-Military Report of the African Campaigns (1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Ministério do Exército, 1989), Vol. I (General Summary), 259-260.

[4]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 259-260.

[5]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 259-260.

was extended to four, two of which had to be served in Africa. The law was loosely enforced in Africa until the manpower requirement became acute in the 1966-1967 period.[6]

Chart of Troop Strength by Origin in the Three Theatres
(31 December)

	Angola			Mozambique			Guiné			Total All
Year	Local	*Metrópole*	Total	Local	*Metrópole*	Total	Local	*Metrópole*	Total	Theatres
1961	5,000 (15%)	28,477	33,477	3,000 (27%)	8,209	11,209	1,000 (21%)	3,736	4,736	49,422
1962	11,165 (25%)	33,760	44,925	3,000 (25%)	8,852	11,852	1,000 (20%)	4,070	5,070	61,847
1963	12,870 (27%)	34,530	47,400	5,003 (35%)	9,243	14,246	1,314 (14%)	8,344	9,650	71,296
1964	15,075 (29%)	37,418	52,493	7,917 (44%)	10,132	18,049	2,321 (15%)	12,874	15,195	85,737
1965	15,448 (27%)	41,625	57,073	9,701 (42%)	13,155	22,856	2,612 (15%)	14,640	17,252	97,181
1966	17,297 (31%)	38,519	55,816	11,038 (36%)	19,550	30,588	1,933 (9%)	17,760	20,801	107,205
1967	14,369 (25%)	43,051	57,420	11,557 (33%)	23,164	34,721	3,229 (15%)	18,421	21,650	113,791
1968	20,683 (36%)	37,547	58,230	13,898 (38%)	22,717	36,615	3,280 (14%)	19,559	22,839	117,684
1969	18,663 (34%)	36,911	55,574	15,810 (40%)	23,286	39,096	3,715 (14%)	22,866	26,581	121,251
1970	19,059 (35%)	36,174	55,233	16,079 (42%)	22,633	38,712	4,268 (16%)	22,507	26,775	120,720
1971	25,933 (42%)	36,127	62,060	22,710 (51%)	21,795	44,505	5,808 (20%)	23,402	29,210	135,775
1972	25,461 (42%)	34,856	60,317	24,066 (52%)	22,657	46,723	5,921 (20%)	24,036	29,957	136,997
1973	27,819 (42%)	37,773	65,592	27,572 (54%)	23,891	51,463	6,425 (20%)	25,610	32,035	149,090

Compiled by the author from official Portuguese Army documents.

Table 1

These figures are for the Army alone. The Navy and Air Force numbers were modest by comparison, and if aggregated with the Army, would not significantly change the percentages above.[7] But these numbers do not tell the whole story. The militarisation of the population in the form of self-defense units, police, and other para-military forces which were not integrated into the primary organisation of the armed

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[6]Douglas L. Wheeler, "African Elements in Portugal's Armies in Africa (1961-1974)," *Armed Forces and Society* (February 1976): 240.

[7]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 251. The Army total of 216,195 at the conclusion of the wars on 25 April 1974 was augmented by approximately 2,500 Naval and 6,000 Air Force personnel, including its *tropas páraquedistas* (paratroops).

forces had the effect of increasing the foregoing percentages constructively to 50 percent.[8] In the case of Mozambique, the percentage of locally recruited troops in all categories reached 70 percent of the total force.[9] In Angola it increased to about 50 percent.[10]

The problem began in 1961, when the Portuguese knew that the war would last longer than simply a few months to stabilise the situation in Angola. Just how much longer was uncertain; however, the process would be measured in years and not months. With this prospect in mind, the government turned to the population of the country to satisfy its military personnel needs. The official census by the Portuguese government conducted on 15 December 1960, just before the beginning of the campaigns, showed the following broad population distribution:[11]

Metrópole	8,889,392
Angola	4,830,283
Guiné	525,437
Mozambique	6,603,653

From these figures and additional census data the numbers of able-bodied males between the ages of 20 and 24 in the four recruiting areas were 816,781, distributed as

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[8]Joaquim Moreira da Silva Cunha, *Ultramar, a Nação e o "25 De Abril"* [The Overseas Provinces, The Nation and The "25 of April"] (Coimbra: Atlântida Editora, 1977), 297.

[9]General Kaúlza de Arriaga, interview by the author, 8 November 1994, Lisbon.

[10]Luz Cunha, 159.

[11]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 213-214. The figures cited in the 1960 census were to be the most accurate for the foreseeable future in the colonies. The 1970 census numbers for Portuguese Africa were suspect because of the war disruption and its attendant refugee migration, and no census of either Angola or Mozambique has been taken since.

shown below.

	Males Aged 20-24 Years in 1960[12]	Approximate Annual Addition
Metrópole	336,672	67,334
Angola	208,853	41,771
Guiné	21,256	4,251
Mozambique	250,000	50,000
Total	816,781	163,356

From the age profile contained in the census it was determined that approximately 163,356 able-bodied males would reach their twentieth birthday and would thus become available annually to add to the pool of eligible candidates. These numbers were always nominally adequate to support the recruiting required to man the armed forces between 1961 and 1974, as the annual addition to the pool from all sources was never less than the replacement requirement. The difficulty came in adjusting to the increasingly high delinquency rate in the *metrópole*, which squeezed the seemingly favourable numbers and shifted a disproportionate burden to the soldiers currently serving and to recruiting in the *ultramar*.

Table 2 above depicts the recruiting picture in the *metrópole* during the course of the wars. There are several dynamics apparent in the trend of the figures, despite the missing data for 1969. The estimated pool of able-bodied males aged 20-24 at the beginning of the wars was 336,672. To this number each year was added about 67,334, and based on the eleven years of data, on the average 62,175 were chosen. For military purposes, therefore, the pool was theoretically adequate for the entire period of the

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[12]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 214.

Recruitment in the *Metrópole*

Year	Registered	Called	Delinquent
1961	75,366	48,832 (64.8%)	8,722 (11.6%)
1962	79,357	57,073 (72.0%)	10,211 (12.8%)
1963	85,410	59,676 (69.8%)	13,328 (15.6%)
1964	86,977	61,249 (70.4%)	14,357 (16.5%)
1965	90,289	64,805 (71.7%)	16,972 (18.8%)
1966	87,506	63,342 (72.3%)	16,008 (18.4%)
1967	86,065	62,017 (72.6%)	16,512 (19.2%)
1968	95,634	70,504 (73.7%)	17,838 (18.6%)
1969			(19.6%)
1970	88,693	63,996 (71.5%)	18,554 (20.9%)
1971	91,363*	65,746 (72.0%)	15,644 (20.3%)
1972	92,613	66,681 (72.0%)	18,841 (20.3%)

Reconstructed from *Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África(1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 258; and *Estudo Sobre Problemas de Recrutamento 1968*, 17.

* The minimum draft age was lowered in 1971 from 20 to 18 years.

Table 2

conflict.

There were, however, other elements competing for this manpower in the *metrópole* and disturbing this equation. Portugal's population has always been one of its leading exports, and the census figures do not fully reflect this drain, particularly clandestine emigration. Continental Portugal with a population at the time of nearly 9 million had an estimated expatriate population of 3 million.[13] On top of this problem was an intense psychological campaign waged from abroad and aimed at planting doubts about the war in Portugal's recruiting-age youth, raising the spirit of the enemy and supporting deserters, however few.[14] This campaign was centred in the universities, and while quite disruptive, was containable. Open student demonstrations began on 17 April 1968 with the inauguration ceremony dedicating a new building at Coimbra University, and student

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[13]Américo Simões Gaspar, Captain, Infantry, Portuguese Army, *Emigração em Portugal* [Emigration in Portugal] (Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1974), 36.

[14]Simões Gaspar, 38.

indiscipline continued at a high level until the force of the law and the academic authorities restored order later in the year.[15] This disorder was attributed to communist incitement against "the colonial war" primarily through the outlawed Portuguese Communist Party, which had clandestine operatives within the country. The entire episode had a demoralising effect on the recruiting effort generally and on officer recruiting specifically, and the morale of the armed forces suffered accordingly.[16]

The recruiting figures do, however, show an accelerating problem in attracting personnel. The wartime manpower demands on the *metrópole* increased from 48,832 in 1961 to a height of 70,504 in 1968 and remained just below that number for the remainder of the wars. Draft registrations peaked in 1968 and declined thereafter. Certainly one cause of this decline was an extension in required service. In 1968 the normal two year conscription period was effectively extended to four through a new charter that required two years of service in Africa.[17] In order to arrest this decline and maintain a sufficient level in the theoretical pool, it was recommended that the draft age be lowered from 20 years to 18 years effective in 1971. The Portuguese military establishment agonized over these two decisions but could reach no other conclusions regarding recruiting in the *metrópole*.[18] The wars would have to be fought largely with the soldiers that existed in 1968, particularly if the skills acquired on the battlefield were

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[15]Marcello Caetano, *Depoimento* [Deposition] (Rio de Janeiro: Distribuidora Record, 1974), 55-56.

[16]Silva Cunha, 290.

[17]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 233.

[18]*Estudo sobre Problemas de Recrutamento 1968*, 3-4. These two options had been proposed in this 1968 study.

to be preserved and not lost to wholesale personnel turnover.[19] The *metrópole* was limited as a manpower resource under the current recruiting parameters, and new recruits in sizable numbers would have to be found in the *ultramar*.

As depicted in Table 2 above, draft delinquencies or "no shows" were 11.6% in 1961, a manageable figure within Portugal's twentieth century experience. This number increased on both an absolute and percentage basis through 1970, levelling thereafter. The delinquent rate of 20.9 percent in 1970 is unremarkable alongside a sample of other years (1900 - 15.7%; 1912 - 22.7%; 1922 - 36.8%; 1933 - 16.6%; 1940 - 12.7%; and 1950 - 9.8%); however, in the context of the wars, the trend is unmistakably negative.[20] Recruiting in the *metrópole*, while it always satisfied the nominal military requirements for manpower, increasingly reflected a lack of enthusiasm for the war alongside the available alternatives. The lure of a European economic boom north of Portugal as well as an expanding domestic job market became increasingly attractive in contrast to the personal inconvenience and relative danger of serving in Africa. Emigration had always been largely from the rural areas and over time they became depleted, leaving the more

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[19]*Estudo sobre Problemas de Recrutamento 1968*, 3: "...é com os soldados que existem que se fazem as guerras..."

[20]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 268; and *Estudo sobre Problemas de Recrutamento 1968*, 17. These relatively large delinquency percentages are also due in part to the Portuguese system of conscription, in which several notices were sent asking that an individual report for induction. If he failed to report on the initial notice, then he was delinquent. Because of the largely rural nature of Portugal, the fact that the inductee might have been working in a Renault factory outside of Paris, or other similar impediments, many reported late as a matter of routine. The Portuguese authorities were aware of these problems, and disciplinary measures were taken only after reasonable induction efforts had failed.

developed areas as the primary centres supplying recruits.[21]

The limitations of the domestic population base threatened the war effort. From the beginning of the wars in 1961 until the conclusion in 1974 the number of personnel in the primary Army organisation expanded from 49,422 to 149,090, representing an average annual rate of increase of about eleven percent.[22] Portugal's need to recruit ever increasing numbers was driven by two factors: the expansion of guerrilla activity from Angola to Guiné and finally to Mozambique, and the increasing use of the military as a manpower pool for expanding psychosocial activity.[23] In relation to the expanding guerrilla activity, the insurgents numbered about 22,000 in all theatres by 1974, giving Portuguese forces at that time a numerical superiority of about 6.8 to one.[24] Maintaining this ratio strained Portugal's resources. Compared to other insurgencies, this ratio fell short of the British experiences in Malaya of 37.5 to one and in Cyprus of 25 to one, and the French in Algeria of 16.7 to one, and exceeded that in Kenya of 4.6 to one.[25] It was similar to the combined U.S. and Republic of Vietnam experience there, where

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[21]*Estudo sobre Problemas de Recrutamento 1968*, 18.

[22]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 259.

[23]Silva Cunha, 295.

[24]Douglas L. Wheeler, "African Elements in Portugal's Armies in Africa (1961-1974)," *Armed Forces and Society* (February 1976): 277. There were 6,425 African troops in Guiné, 27,572 in Mozambique, and 27,819 in Angola in 1974 facing 6,000 guerrillas for the PAIGC, 10,000 for FRELIMO, and 4,500 for the MPLA. UNITA and the FNLA combined had fewer than 1,500 full-time guerrillas in Angola.

[25]Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer M. Taw, *Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: The Development of Britain's "Small Wars" Doctrine During the 1950s* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1991), 38; and Colonel Virgil Ney, U.S. Army (Retired), "Guerrilla Warfare and Modern Strategy," in *Modern Guerrilla Warfare*, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka (Glencoe, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), 36.

in 1964 the ratio was an estimated 4 to one and later in 1968 about 8.75 to one.[26]

The momentum of the psychosocial program would be maintained through a shift of available manpower and its orientation. Through a series of government directives in 1968, a five point plan was implemented to address the issue: (1) intensify recruitment in the *ultramar*, where the demographics held the potential to sustain a flow of candidates; (2) expand the numbers of special forces for counterinsurgency; (3) expand the local *ultramar* paramilitary forces; (4) reduce *metrópole* forces proportionately to the expansion in forces recruited in the *ultramar*; and (5) modify the force structure to include additional small units suitably effective in counterinsurgency.[27] Thus, faced with this necessary expansion and the recruiting difficulties at home, Portugal in 1968 pragmatically shifted its focus to local recruiting in the colonies. Reinforcing this shift was also the belief that indigenous forces would strengthen the political legitimacy necessary for success against the insurgents.

Recruiting Leadership

In addition to the search for raw manpower, the expansion of the armed forces necessitated the recruitment, training, and development of leaders in the form of officers and sergeants. The Military Academy produced adequate numbers of permanent officers for the first four years of the war, but thereafter was never able to recruit properly from the universities and fulfil the requirements. In 1966 Portugal began to draw from the

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[26]Frank N. Trager, "Military Requirements for U.S. Victory in Vietnam," in *Viet Nam: History, Documents, and Opinions on a Major World Crisis*, ed. Marvin E. Gettleman (Greenwich: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1965), 347.

[27]Silva Cunha, 295.

Central School for Sergeants to fill this need for permanent officers and did so until 1972. Table 3 below reflects the dynamics of this problem. Contestants for vacancies at the Military Academy exceeded openings until the 1965-1966 academic year, after which the deficit became increasingly a problem. Officers from the sergeants ranks did not wholly satisfy the need, but produced adequate numbers of leaders in the form of permanent officers to run the war until 1972. To supplement the corps of permanent officers, reserve officers (*milicianos*, literally "militia") were recruited to flesh out the junior officer ranks. At the end of their contract these officers had the option of extending it, or later of applying to continue as permanent officers, or of resigning.

Military Academy Permanent Officer Commissioning

Academic Year	Vacancies	Contestants	Admitted	Unfilled Vacancies	Commissioned Sergeants	Net Deficit
1961-1962	265	559	257	8	-	8
1962-1963	266	444	266	0	-	0
1963-1964	200	392	180	20	-	20
1964-1965	262	307	137	125	-	125
1965-1966	350	283	129	221	42	179
1966-1967	377	199	90	287	118	169
1967-1968	410	175	90	320	236	84
1968-1969	430	149	58	372	261	110
1969-1970	460	112	33	427	226	201
1970-1971	400	151	62	338	287	51
1971-1972	550	169	103	447	200	247
1972-1973	495	154	72	423	-	423
1973-1974	243	155	88	155	-	155

Compiled from information in Estado-Maior do Exército, 6.ª Repartição, Notice Nº 17/IE, 18 March 1982.

Table 3

The recruiting difficulties in the *metrópole* adversely affected the ability of the armed forces to attract and retain the key leadership skills embodied in the officer and sergeant ranks. The normal *miliciano* contract was two years in duration, and means were constantly explored to grant these officers and sergeants special privileges if they would

extend their military obligation.[28] Also the idea of giving *miliciano* officers with good records the option of accepting a regular commission was regularly studied. This retention mechanism had long been popular with Western military services and provided an opportunity for entry into a military career through several avenues outside the Military Academies. This practise would have been implemented long ago, according to Douglas Porch:

> ...had its effects on the rather archaic promotion system in the Portuguese army not proved so disruptive. Most armed forces attempt to strike a balance between seniority and ability in the promotion stakes, giving preference perhaps to top Military Academy graduates. But Portugüese promotion was based almost exclusively on seniority.[29]

It would be fair to say, however, that with the advent of the wars, seniority was less of a determining factor in promotion.[30]

The spectre of having the *milicianos* be given credit for all of their former service in establishing their seniority in a system where seniority was everything was too much of an obstacle. Despite the fact that Dr. Caetano personally became interested in changing the system and all of the Commanders-in-Chief who came to Lisbon from the operational theatres supported the plan, the resistance of the regular officer corps to this move was just too strong.[31] The initial solution to the problem was borrowed from one adopted following the Great War in which a special category of officer (*quadro especial de*

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[28]Silva Cunha, 295.

[29]Douglas Porch, *The Portuguese Armed Forces and Revolution* (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 65.

[30]Luís Alberto Santiago Inocentes, Colonel, Staff Corps, Portuguese Army (Retired), interviewed by the author, 5 September 1994, London.

[31]Caetano, 184-185.

oficiais, or QEO) was created. The QEO provided for the granting of regular commissions to *miliciano* officers of good standing in limited numbers but confined their advancement to the rank of lieutenant colonel.[32] The first small contingent of 90 officers was augmented into the regular officer corps through this mechanism in 1970, thus temporarily solving the problem.

As Table 3 shows, the problem only worsened. By 1973 the QEO allotment had been exhausted, and the retention difficulties had again reached crisis proportions. Thus the situation was reexamined by the new Minister of National Defense, General Sá Viana Rebelo. This review resulted in the Council of Ministers approving Decree Law Nº 353/73 in July 1973, which gave the *miliciano* officers under certain conditions regular commissions with seniority based on their length of service as a reserve officer.[33] Although less than 200 *miliciano* officers were eligible and would affect the force of over 2,800 regular junior officers, these "Rebelo decrees" because of their implications were immediately and strongly unpopular with the officer corps of the armed forces.[34] This fissure was also heightened and exploited by the communists to undermine service morale.[35] Dissention was centred in the captain ranks.[36] Dr. Caetano's experience was

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[32]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 236-237. Decree Law Nº 49 324 of 27 October 1969 created the QEO and limited it to the following officer numbers: lieutenant colonel - 20; major - 40; captain - 120; and subaltern - 180.

[33]Caetano, 185.

[34]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 255-257; and Silva Cunha, 296.

[35]Inocentes interview, 5 September 1994.

[36]Silva Cunha, 305.

indicative of approaching problems:

> It was not many days later that my military adjutant...informed me that the decree law did not sit well with much of the Army because of the changes in relative seniority caused by the ex-*miliciano* officers. There are captains, he told me, who have jumped past lieutenant colonels. And he reminded me of the enormous importance that a soldier attaches to his seniority on the ladder: "seniority means a promotion."[37]

While the Rebelo decrees solved the retention problem for the *miliciano* officers, the bitterness caused by the implementation of this long overdue reform sowed the seeds of junior officer revolt that contributed to the revolution on 25 April 1974.[38] It was likewise in this context that Portugal sought to expand its sergeant and officer ranks through local recruiting in the war theatres.

Precedent for Africanisation

Portugal increasingly turned to its colonies to fill its wartime manpower need, as it had done in the past, although never on the scale of the Campaigns. African troops represent a tradition of having served or cooperated with Portugal in times of need since the earliest days of the colonies. In almost every year between 1575 and 1930 there was a colonial campaign somewhere in Portuguese Africa, and the African auxiliary and irregular forces proved indispensable. Called the *guerra preta* ("black war") from the campaigns of 1681 until this century, they had a history of loyalty and could be raised

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[37]Caetano, 185. "Não tardaram muitos dias, o meu adjunto militar...informou-me que o decreto-lei caíra mal nos meios do Exército por causa da modificação da posição relativa de antiguidades que envolvia para os oficiais ex-milicianos. Há capitães, disse-me, que pulam para tenentes-coronéis. E lembrou-me a importância enorme que para o militar assume a sua antiguidade na escala: "a antiguidade é um posto."

[38]Silva Cunha, 305.

on short notice.[39] This flexibility meant that Portugal did not have to mobilise large numbers of its continental troops and transport them to Africa in times of colonial crisis. While these earlier campaigns were pacification operations and were not in the same genre as modern insurgencies with their political theme, they nevertheless, set a precedent for Portugal's extensive Africanisation of the late Campaigns.

A typical example is represented by the 1888 campaign in the Zambezi Valley in which more than 90 percent of the soldiers in the Portuguese pacification force were Africans.[40] During this period Portuguese influence in the Zambezi Valley beyond its coastal regions was on a negotiated basis with the leaders of a series of small kingdoms or *prazo* states, and half of these troops were furnished by the coopted leaders of these fiefs. These leaders kept private armies of warrior slaves or *achikunda* as a secondary force for protection of their *prazo* holdings, and thus, the typical Portuguese force was comprised largely of these *achikunda* and a contingent of African militia. Leadership and direction was provided by Portuguese officers and the friendly leaders of the secondary states. Allen Isaacman provides a valuable assessment of the use of locally recruited troops in this 1870-1902 campaign for control of the Zambezi Valley:

> Lisbon's ability to recruit a large African force provided crucial support for its success. Less than three per cent of the total army of twenty thousand were of Portuguese descent. Fourteen élite platoons were recruited from such diverse ethnic groups as the Nguni of Inhambane, the Chope of Lourenço Marques, the Macua of northern Mozambique and a mix of Angolan peoples. Many of these soldiers had already been coopted into the colonial system and had aided the

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[39]C. R. Boxer, *Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire 1415-1825* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 32. They were also known as *empacasseiros* from a word meaning "buffalo hunters."

[40]Allen F. Isaacman, *The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique* (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1976), 38.

Portuguese in earlier conquests. In turn for their services they enjoyed a relatively privileged economic and political position. Portuguese officials, in conjunction with the large agricultural companies and the new *prazo* owners, also mobilized more than 15,000 *sepais* or reserves from the immediate Zambezi region. Many had previously served as supervisors of gangs of African agricultural workers, as policemen, or as low-level functionaries for the Portuguese government, for which they received salaries several times those of the local African population. Besides financial remuneration, the opportunity to seize the women and children of the vanquished peoples provided an additional incentive for the *sepais*.[41]

In the twentieth century the *guerra preta* continued to be used both in pacification operations until their conclusion in 1930 and in the Great War of 1914-1918, and endured as a formidable force for defense of the colonies.[42] General Norton de Matos had recommended in 1924 that indigenous troop levels be maintained in Angola at 15,000 regulars supported by a system that could mobilise an additional 45,000 reservists in time of war.[43] The continuing reliance on colonial troops as a source of manpower was established defense policy, and in 1924 it was estimated that from all sources 460,000 men in 28 divisions could be fielded in a national crisis.[44] In this calculation Angola and Mozambique were to supply 71 percent or 20 divisions totalling 325,000 men.

Mozambique had also been a fertile recruiting ground for troop requirements in other

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[41]Isaacman, 65.

[42]Capitão Gastão Sousa Dias, "A Defesa de Angola" [The Defense of Angola], *Revistar Militar* (July-August 1932): 611-619.

[43]General José Mendes Ribeiro Norton de Matos, "O Exército em Angola" [The Army in Angola], *Revista Militar* (March 1924): 85.

[44]Gaspar do Couto Ribeiro Villas, Colonel, Staff Corps, Portuguese Army, *As Tropas Coloniais na Vida Internacional* [Colonial Troops in International Affairs] (Lisbon: Sociedade de Geografia, 1924), 72.

colonies beginning in the early twentieth century. One to two companies were formed each year and deployed for two year tours between 1906 and 1932.[45] These deployments included virtually every colony: Angola, Guiné, Timor, Macau, São Tomé, and India. Consequently, the reputation of Mozambican troops was well established by 1961.

During the Great War, Portugal fought in France, in the south of Angola, and in the north of Mozambique. The largest campaign conducted was the defense of Mozambique against the German incursion. Portugal sent 32,000 troops from the *metrópole* and hurriedly recruited another 25,000 locally.[46] The mixture of this force was 44 percent African. Portugal had had an urgent manpower requirement on its border between Mozambique and German East Africa and had had no choice but to rely on local troops.[47] Many companies of indigenous personnel were formed and trained under the most difficult of conditions, and acquitted themselves admirably in this campaign. At the conclusion of hostilities, a Portuguese major who had led troops there acknowledged their vital role in this conflict:

> During the four years of struggle our native African infantry always fought with courageous determination, when well supported and led, and there was never an incident of disloyalty or betrayal in their ranks....Many citations acknowledged this dedication which was characterised by natural bravery and valour. But of this most important contribution to the cause for which we fought, the majority of the

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[45]Colonel E. A. Azambuja Martins, *O Soldado Africano de Moçambique* [The African Soldier of Mozambique] (Lisbon: Ministério das Colónias, 1936), 34.

[46]Luz Cunha, 73; and Carlos Selvagem, *Tropa D'África* [African Troops] (Pôrto: Renascença Portuguesa, 1919), 410 and 416.

[47]German East Africa, 1885-1920; subsequently Tanganyika Territory as a British Mandate, 1920-1961; Tanganyika, 1961-1964; and Tanzania, 1964-present

Portuguese people remained unaware.[48]

Before the beginning of the African Campaigns (1961-1974), the history of locally recruited African troops and their exploits was not widely appreciated, particularly in the *metrópole*. Just why their contribution remained so obscure is a mystery, despite the fact that it was the most venerable of any of the African colonial powers.

Development of Africanisation

Africanisation within the primary organisation of the Army went largely according to the plan developed in 1968, which was to level recruiting efforts in the *metrópole* and expand the force to the desired levels through increased recruiting in the *ultramar*. Africans serving in first line units of the Army represented 30 percent of the force in 1966 and by 1971 had increased by a third to 40 percent, where it remained throughout the wars. This expansion represented an increase in local troops in all theatres from about 30,000 to 54,500, or nearly 25,000 new troops. There were, however, more than this first tier of troops in the Africanisation process.

Prior to the Campaigns and to this augmentation, local troops were not only raised by the armed forces but also by the comparable civil authorities, and employed as "second line units" with the functions of guides, civil militia, auxiliary forces, self-

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[48]Francisco Aragão, Major, Cavalry, Portuguese Army, *Tropas Negras* [Negro Troops] (Lisbon: Seara Nova, 1926), 22 and 23. "Durante quatro anos de luta a nossa infantaria indígena sempre se bateu com valorosa decisão, quando bem enquadrada e comandada, e das suas fileiras não saíu um exemplo de deslealdade ou de traição...Muitas citações premiaram essa dedicação e a natural bravura e valentia que as caracterizam. Mas o concurso mais importante que deram à causa por que nos batíamos permanece ignorado para a maioria dos portugueses."

defense groups for villages and other specialised roles.[49] The self-defense units were simply armed civilians who had been organised and trained to act in defense of their village, if surprised by guerrillas. This organisation provided a degree of confidence to local communities through a rudimentary ability to defend its members. Supposedly these para-military forces coordinated their activities with local Army operations; however, this cooperation was not always present.[50] Army units consequently might to their surprise find themselves patrolling the same area concurrently with another friendly force.

This sanctioned activity continued during the Campaigns and in the three theatres these irregular troops fought well and provided an invaluable service.[51] In Angola the various police forces and "third line units" of the *Organização Provincial de Voluntários e Defesa Civil* (Provincial Organisation of Volunteers and Civil Defense, or OPVDC) were organised as a single body.[52] The OPVDC was composed of contracted individuals whose original duties were to protect the rural areas in the north of Angola. The organisation began as a vehicle for mobilising the white settler population but became increasingly multi-racial towards 1970.[53] Later these duties were expanded to include the guarding of road construction equipment in areas of aggressive guerrilla activity.

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[49]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 242.

[50]Inocentes interview, 5 September 1994.

[51]Silva Cunha, 297.

[52]Silva Cunha, 297.

[53]Peter Abbott and Manuel Ribeiro Rodrigues, *Modern African Wars (2): Angola and Moçambique 1961-1974* (London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1988), 41.

This centralised organisation was not always the case. Initially in Angola, for instance, Portuguese mobilisation was fragmented. There were:

- *Milícias Tradicionais de Regedoria* (Traditional Local Jurisdiction Militia)
- *Forças de Contra-Guerrilha* (Counter-Guerrilla Forces), which were created according to diverse criteria for various duties and with neither a structure nor a mission that was well defined.[54] Originally in this grouping there were

Tropas Especiais (TE),

Forçes Especiais (FE),

Grupo Sonda in the *Zona Militar Leste* (ZML),

Pseudo Terrorists (PT) in Nambuangongo, and

Milícias Armadas de Malanje.[55]

In addition to the regional militias, the OPVDC, also known as the *Corpo de Voluntários* (Volunteer Corps), was created, as described earlier, and only gathered momentum in Angola.[56] From about August 1967 there was a move to consolidate and gain control of these local para-military forces and to direct their efforts more effectively. The *Grupos Especiais* (GE), TEs, and OPVDC were the primary vehicles for this tighter organisation, although during the course of the wars this task was constantly challenged by the surfacing of additional bodies. The following paragraphs will address the more unique aspects of Portuguese Africanisation, some of which began outside of the conventional

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[54]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 243-244, and Vol. II, 154.

[55]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 243-244, and Vol. II, 154.

[56]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 243-244, and Vol. II, 154.

recruiting, force structure, and normal soldiering duties. Ultimately many of these were officially incorporated into the Portuguese Armed Forces and account for the recorded increase in numbers of locally recruited troops. Others remained part of the para-military Africanisation until 1974.

Tropas Especiais (Special Troops)

Called *Tropas Especiais* (TE) because of the special nature of their recruitment, this force had its origin in the 1965 defection of Alexandre Taty, the Minister of Armaments of the UPA/FNLA/GRAE and a prominent Cabindan. Taty, who had studied to be a priest and forsaken the cloth for a job in the post office, had a strong affinity for women and drink. He stole from his employer to support these interests, and when discovered, fled to the Belgian Congo and ultimately joined Holden Roberto's organisations. He next attempted and failed to replace Roberto, and subsequently through Portuguese agents of the PIDE negotiated the forgiveness of his postal robbery and his return to Angola. With him he brought about 1,200 loyal troops, half of whom remained in the Congo to gather intelligence.[57] Taty was instrumental in helping the Portuguese control Cabinda and the adjacent northern border of Angola.

Crossborder operations were routine for the TEs, who were composed entirely of black troops and carried no Portuguese identity cards. Their missions were thoroughly planned, and they prepared for them by practising on full scale model replicas of the

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[57]General Joaquim Miguel Mattos Fernandes Duarte Silva, Portuguese Army (Retired), interview by the author, 3 April 1995, Lisbon. When he was a Major, General Duarte Silva was the Portuguese Army liaison officer to the TE operation under the code name *Lourenço* between 28 January 1966 and 14 July 1967.

targets at their camps in northern Angola. They wore insurgent uniforms and carried Soviet block weapons and equipment on their numerous raids.[58] The Portuguese authorities were never sure if these missions were fully accomplished, and while sceptical, felt that this activity kept the insurgents occupied defensively and off balance.[59] Initially the troops were irregularly trained and were organised in groups of thirty-one men consisting of a leader and three sections of ten men each. Later they were expanded from Taty's recruiting efforts and organised on the Portuguese pattern into four battalions of sixteen 31-man combat groups each. This force of 64 groups operated from Cabinda and the districts of Zaire and Uíge in northwest Angola. When the ZML became active in 1966, a battalion was sent there. Portugal paid and fed the troops and ran the operation with a low profile to avoid criticism of harbouring and using former insurgents. In 1972 they numbered about 2,000 and were incorporated into the regular forces.[60]

***Grupos Especiais* (Special Groups)**

In 1968 a series of similar groups appeared in the east of Angola. These were formed from captured insurgents or those who presented themselves, and were organised with the designation *Grupos Especiais* (GE). As time went by, they were used throughout Angola, but particularly in the eastern sector (ZML). There were ninety-nine groups of GEs, and these were likewise incorporated into the regular forces in 1972.[61]

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[58]Duarte Silva interview, 3 April 1995.

[59]Duarte Silva interview, 3 April 1995.

[60]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 243-244, and Vol. II, 347.

[61]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 243-244, and Vol. II, 347.

By 1974 these ninety-nine groups with an average compliment of 31 men per group totalled 3,069 troops.[62]

In Mozambique GEs were also organised in 1970 and parallelled the structure, training, and duties of those in Angola. The first organisation consisted of six groups aggregating 550 men.[63] They were originally constituted as small units in the mould of a typical light platoon or combat group, and eventually numbered about 7,700 men in eighty-four such groups.[64] At first they were led by European officers and sergeants; however, progressively as cadres matured, Europeans were replaced by black officers and sergeants.[65] Later in 1971 GE training was extended to include an initiation of parachute qualification. Twelve units from this program were established as *Grupos Especiais Pára-quedistas* (Special Groups Parachutists, or GEP) and attached to the Air Force as an adjunct to the normal *tropas pára-quedistas*.[66] Each of the twelve units had a lieutenant as its commander, a sergeant specialist in psychological operations, four sergeants as sub-group commanders, sixteen corporals, and forty-eight soldiers, or a total

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[62]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 243-244, and Vol. II, 173.

[63]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 243-244, and Vol. IV, 156.

[64]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 243-244, and Vol. IV, 308.

[65]General Kaúlza de Arriaga, *Guerra e Política* [War and Policy] (Lisbon: Edições Referendo, Lda., 1987), 313.

[66]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 244.

of seventy men.[67] All totalled the GEPs numbered about 840 troops. Other than the qualification jumps the units were rarely used in this fashion and were deployed by helicopter similarly to the normal paratroop units.[68] One might conclude that their special training was a manifestation of General Kaúlza de Arriaga's earlier interest and sponsorship of the Portuguese paratroops.[69] Much later there was also a small number of *Grupos Especiais de Pisteiros de Combate* (Special Groups of Combat Trackers, or GEPC) who were quite specialised and simply incidental to "first line units." In all the GEs, GEPs, and GEPCs in Mozambique totalled about 8,500 troops.[70] While originally trained as a counterinsurgency force, their chief duties evolved as protective cadres for the population in the *aldeamentos* (resettlement villages), which will be addressed in a forthcoming chapter.[71]

***Milícias* (Militia)**

In Guiné units similar to the TEs and GEs were formed in 1964 as paramilitary forces, taking the designation of *Milícias* (Militia). They came to be called *Milícias Normais* (Normal Militia) and *Milícias Especiais* (Special Militia), depending on the

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[67]Miguel António Gabriel da Silva Machado and António Eleutério Sucena do Carmo, "Tropas Pára-Quedistas Portuguesas" [Portuguese Paratroops] *Boina Verde* (July-September 1991): 83-84.

[68]David E. Spencer and Miguel Machado, "The Unknown War: Portuguese Paratroops in Africa, 1961-74 (2)" *Military Illustrated* (May 1992): 42.

[69]Silva Machado, 83.

[70]Twelve GEP units with 70 men per unit and eighty-four GE units with ninety men per unit yield about 8,500 troops.

[71]Arriaga, 313.

duties of the units.[72] The Normal Militia assumed a defensive role in protecting the population from attack, lived in or near their villages, and fell under the operational control of the local military commander. The Special Militia conducted offensive counterinsurgency operations away from the local defenses. In 1971 a new *Corpo de Milícias* was formed to integrate all of the *Milícias* and *Tropas de 2.ª Linha* (Second Line Troops) into the regular Army. The *Corpo* was organised by companies of combat groups and aggregated some 40 companies with more than 8,000 men.[73] They were armed primarily with the Portuguese G-3 assault rifle and bazookas. There was also a *Comando Geral de Milícias* (Militia General Command) which oversaw their administration and training. Their training was conducted at three centres, and the course of instruction lasted three months. The Militias were quite effective in protecting the villages and in the consequent freeing of regular troops for other operations. Towards the latter stages of the Campaigns the Militias were accounting for 50 percent of insurgent contact.[74] By the end of the Campaigns these Militia totalled forty-five companies of Normal Militia (about 9,000 men) and twenty-three groups of Special Militia (about 713 men).[75]

Katanganese *Fiéis* (Faithful)

After the granting of independence to the Congo by Belgium in 1960, there was an

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[72]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 244.

[73]General Carlos Fabião, Portuguese Army (Retired), interview by the author, 31 March 1995, Lisbon.

[74]Fabião interview, 31 March 1995.

[75]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. III, 110.

enormous political upheaval centred in the *Force Publíque*, the new nation's army. This spread of disorder prompted Moise Tshombe to declare the Province of Katanga an independent state, expel the mutinous elements of the *Force Publíque*, and raise his own force of gendarmerie.[76] Eventually the UN intervened and returned Katanga to the control of the central government in January 1963, at which point Mr. Tshombe went into exile in Spain. During this period Portugal had opénly encouraged the Tshombe government and supported it from eastern Angola against the UN forces. In June 1964 the UN withdrew, and Mr. Tshombe was unexpectedly invited to return as Prime Minister in a government of reconciliation. Unfortunately Mr. Tshombe could not bring harmony to the situation, and it degenerated into a civil war.[77] Faced with a weak and demoralised Congolese National Army, he took the controversial step in September 1964 of hiring white mercenary troops to assist his army in regaining order. General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, the army commander, along with selected army units and mercenaries quelled the rebellion. The Portuguese again established strong ties with Mr. Tshombe, and this relationship dampened insurgent activity through 1965. In the autumn of 1965 General Mobutu overthrew Mr. Tshombe in a coup, and again he left for Spain. With the Tshombe exit the MPLA was then given access to eastern Angola. In 1967 General Mobutu suspended the new constitution and the National Assembly and prevented Mr. Tshombe from returning to the Congo. At this point the old gendarmerie, loyal and faithful to Mr. Tshombe, crossed into eastern Angola at Teixeira de Sousa to fight for the Portuguese.

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[76]Mike Hoare, *Congo Mercenary* (London: Robert Hale, 1967), 291.

[77]Hoare, 14.

These "*Fiéis*" or faithful ones numbered about 4,600 with women and children.[78] The Portuguese screened and selected some 2,300 men initially, whom they organised into three battalions of 15 companies. Each of these battalions was based at one of three camps: Chimbila on the border between the districts of Lunda and Moxico, Camissombo (near Verissimo Sarmento) in Lunda, and Gafaria (the old leaper colony near Cazombo) in Moxico. The "*Fiéis*" retained their command structure with their own officers and sergeants and were under the general command of "Brigadier" N'Bumba Nathaniel; however, in performing missions they were placed under the operational command of the local military commander.[79] Their primary duty was to protect the crews building roads in eastern Angola. These black troops were "fearless soldiers who fought like tigers" and by 1972 had sustained 31 killed in action, 34 killed in accidents and 36 seriously wounded.[80] By 1974 they numbered about 3,000 troops and posed a continuing threat to General Mobutu.[81] The Portuguese exploited this situation to maintain their influence over him and the insurgent activities that he influenced from the Congo sanctuary.

Commandos

Comandos and *Comandos Africanos* (African Commandos) had their more modern origin in the lessons that the Portuguese learned from their own colonial pacification operations earlier in this century and additionally from observing the French experience

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[78]Colonel Dionísio de Almeida Santos, Portuguese Army (Retired), interview by the author, 30 March 1995, Porto. Colonel Almeida Santos was Portuguese liaison to the "*Fiéis*."

[79]Almeida Santos interview, 30 March 1995.

[80]Almeida Santos interview, 30 March 1995.

[81]Almeida Santos interview, 30 March 1995.

in Algeria, which was "the paradigm of subversive war and the laboratory for counterguerrilla techniques."[82] The Portuguese, having identified the need for a small specialised force, established in 1959 a series of "quick reaction units" to be used in the special operations of internal security, counter-subversion, and counterguerrilla activities.[83] Three of these *Companhias de Caçadores Especiais* (Companies of Special Hunters, or CCE) completed training in April 1960 and were sent to Angola in June. Others followed to Mozambique and Guiné, as each theatre commander realised that he needed a cadre of special troops to conduct counterinsurgency operations.[84] The CCEs were not produced after 1961, as their training was extended to all Army units. The need for a specialised force remained, and in 1962 it was recommended by Lieutenant Colonel Bethencourt Rodrigues, the Chief of Staff of the Military Region of Angola, that *comandos* (commandos) be formed.[85] Centres were established for their expansion through local recruitment and training in each of the three theatres, beginning with Angola, and later in 1970, Mozambique and Guiné.[86] In Guiné locally recruited

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[82]Ribeiro Villas, 84; and Colonel Rio Carvalho, Infantry, Portuguese Army, "As Companhias de Caçadores Especiais" [The Companies of Special Hunters], *Jornal do Exército* (April 1994): 26. "...o paradigma da guerra subversiva e o laboratório das técnicas de contraguerrilha."

[83]Rio Carvalho, 26. "unidades para intervenção imediata."

[84]Colonel António Dias Machado Correia Dinis, Commando, Portuguese Army, *Subsídios Para a História dos Comandos Portuguese* [Supplementary Information on the History of the Portuguese Commandos] (Lisbon: Associação de Comandos, 1981), Vol. III (Guiné-1963), 14.

[85]Brigadeiro Renato F. Marques Pinto, Portuguese Army (Retired), correspondence with the author, 9 August 1995, Oeiras.

[86]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 330-331.

Commandos were known as African Commandos.[87]

In directing the establishment of the 1st Company of African Commandos on 11 February 1969, General António de Spínola set the tone for its formation and use in keeping with the tenets of Africanisation established in Lisbon in 1968:

> The defense of peace in the sacred lands of Guiné together with the building of the future for its people, must be completed progressively for those who were born here and strive here to make a better life. In light of this national imperative, our African Military Force has been established at a growing rate and now includes the elite unit, 1st Company of African Commandos, formed exclusively from the native sons of Guiné....Your ascension to the position of Commando in the Portuguese Army marks a significant stage in the course of progress for all Guineans.[88]

And later in authorising two more indigenous regular infantry companies, General Spínola again reflected the new emphasis on Africanisation:

> We do not want war. The new African force, born today, is destined to conclude the war and bring peace. The government does not want to spend more money on bombs and bullets that kill and destroy everything. The government wants to channel all its money for the Province into the construction of hospitals, maternities, schools....It is to guarantee peace in the simpleness of Guiné and in

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[87]Joaquim Lopes Cavalhairo, *Forças Especiais na Guiné: O Batalhão de Comandos 1971-1973* [Special Forces in Guiné: The Battalion of Commandos 1971-1973] (Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1979), 1-2.

[88]General António de Spínola, address given on 11 February 1969 establishing the 1st Company of African Commandos, Bissau, Guiné, as quoted in *Forças Especiais na Guiné: O Batalhão de Comandos 1971/1973* [Special Forces in Guiné: The Commando Battalion 1971/1973] by Joaquim Lopes Cavalheiro (Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1979), 1. "A defesa da paz no sagrado chão da Guiné, paralelamente com a construção do futuro das suas gentes, deverão competir, progressivamente, aqueles que aqui nasceram e aqui anseiam lutar por uma vida melhor. Á luz deste imperativo nacional, se está estruturando, em ritmo crescente, a nossa Força Militar Africana, onde se destaca como unidade de escola 1ª Companhia de Comandos Africanos, formada exclusivamente por naturais da Guiné....A vossa ascenção a postos de comando do Exército Português fica a marcar uma expressiva etapa na rota da promoção do povo Guiniense..."

the peaceful spirit of its people, that the new African Army is born.[89]

In Angola there were five companies operating by the end of the war.[90] Each company had a complement of about 125 men for a total of 625 Commandos.[91] The units were mixed rather than largely European or locally recruited. Thus it is difficult to give a close assessment of Africans serving in this capacity. In Guiné there were three companies of African Commandos in the Commando Battalion at the conclusion of the war.[92] With about 125 men in a company the total of locally recruited Commandos was about 375 men. In Mozambique by the end of the war there was a battalion of Commandos with eight companies of about 125 men each.[93] Half of the companies or about 500 men were recruited locally.

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[89]General António de Spínola, address given on 16 April 1969 establishing the 11th and 12th *Companhias Indigenas de Caçadores* (Indigenous Companies of Hunters), Bissau, Guiné, as quoted by Lopes Cavalheiro, 2. "Não queremos a guerra. A nova força africana, que hoje nasceu, destina-se a acabar com a guerra e a conquistar a paz. O Governo não quer gastar mais dinheiro com bombas e com balas que matam e tudo destroem. O Governo quer canalizar todos os dinheiros da Província para a construção de hospitais, maternidades, escolas....É para garantir a paz no chão da Guiné e a tranquilidade de espírito do seu povo, que nasceu o novo Exército Africano."

[90]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 243-244, and Vol. II, 170.

[91]Lieutenant Manuel Ferreira da Silva, interview by Al J. Venter in *The Terror Fighters: A Profile of Guerrilla Warfare in Southern Africa* (Cape Town: Purnell and Sons Ltd., 1969), 134.

[92]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 243-244, and Vol. III, 167.

[93]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 243-244, and Vol. IV, 184.

Fuzileiros (Marines)

The Portuguese *Fuzileiros* had their origin in the formation of the Royal Naval Regiment of Portugal in 1618. Deactivated in 1890, they remained so until 1961 except for a brief period from 1924 to 1926. Responsible for maritime and riverine security, the *Fuzileiros* played key and varying roles in all of the theatres. Almost exclusively recruited and trained in the *metrópole*, the *Companhias de Fuzileiros* (Companies of Marines, or CF) were responsible for coastal security and river support. Special operations were conducted by the *Destacamentos de Fuzileiros Especiais* (Detachments of Special Marines, or DFE), and these were the first naval forces to be used in the Campaigns with the deployment of DFE 1 to Angola on 10 November 1961.[94] Subsequently deployments reached a height in 1971-1972 with eleven DFEs and eight CFs in the three theatres.[95] Locally recruited units were restricted to Guiné, where in February 1970 two *Destacamentos de Fuzileiros Especiais Africanos* (Detachments of Special African Marines) were formed at the *Centro de Preparação de Fuzileiros Africanos* (Training Centre for Special African Marines) at Bolama.[96] These units, DFE 21 and 22, served throughout the Campaigns, and while not a large portion of the Navy's overall complement, were very important. As the normal DFE held a complement of 80 men, the two units totalled only 160.[97] This level represents about 9% Africanisation.[98]

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[94]Corpo de Fuzileiros, *Fuzileiros Especiais* (Lisbon: Ministério da Marinha, unpublished history written in 1987), Schedule of Deployments (Angola).

[95]Corpo de Fuzileiros, 17.

[96]Vice Admiral Nuno Gonçalo Vieira Matias, interview by the author, 23 November 1994, Lisbon; and Corpo de Fuzileiros, 15.

[97]Corpo de Fuzileiros, 14.

Flechas (Arrows)

Lastly, the most controversial African force was the *Flechas*. The Portuguese intelligence apparatus required specialised augmentation in Africa, and PIDE was designated to perform these counterinsurgency duties.[99] PIDE and its successor, the *Direcção Geral de Segurança* (DGS) normally performed the various police and security duties that would typically fall to the British MI-6, Special Operations Executive, Scotland Yard's Special Branch Officers, or the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency.[100] When the Campaigns began, the new requirements in Africa attracted the best talent in PIDE for this purpose. PIDE faced initial problems in adjusting to the new environment and to gathering intelligence on the insurgents' movements in Angola. The population continued to be terrorised, the local situation remained confused, and there was a consequent pressing need for a long term solution. PIDE continued to experiment with this uncertain situation in its search for the key. One obstacle to its efforts was the proliferation of languages spoken, as there were perhaps fifteen different dialects. By about 1967 in an attempt to make its reconnaissance

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[98]Corpo de Fuzileiros, 17. There were 11 DFEs at 80 men each and 8 CFs at 120 men each for a total of 1,840. Africanisation at 160 men represented 9% of this figure.

[99]Marques Pinto correspondence, 9 August 1995. The Portuguese Army, although it did not have an intelligence service of professionals, had a system of intelligence with divisions or sections at all headquarters commands. These cells were manned by officers with a sub-specialty and schooling in intelligence. There was thus a system functioning at all levels of command, and it was supported by the Air Force with visual and photo reconnaissance and by radio monitoring attachments. The PIDE was responsible externally for intelligence collecting and internally for counterintelligence and in this case counter-subversion. In Angola and Mozambique the entire intelligence picture was coordinated through the *Serviços de Centralização e Coordenação de Informações* (Service of Centralisation and Coordination of Intelligence, or SCCI), which analysed the raw information and produced intelligence reports.

[100]Duke of Valderano, interview by the author, 17 March 1995, London.

missions more effective, it had begun to use local auxiliaries with their knowledge of the immediate terrain, familiarity with the population, and unique language skills. This initiative proved partially successful, and about 600 agents were eventually employed to address both the vastness of Angola and the large number of languages. This original number was expanded to about 1,000 by 1974.[101]

This use of auxiliaries began around the city of Luso in eastern Angola, and employed people who had been born and raised there to go into the familiar bush and discover what was happening. These locals could travel easily through the country for extended periods, blending with the population and maintaining a low profile. Initially these agents were simply supposed to observe and collect information on insurgents; however, PIDE found that they were being captured and tortured, so it began to arm them for their own defense and train them properly. It found that the Bushmen were the best for this purpose.[102] These people inhabited the vast remote area of the Cuando Cubango district in southeastern Angola, which was also aptly named "*Terras do Fim do Mundo*" (Lands of the End of the Earth). It is here that the Bushmen lived and were largely employed, and it is here that the *Flechas* began.

PIDE had to make a number of concessions in employing the Bushmen for reconnaissance work. They were small in stature and could not carry heavy weapons. And indeed, the Portuguese G-3 9mm assault rifle was too heavy and unmanageable for

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[101]Óscar Cardoso, interview by the author, 1 April 1995, Azaruja, Portugal. Sr. Cardoso is a former Inspector with the PIDE/DGS and was instrumental in founding the *Flechas*.

[102]Óscar Cardoso interview, 1 April 1995.

them. Thus they continued to carry their bows and arrows armed with poison tips. The insurgents were allegedly terrified of this weapon, and because of the awe that it evoked, the men who wielded it were named for it - *flechas* or arrows.[103] Before eventually settling on the Soviet AK-47, they tried many weapons. By 1974 standardisation had begun on the lightweight U.S. M-16 assault rifle.

PIDE began with the most primitive people in the sense of civilisation and not intelligence. These Bushmen were initially motivated by their hatred and mistrust of the blacks, as historically the blacks had treated them as chattels and sold them as slaves. PIDE exploited this animosity and compensated the *Flechas* through booty.[104] Later blacks were employed to work primarily in western Angola and adjustments were made to dampen the ill feeling. Pay methods were changed but had to be handled carefully. While the value of the compensation was the same as that of his fellow European, he could not be paid in quite the same way. As many would immediately spend their earnings on drink and have little left to support their several wives and numerous children, multiple disbursements were made to families to accommodate this propensity.[105]

The Army had great respect for the *Flechas* and operated with them frequently either in small reconnaissance groups or in larger contingents as part of an Army operation. These reconnaissance missions were wide-ranging, deep-penetration patrols in known or

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[103]Óscar Cardoso interview, 1 April 1995.

[104]Óscar Cardoso interview, 1 April 1995.

[105]Óscar Cardoso interview, 1 April 1995.

suspected enemy areas and were spartan and low profile. When *Flechas* operated with the Army, they reported to the local Army commander and were used to guide the normal troops. The Army relied on the *Flechas* to maintain the continuity of local operating knowledge in an area, as the overall experience level of a typical unit tended to degrade with the constant rotation of its troops.[106]

Flechas were organised into combat groups along the same lines as the Army and received their training from the Portuguese Commandos. Often training was extensively modified, as *Flechas* always seemed to have a unique African way of solving problems. Their groups never exceeded thirty men, and they invariably operated in areas where they were familiar with the language and terrain. The primary centres for their operations were Carmona (Uíge), Caxito (Luanda), Gago Coutinho (Moxico), and Serpa Pinto (Cuando-Cubango). Gago Coutinho was the site of the first turned guerrillas in late 1968, and this recruiting avenue yielded about 200 former insurgents scattered throughout the *Flecha* ranks.[107] In the beginning there were eight *Flechas*, and by 1974 there were about 1,000. The concept was also implemented in Mozambique late in the war, and the several hundred *Flechas* were established there.[108]

It is thus apparent that the range and degree of formal militarisation varied greatly. In addition to the specialised units described above, there were thousands of men recruited locally both in and out of the armed forces. Those who were members of the

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[106]Óscar Cardoso interview, 1 April 1995.

[107]Óscar Cardoso interview, 1 April 1995.

[108]Óscar Cardoso interview, 1 April 1995.

armed forces served generally as infantry soldiers or in other non- or low-technical duties. Those in civil support jobs, such as drivers, were again performing a low technology service.[109] Soldiers from the *metrópole* generally performed the more technical tasks because of their higher education level. The count for those formally employed as soldiers is included in the data in Table 3. Conversely, civilian employment data is so irregular as to be only gross estimates.[110]

The lack of delinquency figures on African recruiting would indicate either that the census was inaccurate and data could not be calculated, or that there was no real delinquency problem. The answer is most likely the absence of an accurate count, although if *efectivos* were not recruited by the Portuguese in some capacity, then the likely alternative was serving one of the nationalist movements. The Portuguese were always able to recruit at a higher rate than the insurgents for a number of reasons. While life was spartan for the Portuguese soldier, it was even more difficult for the guerrilla.[111]

The best estimates of nationalist strength show a peak of about 22,000 guerrillas by 1974 against 61,816 locally recruited troops just in the formal Army organisation.[112] If one adds the para-military forces, the ratio of African against African would easily

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[109]Inocentes interview, 22 October 1994.

[110]Pedro Cardoso interview, 17 November 1994.

[111]Edgar O'Balance, "To Turn His Coat - or Not?," *Royal United Services Institute Journal for Defense Studies* (March 1973): 85-87.

[112]Wheeler, 277.

exceed 3 to one. This experience is similar to that of the French in Algeria, where "At no time from 1954 to 1962 did the numbers of Algerians fighting with the F.L.N. for independence match the number of Algerians fighting on the French side."[113] There were about 200,000 Algerians serving France, of whom about 171,000 were auxiliary troops, against the 35,000 man FLN army in 1961 or about a 6 to one ratio.[114]

This Portuguese Africanisation compares favourably with the efforts of the French in the *jaunissement* or yellowing of their Indochina War (1946-1954) and their use of locally recruited troops in Algeria (1954-1962). It was also far more extensive than the U.S. Vietnamisation between 1963 and 1973. At the height of the Indochina War in 1954 the French Expeditionary Corps numbered 235,721, to which about 54,000 Vietnamese were added for a *jaunissement* of 19 percent.[115] In Algeria French troop strength levelled at about 600,000 in 1961, of which about 200,000 were Algerians for an "Arabisation" of about 33 percent.[116] In Vietnam the U.S. and Republic of Vietnam forces totalled in 1968 about 700,000 of which 200,000 or 29 percent were Vietnamese.[117] Thus while the use of indigenous forces in counterinsurgency was not a new concept, in none of the foregoing cases were locally raised troops used to the relative extent that the

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[113]Horne, 255.

[114]Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace, Algeria 1954-1962* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), 255 and 476; and Alf Andrew Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 179 and 261.

[115]Douglas Porch, *The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 531 and 550.

[116]Horne, 235 and 506; and Heggoy, 179.

[117]Trager, 338: and Krepinevich, 192.

Portuguese employed them, and few reached the absolute numbers.

Motivations

In a war of national liberation in the modern era, the question inevitably arises as to why such a large percentage of the Portuguese Army was local, and why these locally recruited troops fought the nationalists with such determination. There are several explanations for this development. The two general motivational factors that prevailed in all three theatres were: (1) the opportunity of relatively well-paid employment as a soldier with the security of medical care and other benefits, and (2) the belief that Africans would benefit more now under a government by the Portuguese than potentially under a victorious nationalist movement.[118] These two factors were paramount, and other elements, such as ethnic differences, were never as compelling.

Certainly the local populations were very poor. From 1962 onward the Portuguese government established a policy in which locally recruited troops would receive the same pay as European troops. This overture made voluntary enlistment overwhelming, and there were always more volunteers than openings to fill.[119] As to the other factor, the Africans tended to believe that the Portuguese would win.[120] They were benefitting

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[118]Inocentes interview, 5 September 1994; and Major Luís Alberto Santiago Inocentes, interview by Al J. Venter in *Portugal's Guerrilla War: The Campaign for Africa* (Cape Town: John Malherbe Pty Ltd, 1973), 134. Colonel Inocentes expanded in the more recent interview on the motivational characteristics of the local troops that he had described to Mr. Venter in 1971.

[119]Brigadeiro Hélio A. Esteves Felgas, Portuguese Army (Retired), interview by the author, 22 November 1994, Lisbon.

[120]Pedro Cardoso interview, 17 November 1994.

with new schools, medical care, and prosperity and did not perceive the nationalists as being able to defeat the Portuguese and deliver on their promises.[121]

Portuguese use of locally recruited troops reflected a further dimension. These troops were fully integrated into the Portuguese Armed Forces in a complete "miscegenation" of units.[122] This practise contrasted with that of the French in Algeria, where the Algerians serving in a military capacity were not integrated into French units. Algerian career officers were particularly sensitive to this discrimination and were never treated as the equals of their European peers.[123] This inequity was highlighted in their classification at various times as "autochthonous," "native," "Franco-Muslim of native statue," and "Muslim officers."[124] There was many a *crise de conscience* for an Algerian officer and few served in Algeria after 1954.[125] In Malaya the British also had separate British and Malayan units in the Commonwealth Forces, keeping a segregation between them.[126] This practise held for Kenya as well.[127] The European Portuguese felt quite comfortable working alongside African Portuguese, and this relationship allegedly helped to maintain a strong solidarity with the population.[128]

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[121]Felgas interview, 22 November 1994.

[122]Luz Cunha, 159.

[123]Heggoy, 262.

[124]Heggoy, 263.

[125]Heggoy, 262-263.

[126]Henry Miller, *Jungle War in Malaya, The Campaign against Communism 1948-60* (London: Arthur Barker Limited, 1972), 25.

[127]Hoffman and Taw, Appendix A.

[128]Arriaga interview, 8 November 1994.

Sensitivity to Casualties

Casualties in any war represent a policy dilemma in that they erode public support at home for continuing to fight. The greater are the casualties proportionately, the greater is the potential for waning public support. Portugal in its Africanisation of the wars was accused of letting Africans die in the place of its European soldiers.[129] The implications of this accusation are that by replacing potential *metrópole* casualties with African ones public support at home could be maintained. The counter to this concept is that the Africans were also Portuguese citizens fighting for their way of life, and they too would not fight long if they felt that they were dying simply for a European colonial cause. Consequently, did the African troops shoulder a disproportionate burden in the fighting in the attempt to retain the colonies and consequently suffer unequally? The total number of deaths from all causes in the three theatres for the entire war was 8,290, of which 5,797 were recruited from the *metrópole* and 2,493 were recruited from the colonies.[130] Not only was the gross figure for *ultramar*-recruited troops lower, but the death rates were likewise lower. Given that on average between 1961 and 1974 about 71,067 troops were deployed from the *metrópole* and 36,025 were locally recruited, death rates were 0.63 per thousand for European troops and 0.53 per thousand for African troops. This statistical data refutes the nationalist claims that Africans were fighting and dying disproportionately for a European colonial cause and shows that, indeed, the black Portuguese troops fought and died at nearly an equal rate with their white counterparts.

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[129]Amílcar Cabral, *Textos Políticos* [Political Texts] (Porto: Edições Afrontamento, 1974); Amílcar Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea: An African People's Struggle* (London: Stage 1, 1969); and Basil Davidson, *The Liberation of Guiné* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1969).

[130]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 264-266.

Army Combat Deaths by Recruitment Source

	Locally	Metrópole	Total
Angola	208	1,098	1,306
Guiné	255	985	1,240
Mozambique	454	1,027	1,481
Total	917	3,110	4,027

Compiled by the author from information in official Portuguese Army documents.

Table 4

When only combat deaths are considered, the figures are even more emphatic. As depicted in Table 4 below, combat deaths in the three theatres over the thirteen year Campaign were 4,027, of which 917 or 23 percent were locally recruited and 3,110 or 77 percent were European troops.[131] Clearly the African troops were not disproportionately at risk in the thick of combat.

Success and Controversy

Portugal in shifting its recruiting efforts to the *ultramar* to support the war achieved a number of important gains. First, the recruiting pressure on the *metrópole* was relieved with the consequent benefits in public sentiment. In this shift Portugal was not only following its tradition of using African troops to fight African wars but was also relieving a domestic impediment to continued fighting. With this change in policy, pressure on mobilisation in the *metrópole* was alleviated, and manpower requirements and casualties would increasingly be assumed by local recruits in the theatres. There would thus be fewer emotional reminders returning from Africa, and domestic public dissatisfaction would remain subdued, indeed even quiescent.

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[131] *Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 264-266.

Second, Portuguese Africans who had the greatest interest in the outcome of the wars and thus the highest motivation for a successful conclusion would now seemingly be doing their portion of the fighting. Engaging the African in his own defense was also seen as one of the best forms of political mobilisation.

Third, this policy introduced efficiencies in the allocation of manpower, as the European recruits with their higher technical skills and education were directed toward the more complicated tasks, while their African counterparts with their irregular education and general lack of technical skills were employed in the more labour intensive tasks, and wars are labour intensive.

Fourth, employing African troops reduced overall manpower costs in that it was far less expensive to recruit and train a soldier in the local theatre of operations than it was to do so in Portugal with the added cost of transporting him to Africa. While initially the African soldier was paid less than his European counterpart, this inequity was corrected early and played little, if any, part in the cost differential. The primary savings occurred in transportation, as the African recruit was generally trained and employed near his home.

Portugal had been forced to mobilise about one percent of its population to fight in Africa and simply could not sustain this domestic manpower drain. On a percentage basis it had more men under arms than any other nation outside of Israel.[132] Portugal's

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[132]Thomas H. Henriksen, "Portugal in Africa: Comparative Notes on Counterinsurgency," *Orbis* (Summer 1977): 404.

mobilisation would have been the equivalent of the U.S. putting 2.5 million men in Vietnam instead of 500,000. The Africanisation of the conflict was thus a pragmatic decision in that Portugal had no other choice but to follow this route if it wished to continue. Portugal was indeed fortunate in that it had a loyal population in Africa willing to shoulder the burden of fighting the nationalists. Unlike the French experience in Algeria, where there were mass defections of Muslim bands, the Portuguese allegedly experienced not one incident of rebellion or of mass desertion.[133] Africanisation from the Portuguese perspective was thus a sound response to a manpower shortage. It added sustainability to the conflict and helped Portugal counter the long range guerrilla strategy of attrition. And finally, by moving the recruiting away from the *metrópole* to the *ultramar*, Portugal was able to realise its goal of maintaining a subdued, low tempo, affordable war.

[133]Paret, 39.

VI

Portuguese Intelligence Network in Counterinsurgency

Locating and destroying insurgents after they had infiltrated the three colonies required "a good intelligence network and a lot of foot-slogging."[1] Gaining intelligence on the guerrillas was vital, if the Portuguese were to keep them separated from the population, to deny them shelter, food, and intelligence on military operations, and to destroy them. Information was needed on their political leaders, their military command, their forces in the field, their sources of support both within the colonies and externally, and their operational plans and intentions.[2] This information was obtained through reports of infantry patrols, air reconnaissance, interrogation of captured or surrendered guerrillas, captured documents, and paid informers and agents.[3] The Portuguese Army realised this critical need for effective intelligence and proceeded to build a productive network that helped its forces exploit weaknesses in the enemy. This chapter describes the organisation and development of Portugal's systematic intelligence effort and shows its effective link in a relentless effort to rob the insurgents of their initiative. It addresses the problems encountered with these operations in the field in selected areas and follows the solutions adopted, comparing and contrasting them to the experiences of other

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[1]Lieutenant General Janie J. Geldenhuys, Chief of the South African Army, "Rural Insurgency and Counter-Measures," in *Revolutionary Warfare and Counter-Insurgency*, ed. M. Hough (Pretoria: University of Pretoria, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984), 41.

[2]Edward E. Rice, *Wars of the Third Kind: Conflict in Undeveloped Countries* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 103.

[3]D. S. Blaufarb and George K. Tanham, *Who Will Win?: A Key to the Puzzle of Revolutionary War* (London: Crane Russak, 1989), 26.

countries with contemporaneous counterinsurgency operations. This intelligence effort was not only adapted to counterinsurgency but to the particular campaign in each theatre. These several adaptations were uniquely Portuguese and in keeping with the subdued and cost-conscious strategy.

Intelligence Organisation .

In the Portuguese Army there was an intelligence system at the beginning of the Campaigns, which while not being a professional service as in the British Army, operated similarly. The officers and men serving in the *2ª Repartição* or *2ª Secção* (Second Division or on a lower echelon, Second Section, which was responsible for the intelligence function) of the General Staff of the Army and its replications down to the battalion level were personnel with diverse warfare specialities (infantry, cavalry, artillery, and so forth) who were assigned to an intelligence section. The rationale for this policy was that officers "self-specialised" themselves, following a natural interest and developing a proclivity for the intelligence craft.[4] When an intelligence service was established, these officers gravitated to it. As early as 1958 the General Secretary of National Defense attempted to draw the various services together in an intelligence sharing effort and began training a cadre for this purpose at the Intelligence Centre of the British Army, Maresfield Park Camp, United Kingdom.[5]

This effort was overcome by the events of 1961. As early as January of that year

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[4]Colonel Luís Alberto Santiago Inocentes, interview by the author, 5 June 1995, London.

[5]Pedro Alexandre Gomes Cardoso, *As Informações em Portugal* [Intelligence in Portugal] (Lisbon: Instituto da Defesa Nacional, 1976), 106.

there had been a working group in Lisbon composed of representatives from the military commands, PIDE, the General Command of the Portuguese Legion, the Director General of the Political and Civil Administration, the Customs Police, and other government arms.[6] The working group recommended the creation of a local intelligence service that would draw together intelligence from all sources and disseminate it in a timely fashion to relevant users. This body would be known as the Intelligence Service of the Government General (*Serviço de Informações do Governo-Geral* or SIGG) and would be responsible for a host of duties in this vein, including psychological operations, intelligence, counterintelligence, electronic surveillance, prisoner interrogation, *et cetera*.[7] This path was followed in both Angola and later Mozambique, where the bodies were known respectively as SIGGA and SIGGM.

Following the March 1961 attacks in the north of Angola and the appointment of General Venâncio Deslandes as the Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Angola, he created a true Service of Centralisation and Coordination of Intelligence (*Serviço de Centralização e Coordenação de Informações* or SCCI) on 29 June. It included not only local intelligence gathering and dissemination but was also the beneficiary of intelligence gathered through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Overseas Provinces, and other national sources.[8] These diverse avenues provided access to both tactical and strategic intelligence. Later a SCCI was created in

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[6]Estado-Maior do Exército, *Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)* [Historical-Military Report of the African Campaigns (1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Ministério do Exército, 1989), Vol. I (General Summary), 360-363.

[7]Pedro Cardoso, 107-108.

[8]Pedro Cardoso, 109.

Mozambique, in Guiné, and in the other colonies as and when it was deemed appropriate. Oversight of the SCCI was the responsibility of the Province's Intelligence Commission (*Comissão de Informações*), which set policy on intelligence operations, military security, counterintelligence, and the like. It was also responsible for the creation of the district, regional and local Intelligence Commissions which held responsibility for the district, regional and local sections of the SCCI.[9] As with most undertakings of this magnitude, the SCCI required tuning to make it function properly across the various military and civil bodies. By February 1963 General Deslandes affirmed the progress and its importance:

> Each passing day reinforces the need of moving quickly to coordinate as much intelligence as is reported and obtained through various methods, as well as to organise its procurement in order to know not only what the enemy wants but especially what interests us.[10]

It was never an easy task for the SCCI to reconcile the diverse viewpoints of the various civil agencies, the police, and the military commands in the interest of an accurate overall intelligence picture. Professional rivalries between intelligence agencies are a service tradition virtually everywhere, and Portugal was no exception. The most notable difficulty arose with PIDE, normally considered a superior and effective intelligence service, disagreeing with the Army.[11] PIDE in a number of these instances

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[9]Pedro Cardoso, 111-114.

[10]Pedro Cardoso, 118. General Cardoso quotes General Deslandes: "Cada dia que passa se verifica a necessidade de caminhar depressa no sentido de coordenar tanto as informações que chegam e são obtidas por várias vias, como de organizar a pesquisa para que não saibamos apenas aquilo que o inimigo quer mas especialmente aquilo que nos interessa..."

[11]Michael Degnan, "The 'Three Wars' of Mozambique," *Africa Report* (September-October 1973): 9.

withheld information and acted on it through the offensive operations of its own *Flechas*. For the most part, however, PIDE did not feel threatened by the military intelligence sections and worked well with the Army. Its conflict was usually with its fellow civil intelligence agencies.[12] Notwithstanding these difficulties, cooperation was viewed as essential and was pursued by the leadership. It improved considerably when the Governors-General were also Commanders-in-Chief.[13] The consequent wisdom of this concept under which the Portuguese operated was reinforced by Sir Claude Fenner, Inspector-General of the Malaysian Police, 1963-1966, who spoke from his experience in this capacity: "Intelligence is one of the most important factors affecting the conduct of the war and a multiplicity of intelligence collecting agencies entails grave hazards both to collectors and sources of intelligence alike. The ideal is to have a single, unified intelligence service..."[14] This unified effort by the Portuguese Armed Forces contrasted sharply with the U.S. position in Vietnam, as observed by Sir Robert Thompson, Head of the British Advisory Mission there between 1961 and 1965: "Nor was there any concentration of intelligence organisation - in fact rather the opposite. When I added up the intelligence organisations which were operating in Saigon in 1966 against the Vietcong there were seventeen, both American and South Vietnamese, and none of them were talking to each other!"[15]

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[12]Brigadeiro Renato F. Marques Pinto, interview by the author, 30 March 1995, Oeiras. Brigadeiro Marques Pinto was Chief of Military Intelligence in Angola 1963-1965, and Director of the SCCIA 1965-1968.

[13]Inocentes interview, 5 June 1995.

[14]Sir Claude Fenner, *Lessons from the Vietnam War*, Report of a seminar held at the Royal United Services Institute in London, 12 February 1966, 6.

[15]Sir Robert Thompson, *Lessons from the Vietnam War*, Report of a seminar held at the Royal United Services Institute in London, 12 February 1966, 2.

The Portuguese sought to avoid this pitfall. In each theatre Portuguese intelligence coordination was theoretically done at every level. Militarily it was effected from the smallest patrols using and gathering intelligence to the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief. On the civil side it ran from the local *posto*'s contact with the population to the Governor General. At every stage intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination coordination was sought between military and civil arms. The mechanism for this joint process was the SCCI, which existed at the province, district, regional, and local levels.[16] Contact with the population was considered paramount. Interpreters and translators were used extensively. Agents infiltrated the enemy's infrastructure. Troops moved freely and regularly among the population, and trackers accompanied the patrols to interpret the signs of the forests and jungles and locate the enemy. Special militias were also formed for the self defense of the population and hopefully reported on enemy contact. All of these activities formed a network or system of intelligence gathering that was coordinated, documented, and shared throughout the civil and military arms. Operations were planned and executed to exploit this information flow on a regular basis.[17] This system was similar to the British innovation in Malaya, where the government established district, province, and national intelligence centres run by the police but with representatives of the military and civil authorities and regularly planned and executed operations to capitalise on the intelligence produced by this network.[18]

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[16]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 368-370.

[17]Estado-Maior do Exército, *Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)* [Information for the Study of Doctrine Applicable in the Campaigns of Africa (1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exército, 1990), 159-160.

[18]D. S. Blaufarb and George K. Tanham, *Who Will Win?: A Key to the Puzzle of Revolutionary War* (London: Crane Russak, 1989), 26.

Intelligence Operations

The desired response to an insurgent's ability to move secretly, strike suddenly, and then disappear is "an intelligence apparatus that will pierce the screen of secrecy."[19] It is the military's responsibility to build this apparatus to support its operations against the enemy. While the requirements for intelligence vary according to the scale of command, they always centre on developing a sound understanding of the environment and of the enemy. This was a difficult task in that throughout the theatres there was a lack of guerrilla organisation and communication. Guerrilla thrusts were only generally organised with a vague operational plan. Consequently, it was difficult to understand precisely what they were doing until contact was made. Effecting contact was difficult, so gaining intelligence and countering incursions was almost as imprecise as the insurgent plans themselves.[20] The insurgents used no radios, so signals intelligence (SIGINT) was denied. This situation was due to three factors: (1) radios were unavailable; (2) the proliferation of languages made communication difficult; and (3) the low educational level of the insurgents made it very difficult to operate and maintain higher technology equipment. "When they began to use radios later, however, we did listen!"[21] Thus in its counterinsurgency campaign the Portuguese were forced to develop this picture piecemeal through the following sources and methods.[22] Each of these made an important contribution in solving the intelligence puzzle, and because of this guerrilla operational vagueness, it was important that information from one reinforce that from the

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[19]Blaufarb and Tanham, 27.

[20]Marques Pinto interview, 7 November 1994.

[21]Inocentes interview, 14 April 1994.

[22]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 363.

others to produce an accurate picture.

Ground Reconnaissance

Ground reconnaissance was the most basic method of finding and fixing the enemy in the difficult terrain of Guiné or the vast expanses of Angola and Mozambique and was a difficult job. To address this problem at the field level each battalion had a staff that included an Operations and Intelligence Section (*2ª Secção*). This section was comprised of 2 officers, 2 sergeants, and 2 enlisted men. Supporting this staff was a reconnaissance platoon of 29 men commanded by an officer with 3 sergeants and 25 enlisted men. It was equipped with jeeps and radios to give it added mobility. In some instances, depending on availability, helicopters might be used; however, this practise was the exception rather than the rule. Thus, there were 35 officers and men or about 5 percent of battalion strength devoted to intelligence duties, a somewhat greater proportion than is normally found in a force structured for conventional warfare.[23]

Patrols by both reconnaissance platoons seeking information on the enemy and normal combat groups obtaining intelligence in the course of performing other missions proved among the most valuable and productive sources.[24] Both types of units were constantly attempting to make contact with the enemy and maintain the initiative, and thus all operations to one degree or another embodied a reconnaissance role. Experienced troops

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[23]Duke of Valderano, interview by the author, 17 March 1995, London; and Marques Pinto, correspondence with the author, 18 July 1995, Oeiras.

[24]Major José Emídio Pereira da Costa, "Informação e Contra-Informação Militar em Ambiente de Guerra Subversiva" [Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence in the Environment of Subversive War], *Revista de Artilharia* (September-October 1961): 149.

were able to deduce information through the simple skills of knowledgable observation, for example, the length of time an insurgent encampment had been abandoned and the number of men in the enemy force. One of the clues in this reasoning process was the state of the latrines at the campsite. Also the type, condition, and origin of any captured weapons fingerprinted insurgents reliably, as it was known who sponsored which nationalist movement with what armament.[25] It also indicated the capability and mission of the insurgents and their logistic needs, and this knowledge was valuable to a tactical commander in enabling him to manoeuvre against the enemy. These several examples of ground reconnaissance and its contribution to the puzzle illustrate the importance of "foot slogging." Attempts were always made to verify this type of information through contact with the population.

The population represented a key source of information, and indeed it was the primary battlefield, or in Clausewitzian terms, "the centre of gravity" of an insurgency. The Portuguese soldier was indoctrinated in this principle and instructed by his doctrine that in his relations with the population he was always to seek intelligence on the time of sighting, nature of armament, and numbers of guerrilla forces.[26] Not only must he be alert to intelligence on the enemy, but he must also protect its primary source from guerrilla intimidation. Indeed it was found that the higher the confidence level of the population in the Portuguese soldier's ability to protect it, the greater the information it would provide. Guerrilla intimidation could easily build a *muro do silêncio* ("wall of

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[25]Pereira da Costa, 149.

[26]Estado-Maior do Exército, *O Exército na Guerra Subversiva* [The Army in Subversive War] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exército, 1963), Vol. II, Part 1, Chapter V, page 2.

silence") between the population and the soldiers, and it required enormous patience, time, and good will to penetrate this "wall."[27] The rewards of doing so, however, were great. This well established principle was explained by Second Lieutenant Oliver Crawford from his experiences in Malaya in 1955:

> But we could not bring our military machine to bear without information, and we could not get information without the support of the population, and we would not get the support of the population unless they were free from terrorism, and we could not free them from terrorism until we had sent men to kill the terrorists. So it went round and round - a most complicated combination of vicious circles. The key to breaking these vicious circles remained one thing: information.

And so the breaking of this "wall of silence" paid dividends for the Portuguese, as well.

An illustration of the typical result of this type of work occurred around the village of Bissássema, Guiné, in November 1970. It was here that Portuguese patrols began to acquire information through their contacts with the population that the PAIGC were planning to attack their camp with four *bi-grupos* or about 150 men. The Portuguese consequently laid a trap in which the insurgents would attack into a crossfire between the camp and a bivouacked patrol hidden in the jungle. The only escape route was through a booby-trapped minefield. When the PAIGC force attacked, it was destroyed as a result of the skilful use of this intelligence.[28] Of course this source was a two-edged sword. Portuguese combat groups generally patrolled by day and established ambushes at night to maintain a steady pressure on the PAIGC. The PAIGC, however, were able to detect

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[27]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, 157.

[28]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. III, 168; and Lieutenant Colonel Baptista Lopes, interview by Al J. Venter in *Portugal's War in Guine-Bissau* (Pasadena: California Institute of Technology, 1973), 90-91.

ambushes through its contact with the population. Thus in order to remain effective, the Portuguese were forced to move the ambush sites constantly.[29]

Air Reconnaissance

Air reconnaissance was the complementary method to ground reconnaissance and was very important in locating guerrilla activity in the difficult and vast expanses of the theatres. It was difficult to do well because of the cover provided by the forests and jungles and the deep reservoir of experience and skill required by an observer to identify the clues to insurgent presence from the air. An observer needed to know the area well so that he could easily detect changes. He acquired this familiarity by flying over his assigned patrol area routinely in a Dornier DO-27 observation aircraft at the relatively low altitude of 200 meters for many hours. Consequently he was able to discern the typical clues to insurgent presence: a new footbridge, a new trail, new and heavy use of an old trail, boats concealed alongside a stream, shelters built at the edge of the forest rather than in the open, and a lack of crops or domestic animals around huts.[30] In observing a suspicious site, the pilot would continue to fly the aircraft on a straight course as if nothing curious was noted. It was hoped that this routine would not flush the guerrillas. Altering course and loosing altitude for a closer look could cause them to move their camp quickly. In the case of a bridge, a boat, a trail, or another object of transit guerrilla use, however, a close look at no less than 50 meters was generally warranted.[31]

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[29]Inocentes interview, 9 April 1994.

[30]Captain Pilot Aviator Joaquim Vito Corte-Real Negrão, "Subsídios para o Reconhecimento Aéreo Visual" [Aid to Visual Air Reconnaissance], *Boletim do Estado Maior da Força Aerea* (Nº12 - 1962): 34.

[31]Negrão, 42.

Photographs of these sightings were a useful tool and their analysis was helpful in revealing the presence or absence of insurgents.[32] Details not easily visible to the naked eye could be identified more readily in pictures. For instance, the construction of normal huts included a door and windows. Insurgent huts had two or three large doors, no windows and were larger than the normal hut.[33] These subtleties might elude the naked eye in flight but could be discerned easily from post-flight photography analysis. Other clues were detectable in the use of burned over areas, fishing structures along the rivers, suspension bridges, float bridges, trails, rafts, dugout canoes, caves, and so forth.[34] Also a series of photographs taken over a month could show changes in the use of these facilities. Information from air reconnaissance was fed to the Army on a continuous basis, as an enemy beaten in one place today would tomorrow establish new camps at another with extraordinary speed. The enemy's tactics were also in a constant state of flux, and it was vital to detect these changes promptly and to modify operations accordingly.[35]

The bulk of intelligence came from these Army patrols and air reconnaissance missions, and their effectiveness cannot be understated.[36] In the north of Angola during the reaction to the 1961 incursions from the Congo, air reconnaissance was indispensable in locating guerrillas in the tall elephant grass and in directing the ground forces to

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[32]Marques Pinto interview, 30 March 1995.

[33]Negrão, 35, and Marques Pinto interview, 30 March 1995.

[34]Negrão, 34-40.

[35]Negrão, 43.

[36]Valderano interview, 17 March 1995.

engagement. This particular operation by the T-6 Harvard and Auster aircraft from the new military airport of Negage, named *Aeródromo-Base* Nº *3* (AB3), occurred in April 1961. It was centred around the village of Mucaba and its reoccupation by units of the 21st Battalion of Paratroops.[37]

The sense of urgency in reacting to the results of air reconnaissance depended on many factors, the activity of the guerrillas, their proximity to or remoteness from the population, and the availability of local troops. Normally guerrillas did not concentrate in large numbers, so locating them required quartering the large expanses of Angola and Mozambique in search of their telltale signs. Visual reconnaissance was necessarily done in daylight, and the guerrillas worked at night, so with this limitation deductions had to be made from these signs.[38] Once located, the Portuguese intelligence network began to develop a picture of their intentions. As the guerrillas moved on foot, their progress was normally slow and gave the Portuguese time to prepare a trap. The guerrillas were easily spooked, and great care had to be taken in planning any operation. They had been hunted so relentlessly that at any hint of danger they quickly melted away. The intelligence picture would then have to be redeveloped. These procedures were in step with maintaining a subdued, cost-conscious war, as the small aircraft were unsophisticated and relatively inexpensive to maintain, and were quiet and unobtrusive in the vastness of the colonies. The results of these low-profile flight operations were

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[37]Colonel Pilot Aviator Augusto Cândido Soares de Moura, "Testemunho Norte de Angola (1961/1962)" [Witness of the North of Angola (1961/1962)], *Mais Alto* (1981-1989 period), 51.

[38]Negrão, 43.

extremely satisfactory in light of the modest investment.[39]

Captured Guerrillas

Captured enemy personnel potentially represented the best source of information and thus "a terrorist captured alive is much more valuable for intelligence purposes than a dead one."[40] Reconnaissance patrols were often assigned the secondary mission of capturing a prisoner, and this mission required careful preparation and special training. Upon capture an insurgent was immediately interrogated to obtain current information about the local area, the presence of other insurgents, their camps and staging points, their equipment, their lines of advance and withdrawal, and so forth.[41] This highly perishable information was generally tested for soundness and verified immediately, at least to the extent possible under field conditions.

The Portuguese were always concerned about mines and booby traps, and thus captured insurgents were also asked to unmask these devices for destruction. Some were cooperative and others less so, depending on their fear and the proximity of their guerrilla compatriots. In these cases the prisoner was asked to lead the way to the devices, for as one Portuguese veteran commented, "After all they laid them and they knew where they were."[42]

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[39]Negrão, 43.

[40]Pereira da Costa, 150. "...un terrorista capturado vivo é muito maior valor para as informações do que um terrorista morto."

[41]Valderano interview, 17 March 1995.

[42]Inocentes interview, 14 April 1994.

A second interrogation would occur at battalion or sector headquarters to obtain more detailed information on the insurgent himself, his training, background, companions, and instructors. While most of these interrogations were performed by Portuguese specialists, there were exceptions. In Zala, for instance, there was an insurgent captured in 1965 who was named Alfredo and who now worked for the Portuguese. He had developed a talent for interrogation, as he knew the language of the guerrillas that habitually infiltrated into the area and had formerly served an insurgent commander in interrogating captured Portuguese. Captain Ricardo Alcada from the garrison post at Nambuangongo, Angola, explained that Alfredo "usually spent an hour or two with a man in a room. By the time he came out he knew the man's history, who his grandmother was, whether she was a communist, what the man was doing in the area, what his unit was, what he was going to do - in fact everything the Portuguese could wish to know."[43]

An assessment would then be made as to whether the man was wholeheartedly with the nationalist movement or whether he had been coerced into joining by fear, promises, or both. In these cases the prisoner was shown troops in training and demonstrations of firepower. An attempt was made to convince him that the Portuguese would prevail in the struggle.[44] The prisoner was also exposed to the new villages and the social work which was being done for the population, including the *apresentados*. These latter individuals were Africans living in the bush due either to fear of the insurgents or of the Portuguese troops and who had presented themselves to the authorities for resettlement

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[43]Captain Ricardo Alcada, interview by Al J. Venter in *The Terror Fighters: A Profile of Guerrilla Warfare in Southern Africa* (Cape Town: Purnell and Sons (S.A.) (Pty.) Ltd., 1969), 72.

[44]Valderano interview, 17 March 1995.

in the new villages. They could also be civilians working for the insurgents as porters, cooks, and the like, and had simply run from the camp. With this exposure to an environment of law and order, organised administration, and medical care, the prisoner was supposed to conclude that life under a Portuguese administration would be infinitely preferable to the hard and dangerous existence of an insurgent in the bush.[45]

Treatment of Africans by the insurgents also contrasted sharply with that of the Portuguese. Anything from a minor mistake, such as the loss of a weapon or kit, to a rational questioning of authority could draw a severe penalty from the insurgent leadership.[46] It was thus very rare in the case of a captured insurgent, *apresentado*, or deserter to rejoin the insurgents, although he had the opportunity to do so.[47] The alternative was one of the prisoner of war camps. These facilities were isolated, and all were similar to São Nicolau on the southern coast of Angola, which was bounded by shark-infested sea on one side and desert on the other. With the opportunity to flee foreclosed by natural obstacles the atmosphere was relaxed. Frequently the former insurgents would take a new wife and with Portuguese help build a new life.[48]

This benign approach was not necessarily the norm, however, and all depended on circumstances at the time of capture. If the capturing patrol was on an operation and

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[45]Valderano interview, 17 March 1995.

[46]Michael Calvert, "Counter-Insurgency in Mozambique," *Royal United Services Institute Journal for Defense Studies* (March 1973): 83.

[47]Inocentes interview, 5 June 1995.

[48]Marques Pinto interview, 30 March 1995.

believed that it was in immediate danger, then treatment would acquire a sense of urgency. In late 1970 during operations in Guiné around the confluence of the Geba and the Corubal Rivers, a PAIGC infiltration group crossed the border from Kandiafara with the mission of cutting and mining the Bafata road. The unit had attacked Bambadinca one evening and withdrawn to await rendezvous with two *bi-grupos* for further assaults. The following day a Portuguese patrol from Artillery Battalion 2917 captured a PAIGC scouting party intact without firing a shot. Included in the group was a senior PAIGC officer. He was flown to Bambadinca by helicopter and given a choice of revealing all or dying. General Spínola was allegedly privy to the entire battle plan within a few hours.[49]

Lieutenant Colonel João Barros e Cunha, garrison commander at Nambuangongo in 1968 described another aspect of the rehabilitation program: "We offer the hand of friendship to these people - partly because we feel we have to, from a Christian point of view, and partly because we know they can help us win the war."[50] In exchange for their lives the terrorists were required to disclose all from beginning to end: "names, places, codes, signals, dates of training, future and past programs and explain any documents and plans that may have been found in their possession."[51] Finally in a moment of truth the prisoner is required to lead the Portuguese to his former headquarters and provide a tour

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[49]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. III, 167; and Lieutenant Colonel João Monteiro, interview by Al J. Venter in *Portugal's War in Guine-Bissau* (Pasadena: California Institute of Technology, 1973), 151.

[50]Lieutenant Colonel João Barros e Cunha, interview by Al J. Venter in *The Terror Fighters: A Profile of Guerrilla Warfare in Southern Africa* (Cape Town: Purnell and Sons (S.A.) (Pty.) Ltd., 1969), 55.

[51]Barros e Cunha interview.

of his operational area.

> It is here where the final showdown comes. The man takes a patrol through the jungle to his various hide-outs. He shows them the places he has used in his own campaign against the Portuguese. Invariably he is spotted by his former colleagues from the jungle. They know this man is betraying them and their cause to their sworn enemy. The Portuguese in turn know that if the prisoner ever tries to return to his guerrilla colleagues he will be shot for helping the enemy. The defector knows this as well. It's as simple as that. This man becomes our man and we are so confident that he will continue to help us, for he has no alternative really, that we give him a gun to protect himself.[52]

Torture was formally prohibited by directives of the Commanders-in-Chief. It was never sanctioned, as with the French in Algeria, and was entirely contrary to Portugal's policy of winning the allegiance of the population, including captured insurgents. It was further seen as alienating both domestic and foreign allies.[53] Both of these reactions would seriously undermine the overall war effort, and certainly the French experience in Algeria was an object lesson. The French malfeasance in the use of torture in intelligence operations among other factors made ties to France ever less desirable and tenable for the Algerians.[54] Even military success for France could not overcome this adverse political factor. While it would be manifestly untrue to state that torture was never used by the Portuguese, information received through its use was always suspect, and its practise appears to have been limited.[55]

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[52]Barros e Cunha interview.

[53]Valderano interview, 17 March 1995.

[54]Christopher C. Harmon, "Illustrations of 'Learning' in Counterinsurgency, *Comparative Strategy* (January-March 1992), 33.

[55]Valderano interview, 17 March 1995.

Under normal conditions prisoners were seemingly treated well. Most had been indoctrinated with the myth that, if captured, they would be subjected to a slow and painful execution.[56] When they were actually captured and were treated decently, the revelation became a major factor in developing sound intelligence. Lieutenant Colonel Barros e Cunha described the rehabilitation of Alberto Imbu, a former guerrilla who had received his training at Tclemen in Algeria and had been badly wounded on 18 March 1967 on an operation near Nambuangongo. After recovering under Portuguese medical care, he had led a patrol in an ambush on his old camp, where many of his former comrades were killed.[57] This behaviour was not uncommon in guerrillas from other conflicts and cultures. In Vietnam, for instance, the U.S. Marine Corps found that once wounded Viet Côngs had received hospital care, and their fear and pain had been replaced with relief, they would routinely be very cooperative.[58] The British experienced the same prisoner reaction in directing the counterinsurgency campaign in the Sultanate of Oman in the early 1970s. Professors Blaufarb and Tanham explain the procedure there:

> In the early phases of the program, captured insurgents were interrogated in the normal businesslike fashion. This proved unproductive. It was then decided to try handling them according to the rules pertaining in that desert society for welcoming guests. They were greeted politely, offered coffee, and chatted up before being asked questions of interest. This approach worked well and was followed for the rest of the war.[59]

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[56]Valderano interview, 17 March 1995.

[57]Barros e Cunha interview.

[58]U.S. Marine Corps, *Professional Knowledge Gained from Operational Experience in Vietnam, 1967* (Washington: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1969), 136-137.

[59]Blaufarb and Tanham, 27.

When the Portuguese followed these tested principles of treating prisoners, they generally acquired sound, reliable intelligence. When they did not, the process resulted in inaccurate information, it discouraged disaffected enemy from surrendering, and it degraded the Army's standing in the eyes of the people. Certainly this situation was the case in the Tete district of Mozambique in 1968 when FRELIMO opened an offensive there from its new sanctuary in neighbouring Zambia. In mid-1971 General Kaúlza de Arriaga, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Mozambique, installed a brutal military governor in Tete, Colonel Armindo Videira. Once the extent of this officer's systematic applied terror became apparent and culminated in the tragedy of Wiriyamu on 16 December 1972, he was dismissed.[60] The damage had been done, however, and Portugal never fully recovered the confidence of the population there.

Captured Documents and Equipment

Captured documents and equipment represented an important facet of the intelligence collection effort and were carefully handled and preserved. Normally documents were written in Portuguese, as it was often the only common language available to the insurgents.[61] For the most part the local languages of Portuguese Africa are spoken only. When a prisoner of any importance was captured, documents were usually found on him or with his equipment. These documents were used to verify his story during interrogation and provided a valuable index to his credibility.[62] In many cases the

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[60]Thomas H. Henriksen, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of Independence 1964-1974* (London: Greenwood Press, 1978), 130.

[61]Marques Pinto interview, 30 March 1995.

[62]Pereira da Costa, 149.

circumstances of capture proved to be as important as the document itself. For example, any document listing guerrilla units was particularly important if connected with the precise time and place of capture. Battlefield searches also often uncovered official papers. Particularly important was a search of the dead insurgents, as they often carried documents that revealed their intentions and were of immediate tactical value. These were always processed as rapidly as possible through channels, as such information was invariably perishable.[63]

In one instance captured documents provided the Portuguese with confirmation that their operations were effective in denying the PAIGC permanent camps in Guiné. A field message captured in July 1971 near Gadamael on the southern frontier was written in Portuguese and reiterated a decree to the effect that no PAIGC unit was to remain in a local area for more than two days. It also reminded *bi-grupo* leaders and commissars of the consequences in disobeying this order both from the PAIGC command and from the Portuguese Air Force once the unit had been located.[64] They would be punished by both.

Captured equipment provided the Portuguese with an indication on the type and degree of support that the guerrillas were receiving from external sources. The taking of such equipment confirmed or complemented the strategic intelligence provided by Lisbon. The Portuguese published booklets describing the equipment and its capabilities, cataloguing all types of armament used by the enemy and their location of capture. By

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[63]Pereira da Costa, 149.

[64]Lieutenant Colonel Lemos Pires, interview by Al J. Venter in *Portugal's War in Guine-Bissau* (Pasadena: California Institute of Technology, 1973), 45.

these means the troops knew the enemy's order of battle and what to expect in combat. The information on mines and booby traps was particularly helpful.[65]

Agents and Informers

For the Portuguese the use of agents and informers was a normal process in obtaining information. In some cases within the theatres such agents worked with the military directly, and in others they sought the police, depending on which authority was present in the area. It was for this reason that a close liaison between the two was so vital and competition and jealousy in intelligence gathering were so counterproductive. More often than not the police were in closer contact with the population than the Army and possessed better facilities for centralising this activity.[66]

In penetrating the sanctuary countries where the nationalist movements resided, border agents were generally handled through the Army and agents on missions further afield were handled by PIDE.[67] Competition between the various factions within the movements provided a fissure that bred informers and fostered agents. Disaffected members of all the movements proved a fertile source of recruits and an opportunity for PIDE to sow the seeds of dissention. In Guiné, the PAIGC "suffered from internal frictions between the mulatto Cape Verdian leadership and the African Guineans; and this

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[65]Marques Pinto interview, 26 June 1995, Lagos.

[66]Pereira da Costa, 148-149.

[67]Marques Pinto interview, 26 June 1995.

was naturally exploited by the Portuguese."[68]

In Mozambique the main nationalist movement, FRELIMO, was in open competition with rival nationalist forces until 1972 not only for external sponsorship but also for nationalist movement dominance. Additionally, within FRELIMO there was a split between those committed to revolutionary socialism and the conservatives. The conservatives found themselves isolated and followed their leader, Lazaro Kavandame, in joining the Portuguese. Shortly thereafter in February 1969, FRELIMO's leader, Eduardo Mondlane, was assassinated by a parcel bomb. Earlier he had recognised the factionalism and its opportunities for exploitation, particularly by PIDE:

> Another difficulty, particularly acute in the early stages of development, when many of the movement's members know little about one another, is the danger of infiltration by Portuguese agents. And this is connected with the problem of splinter groups, since these may use a member of the main organisation to try to spread dissent, so as to bring over a section of the membership. The complexity of motives behind divisive conduct makes it the more difficult to guard against: individual neuroses, personal ambitions, real ideological differences are muddled up with the tactics of the enemy secret service.[69]

The Angolan nationalist movements spent most of their time fighting among themselves and thus had little united war effort. The Portuguese were so successful in exploiting these differences and causing defections that it prompted René Pélissier to comment in 1971 that "the PIDE networks and Portuguese informants in Congo-Kinshasa

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[68]Peter Janke, "Southern Africa: End of Empire," *Conflict Studies* (December 1974),3.

[69]Eduardo Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique* (London: Zed Press, 1969), 132.

are equal in effect to a division of parachutists on the ground."[70]

It is likely that the Portuguese in their missions to Algeria learned something from the French experience there. Here the French had proved very adept in their use of agents, as Alistair Horne's description of events in August 1957 indicated:

> Meanwhile, the French were resorting to new and subtler techniques of penetration. Under the inspiration of Captain Léger, an Arabic expert with the 11th Shock, selected turncoats clad inconspicuously in workers' dungarees, or *bleus de chauffe*, were unleashed in the Casbah to mingle with their former terrorist associates and lead Godard's intelligence operatives to the bosses' lairs. The technique was to achieve such success that the expression *la bleuite*, or "the blues," later assumed a particularly sinister connotation in the war as whole.[71]

It would also be a gross dereliction for a country fighting an insurgency not to exploit the personal weaknesses of a movement's leaders and its organisational deficiencies, as explained by Mr. Michael Elliott-Bateman:

> It is a mistake to start off by imagining the enemy are a solid block of communists on one side of the fence and we are a solid block of anti-communists on the other. If one starts off with that attitude one misses half the game, and will fail to note the incredible strains and stresses in any revolutionary movement. For a start, great struggles for leadership and power are going on within the enemy structure which can be exploited. If there is one lesson or one technique that should be developed in counter-insurgency, it is the ability to infiltrate within the structure of the enemy's organisation so as to splinter and debase it.[72]

The Portuguese consistently sought to undermine the organisational structure of the nationalist movements during the Campaigns. The existence of many and varied ethno-

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[70]Douglas L. Wheeler and René Pélissier, *Angola* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971), 216.

[71]Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), 212.

[72]Michael Elliott-Bateman, *Lessons from the Vietnam War*, Report of a seminar held at the Royal United Services Institute in London, 12 February 1966, 4-5.

linguistic groups throughout the theatres made the task of maintaining constituency order far more difficult for the insurgents than the Portuguese. Any action, normally brutal, against the population by either side was an unpardonable offense and an unbearable transgression against a group, particularly if it were inflicted by insurgents of a different group. An undercurrent of vendettas was a continuing condition of the Campaigns[73]

Guides and Translators

The Portuguese used guides and translators routinely to identify and track insurgents and to communicate with the population. Normally such guides were simple, unsophisticated people whose confidence and cooperation were vital to Portuguese success.[74] In Angola, for instance, the best trackers were Bushmen from the Kalahari Desert in the southeast, who were also initially employed as PIDE agents.[75] The Bushmen were intelligent and gifted people who had:

> ...lost none of their age-old talent for tracking in the bush. In the sandy wastes they are able to pick up trails that are often a week old. They can tell how old a track is, how many people have used it and in which direction the original party was going...they could also smell the presence of humans, and tell you whether they were black or white - all at a distance of about a quarter mile, or further, with the wind in the right direction.[76]

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[73]Inocentes interview, 5 June 1995.

[74]Pereira da Costa, 149.

[75]Óscar Cardoso, interview by the author, 1 April 1995, Azaruja, Portugal. Sr. Cardoso is a former Inspector with the PIDE/DGS and was instrumental in founding the *Flechas*.

[76]Captain Vitor Manuel Rodrigues Alves, interview by Al J. Venter in *The Terror Fighters: A Profile of Guerrilla Warfare in Southern Africa* (Cape Town: Purnell and Sons (S.A.) (Pty.) Ltd., 1969), 142.

With the plethora of local languages in each of the theatres, translators were attached to every unit to accommodate those that might be encountered in its operating area. In Guiné, for example, each company had between 20 and 23 translators attached, as there were some 20 different languages that they might use in the course of their operations.[77] These translators also provided a bridge between the population and the soldiers in the field and took great pride in their responsibilities for the simple reward of appreciation and the satisfaction of their physical needs.[78] Their pay, while normally equal in value to that of a Portuguese soldier, was a mixture of kind and cash, and often payment was divided and made not only to the translator but to his wife or wives.[79]

The importance of being able to communicate with both the population and the captured enemy cannot be overemphasised in the political atmosphere of an insurgency. This requirement was not unique to the theatres in Portuguese Africa, and the men of the 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, came to understand this principle in their 1966-1967 deployment to Vietnam and to learn what the Portuguese had found so indispensable in cross-cultural communication. Colonel O'Neill, its commanding officer, explained:

> I used one of our Vietnamese native interpreters when talking to the villagers, not only because I did not speak Vietnamese, but because the interpreter formed a social bridge between myself and the person with whom I was talking. It seemed very important to get each Vietnamese to relax as much as possible and a good Vietnamese interpreter was able to do this far better than any European. This consideration was important not only for interrogation, but for general contact with Vietnamese officials and civilians, for a good interpreter knew the social form, he knew the local area, he could effect the right sort of introduction at the

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[77]Brigadeiro Hélio A. Esteves Felgas, interview by the author, 22 November 1994, Lisbon.

[78]Pereira da Costa, 149.

[79]Óscar Cardoso interview, 1 April 1995.

> commencement of a conversation, he knew what humour to use, he could warn me if I put a foot wrong and he could suggest something I might do or say to the person with whom we were speaking which would produce a favourable reaction.[80]

In contrast the U.S. Army in Vietnam lacked the attuned approach of the Portuguese and its "intelligence operations were hampered by a lack of familiarity with the language and culture of the people with whom they were working as well as by the absence of any Army procedures for the procurement of such intelligence."[81] The Portuguese soldiers recruited in Africa knew one or more local tongues and seemed to have a facility for acquiring them.[82] After all, "you cannot fight a political war if you cannot communicate with the people for whom and with whom you are fighting."[83]

The Key to Counterinsurgency

The Portuguese clearly understood that the centralised flow of intelligence was the key to counterinsurgency and that this flow would come primarily from the population.[84] They consequently designed their intelligence collecting machinery to work in this special environment. It was here again that their entire effort was reoriented from conventional war with its focus on the enemy as the primary source of information to

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[80]Robert J. O'Neill, *Vietnam Task* (Melbourne: Cassell Australia, Ltd., 1968), 75-76.

[81]Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army in Vietnam* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 230.

[82]Marques Pinto interview, 30 March 1995.

[83]Philip Goodhart, *Lessons from the Vietnam War*, Report of a seminar held at the Royal United Services Institute in London, 12 February 1966, 16.

[84]Marques Pinto interview, 30 March 1995.

counterinsurgency, in which the operating area and the civil population there were primary. The understanding of this principle was well articulated by a Portuguese junior officer writing in a military journal of the time:

> Intelligence is the principal contributing factor in implementing adequate measures of internal security. The primary objective of the terrorists is to destroy the population's confidence in the guarantees of protection that can be provided by local government. With this objective achieved, the local population is reluctant to provide intelligence to the authorities for fear of reprisals. Only with well conducted operations will it be possible to reestablish this loss of confidence. And these depend upon the timely utilisation of reliable intelligence, developed from this source to satisfy the clear requirement of being advised in advance as much as possible on the terrorist habits and methods of operation.[85]

No counterinsurgency could be won without intelligence, and indeed nothing happened without information. The Portuguese intelligence apparatus sought it relentlessly, just as First Lieutenant Oliver Crawford described the British experience in Malaya:

> The search for information was the key to the war. Information came from captured terrorists, who bought their lives with it; from spies; from informers; from every kind of civilian contact and grapevine; from photographs of the jungle; from single footprints in the jungle; from captured documents, weapons, camps, clothes, supplies; from the reports of the jungle-patrols quartering backwards and forwards over the same huge areas. All this added up into the massive files which, accumulating, told us more and more about our enemy and how to kill him.[86]

And killing, or preferably capturing, insurgents who had infiltrated into the three theatres

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[85]Pereira da Costa, 147. "A informação é o factor contribuinte principal para aplicação de medidas adequadas de segurança interna. O primeiro objectivo dos terroristas é criar o descrédito entre a população quanto às garantias de protecção que ihe possam ser dadas pelo governo local. Conseguido este objectivo, as populaçóes locais passam a recusar-se a fornecer informaçóes seguras, tornando-se, desta forma, evidente a necessidade de, com antecedência, se procurar conhecer, o mais possível, dos hábitos e métodos de actuação dos terroristas."

[86]Crawford, 179-180.

was Portugal's military aim.

As intelligence networks operate largely in secret, the details of their organisation and operations are not often visible to outsiders. The litmus test for the effectiveness of an intelligence apparatus is the frequency with which it is taken by surprise. In the Campaigns the Portuguese were seldom caught unawares, but when they were the results were severe. The initial events in Angola in 1961 represented more a failure to act on intelligence than poor intelligence itself.[87] Thereafter, the system in all three theatres appeared to work relatively well, and it was more often the insurgents who were taken by surprise in operations that were planned and executed regularly to exploit information. The contribution of a good intelligence network was one of the decisive factors in Portugal's ability to sustain the conflict for thirteen years and to employ its limited resources in effectively controlling the guerrilla threat. It was able to anticipate the guerrilla well and largely defeat him over this prolonged period through consistently thorough intelligence work. The most notable exception lay in the Tete district of Mozambique, where FRELIMO in 1969 shifted from attacks on the massive Cabora Bassa dam project to politicising the population.[88] FRELIMO began systematically eliminating tribal chiefs north of the Zambesi, and the security situation deteriorated rapidly and caught the Portuguese largely unawares. It became readily apparent that the intelligence network in Tete had either failed or been disregarded. The failure in the

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[87]Brigadier Martins Soares, interview by Al J. Venter in *The Terror Fighters: A Profile of Guerrilla Warfare in Southern Africa* (Cape Town: Purnell and Sons Ltd., 1969), 12-13.

[88]Ken Flower, *Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record: Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: 1964-1981* (London: John Murray Ltd., 1987), 116.

north of Angola in 1961 may have been understandable. The failure of the intelligence apparatus in Tete in 1969 represented a serious void in that Portuguese complacency about FRELIMO's capabilities allowed a rapid subversion of the district. Notwithstanding this setback, information was the cornerstone of Portuguese counterinsurgency, and no operation proceeded without substantial intelligence. This strength sustained an otherwise fragile military presence stretched across the three theatres and was indicative of Portugal's use of leverage in pursuing a relatively inexpensive advantage over its opponents.

VII

Portuguese Approach to Mobility in Counterinsurgency

"Foot slogging" by infantrymen was the most important and fundamental way to address an insurgency; however, there were limitations to his mobility. To increase his versatility, the Portuguese introduced two contrasting means, the helicopter and the horse. While there were other, more conventional solutions to the mobility problem, such as trucks, jeeps, and light armoured cars, these vehicles required at least crude roads, had other terrain limitations, and were vulnerable to land mines. The helicopter had no such limitations, and the horse was ideal transportation in the rugged areas of central and eastern Angola and central Mozambique. These two methods were by no means panaceas for Portugal's ground force mobility requirements; however, they are considered here because they bear the distinctive imprint of Portuguese counterinsurgency. This chapter describes the organisation and development of these two responses and examines their strengths and limitations in hunting insurgents and maintaining the initiative. It also compares and contrasts their employment to that in other contemporary counterinsurgencies.

Initial Helicopter Operations

The advent of the helicopter and its application in counterinsurgency began with the British in Malaya on 1 April 1950 with the formation of the Far East Casualty Air

Evacuation Flight at Seletar with a strength of three Westland S-51 Dragonfly helicopters.[1] During the Malayan Emergency the British used their helicopters primarily for casualty evacuation and later for airlifting troops. Their helicopters suffered from severe maintenance problems, and availability was consequently low. Helicopters at that time were relatively new, and there were many teething problems associated with their employment, especially in the insidious tropical environment. At the height of helicopter operations in 1956, there were only 17 medium and 14 light helicopters, or a total of 31, and these numbers were always inadequate.[2] Operations were exclusively transport, and while there were troop insertions and extractions beginning in 1952, there was nothing as advanced as a gunship with its associated tactics.

The French began the war in Algeria in October 1954 with one Bell helicopter rented from a commercial firm and six months later acquired 8 Sikorsky helicopters from the U.S. Air Force in Germany.[3] With this modest beginning the French Air Force proceeded to develop, refine, and expand helicopter employment, and experimented with lightly armed helicopters and airborne command posts. From 1957 onward, about three years after the beginning of the conflict, helicopter operations had become a mainstay of counterinsurgency in Algeria.[4]

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[1]Robert Jackson, *The Malayan Emergency: The Commonwealth's Wars 1948-1966* (London: Routledge, 1991), 95.

[2]Jackson, 96-97.

[3]Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace, Algeria 1954-1962* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), 113.

[4]Major Hilaire Bethouart, "Combat Helicopters in Algeria," in *The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him*, ed. T. N. Green (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), 266-267.

The Portuguese Air Force was heavily influenced by these French developments and not only adapted them to its African theatres but also purchased French equipment in the Sud Aviation series of helicopters. The Portuguese were slower than either the French or the British to embrace the helicopter as a counterinsurgency tool, and it was five years from the beginning of the wars in 1961 until the initial combat operations occurred in Angola in 1966.

Except for the individual Portuguese soldier, the most useful all-purpose item in the theatres was the helicopter. Because of its versatility there were always missions to be flown, and consequently its use was continually rationed. The helicopter was the one vehicle that could provide the proper mobility in the difficult terrain, and illustratively, a one minute flight in a helicopter equalled about one hour on foot in the jungle.[5] Applying this formula in Guiné, for instance, meant that the lack of a helicopter to bring the typical patrol out of the jungle following operations resulted in a return walk of two days and a night for its men.[6] The freakish geographical configuration of Guiné made the helicopter the most efficient method of moving forces there, as the British had earlier found to be true in Malaya.[7] In February 1952 Flight Lieutenant J. R. Dowling made a number of sorties to lift 17 men and a captured terrorist "from a swamp in the Ulu Bernam area north-west of Selangor (Malaya), when rising water threatened to cut them

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[5]Lieutenant General Sir Walter Walker, *Lessons from the Vietnam War*, Report of a seminar held at the Royal United Services Institute in London, 12 February 1966, 21.

[6]Luís Alberto Santiago Inocentes, Colonel, Staff Corps, Portuguese Army (Retired), interviewed by the author, 9 April 1994, London.

[7]Brigadeiro Hélio A. Esteves Felgas, "Papel do Helicóptero na Guerra da Guiné" [Role of the Helicopter in the War in Guiné], *Jornal do Exército* (August 1968): 33.

off. The soldiers were all suffering badly from fatigue and sickness after spending twenty-nine days in swamp country, and it would have taken a fortnight for help to reach them by surface transport."[8]

In counterinsurgency warfare there was a constant challenge to make contact with the enemy. When contact was made, complete reconnaissance was often impossible, or the opportunity for engagement would be lost.[9] Consequently, the security forces required speed, mobility and flexibility to capitalise on these infrequent opportunities and to establish tactical success. The helicopter was the answer to responding promptly and profiting from enemy contact.[10] The Portuguese became quite proficient in helicopter operations and followed the methods developed in Borneo, as explained by Lieutenant General Sir Walter Walker: "We used our helicopters...to achieve a silent approach, and to achieve surprise by setting down troops unseen and unheard neatly in depth to outflank and outwit the enemy."[11] This type of capability did not come easily, and the Portuguese worked hard to mould and train a composite force of aviators and ground troops based on helicopter capabilities and their adaptation to the African environment.

Portuguese Adaption

The first helicopter operations were begun in 1966 near Madureira and Zala in Angola against UPA attacks on convoys. Initially ten rotorcraft were deployed in the

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[8]Jackson, 98-99.

[9]Duke of Valderano, interview by the author, 17 March 1995, London.

[10]Walker, 21.

[11]Walker, 7.

Dembos region and would deposit a picked body of Commandos behind an ambushing insurgent force, thereby blocking its escape and catching it in a crossfire.[12] This procedure was the simplest and most obvious use of heliborne troops and had been used by the British and French since the early years of Malaya and Algeria.[13] Thereafter operations became quite refined.

In Angola the Portuguese formed flights of five helicopters together capable of putting 20 men on the ground quickly and judiciously to take advantage of insurgent contact. The order of battle of the normal flight comprised five helicopters to accommodate the five sections of a combat group of Commandos, although the actual size depended on the number of troops to be transported. If the flight was expected to encounter resistance, then a *heli-canhão* or helicopter gunship with a 20mm cannon covered the insertion and recovery and provided support as required.[14]

The key to its successful operation was the lead pilot in the flight. He was invariably an aviator qualified in both helicopters and fixed wing aircraft, and would spend the initial phase of his training flying many hours low over the his assigned operational area in a small Dornier DO-27 observation aircraft. In addition to familiarising himself with the terrain, he would mark a map with suitable helicopter landing sites that might be used

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[12]Captain Ricardo Alcada, interview by Al J. Venter in *The Terror Fighters: A Profile of Guerrilla Warfare in Southern Africa* (Capetown: Purnell and Sons Ltd., 1969), 71.

[13]Lieutenant Colonel Roland S. N. Mans, "Victory in Malaya," in *The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him*, ed. T. N. Green (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), 266-126; and Bethouart, 266.

[14]Valderano interview, 17 March 1995; and Marques Pinto correspondence, 18 July 1995.

in future operations. In designating the landing sites, he would also mark approach routes to each. These routes were chosen for their natural terrain features which would mask a flight's arrival and potentially provide as near total surprise as possible. In conjunction with the area familiarisation for the pilots, the Commandos and other troops rehearsed operations until its members were proficient as a team.[15]

Once prepared, the team was kept on alert at a primary base, such as Luanda or Luso, until an operation was imminent. At that point the group would relocate to a major airfield in the area of anticipated operations, where there might be a wait of several days before an opportunity occurred. The entire success or failure of the mission depended on the factor of surprise, and considerable pains were taken to achieve it. Reconnaissance of the target was kept to an absolute minimum to avoid flushing the guerrillas prematurely. Discussion of the mission was forbidden outside the secure briefing area.[16] Once called, the team would quickly be given its final brief and launched, taking the most direct preselected route to the target area and its prescribed landing zone (LZ), flying a nap of the earth profile enroute.[17] The helicopter gunship would circle the LZ, covering the area with his cannon and providing suppressing fire, if required, while the other helicopters were most vulnerable in debarking the assault force. The 20mm cannon was much feared by the guerrillas and was an improvement

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[15]Valderano interview, 17 March 1995.

[16]Valderano interview, 17 March 1995.

[17]General Tomás George Conceicão e Silva, interview by the author, 3 April 1995, Lisbon. General Conceicão e Silva was the Chief of Staff of the Portuguese Air Force from 1988 to 1991.

over the less accurate French use of rockets and lighter machineguns.[18] There might also be a Dornier DO-27 with two 9-rocket canisters, one under each wing.[19] These 37mm rockets were used for marking with smoke or attacking guerrilla sites. They had been developed by the French and were very reliable.[20] The force would immediately move to engage the enemy under the covering fire of the gunship.[21]

At the conclusion of the action, the helicopters would land at the nearest suitable site and load the assault team and hopefully a highly valued prisoner. The entire action would last about ten minutes, and the team would then prepare to assault another objective. The team would normally remain in the field pursuing the insurgents and coordinating operations with ground forces throughout the day. At the conclusion of daylight operations, it would rendezvous with a preselected, specially equipped ground unit with whom to bivouac for the evening. As only certain units were equipped with the necessary field support in fuel, ammunition, and maintenance capability to host an air assault team, this choice required some considerable planning and coordination. During the evening the helicopters would be fuelled and rearmed, and the men rested for further operations the following day. This process continued for three to four days before returning to the original base.[22]

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[18]Bethouart, 266-267.

[19]Conceicão e Silva interview, 3 April 1995,

[20]Bethouart, 267.

[21]Valderano interview, 17 March 1995.

[22]Valderano interview, 17 March 1995.

Upon occasion two air assault teams would be employed together, thereby doubling the force on the ground from 20 to 40 troops. Unless the team was part of a larger operation and formed one of the closing forces in a hammer and anvil tactic or a similar manoeuvre, such a small body could be overrun by a larger insurgent force. Thus care had to be exercised not to insert a team into an untenable situation.[23]

In Guiné, where there was only one squadron of twelve helicopters, the loss of a single machine was considered a catastrophe.[24] With this very limited number a team was restricted to a normal three and occasionally four helicopters. This situation was such a constraint that General Spínola was reluctant to authorise an assault just on the initiation of enemy contact. As the helicopters were relatively slow and there was little natural terrain to shield their approach, surprise was far more difficult to achieve than in Angola. When the PAIGC commanders heard helicopters approaching, they disengaged and disappeared into the jungle. Consequently, helicopters would generally not be used in the beginning of an operation when intelligence on the insurgents was not fully defined. General Spínola's policy was to hold the helicopters in reserve while the ground commanders determined the likely intentions, strength, and withdrawal routes of PAIGC forces.[25] It was at this point that the helicopter assault troops would be deposited behind the enemy as a blocking force in an attempt to foreclose his withdrawal. This tactic was not always successful in terrain where an insurgent could "creep in

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[23]Valderano interview, 17 March 1995.

[24]Inocentes interview, 9 April 1994.

[25]Sergeant Alphonso Mateus, interview by Al J. Venter in *Portugal's War in Guine-Bissau* (Pasadena: California Institute of Technology, 1973), 167.

between the lianas or a mangrove root and you won't see him even if you pass within touching distance of him."[26] Nevertheless, the surprise attacks which were conducted by the ground forces in Guiné and which were so successful between 1963 and 1966 had become ineffective. By 1968 it was impossible to surprise an enemy camp because of the sentries and defensive mining and booby traps surrounding it, oftentimes out to a distance of several kilometres. The helicopter had been the only solution to regaining the initiative.[27]

Helicopter Limitations

While the helicopter was seen as a high-technology tool essential to modern counterinsurgency operations and represented a major advance in this field, it also had a number of important disadvantages. Helicopters were relatively expensive and their addition to a campaign increased costs significantly. Because of this constraint the British in Malaya at the height of their campaign in 1956 could only muster 31 helicopters. The Portuguese by 1974 had accumulated a precious inventory of 93 helicopters and always wanted more.[28] These desires were frustrated when 12 newly delivered machines, a composite of Sud Aviation Alouette IIIs and SA-330 Pumas, were destroyed in a night sabotage raid by the Maoist underground opposition *Acção Revolucionária Armada*

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[26]Mateus interview.

[27]Felgas, 33.

[28]T. N. Dupuy, John A. C. Andrews, and Grace P. Hayes, *The Almanac of World Power* (Dunn Loring, Virginia: T. N. Dupuy Associates, 1974), 112. The Portuguese helicopter order of battle comprised 2 Sud Aviation Alouette IIs, 80 Alouette IIIs, and 11 SA-330 Pumas, a total of 93 machines.

(ARA) at the Tancos airbase in early 1971.[29]

Added to the initial cost of a helicopter were the extraordinarily high maintenance and operating expenses, particularly in a tropical environment. Helicopters require a great number of very specialised men to service and fly them, and their expense would have been a substantial and continuing burden, particularly as helicopter usage rose.[30] Portuguese aircraft usage was always high, as its number of available craft was severely limited. Further, the Portuguese machines were old before the strains of combat, for the inventory was largely second-hand.[31] This situation required a high standard of maintenance to ensure aircraft availability. If planes did not fly, it was generally for a lack of cash to buy spare parts.[32] Because Portugal had difficulty affording additional helicopters, preserving its current inventory was the best answer to the shortage. Because of these limited resources Portugal never fell into the trap of having its troops carried in helicopters so frequently that they lost contact with the population and lived in a different world from the enemy. Moreover, the use of armed helicopters was carefully controlled, so damage and casualties in the population were avoided through any indiscriminate use of firepower. Helicopter assault operations were executed away from populated areas.

There was much to be said about the advantages of helicopters; however, their

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[29]Mateus interview.

[30]Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Conflict: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1971), 137.

[31]Mateus interview. In 1972 Portugal was continuing to acquire aircraft on a regular basis; however, the last new aircraft was taken into service in 1954.

[32]Mateus interview.

intelligent deployment was not always in direct proportion to their numbers. In fact, just the opposite might be said, and this principle worked in Portugal's favour. While this desire for additional helicopters was always present, the very limited number available forced Portugal to use the aircraft as effectively as possible. And indeed, search and destroy operations in the theatres would not have been possible without them. Nevertheless, when there was a vast quantity of helicopters, as with the U.S. in Vietnam, and there was constant pressure to keep them fully employed. Such pressures fostered a misuse, and Sir Robert Thompson noted such a loss of purpose in his criticism of the U.S. use of helicopters in Vietnam: "I have seen hundreds of helicopters and it is a fantastic sight. It is a constant stream of helicopters and, when you get to that stage, you are not on a collision course with the enemy."[33] The U.S. Army had constantly sought methods to improve its troop mobility and saw helicopters as a quantum improvement over leg power and ground vehicles. This position was reinforced by Chief Warrant Officer Robert Mason, a U.S. Army helicopter pilot in Vietnam, who described the following conversation with a squadronmate in September 1965 at laager area Lima, two miles east of An Khe pass on Route 19: "I talked to Wendall...about the French. He had read *Street Without Joy*, by Bernard Fall. His descriptions of how the French were destroyed around here by the same people we were going against got me depressed. The major reason our leaders felt we could win where the French hadn't was our helicopters. We were the official test, he said."[34] The development of the U.S. Army's airmobile concept centred on firepower and air mobility to the exclusion of pacification and

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[33]Sir Robert Thompson, *Lessons from the Vietnam War*, Report of a seminar held at the Royal United Services Institute in London, 12 February 1966, 21.

[34]Robert Mason, *Chickenhawk* (London: Corgi Books Ltd., 1983), 87-88.

securing a population. In Vietnam after 1964 the airmobile forces busied themselves searching for main force guerrilla units and allowed the individual guerrilla to work his purpose - the infiltration of villages and subverting the rural population.[35] The entire U.S. focus was the operation of the air assault division in mid-intensity conflict.

The Portuguese had adapted their helicopter assault operations to their environment. They outflanked and outmanoeuvred the enemy when contact was made, just as their precursor, the British, had done in Borneo:

> It was a combination of the judicious use of helicopters and good intelligence that enabled us to anticipate the enemy's intentions, cut him off, seal him off and destroy him before he could retreat to the safe sanctuary of his side of the frontier. Because helicopters were such a battle winner and were our life line, and because they were in short supply, we learnt how to get the best use out of them, and indeed we valued them as highly as we did the lives of our soldiers.[36]

The helicopter and its effective utilisation was without question the biggest difference in military capability between that of Portuguese forces and of the enemy.[37]

Horse Cavalry

Because helicopters were in such short supply and had their operational limitations, other methods had to be found to augment their capabilities and provide the necessary mobility for certain battlefields in the theatres. Helicopters were indispensable for mobility in the tidal deltas of Guiné and the Dembos jungle forests of Angola, but they could only be spread so far. There were other areas that were less difficult but still in

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[35]Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 125.

[36]Walker, 7.

[37]Felgas, 32.

their own way presented severe challenges in terrain and provided the insurgents with a fertile medium for operations. It was in these areas of large open savannah plains in central Angola and the highlands of Mozambique that an imaginative supplement to the helicopter was required. They were too expansive to patrol on foot, particularly with Portugal's manpower limitations, and unsuited for wheeled vehicles with the tall elephant grass and frequent rivers. While the helicopter was considered the answer, there were too few of them, and their unique requirements often were needed more imperatively elsewhere. The helicopter also had the disadvantage in its operational tendency to fly over the populations of these areas where communication with the people and securing their loyalty were vital.

In 1966 the MPLA opened its eastern front, and thereafter insurgent activity became an increasing problem in the area between Luso and Serpa Pinto. UNITA had also begun its military activity nearby in December 1966 with an attack on the Portuguese post of Cassamba. Consequently, eastern Angola became a priority, and an effective solution had to be found to address this new extension of the conflict. The first lay in developing the proper security force, one which would combine mobility over rough terrain with ability to engage insurgents and maintain strong links with the population. The second lay in isolating the guerrilla in these vast tracts of wilderness.

Dr. Jonas Savimbi, who headed UNITA and believed that a nationalist movement should operate from bases inside Angola, was soon isolated and by 1969 counted less than 1,500 followers. In order to survive in defeat, he and his force came to an accommodation with the Portuguese, and between 1971 and 1973 UNITA was restricted

to a zone which it was not supposed to leave.[38] In return UNITA would cease activities against the Portuguese.[39] UNITA also received arms and medical support.[40] This development left primarily the MPLA to address.

The partial solution to the shape of a proper force was found in history. Horse cavalry had been used in Angola since 1571 and had participated in the early Battles of Cambambe (1583) and of Rio Lucala (1590).[41] These and subsequent experiences through the 1850s had taught several lessons on the use of cavalry here:

- Mounted troops were historically superior against the much more numerous indigenous forces on foot.
- An armed rider firing from a charging horse presented an intimidating appearance to a man on foot.
- African horses were unsuitable for cavalry use because they lacked stamina from a poor local diet and susceptibility to disease. This shortcoming had historically required the importation of animals from Brazil and Argentina, where they were accustomed to a similar climate and were bred with a physique and temperament more suitable for combat patrols.

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[38]Adelino Gomes, "Exército e UNITA Colaboraram antes de 74" [Army and UNITA Collaborate before 74], *Público* (19 October 1995): 2-4.

[39]Óscar Cardoso, interview by the author, 1 April 1995, Azaruja, Portugal. Sr. Cardoso is a former Inspector with the PIDE/DGS and was instrumental in founding the *Flechas*.

[40]Inocentes interview, 17 March 1995.

[41]Colonel António Casimiro Ferrand d'Almeida, "Recordações de um «Dragão de Angola»" [Recollections of a "Dragoon of Angola"], *Revista Militar* (October-November 1985): 690-692.

- The enemy held no tradition in the use of mounted troops. Thus no opponent was likely to employ an opposing cavalry force. This situation existed because of the restriction, which was lifted in 1796, on importing mares to Angola so that horses could not be bred and used by indigenous forces against the Portuguese.[42]

It was thought that horse cavalry might be the solution to the problem of establishing a presence on the ground in certain parts of Angola where conditions of the cooler, tsetse-free climate, varied terrain relief, grassy vegetation, and sparse population lent themselves to a mounted force. That the horse would present a large target and be vulnerable in a firefight and that it represented yet another mouth to feed and animal to train were valid concerns of the sceptics. In experiments and tests it was found that horses were a confusing target and difficult to hit when charging head-on. Experience was to support this thesis and the normal loss rate of a cavalry squadron of 130 to 150 mounted troops was one horse per month.[43] These observations confirmed the consistent durability of horses in combat over the years, as earlier explained by Captain L. E. Nolan of the 15th Hussars in 1864, "Saddles will be emptied, horses killed and wounded, but no horse, unless he is shot through the brain, or has his legs broken, will fall; though stricken to the death, he will struggle through the charge."[44] Captain Nolan cited the following incident as an example:

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[42]Ferrand d'Almeida, 692-693.

[43]Colonel César Augusto Rodrigues Mano, Portuguese Army (Retired), interview by the author, 10 November 1994, Oeiras. Colonel Mano commanded the *Grupo de Dragões de Angola* between 1973 and 1974.

[44]Captain L. E. Nolan, *Cavalry; Its History and Tactics* (Columbia, South Carolina: Evans and Cogswell, 1864), 173.

> One without his rider, at Strigau, which had one of his hind feet carried away by a cannon-ball, joined the left of the squadron, where he remained with the others during all the battle, although we were several times dispersed; at the sound of the call he always fell into the same place, which was, without doubt, the same that he had before belonged to in the squadron.[45]

Moreover, the cost of one *Berliet* truck roughly equalled that of the horses required to mount a platoon.[46]

The required logistic and veterinary support and the necessary specialised training also proved less troublesome than anticipated.[47] Obtaining water in the central plains of Angola was normally not a problem on operations; however, it was important to be careful during the dry season, as the usual sources could be surprisingly empty. In one instance during an operation in the region of Fort Cameia, south of Lumeje, it was necessary to lead the horses for two days, resting in the shade during daylight and travelling at night, until the squadron arrived at the River Luena for watering.[48] Health problems were fairly conventional, and both horse and man were vaccinated against the known diseases. Vitamins and dietary supplements also played a key role in maintaining the health of the horses so that they were not susceptible to sickness.[49] Through research and experience feeding was reduced to a formula of 4.5 kilograms of ground corn and oats per day. As the normal patrol was four to five days, 18 to 22.5 kilograms of feed

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[45]Nolan, 173.

[46]Peter Abbott and Manuel Ribeiro Rodrigues, *Modern African Wars (2): Angola and Mozambique 1961-1974* (London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1988), 24.

[47]Ferrand d'Almeida, 695.

[48]Ferrand d'Almeida, 704.

[49]Ferrand d'Almeida, 704-705.

packed in individual plastic ration sacks were carried by each horse. This ration was also supplemented, as noted, and they were able to eat local fodder as well. Extra rations were packed in the infrequent event that a horse became so sick that he could not move.[50]

In further experiments it was found that a patrol could go anywhere from eight to twenty-seven days without difficulty.[51] The horses had a hard, durable hoof, so shoes and farrier services were not required, and the terrain had few stones.[52] Based on this experience it was found that the normal patrol could be extended into a long-range one of 20 to 25 days with resupply by helicopter or truck about every five days.[53] A patrol of eight days would typically cover about 250 kilometres and would extend further with increased duration.[54] The normal speed of advance was 8 to 13 kilometres per hour or about 50 kilometres per day when patrolling, which was many times that of a man on foot. Quite often the horses were transported in trucks or by railcar to their patrol area, as in the similar practise with infantry troops, to make more efficient use of this resource.[55]

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[50]Ferrand d'Almeida, 705.

[51]Colonel Luiz Barros e Cunha, "Cavalaria a cavalo no Ultramar? Algumas reflexões" [Horse Cavalry in the *Ultramar*? Some reactions], *Revista da Cavalaria* (1967 annual issue): 277.

[52]Inocentes interview, 14 April 1994.

[53]Mano interview, 10 November 1994.

[54]J. A. (initials only), "Cavalaria a cavalo em Angola" [Horse cavalry in Angola], *Revista da Cavalaria* (1969 annual issue): 171.

[55]Lieutenant Colonel Vicente da Silva, "Lances de «Cavalo» no «Xadrez» Angolano" [Moves of the "Horse" on the Angolan "Chessboard"], *Jornal do Exército* (June 1972): 28.

Both training and organisation followed the historically tested and traditional route and was similar to that employed a century earlier by such North American figures as Lieutenant General James Ewell Brown Stuart, CSA, and Colonel John Singleton Mosby, CSA, in the 1860-1865 period, as well as by the Portuguese in the Angolan campaigns of the 1850s.[56] A Centre of Instruction for horse cavalry was established in Angola in 1970, and over 300 mounted troops were trained there in the basics of equitation and cavalry tactics during the Campaigns.[57] In the initial phase of the program 225 horses were imported from Argentina, and subsequently the Republic of South Africa supplied the sturdy *Boerperde* at a rate of about 20 to 30 mounts every three months for squadron replacement and expansion.[58]

Also beginning in 1970 local recruitment was sought for the cavalry squadrons. Because there were few horses in Angola, it was very difficult for many of the early recruits to adapt to an animal that they had never seen before. Consequently, the recruiting effort gravitated toward certain peoples in southwestern Angola, the *cuanhamas* and the *cuamatos*, who were very fierce and had a history of cattle raising. As these people were familiar with cattle, they adapted quickly to the horse and proved to be excellent riders.[59] While it is difficult to say precisely what percentage of the recruits were indigenous, the cavalry squadrons were for the most part comprised of local troops

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[56]Colonel J. Lucius Davis, *The Trooper's Manual: or, Tactics for Light Dragoons and Mounted Riflemen* (Richmond, Virginia: A. Morris, 1862), vii-ix.

[57]Ferrand d'Almeida, 689.

[58]Mano interview, 10 November 1994.

[59]Ferrand d'Almeida, 712.

except for the officers and sergeants. In one squadron all of the subalterns were *cuanhamas* and *cuamatos* with the exception of one white, two *mestiços* and a negro.[60]

The basic cavalry organisation was the platoon, which consisted of three sections of ten mounted troops each, plus a support section of one machine gun and three rifle grenadiers, an orderly, a bugler, and a farrier.[61] Three platoons comprised a squadron, and three squadrons equalled a group. The typical cavalry patrol was performed by a platoon advancing in a double echelon or inverted "V" formation that was between 200 and 500 metres wide.[62] Alternatively, the "V" could be changed to a single echelon, or to a line abreast or rank formation, depending on the terrain and visibility. The mounted troops could see over the vegetation and undergrowth from the height of the horse and identify insurgents readily from this vantage. It was very difficult for the insurgents to ambush a patrol, as they were on foot and unable to see the horsemen well enough for surprise. Should an ambush be attempted, then the formation would execute a wheeling movement toward the attack and surround the insurgents. With the advantage of speed and height, the cavalry prevented the normal "shoot and scoot" tactics of the guerrilla, and enemy encirclement and capture or destruction in such instances was almost certain.[63] Consequently ambushes of cavalry became rare, as the insurgents could not counter it successfully.

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[60]Ferrand d'Almeida, 713.

[61]Abbott and Ribeiro Rodrigues, 24.

[62]Ferrand d'Almeida, 698.

[63]Mano interview, 10 November 1994.

Dragoon Operations

Initial exploratory operations had begun in 1966 with a reconnaissance platoon based in Silva Porto.[64] In 1968 this unit was expanded to form the three squadron *Grupo de Cavalaria* Nº *1* and operated variously from there and Munhango throughout the war.[65] This combined force approached 300 mounted troops and operated in Angola between Silva Porto and the eastern border near Cazombo. The southern boundary of the operating area was the Savimbi buffer, and the northern one was the River Cassai, which ran approximately along the 11° south latitude.[66] The concept was extended to Mozambique in 1971 and operated from Vila Pery in the highlands west of Beira until the end of the Campaigns.[67]

The Portuguese *dragões* or dragoons were indeed trained equally for cavalry or infantry service, just as their predecessors in history had been. In some instances the horses would be used for a patrol to reach its assigned area quickly over difficult terrain and then dismount to continue on foot for an attack or reconnaissance mission based on intelligence. In these cases one rider in every six would be left at the dismounting site to care for the horses, and the remaining troopers would conduct an infantry patrol. The typical platoon of 30 would leave five men to guard the 30 horses and form a patrol of 25 men. Picketing the horses for long periods lightly defended and thus exposing them

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[64]Abbott and Ribeiro Rodrigues, 24.

[65]Abbott and Ribeiro Rodrigues, 24.

[66]Ferrand d'Almeida, 694.

[67]Abbott and Ribeiro Rodrigues, 24.

to enemy attack was not the normal practise.[68] Nor were night actions sought, as cavalry operations were predicated on a visual advantage over the insurgents. At night this advantage evaporated, particularly as horses cannot see well in the dark. Cavalry manoeuvres also depended upon visual contact for signalling, and this communication was difficult under low visibility. Darkness thus put cavalry at a severe disadvantage, and this vulnerability was to be avoided. So cavalry patrols preferred to rest at night and sought secluded bivouacs where the enemy was unlikely to pinpoint the troopers and horses for an attack.[69]

Cavalry forces tended to operate in vast tracts of wilderness where there were few roads and even fewer passable ones during the rainy season. Encountering mines was thus an infrequent event. When a horse did step on a mine, it was inevitably killed, although the rider generally survived.[70] Likewise in firefights horses were rarely wounded, as the guerrillas were not normally prepared to stand in the face of a charging horse with its firing rider. It was not only psychologically intimidating to the guerrilla, but it was also dangerous for him.[71] In Angola one horse was wounded on the average about every four months, and almost all recovered.[72]

The cavalry forces from the beginning of their combat operations in 1966 and

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[68]Mano interview, 10 November 1994.

[69]Ferrand d'Almeida, 707.

[70]Mano interview, 10 November 1994.

[71]Mano interview, 10 November 1994.

[72]Mano interview, 10 November 1994.

particularly after augmentation in 1968 helped to neutralise MPLA operations in central and eastern Angola and presented a continuing threat to insurgent activity. Their large sweeping patrols found the enemy in the vast plains of Angola and destroyed him. It was not spectacular work, but it was decisive in guaranteeing the security of the population and enabling the people to lead normal lives.[73] Cavalry was particularly effective in its psychological impact on the enemy. The mobility and quickness of reaction, especially to an ambush, was intimidating. A cavalry formation charging at a gallop and surrounding an insurgent force or pursuing it was decisive and generally successful in its action. Horses moved silently through the savannah plains relative to the helicopter and were able to surprise the insurgents quite well, and thus had better success in detecting guerrillas in the bush than helicopter-borne troops.[74] They were not only capable of moving over vast distances during a patrol, and 500 kilometres was not considered unusual, but also of negotiating the most inaccessible and remote territory. In moving against an enemy force, they exhibited flexibility with the combination of an approach by horse and the transition to attack or reconnaissance on foot.[75]

These Portuguese cavalry operations represented a partial solution to the problem of covering approximately 250,000 square kilometres of miserable terrain, normally impassable in the rainy season. With some 300 cavalry troops and a minimum of logistic strain the Portuguese were able to gather intelligence, communicate with the population, provide a presence, and conduct operations between the larger, full-scale offenses against

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[73]Ferrand d'Almeida, 714.

[74]Abbott and Ribeiro Rodrigues, 24.

[75]Ferrand d'Almeida, 715-717.

MPLA infiltration in the east.[76] Only in Rhodesia with the establishment of Grey's Scouts in 1976 did a modern counterinsurgency employ horse cavalry as a solution to its mobility requirements in the way that the Portuguese did.[77]

Beginning in 1977, the South African Defense Force (SADF) used cavalry and scrambler motorcycles for hot pursuit of guerrillas in its border war with SWAPO (South West African People's Organisation), which was concluded in 1989. This SADF use was quite different from the long range patrolling of the Portuguese in Angola. All three of these cavalry employments were successful in their own way; however, there were limitations. Under heavy fire a horse could panic and throw his rider. While there were few equine deserters; nevertheless, this risk was present. The use of horses was also restricted to tsetse-free areas, a significantly limiting condition. Horses, like humans, could become sick. This incapacity was no less serious than a mechanical failure on a vehicle, and the training, care, and feeding of the animals was no more arduous or expensive than maintaining the same vehicle. In fact, the use of motorcycles by the SADF revealed that the horse, while not as fast, was more durable. Motorcycles in the bush tended to have a short life.[78] While such mechanical devices were useful, the mounted trooper could range much farther afield over difficult terrain than most vehicles and certainly farther than his comrade on foot without becoming exhausted, even in hot weather. His perspective from atop a steed gave him a distinct advantage over the

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[76]Inocentes interview, 14 April 1994.

[77]Patrick Ollivier, *Commandos de Brousse* [Bush Commandos] (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1985).

[78]Willem Steenkamp, *South Africa's Border War 1966-1989* (Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing Limited, 1989), 201.

guerrilla. The horse moved silently through the bush and gave mounted security forces the advantage of surprise. Finally, the most compelling argument for resurrecting the archaic horse soldier lay in the unique advantage of combining troop mobility with the maintenance of contact with the population.

Portugal's resources were stretched thin in fighting the Campaigns. The nineteen Alouette helicopters and the two newly acquired SA-330 Pumas represented in the 1970 period thin resources to cover the estimated 400,000 square kilometres of Angola's eastern front.[79] The addition of the dragoons produced a winning, cost effective, low-key combination with the helicopter and infantryman that resulted in a neutralisation of the enemy in the east.[80]

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[79]Willem S. van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Angola 1961-1974* (Rivonia: Ashanti Publishing (Pty) Limited, 1993), 196.

[80]van der Waals, 195.

VIII

Portuguese Social Operations and *Aldeamentos*

Meeting insurgent force with force in counterinsurgency is a key element in protecting the population; however, the initiation of appropriate and efficient action to address its needs is considered the most effective means of gaining its support.[1] Since before the establishment of the Portuguese Republic in 1910, there had been a liberal feeling in Portugal that the indigenous inhabitants of the colonies should be elevated in both their standard of living and their status as citizens. While many laws had been passed to this effect in Lisbon, they had never been backed by the necessary resources and thus remained unenforced in the *ultramar*.[2] With the outbreak of war in 1961 and the arrival of the Army, there now existed an adequate vehicle to implement Lisbon's policies in Africa. And indeed in 1961 an Army that thought it was going to Africa to fight insurgents sometimes found in protecting the population that the enemy was the white colonists who were abusing the blacks.[3] While such social progress was admittedly long overdue and prompted by the hostilities of an insurgency; nevertheless, social problems were perceived to be the root of the insurgency and their correction was initiated with

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[1]D. S. Blaufarb and George K. Tanham, *Who Will Win?: A Key to the Puzzle of Revolutionary War* (London: Crane Russak, 1989), 18.

[2]Malyn Newitt, *Portugal in Africa: The Last Hundred Years* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1981), 102.

[3]Brigadeiro Renato F. Marques Pinto, interview by the author, 10 November 1994, Oeiras, Portugal.

vigour and enthusiasm.[4] Although Portugal's motives for these improvements were always transparent to the indigenous population, they were no less genuine and beneficial in their effect.[5]

This chapter describes the development and implementation of Portugal's social programs in the three theatres, the swaying of the population through carefully orchestrated psychological operations (PSYOP) to advance the social effort, and the attempt to control and protect the population through its resettlement in the protected villages or *aldeamentos*. It will address the problems encountered in these social operations and follow the solutions adopted to achieve success, comparing and contrasting them to the experiences of other countries with contemporaneous counterinsurgency operations.

Basis for Social Operations

The basis of the Portuguese effort in all three areas was contained in the experiences of France and Britain, and these elements were adapted to Portugal's anticipated requirements in the theatres. Social advancement was the centrepiece; however, it alone was not the complete solution. It was necessary to promote this action through a psychological appeal and to facilitate the population's acceptance of social benefits and self-defense. The first aspect was found principally in the French concept of *guerre révolutionnaire*, and the second was drawn not only from Portugal's longstanding

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[4]Marques Pinto correspondence, 22 May 1995, Oeiras.

[5]Peter Janke, "Southern Africa: End of Empire," *Conflict Studies* (Nº 52 - December 1974): 5.

experience with protected villages and population regroupment but also from the modern British and French experiences in counterinsurgencies.

The Portuguese in their contact with the French and their *guerre révolutionnaire* theory in Algeria in 1959 realised that the psychological weapons which were embodied in this concept were applicable in Portuguese Africa. An essential ingredient of this theory was the unprincipled use of psychological warfare.[6] The French theorists divided this offensive into two parts: psychological war and psychological action. The first was directed toward the enemy, and its methods were designed to undermine his will to resist. The second was directed toward the population and the security forces, and its methods sought to strengthen both the morale and allegiance of the people and the fighting will of the soldiers. Portugal saw this aspect of counterinsurgency as being critical to its success in that with the proper approach to its indigenous African populations, it could hold its colonies with minimal expense and loss of life.[7] If it were to work, then the principles of psychological action would have to be as familiar as any other weapon to its soldiers, for they would be the prime conduit of any message to the population. Portugal would also have to use these methods to rally its domestic population and inspire its willing sacrifice.

The final point in implementing any social program was separating the population from the guerrillas so that they were deprived of their logistic and political support. One

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[6]George A. Kelly, "Revolutionary Warfare and Psychological Action," in *Modern Guerrilla Warfare*, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), 430.

[7]Kelly, 430-431.

of the most prominent solutions to this problem was regrouping the population. This move was a sound concept and considered an important facet in maintaining internal security. Widely dispersed or refugee populations were easy prey to insurgent intimidation and extortion. Insurgents required manpower, supplies, and intelligence on government forces, and the population was the source of this sustenance. To deny the guerrilla theoretical access to the population, villages were built by the government and the population brought together and resettled in these strategic hamlets. This concentration facilitated the government's efforts to bring medical care, education, and food to the people as well as to preserve them against insurgent contact. Villagers were organised into self-defense forces both as a counter to guerrilla attacks and as a political mobilisation. This village organisation provided the government with an opportunity to deliver its message to the population. Lastly, if the population were controlled, then the security forces could conduct unrestricted warfare outside of the villages against the guerrillas.[8]

This resettlement concept was sound in theory but so often went wrong in its execution. Success depended on thorough planning, adequate finance, and knowledgable people. These ingredients were not always present, and indeed other factors provided obstacles. Nomadic populations did not welcome the restrictions of a permanent settlement, nor would one improperly built and administered help the government's position. Consequently the Portuguese, like their predecessors in the British and French, had both success and failure in the application of this concept.

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[8]Colonel Carlos da Costa Gomes Bessa, "Angola: A Luta contra a Subversão e a Colaboração Civil-Militar" [Angola: The Fight against Subversion and Civil-Military Collaboration], *Revista Militar* (August-September 1972): 435.

Portuguese Social Operations

In planning social operations in the *ultramar*, the Portuguese sought two goals within the population:

- Its overall support for the defense of the colonies and the concept of Portuguese sovereignty; and
- Its general collaboration not only with the governing authorities but also between its constituent groups.[9]

Achieving these goals was complicated by ethno-linguistic divisions. In Angola, for instance, there were nine Banto and two non-Banto groups. The nine Banto groups speaking nine different languages were further divided into 101 subgroups.[10] This mosaic of peoples was similar in both Guiné and Mozambique. Each group had varied interests that frequently were very different, and these differences produced severe antagonisms within the population. Reconciling these divergent viewpoints in numerous languages to achieve overall harmony or "national unity" was extremely difficult and represented a continuing challenge.

A further impediment was the irregular distribution of the population, particularly in Angola. Here, for instance, according to the census of 1970 more than 80% of the territory had less than four inhabitants per square kilometre, and more than half of the population was concentrated on 9% of the land. The majority were located in the districts of Huambo (25.7%) and Luanda (16.6%). About 20% of the population was

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[9]Gomes Bessa, 410.

[10]Estado-Maior do Exército, *Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)* [Historical Military Report of the African Campaigns (1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exército, 1989), Vol. II, 29.

located in twenty-five cities with half of this figure in Luanda and its surrounds.[11] Guiné and Mozambique were characteristically similar.

The dual nature of the colonial economies was yet another consideration. In Angola and Mozambique there were areas of stagnant and slow economic activity that lay between islands of modern and vibrant enterprise. The former was characterised by small or subsistence farming and commercial activity which served an internal market. The latter was marked by large operations serving not only an internal market but export as well. This disequilibrium produced inconsistencies in prosperity that needed to be addressed.[12] In Guiné, however, the economy was predominately agricultural and rested on the raising of rice in the littoral zone and maize, cattle, and peanuts in the interior.[13] This situation produced its own set of problems.

The Portuguese in addressing the development of the colonies through social operations sought to achieve their goals, first, by an economic expansion that encompassed the traditional agricultural pursuits and integrated them into the overall economy, and second, through a comprehensive educational program for the indigenous peoples. Agricultural support had the objective of teaching advanced and profitable crop and cattle raising techniques to the rural subsistence farmers, and providing marketing

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[11]Gomes Bessa, 416.

[12]Gomes Bessa, 417.

[13]Província da Guiné, *Prospectiva do Desenvolvimento Económico e Social da Guiné* [Prospectus for the Economic and Social Development of Guiné] (Lisbon: Junta de Investigações do Ultramar, 1972), 63-72.

support for their produce.[14] Education had the objective of teaching Portuguese to everyone so that there would be a common tongue throughout the *ultramar*, and thus easier communication between the various ethnic groups with a view to a more cohesive population.[15] The universal knowledge of Portuguese within the theatres would also make PSYOP considerably less complicated. In addition to education and economic expansion, health services, local improvements to infrastructure, communications, and the self-defense of rural localities and villages were added. An increasingly prosperous and content population, it was believed, would tend to support the Portuguese government rather than an insurgency.

It has been estimated that during the Campaigns military operations comprised from 10% to 20% of the war effort, and political and economic programs represented over 80%.[16] The implication of this statement was that the political and economic aspects were proportionately large and encompassed many types of activity, all of which were non-military. And yet the only agency with the resources to effect the required change was the armed forces. This situation was not unique to Portugal. In Vietnam for instance, Ambassador Robert Komer (Deputy to the Commander, Military Assistance Command Vietnam, 1966-1968) elected in May 1967 to place pacification under the aegis of the military because, "if you are going to get a program going, you are only going to be able to do it by stealing from the military. They have all the trucks, they have all the

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[14]Gomes Bessa, 418.

[15]Gomes Bessa, 418.

[16]Gomes Bessa, 407.

planes, they have all the people, they have all the money."[17] Consequently, the lion's share of the burden fell by default on the Portuguese military, and it shouldered a substantial, if not full, responsibility in the areas of education, health, construction of local infrastructure, communications improvements, and the training of self-defense militia for the rural villages and localities.

Education and Commercial Development

Education in Portuguese Africa was not always as it seemed. While statistics were kept on the European-style education in European-style schools, this index was not necessarily the true measure of a proper and useful schooling for the indigenous population. Africans had been educating themselves in their own way long before Europeans arrived, and indeed this type of training had far more relevance for the rural citizen than the European process.[18] However, if an individual had aspirations of leaving the rural setting and seeking a job in the urban environment or even of participating in economic advancement, then he needed the elements of a European education. With the industrialisation of Angola and Mozambique and the consequent demand for trained workers during the Campaigns, this education was increasingly sought. The key elements of literacy in the Portuguese language and an elementary knowledge of mathematics were not only the means to a higher standard of living but also to communication throughout Lusophone Africa. Portugal accordingly recognised education as a weapon to be deployed in the struggle and assumed full responsibility for and control of it, giving

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[17]Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army in Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 217.

[18]Newitt, 141.

priority to the training of teachers and the development of primary education in the rural areas.[19]

Primary Education in the *Ultramar*

School Year	1961/1962	1969/1970
Angola		
Students	103,781	420,410
Teachers	2,890	10,177
Guiné		
Students	13,534	26,401
Teachers	228	563
Mozambique		
Students	388,328	578,410
Teachers	4,361	8,549

Compiled from official Portuguese sources.

Table 1

Table 1 shows the dramatic results of this effort claimed by the Portuguese through the increase in teachers and students in primary education between the 1961/1962 and 1969/1970 school years. The most impressive achievement was reflected in the four fold increase in Angola during this eight year period. The approximate doubling of teachers and students in Guiné and Mozambique during the same period likewise appeared dramatic. Progress in secondary and university education was also exceptional. Secondary school expansion in all areas more than tripled in Angola and Mozambique and increased ten fold in Guiné.[20] The Universities of Luanda and Lourenço Marques were established and by 1970 enrolment in each exceeded 2,000 students.[21] While the expansion is impressive, it began from a very low base. In 1960 it was estimated that

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[19]Willem S. van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Angola 1961-1974* (Rivonia: Ashanti Publishing (Pty) Limited, 1993), 123.

[20]Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Portuguese Africa: An Introduction* (Lisbon: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1973), 56-57.

[21]*Portuguese Africa: An Introduction*, 58.

as much as 98% of the population in Portuguese Africa was illiterate and that only 50% spoke Portuguese.[22] Nonetheless, by 1970 Portugal believed that it had exceeded its African neighbours in offering a substantial part of its population an European-style education and felt proud of its achievement in this field.[23]

The Army played an important role in this educational expansion. Illustratively, in Guiné for the school year 1970/1971 the Army ran 127 of the 298 primary schools, or 43%, compared to 91 (31%) official schools and 79 (27%) missionary schools.[24] Each category accommodated approximately 10,000 students. The reason that the Army had so many more schools to accommodate the same number of students as the government and the missionary schools was that it undertook to address the sparser areas of the country where the population was thin. It was in these areas that Portuguese soldiers built schools, and when there were no civilian teachers available and anti-guerrilla operational activity was not necessary, sent university-trained soldiers to spend part of their time each day teaching.[25]

Also in Guiné the teaching job at the primary level was complicated by the duality of the education requirements, the traditional African teaching and the European-style schooling. The Portuguese authorities attempted to accommodate both. Instruction at

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[22]van der Waals, 43; and Colonel Guilherme Pires Monteiro, *População de Angola Tendo em Vista a sua Defesa* [Population of Angola Relative to its Defense] (Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1965), 5.

[23]*Portuguese Africa: An Introduction*, 54-57.

[24]*Prospectiva do Desenvolvimento Económico e Social da Guiné*, 188.

[25]Neil Bruce, "Portugal's African Wars," *Conflict Studies* (Nº 34 - March 1973): 15.

this level addressed the traditional rural life and the fundamentals of agriculture, and arrangements were made for the necessary technical support in these courses.[26] Concessions were also made to support the cultural heritage of certain sectors of the population. In Guiné, in addition to the Portuguese language students in Islamic areas were taught to read and write in Arabic, or more exactly a corruption of Arabic called marabout.[27] These sorts of teaching complications were prevalent throughout the theatres.

When General Spínola left Guiné in 1973, there were approximately 30% of school-age children attending classes, and because of the ground work that he had laid, that figure allegedly reached 60% two years later.[28] This effort was duplicated in the other African colonies as well. For example, in the garrison of Nangade on the Tanzanian border of Mozambique a battalion was using the skills of its soldiers to man the school. Here in November 1972, Army personnel were teaching 312 school children by day and 130 adults in the evening.[29] Other government schools worked in three shifts from 7 o'clock in the morning until 11 o'clock in the evening to educate an estimated 37% of

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[26]Comando-Chefe das Forças Armadas da Guiné, "Directive Nº 65/69: Manobra Socio-Economica. Esforço no 'Chão' Manjaco" [Directive Nº 65/69: Socio-Economic Operations. Work in the Manjaco "Sacred Lands"], 13 August 1969, Headquarters, Bissau, page 3.

[27]*Prospectiva do Desenvolvimento Económico e Social da Guiné*, 188.

[28]Colonel Lemos Pires, interview by Al J. Venter in *Portugal's War in Guine-Bissau* (Pasadena: California Institute of Technology, 1973), 53.

[29]Michael Calvert, "Counter-Insurgency in Mozambique," *Royal United Services Institute Journal for Defense Studies* (March 1973): 84.

the children of Mozambique.[30] With this sort of effort a European-style education became increasingly available to virtually the entire population.

While the economy of Guiné was difficult to grow, those of Angola and Mozambique were expanding at average rates of 11% and 9% respectively.[31] This expansion was creating jobs and employing Africans at increasing rates, and was evident particularly after 1965, when Portugal opened the *ultramar* to wholesale foreign investment. Subsequently such projects as the Cunene River Dam with its irrigation potential in Angola began to create an estimated 500,000 new jobs.[32] With this prosperity in Angola and Mozambique, fewer citizens were inclined to pursue an insurgency. The ultimate proof of this policy of preempting an insurgency with prosperity lay in the fact that it was "where the greatest economic and industrial growth took place that the guerrillas were in the end least successful."[33]

The Portuguese attempted to manage their educational effort in the theatres to complement the commercial development programs, so that there was an avenue of opportunity for the population rather than the frustration of a dead end. This approach contrasted with that in the Republic of Vietnam, where:

> ...the educational system set up by the French and perpetuated by the Saigon regime effectively reserved secondary and higher education and therefore the leadership positions in non-Communist society, for the urban middle and upper

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[30]Calvert, 85.

[31]*Portuguese Africa: An Introduction*, 76.

[32]*Portuguese Africa: An Introduction*, 70.

[33]Newitt, 238.

classes and for the former landed class of the countryside that had fled to the towns and cities. If a peasant child managed to get through the five years of elementary education, he faced a dead end. The nearest secondary schools were in the district centers. The farm families were usually too poor to send the children to them, and the district schools did not go beyond the initial four years of secondary education in any case. Virtually the sole route to status in life for a peasant child was to turn to the Viet Công and their National Liberation Front, as the most talented obviously did.[34]

This flaw in the French system extended to Algeria as well. Muslims were neglected in favour of Europeans and in 1954 the extent of this neglect meant that illiteracy (in French) among the Muslims was 94 percent in males and 98 percent in females.[35] During the Algerian conflict there were enormous strides in education. At the primary level enrolment increased from 650,000 in 1958 to nearly a million in 1960; however, half of all children did not attend school and technical education was limited because of a lack of skilled personnel.[36] Only 28,000 new jobs had been created against a target of 400,000.[37] Without the proper education there would not be industrialisation. The little learning that was available created an appetite for more in the Muslim community. It also threatened to create a class of the "literate unemployed" because the economy could not absorb these newly qualified entrants into the job market.[38] This frustration fed the nationalist cause, a situation that the Portuguese sought in their case to avoid.

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[34]Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 1988), 522.

[35]Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), 61.

[36]Horne, 421.

[37]Horne, 421.

[38]Horne, 61.

Health

Throughout the theatres the problem of health was identical to that in all of tropical Africa: a need for large investments in health care, a need for medical and para-medical personnel, a low socio-economic level within the population, and a general lack of medicine, hygiene and proper nutrition.[39] From the beginning of the wars Portugal continued to improve health care in the *ultramar* on a limited budget. The World Health Organisation (WHO) noted this progress in its 1963 visit and report that "certain services deserve to be cited as exemplary" throughout the *ultramar*.[40] But it was clear that more had to be done.

In 1971 the WHO standards for proper health care for a country stood at

- 1 doctor per 10,000 inhabitants,
- 1 nurse per 5,000 inhabitants,
- 1 hospital bed per 430 inhabitants,
- 1 hospital nurse per 15 dozen hospital patients, and
- 5 nursing auxiliaries per hospital nurse.[41]

The Portuguese authorities took these guidelines seriously and sought to implement them in Africa, and again the armed forces became the primary vehicle in achieving the health goal. In Guiné by 1971 the Army had augmented the health system to such a degree that it met or exceeded the WHO standards. Table 2 below shows just how vital this military support was in supplying the lion's share of resources. In Angola in 1970 there was one doctor per 10,000 inhabitants, and in Mozambique, one per 15,000. In Angola there was one nurse per 3,080 inhabitants, and in Mozambique, one per 4,080. In Angola there

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[39]*Prospectiva do Desenvolvimento Económico e Social da Guiné*, 211.

[40]*Portuguese Africa: An Introduction*, 50-51.

[41]*Prospectiva do Desenvolvimento Económico e Social da Guiné*, 211.

was one hospital bed per 400 inhabitants, and in Mozambique, one per 600.[42] In both of these cases it was likewise the military resources that made the difference in approaching or exceeding the WHO standards. Because of this support, medical care in the *ultramar* trailed only that of the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia during the Campaigns.[43]

Health Standards for Guiné against Actual Figures by Source

	1971 WHO Standards for Guiné	Health Department	Military
Doctors	48	5	49
Nurses	96	33	100
Hospital Nurses	75	--	--
Nursing Auxiliaries	375	89	260
Hospital Beds	1,100	918	--

Compiled from official Portuguese sources.

Table 2

The figures, however, do not tell the whole story. Portuguese medical care had established a widespread reputation which increasingly drew patients to the clinics for treatment. In Guiné for instance, patients from Senegal without documentation to cross the border, came to receive this care. Senegalese maternity patients were even given follow-up appointments.[44] This traditional role of the patient coming to the clinic was not always possible because of the long distances and difficult terrain. It was necessary in order to reach these remote people for the Army to establish mobile clinics. The goal was a monthly visit to every village that did not have regular contact with the more

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[42]*Portuguese Africa: An Introduction*, 52.

[43]Colonel Luís Alberto Santiago Inocentes, interview by the author, 14 April 1994, London. Colonel Inocentes was Chief of Staff, Brigade Headquarters, Guiné, 1970-1972.

[44]Inocentes correspondence, 15 July 1995, London.

developed centres. It was hoped that this important facet of social operations and the confidence that it developed would prompt the all important flow of intelligence and cooperation. This dividend was true to a large extent in Angola and Mozambique; however, Guiné was so small a theatre that the guerrillas were around every corner, and it was thus very difficult to prevent subversion of the population.[45]

This Portuguese medical outreach program was similar to those of other counterinsurgencies. The U.S. Marine Corps MEDCAP (Medical Civil Action Program) consisted simply of the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) corpsman, with the help of the other platoon members, administering a basic "sick call" for the local village on a routine basis.[46] The Marines would conduct MEDCAP patrols as often as every day but more likely twice a week in the local village or villages for which they were responsible, and tried to give the program a permanence through not only treatment of the Vietnamese but also teaching them how to care for themselves.[47] It was hoped that this association would produce a positive bond between the Marines and the Vietnamese people. The French approach in Algeria was similar in that the SAS (*Section Administrative Spéciale*) teams assigned to the remote villages in the *bled* would establish clinics to be visited by travelling teams of physicians and nurses on a regular basis with the same general intents

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[45]Inocentes interview, 14 April 1994.

[46]U.S. Marine Corps, *Professional Knowledge Gained from Operational Experience in Vietnam, 1967* (Washington: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1969), 482.

[47]Al Hemingway, *Our War Was Different* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 112 and 133.

and results.[48]

Local Infrastructure and Communications

The greatest impact of social operations was achieved in the rural areas where local administration had been weak, and consequently such modest government presence had had little influence on the population. Military security coupled with social and infrastructure advances aimed to restore or strengthen government influence through a more confident and cooperative population. The strategic emphasis was the building of local aviation runways and heliports and connecting the various centres with passable roads. Local emphasis concentrated on building irrigation dams, boring wells, constructing schools and medical stations, and helping to build zinc-roofed houses.[49] In this process the military again led the way, although its efforts were augmented throughout the theatres by civilian contractors and labourers.

While many other infrastructure projects were impressive in their scope, there was none more so than the road construction program throughout the theatres. With the goals of aiding economic expansion, supporting military operations, and connecting the district capitals, the Portuguese bent to the job with a relentless will. Angola at the beginning of the wars had about 36,211 kilometres of roads and in 1974 that figure exceeded 80,000 with 12% asphalted, 38% tarred with gravel or dirt surfaces, and 50% rough dirt

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[48]Peter Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: An Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), 46-47.

[49]Ministério do Exército, *Os Dez Anos do Batalhão de Engenharia da Guiné* [The Ten Years of the Engineering Battalion of Guiné] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exército, 1974), 17-32.

roads or tracks that were generally impassable in the rainy season.[50] This dramatic increase was made even more so by the difficult terrain with which the Portuguese often had to contend. Colonel Souza at the Eastern Intervention Zone headquarters in Luso described some of these difficulties in a 1968 interview: "Almost the entire region was overlaid with sand up to a depth of about 5 metres. In some areas the sand went down to more than 40 metres. It is impossible to build roads on this kind of foundation. We do, of course, have some good roads, but it's a giant task keeping them serviceable."[51]

This construction also entailed a major bridging effort. The military initially undertook the upgrading of the road system here beginning in June 1960 and completed its work by mid-1964. It took ten battalions of engineers 50 months at the rate of 90,000 man-hours per 100 kilometres of road to build, repair or maintain the system.[52] Ultimately the job was given to road contractors as a more efficient use of resources, and the military provided security. These contractors with Lisbon management and local workers became quite good, and following the war moved with their skills to continue in the Middle East.[53] Building of new roads continued until 1974 at the rate of about 1,100 kilometres a year.[54]

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[50]*Portuguese Africa: An Introduction*, 73.

[51]Colonel da Souza, interview by Al J. Venter in *The Terror Fighters: A Profile of Guerrilla Warfare in Southern Africa* (Cape Town: Purnell and Sons Ltd., 1969), 129.

[52]Colonel (Engineering) Armando Girão, *10 Batalhãões de Engenharia em Angola...Antes da Subversão* [10 Engineering Battalions in Angola...Before the Subversion] (Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1965), Annex.

[53]Inocentes interview, 14 April 1994.

[54]*Portuguese Africa: An Introduction*, 73.

In Guiné during the Campaigns 520 kilometres of new tarred road were built, of which 241 were completed by the resident engineering battalion and the balance by road contractors hired through the Public Works Department.[55] Guiné began the war with 3,102 kilometres, of which 55 were paved with asphalt and about 2,000 were open year-round. In the end there were only 3,570 total, but they had been rebuilt and upgraded with new surfaces and bridges. This work was completed despite the mines and booby traps that the guerrillas laid in advance of the road crews to disrupt their progress[56] This modest increase in total roadway relative to the other theatres occurred because in Guiné the rivers were more important than the roads for communication. There were about 300 kilometres of navigable rivers for large vessels, and approximately 130 such craft were capable of carrying upwards of 100 tons each and moving local cargo on a regular basis.[57]

Mozambique began the war with 37,000 kilometres of roads and boasted 48,000 in 1974.[58] Here the emphasis was placed on building new north-south roads, as the primary pre-war land communication routes were east-west along the rivers and from the ports to the interior. The primary north-south traffic had traditionally moved by sea along the 1,000 kilometre length of the colony, while little more than rutted tracks had served as land communication links. During the Campaigns the Portuguese converted

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[55]*Os Dez Anos do Batalhão de Engenharia da Guiné*, 33.

[56]Inocentes interview, 14 April 1994.

[57]Vice Admiral Nuno Gonçalo Vieira Matias, interview by the author, 23 November 1994, Lisbon. Admiral Matias is a former detachment commander of *Fuzileiros Especiais* (Special Marines) in Guiné.

[58]*Portuguese Africa: An Introduction*, 73.

these tracks to roads with a measure of paving and a major bridging effort. This expansion totalled about 11,000 kilometres of varying surfaces; however, this achievement tended to be overshadowed by the vastness of the territories.[59] Brigadier Michael Calvert, reporting on a November 1972 trip there, commented on this immense task and put it in perspective with other counterinsurgencies in the following observation: "The road programme alone which is running at a rate of 1,400 km of tar macadam highway a year for six years compared with the Americans' total of 1,400 km of high-class road in six years in Vietnam and our 140 km in 12 years in Malaya, will cost more than the whole Cabora Bassa Dam complex."[60] With something over 45,000 kilometres of new roads built throughout the theatres during the Campaigns, like the Romans, the Portuguese appeared to subscribe to the adage, "The end of subversion depends on the morale of the population and good roads."[61] Good roads of course served both a commercial and military need.

While the road system stands as the most significant infrastructure accomplishment during the Campaigns, there were others that contributed more directly to the improvement of the quality of life among the people. One of the most important in this respect was the irrigation dam or dyke program in Guiné. Here the population can be roughly divided by a line separating the tidal zone from the higher interior. Toward the ocean the people live on fish and rice primarily and follow animist religions. The

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[59]*Portuguese Africa: An Introduction*, 73.

[60]Calvert, 83.

[61]Girão, 33. "O termo da subversão depende do moral da população e de boas estradas."

interior people live on maize and meat and are Moslems. The lives of the coastal people are governed by the rice cycle, and indeed, they count their age by "rains" or *épocas*. This sequence begins with the three-month rainy season in mid-July, and when it is finished in mid-October, there is virtually no rain until the next year. As the rains begin in the north and move south along the African coast in this cycle, so the people begin working the soil. This labour requirement also extended to the children, and their work in the fields during the Campaigns initially disrupted their schooling but was later resolved. Critical in this process was the building of dykes throughout the river system to separate the fresh water supplied by the rains and runoff from the salt or brackish water produced by the tidal action. It was in the basins formed by the dykes that the rice was planted, grown and harvested.[62]

The war disturbed this agricultural cycle considerably. The insurgents used the threat of cutting the dykes and stealing the seeds to subvert the population. While protection was extended as widely as possible, other means were also sought to help the people. Special rice seed that could resist salt water was developed from Philippine strains. It took four to five years to perfect this program, but it improved the rice yield significantly.[63] To expand the dyke system and repair damaged dykes in concert with this program, the Army engineers undertook to build over 630 dykes between 1963 and 1974.[64]

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[62]General Pedro Alexandre Gomes Cardoso, interview by the author, 29 March 1995, Lisbon.

[63]Pedro Cardoso interview, 29 March 1995.

[64]*Os Dez Anos do Batalhão de Engenharia da Guiné*, 54.

In the Islamic interior drinking water was very important for cattle raising as well as the population overall because of the dry season. Consequently, there was also a program of well drilling and water collection throughout Guiné for these purposes. During the period 1969-1973 the number of wells was increased from 26 to 163 along with 34 wash houses, 32 watering fountains, and 56 public drinking fountains.[65] The civilian contractor employed to supplement the battalion activity drilled 56 wells and built associated water reservoirs with a total capacity of 550,000 litres.[66] In both of the foregoing examples the Army engineers were the prime force behind their execution.

In support of expanded education and health care in Guiné, Army engineers built 196 schools and 51 health stations in the five years from 1969-1974.[67] This construction was associated with the expanded education and health care programs in the three theatres in which the Army played such a key supporting role.

Lastly, from about 1969 onward in Guiné a *reordenamento rural* (rural reordering) program was implemented to regroup the population in settlements where it would have ready access to medical care, schooling, sanitary facilities, and water.[68] Each of these settlements was based on a currently existing village and its expansion was carefully planned. Rural settlement was designed to accommodate the people in its locale and to

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[65]*Os Dez Anos do Batalhão de Engenharia da Guiné*, 79.

[66]*Os Dez Anos do Batalhão de Engenharia da Guiné*, 52.

[67]*Os Dez Anos do Batalhão de Engenharia da Guiné*, 77.

[68]Comando-Chefe das Forças Armadas da Guiné, *Plano Director para o Reordenamentos* [Plan Directive for Resettlements] (Bissau: Headquarters, Comando-Chefe das Forças Armadas da Guiné, 1969), 5.

provide the proper facilities in a pleasant setting.[69] In keeping with the people's preferences, the houses were simple and constructed of local materials. For the most part they were wood covered with clay, and the only modern concession was that of a tin roof. The local cibe tree was harvested and split into *rachas* or long strips made with the grain. The future occupants generally furnished the labour of weaving these *rachas* into sides, covering them with mud, and constructing the house under the supervision of the Army engineers. The tin roof was important for permanence and protection in the rainy season and was usually covered with palm leaves to reduce rain noise and the heat in the dry season.[70] Each family took great pride in its handiwork. In the five years from 1969 to 1974 the Army engineers built 8,313 of these huts in support of the program.[71] Not infrequently a family would also build a traditional hut without a tin roof next to the more modern one.[72]

In these years the bulk of the wells, school houses, and medical clinics built were associated with the *reordenamento* program, which entailed the construction or improvement of sixty-one towns, villages, and settlements.[73] By establishing these centres for community life, the government could foster economic expansion and provide the basic necessities for the people. The rural population of Guiné depended on the land

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[69]Província da Guiné, *Ordenamento Rural e Urbano na Guiné Portuguesa* [Rural and Urban Resettlement in Portuguese Guiné] (Lisbon: Agência-Geral do Ultramar, 1973), 7-9.

[70]Pedro Cardoso interview, 29 March 1995.

[71]*Os Dez Anos do Batalhão de Engenharia da Guiné*, 78.

[72]Marques Pinto interview, 30 March 1995, Oeiras.

[73]*Ordenamento Rural e Urbano na Guiné Portuguesa*, Index.

for its livelihood, and thus it was important to support them with the farming and animal husbandry techniques, selection of seeds and feed, and pest control. The *reordenamento* program was a focal point for administering this help.

While Guiné has been cited in the forgoing examples, the situations in Angola and Mozambique were similar, and the projects there were tailored to their specific problems. In these latter two theatres, the resettled villages in threatened areas were known as *aldeamentos* and in the more benign settings as *reordenamentos*. Similarly, the armed forces played a key, if not preponderant, role in all such social operations, and led the way in supporting the war effort with the population. In this respect it most resembled the progress made by Governor General Jacques Soustelle's program in Algeria, in which the SAS corps (*Sections Administratives Specialisées*, or essentially, the social services support) was established in 1955 to extend social operations to the remote *bled*. Alistair Horne explained the work of these men:

> Their aim, essentially, was to take into their protective net populations in the remoter *bled* that might otherwise become subject to the rebels, or buffeted by the army - or both. Some 400 S.A.S. detachments were created, each under an army lieutenant or captain who was an expert in Arabic and Arab affairs and could deal with every conceivable aspect of administration; from agronomy, teaching and health, to building houses and administering justice. The *képis bleus*, as they were affectionately called, were a selflessly devoted and courageous band of men, who made themselves much loved by the local populace, and for that reason were often the principal targets of the F.L.N., suffering the heaviest casualties of any category of administrator. Foreign journalists who saw them at work in the remoter bled, isolated and in constant danger, never ceased to be impressed. Unfortunately, there were always too few *képis bleus* with all the numerous qualifications that the job required.[74]

Pacification work by the Portuguese was similar to that in other counterinsurgencies

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[74]Horne, 109.

but was tailored to their specific problems in each theatre. The U.S. in Vietnam tended to address pacification the least, as it had no deep responsibility for the population. The French doctrine of *guerre révolutionnaire* was primarily military, and accordingly pacification took a back seat in Algeria. The British in their counterinsurgencies realised that both the military and social fronts existed and addressed both in a coordinated effort. The Portuguese approach most resembled the British example generally but differed in its specific application because of the differing characteristics of the various conflicts. The last of the three aspects of pacification, population resettlement, was practised by all four major counterinsurgency participants with vastly different results from very different approaches.

Aldeamentos

The *aldeamento* program was one of the most controversial social operations of the Portuguese Armed Forces. Conceived in response to the insurgencies, it was intended to facilitate three functions in controlling the rural population and in keeping it separated from the guerrillas and their demands for intelligence, food, and shelter:

- Administration of the expanded social and economic programs,
- Protection of the population from insurgent intimidation, and
- Execution of psychological operations.[75]

Not everyone, even in the military sphere, agreed on this program. The primary consideration was the willingness of the population to be relocated or protected. There was always a compromise between what the military needed for security and the people's desires. Moving people was invariably an emotional process because of their attachment

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[75]Luiz F. Carreiro da Câmara, "Aldeamentos," *Jornal do Exército* (April 1970): 62.

to ancestral lands. Timing was also a large factor, and moving the population after it had been subverted was pointless and generally backfired.[76] Often implemented in a rush, the program experienced unnecessary teething problems that required a sizable amount of time and money to correct.

Resettlement of a population was not for the Portuguese an outgrowth of modern insurgencies. The word *aldeamento* was derived from the mid-sixteenth century practise developed by the Jesuits of gathering the nomadic Brazilian Indians into villages, called *aldeias* (from the Arabic *aldayá*), to facilitate their religious instruction and protection under the watchful eye of the Church, to develop a local economy, and to utilise the Christian Indians as a military force against attacks by the unconverted.[77] As time passed, the Jesuit aims diverged from those of the government, and in 1758 as a result of the Marquis of Pombal's decreeing the Indians free men and granting land to them, the *aldeias* were wrested from Jesuit power.[78]

The modern *aldeamento* program was begun in 1961 in the north of Angola, and by 1964 a total of 150 had been built, each with a capacity to accommodate about 2,000 people, or a total capacity of 300,000.[79] Here the initial, violent action between the

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[76]Inocentes correspondence, 15 July 1995, London.

[77]Edward Bradford Burns, *A History of Brazil* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1970), 29-30.

[78]Gilberto Freyre, trans. by Samuel Putnam, *The Masters and the Slaves* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 165.

[79]van der Waals, 120.

UPA insurgents and the Portuguese had created an estimated 400,000 to 500,000 refugees.[80] These people faced starvation, were the victims of attacks by both combatants, and were unable to return to their homelands and traditional way of life. For them the *aldeamentos* held the hope of safety and the potential for employment on the neighbouring coffee plantations. The problem had developed so rapidly that Portuguese action, while earnest, appeared irregular in helping the displaced population and protecting their tenuous thread of economic sustenance. After the eastern front opened in Angola, the program was introduced there. By February 1973 just short of a million Angolans were living in 1,936 *aldeamentos* in the Eastern Military Zone, and by 1974 there were a further 900 *aldeamentos* in the north.[81] At the end of the war there were well over a million Angolans living in almost 3,000 villages.

Initially there were charges that the villages were prisons and that they resembled the turn of the century camps in South Africa where the Boer civilians were "concentrated" to prevent contact with Boer forces, or worse, the German camps of World War II.[82] This appearance in the early years stemmed from the urgency of the situation in alleviating the plight of the refugees, a lack of funding, and a shortage in planning. As the program matured in Angola and these flaws were addressed, the situation improved somewhat; however, it was invariably disruptive to the economic wellbeing of those

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[80]Gerald J. Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 165.

[81]van der Waals, 200-201.

[82]Bernard B. Fall, *The Two Vietnams* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963), 372.

affected.[83] By 1972 concern ran high, and sufficient resources had been allocated largely to resolve the earlier problems of human discomfort.[84] The South African Vice Consul in Luanda also reported from a military perspective that after 1972:

> The *aldeamento* policy frustrated the enemy's attempts to set up consolidated base areas in the guerrilla-contaminated zones. By these means, Portugal succeeded in disrupting the prescribed revolutionary pattern of gradual expansion and regained the strategic initiative. After 1972 there were no "liberated" or revolutionary-controlled areas within Angola. At the most there were areas of influence.[85]

In Mozambique the first *aldeamentos* were built in 1966 and by the end of the war a reported 969,396 Mozambicans had been regrouped in 953 villages.[86] Here also there were significant problems in planning, execution, and funding that led to a less than ideal result. Certainly progress on all fronts was irregular, but nevertheless, the intent and will of the Portuguese authorities to bring benefits to the population appeared sincere.[87] The urgency of insulating the population from FRELIMO meant that there were mistakes made. The short notices that were often given for regroupment and the coercive measures employed with the consequent disruption to the routine of the population sowed the seeds of animosity. Colonel Ronald Waring, now the Duke of Valderano, provided a personal observation:

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[83]Bender, 164.

[84]van der Waals, 201.

[85]van der Waals, 232.

[86]Thomas H. Henriksen, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of Independence, 1964-1974* (London: Greenwood Press, 1978), 155.

[87]Miguel Artur Murupa, *Perspectivas da África Portuguesa* [Perspectives of Portuguese Africa] (Beira: Edition of the author, 1973), 35-37.

On occasions, the new villages were badly sited in quite unsuitable places, on some occasions the local Militia, formed from the indigenous population for the defense of the villages, joined FRELIMO, taking their weapons with them, but these were very rare occurrences. Sometimes there was a certain degree of cooperation between villages and guerrilla bands, and where protected villages bought off enemy attacks by handing over food and even weapons rather than fight to defend a village perimeter. There is no doubt too that on occasions there was hostility to the enforced relocation of a village, as elsewhere in the world, African villagers preferred to stay on their ancestral lands rather than move to the new villages, even when, thereby, they would have a much greater degree of protection.[88]

It required much patient work to rectify this ill will. In Mozambique as elsewhere, Portugal's limited resources were constantly taxed in addressing the vastness of the task of resettling the population adequately to preserve it from FRELIMO, and of providing it with the promised benefits.[89] It was always a fine line in the trade-off between the ill will of disruption and the delivered benefits to the population in executing the *aldeamento* program.

In Guiné, as earlier described, the *reordenamento rural* program was the basis for economic and social expansion and was based on improving current villages rather than any wholesale resettlement of the population in new villages. Militias were established for any threatened villages, but because the population was already relatively concentrated in settlements, an *aldeamento* program as such was not the answer to separating the population from the insurgents in this theatre.

Accusations that the *aldeamento* program was not successful overlook its primary thrust. The regrouping of the population was very inconvenient for the terrorists in that

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[88]Duke of Valderano, interview by the author, 17 March 1995, London.

[89]Henriksen, 158.

their access to it was restricted. Every effort was made to preserve the local pattern of life, and the construction of huts and other habits of the population were disturbed as little as possible. Such issues as theft, rape, and other abuses were no greater or lesser in the *aldeamentos* than elsewhere.[90]

The *aldeamento* program in Mozambique was more controversial than in the other theatres, as General Arriaga attempted to do too much to quickly with inadequate resources, and this combination produced significant problems. His urgency was prompted by his belief that the population was the battleground on which the war would be won or lost.[91] While the numbers of *aldeamentos* built and people resettled to protect the General's battleground never equalled that of Angola, he oversaw nearly 1,000 such settlements and had ambitious plans for a total of 4,000.[92] Nearly always the *aldeamentos* were viewed by the local citizens in a negative light, unless they were threatened by immediate violence; however, from a military perspective there was merit, as Professor Henriksen has argued:

> Despite all their failings, a measure of *aldeamento* effectiveness can be deduced from FRELIMO's reactions to them. Labelling them "concentration camps," the guerrilla forces mortared and rocketed the protected villages on a fairly routine basis. FRELIMO struck most frequently and intensely in Tete, where regroupment stood a chance of slowing infiltration. Rapid-fire sieges were aimed at lowering Portuguese military prestige in local eyes and at negating whatever social benefits existed. But these shellings strengthened the resolve of some village self-defense forces, such as the Mecanhelas on the Malawi frontier. So, all regrouped or self-defended villages were not seedbeds of anti-Portuguese revolt. As for defense, the *aldeamentos* fared comparatively much better than the

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[90]Inocentes interview, 14 April 1994.

[91]Kaúlza de Arriaga, *Coragem, Tenacidade e Fé* [Courage, Tenacity and Faith] (Lourenço Marques: Empresa Moderna, 1973), 198 and 200-201.

[92]General Kaúlza de Arriaga, interview by the author, 8 November 1994, Lisbon.

Diem regime's ill-fated strategic hamlets, although the latter faced the much more aggressive assaults of the Viet Cong.[93]

The *aldeamento* plan was aimed at denying the insurgents access to the population and its support and in persuading the people that their future lay with Portugal and not a losing cause. According to this definition, the system with all of its flaws held a measure of success. It is difficult to identify an ideal, similar regroupment project with which to compare Portugal's effort. The various population relocations and their degree of success in other counterinsurgencies depended in each case on the character of the enemy and the food available to the population. No group wanted to be "regrouped" in a planned village, and such action was invariably controversial.

In Malaya the communists numbered only 8,000 strong against 300,000 counterinsurgency troops, and thus could never seriously challenge the New Village program, which settled approximately 423,000 Chinese squatters in 400 New Villages.[94] These people represented only 6% of the population and made no contribution to the economic life of the country.[95] Completely removing them to villages away from the fighting and zone of influence was thus a feasible alternative. Malaya was also a food-deficit area, so starving the guerrilla was an effective plan.[96] These conditions were not duplicated in Portuguese Africa. Its population, while not homogeneous, was not sharply

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[93]Henriksen, 162.

[94]Richard Clutterbuck, *The Long Long War: The Emergency in Malaya 1948-1960* (London: Cassell & Co., Ltd., 1966), 60-61.

[95]Fall, 372-373.

[96]Fall, 373.

defined in the Chinese-Malay contrast. It was certainly far too large to be relocated on a wholesale basis and isolated from any zone of influence. Further, Portuguese Africa represented subsistence farming with a surplus in certain areas, depending on the disruption by the fighting and the vagaries of the weather. This situation likewise presented almost insurmountable problems to an insurgent operating where the only food available was that which was cultivated. Water was also scarce in such areas as the remoteness of eastern Angola. The cases are thus quite different in both scope and complexion.

The French in Indochina and the Diem regime in Vietnam each faced a 13 million population, 10 million of which lived in a food-surplus area, so starving the guerrilla into submission as in Malaya was not a viable option. Nor could the population be removed effectively from the fighting area, as the British had done. The French had 380,000 troops facing 500,000 Viet-Minh and could not protect a regrouped population adequately without a village self-defense initiative. While this concept was implemented with success in Cambodia in 1951-1952 through a regrouping of the Khmer peasants, it was not universal and came too late in the war to stem the tide.[97] As in the later U.S. involvement, a military solution was the preferred option.

Following the French exodus, the government of South Vietnam in 1962 attempted overambitiously to move more than 9 million people or two-thirds of the population into

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[97]Captaine André Souyris, "Un Procédé de Contre-Guérilla: L'Auto-Défense des Populations," *Revue de Défense Nationale* (June 1956): 686-699.

about 7,500 strategic hamlets.[98] The plan ultimately failed through lack of planning and resources, but not before it had achieved some success despite its flaws. It aimed to seize the initiative in the contest with the communists at the level of the enemy's attack and to reverse their progress in the countryside. The communists recognised it as a major threat and reacted accordingly, concentrating attacks on hamlets, destroying their defenses, and denouncing the mobilisation of the peasantry. Had problems been addressed and resolved, it could have been devastating to the Viet Công.[99] As it was, the plan fell prey to a deficiency in all of the three requirements for a successful social operation: detailed planning, sufficient funding, and an adequate number of trained people to administer the operation. With the program in disarray, the U.S. moved to seek a military solution.

The primary touchstone of counterinsurgency practise for the Portuguese was the French experience in Algeria. Relocation of the Muslim population there, as the military element of the Challe Plan, was far more controversial than the *aldeamento* program. Two million Muslims were forced to participate in a policy of rehabilitation in which the army engineers followed behind the troops and rapidly built roads that connected a string of newly constructed military outposts as a part of the *quadricula* system. Communities for these Muslims were established within this framework with an organised self-defense militia and the obligatory SAS detachment.[100] These "self-defense" communities or

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[98]Fall, 373.

[99]William Colby, *Lost Victory* (New York: Contemporary Books, Inc., 1989), 102-103.

[100]Horne, 338.

camps had the propensity to become horror stories and often resembled "the fortified villages of the Middle Ages to the concentration camps of a more recent past. In the latter conditions were nothing short of scandalous. Hunger first, and cold secondly, were the enemies."[101] The public gaze was directed in July 1959 by an article in *Figaro*, which focused on the camps.[102] This pressure prompted a strong effort to improve living conditions. While the French appear to have resettled about the same number of people as did the Portuguese, they seem to have focused on isolating the Muslims from the insurgents without the strong emphasis on social benefits and the consequent gain in confidence and support of the population.

Alongside this inventory of modern experience, the Portuguese program reflects initial planning problems because of the sudden demands for action in the north of Angola, and a persistent lack of resources to execute relocation on the scale envisioned. On the positive side, the population supposedly benefitted from the associated social programs and was largely protected from guerrilla intimidation. The program consistently disturbed or halted insurgent advances.[103] While not as airtight as the Malayan experience, it far exceeded the effectiveness of that in Vietnam and was relatively humane alongside Algeria. In the long run, however, resettlement only bought time for the Portuguese and could not necessarily destroy the enemy. This interlude was valuable and might have been used to build the necessary local political participation for an autonomy that would have fully countered the nationalist arguments.

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[101]Horne, 338-339.

[102]Horne, 338-339.

[103]van der Waals, 232.

Self-Defense

It was in the area of village self-defense that the Portuguese had one of the greatest opportunities to frustrate the guerrilla contact with the population. More than anything else the population valued the products of their labours and wanted to be left in peace to enjoy them and to prosper. For this privilege the people would defend themselves. While the Portuguese did much to deliver these circumstances in a physical way, a ringing endorsement of trust came only reluctantly in some cases in the development of the village self-defense concept. In virtually every situation except the British in Malaya counterinsurgency efforts required the full participation of large populations that were difficult to move out of reach of the enemy. Arriving at this realisation belatedly, the Portuguese proceeded to develop and implement a village self-defense program in the form of local militia. At first one of the large drawbacks seemed to be an uncharacteristic reluctance to trust the black African population with weapons, when black troops had historically been armed in relatively large numbers.

Local militia were formed originally to mobilise the white colonists in Angola and later Mozambique under the banner of the OPVDC.[104] Only after the struggle matured toward 1968 were blacks widespread in this body. Its primary mission was defense and security, and it also served a secondary role in logistic aid and social operations. Equally as important but less seriously regarded was the *Corpo Militar de Segunda Linha* (second line forces), which was organised as a militia largely to support the *aldeamento*

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[104]Douglas L. Wheeler, "African Elements in Portugal's Armies in Africa (1961-1974)," *Armed Forces and Society* (February 1976): 241.

program.[105] Members of this latter organisation were the battlefield themselves, and if armed and trained properly, offered Portugal an opportunity to defeat the guerrillas by giving the population the choice of rejecting them on its own terms. These militia forces in Angola had reached a strength of 30,000 by the end of the war.[106]

In 1967 Ambassador William Colby espoused this point in Vietnam when he said that, as the security forces could not be omnipresent to protect the population from insurgent intimidation, village self-defense through a local citizens' militia was the considered answer not only for physical security but also as one of the best forms of political mobilisation.[107] Experience in Vietnam had shown that a disarmed village community could be entered and dominated by a five-man squad. If they met no opposition, then they could harangue the population with their message, collect taxes and supplies, and recruit or conscript local youths. Even a modest local defense force could block this intrusion and allow villagers to resist the subversive intimidation. Automatic weapons were not required to present effective opposition, and vintage arms were found to be a sufficient deterrent.[108] This situation was no different in the three theatres.

Early on it had become clear that the armed forces with its limited manpower could not maintain a presence in each village to protect it from possible insurgent attack. There

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[105]Douglas L. Wheeler, "The Portuguese Army in Angola," *Modern African Studies* (October 1969): 432.

[106]Bender, 161.

[107]Colby, 99.

[108]Colby, 242.

was only one, obvious solution: "suitably instruct and arm the population without regard to the colour of its skin or the level of its education."[109] Thus in the east and north of Angola, in the north of Mozambique, and in all of Guiné it became routine to see the small villages with its citizens ready to repel any terrorist attack in protecting that which was theirs. Like the itinerant medical program, the armed forces sought through training and arming villages to give its people a measure of self-sufficiency in protecting themselves.[110] The procedures were similar in each theatre and were introduced in various styles.

In Guiné, General Spínola on his arrival in 1968 had directed the implementation of this concept in which each village or *tabanca* would have a militia for its self-defense.[111] This force was trained by the Army, reported to the village headman, and was equipped with radios to call for help from a local camp, if a PAIGC attack threatened to overwhelm it.[112] Each village was defended by a series of earthworks and trenches, a barrier of barbed wire, and cleared fields of fire for 200 metres. Beer bottles and tinsel served as warning devices on the barbed wire. Anti-personnel mines were also used in the cleared approach areas to prevent a concentrated charge at the fortifications that could overwhelm militia firepower at a chosen point. The militia was equipped with

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[109]"Aldeamentos em Autodefesa," *Jornal do Exército* (April 1971): 62. "...instruir e armar convenientemente as populações, independentemente da cor da pele e grau educacional."

[110]"Aldeamentos em Autodefesa," 62-63.

[111]Comando-Chefe das Forças Armadas da Guiné, "Directive Nº 43" [Directive Nº 43], 30 September 1968, Headquarters, Bissau.

[112]Captain Manuel Medina Matos, interviewed by Al J. Venter in *Portugal's War in Guine-Bissau* (Pasadena: California Institute of Technology, 1973), 144-146.

an array of weapons, and training and weapon suites varied from village to village, depending on the availability of arms. Weapons ranged from light machine guns, Kalashnikov AK-47s, bazookas, and the Portuguese G-3 assault rifle to old Mauser bolt-action rifles.[113]

Not all programs in the theatres functioned on this model. In the north of Angola a similar pattern had developed in which the *aldeamentos* were in the vicinity of Army camps. During the day the inhabitants would work on their farms or on nearby plantations, and at dusk return to their settlements within the protective shadow of the Army. For resisting the terrorist overtures and refusing to cooperate these people risked their lives and were thus given arms to protect themselves. For each *aldeamento* the Portuguese had organised a militia which consisted of a series of platoons under section-leaders who reported to a Portuguese Army officer. If the settlement was attacked, the officer would direct its defense. This structure was necessary, as the majority of these people were refugees and often lacked leadership in the traditional headman. The Portuguese went to great lengths to emphasise the voluntary nature of the program, and Colonel Martins Soares in a 1968 interview in Santa Eulalia, Angola, noted: "We do not give arms where they are not asked for - and then only when we are quite certain that they will be used for protective purposes."[114]

In northern Mozambique the population was relocated in *aldeamentos*, often forcibly.

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[113]Matos interview.

[114]Colonel Martins Soares, interview by Al J. Venter in *The Terror Fighters: A Profile of Guerrilla Warfare in Southern Africa* (Cape Town: Purnell and Sons (S.A.) (Pty.) Ltd., 1969), 16.

Because this operation imposed hardships on the people and was particularly unsettling to nomads, it created a degree of animosity which sometimes led to a reluctance in arming a resettled population.[115] When armed, the weapons were generally the same as described above and may easily have been captured from FRELIMO.[116] General Arriaga indicated that he had issued some 10,000 such arms to *aldeamento* self-defense militias.[117] These weapons went largely to the villages of trusted chiefs, as over 200 had been murdered by FRELIMO and the remaining lived in fear of the same fate.[118] Ambassador Colby faced a similar situation in Vietnam and from the beginning was less reserved in his feeling on distributing arms:

> The key point was that giving the villagers arms was a Government show of confidence in them that would have a major favorable impact. It would be the best possible way to enlist the villagers' participation in the struggle against the Communists - essential to a people's war strategy. Even if some of the weapons went astray, the net benefit in enlisting most of the people would be well worth it. My own estimate was that we would probably lose about 20 percent of the weapons but would gain 80 percent of the population - in my view a very good trade.[119]

About 500,000 vintage weapons were distributed through Ambassador Colby's program to the Vietnamese villages over the 1967-1970 period with two effects, the loss of very few weapons and the increased participation of the villages in self-defense. Ambassador Colby explained:

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[115]Henriksen, 160.

[116]Edgar O'Balance, "To Turn His Coat - or Not?," *Royal United Services Institute Journal for Defense Studies* (March 1973): 87.

[117]Arriaga interview, 8 November 1994.

[118]General José Luís Almiro Canêlhas, interview by the author, 3 April 1995, Lisbon. General Canêlhas headed the Psychological Operations Directorate in Mozambique from 1969 to 1971.

[119]Colby, 242.

The program was first carefully applied in areas basically safe, both to gain confidence in it and to avoid exposing the self-defenders to more than they could handle. This procedure, and the daily exchange of the weapons under the careful control of the village chief, brought the surprising result that the losses were no more than 2 or 3 percent of those issued - far below the 20 percent I had anticipated. Some firefights with the enemy took place, and predictably the self-defenders proved not very fearsome warriors, but the primary political purpose of the program began to be achieved as the number of participants mounted from the hundreds to the hundreds of thousands.[120]

A similar oil spot method was used in the sparse areas of northern Mozambique to increase the participation of villages in self-defense. An official communique from the Commander-in-Chief stated that rural population groups organised under a self-defense system had increased by the end of 1972 to 230,000.[121] This figure was centred in the mobilisation of Cabo Delgado (pop. 346,100), Niassa (pop. 285,300), and Tete (pop. 488,700), whose populations in 1970 totalled 1,120,100.[122] It thus represents a participation of about 21% of the people in the war districts and reflected the fact that "there was no shortage of volunteers for the village militia."[123] In 1969 the Vietnamese self-defense force rose to 2 million or about 20% of the population, of which 400,000 were armed.[124] The Vietnamese program was successful in pacifying the Mekong Delta

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[120]Colby, 243.

[121]Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Mozambique, "Portuguese Armed Forces Communique Nº 1/73," 29 January 1973, Headquarters, Nampula, page 5.

[122]Estado-Maior do Exército, *Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)* [Historical Military Report on the African Campaigns (1961-1974)] (Estado-Maior do Exército, 1988), Vol. IV, 27.

[123]O'Balance, 87.

[124]Colby, 270.

and reached as far north as Hué by the spring of 1971.[125] It had taken four years to reach this degree of success. The Portuguese self-defense mobilisation in Mozambique, although quite similar, was slower and more tentative, having taken a longer seven years to reach a similar level.[126]

The French in Algeria established local *maghzen* units for settlement self-defense. These were detachments of from thirty to fifty Algerian volunteers who were armed by the French Army and helped to protect the villages supported by SAS teams. Because of desertion incidents the European community had mixed feelings about arming Algerians. The practise drew a constant barrage of criticism from military quarters that were suspicious of arming any Algerian.[127] While such a force was necessary to protect the SAS and its projects from the guerrillas, it was always controversial and suffered from a low comfort level in the security forces. Its effectiveness suffered accordingly.

Portuguese implementation of village self-defense most resembled that of the U.S. in Vietnam. The British in Malaya had only to worry about the minority ethnic Chinese population as a source of support for the guerrillas. It was thus a far easier job to resettle and isolate this limited portion of the population than it was in any other insurgency. While Home Guards were an important part of the villages and their

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[125]Colby, 313.

[126]Henriksen, 154.

[127]Alf Andrew Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 196.

defense, their organisation and loyalty was far easier to engineer than that in either Algeria, Vietnam, or Portuguese Africa, where entire populations were vulnerable.[128]

Assessment of Social Operations

When General Spínola arrived in Guiné in 1968, he was disturbed about the overall deteriorating situation and implemented his Psychological Campaign for Recovery, in which the people and the Army would build a better Guiné with improved health, education, infrastructure, and commerce.[129] This program was known as *Um Guiné Melhor* or "A Better Guiné" and directed substantial resources toward social operations on the premise that by attacking the fundamental needs of the people through deeds supported by an oral message the promises of the PAIGC would be directly challenged.[130] This theory proved to be valid, and the PAIGC saw the Portuguese program as potentially even more dangerous than General Spínola's devastatingly efficient helicopter assaults.[131] Social problems were perceived to be the root of the insurgency problem in all of the theatres and their cure critical to any hope of victory.

In Angola the war had been won by 1972, and this victory was perhaps 80 percent

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[128]Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer M. Taw, *Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict, The development of Britain's "Small Wars" Doctrine During the 1950s* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1991), 90.

[129]General Pedro Alexandre Gomes Cardoso, interview by the author, 29 March 1995, Lisbon.

[130]General Pedro Alexandre Gomes Cardoso, undated personal notes on psychosocial operations in Guiné from 1968-1973, pages 30-31.

[131]Patrick Chabal, *Amícar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 94.

attributable to successful social operations.[132] The population there was relatively secure. In Mozambique many mistakes had been made; however, the situation was retrievable even in 1974 with the addition of resources and patient and skilful leadership. The blueprint remained valid in that social operations were the key to any government success against the insurgents. The Portuguese Army had entered the conflict largely prepared to fight a military engagement and adjusted to shoulder a great part of the civilian burden as well, as it came to understand counterinsurgency and its own Campaigns. This shift in emphasis was the result of Portugal's search for the successful solution to its insurgency in accordance with its low cost, long haul strategy

While many of the aspects of social operations were extremely positive, such as health, education, and infrastructure, the *aldeamentos* program remained controversial. Resettlement led to the social and psychological insecurity of those affected, and an unhappy population was one vulnerable to guerrilla influence.[133] While the *aldeamento* program was adequately successful to disrupt guerrilla intimidation of the population, it can be argued strongly that the implementation of such a policy is invariably a difficult and chancy policy decision in any counterinsurgency strategy. On balance Portugal's social operations brought a distinct elevation in the standards of living of the indigenous populations throughout the theatres. This aspect contributed effectively to keeping the conflict subdued through its substantive effort to gain the loyalty of the population and neutralise the insurgents.

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[132]Gomes Bessa, 407.

[133]Bender, 195-196.

IX

Selected Aspects of Logistical Operations

Portugal faced the very formidable logistical challenge of delivering adequate goods and services to the three distant and differing war zones and distributing them locally to sustain the Campaigns. This chapter will identify selected problems that Portugal faced in moving and maintaining its forces, and describe the imaginative solutions devised to overcome the limitations encountered and to achieve the desired ends.

Lifeblood of War

Military activity is normally described in terms of strategy and tactics, and these arts of war make exciting accounts; however, the truly important activity lies outside of this narrow range. Field Marshall A. C. P. Wavell explained this broader perspective:

> The more I have seen of war the more I realise how it all depends on administration and transportation (what our American allies call logistics). It takes little skill or imagination to see *where* you would like your army to be and *when*; it takes much knowledge and hard work to know where you can place your forces and whether you can maintain them there. A real knowledge of supply and movement factors must be the basis of every leader's plan; only then can he know how and when to take risks with those factors; and battles and wars are won only by taking risks.[1]

The Portuguese had a long history of military operations in the colonies and had developed an understanding of these principles early in their pacification operations. Their later experience with the Atlantic Alliance had refined and modernised their concept of logistic support, and as a result they had developed a cadre of logistically

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[1]Archibald C. P. Wavell, *Speaking Generally* (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd, 1946), 78-79.

indoctrinated and trained personnel. The Portuguese Armed Forces, having shifted to the *Tipo Americano* or *TA* methodology in 1953, proceeded to send its officers to the major command and staff colleges in the United States, where they studied this logistic phenomenon. As a consequence, the U.S. and the similar NATO logistical doctrine and practises were reformulated and adapted in concept, principle, and practise by the Portuguese Armed Forces. When the uprisings of 1961 occurred, Portugal was thus theoretically prepared to apply what it had learned in supporting the wars in the *ultramar*.[2]

Unfortunately, at the onset of the wars Portugal had two reasons for concern in this area. The first was that despite the elaborate training and indoctrination in logistics for conventional war in Europe, the Ministry of the Army had written no doctrine or regulations regarding logistic support for counterinsurgency in the *ultramar*.[3] The second parallelled the first in that a separate doctrine needed to be established for each of the three theatres, as they differed so much in their individual campaign requirements. These deficiencies were in reality strengths to the extent that while Portugal did not have a logistic system designed to support a war on the scale of the Campaigns, it began without the encumbrance of any inadequate doctrine or system. Thus Portugal proceeded to design and install the necessary procedures that pragmatically considered the characteristics and conditions of each of the theatres and that would also function with

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[2]Estado-Maior do Exército, *Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África* [Aid to the Study of Doctrine] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exército, 1990), 193-194.

[3]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África*, 194.

flexibility and responsiveness in supporting both military and social operations.[4]

Organising for War

At the beginning of the Campaigns in Angola in 1961 it was relatively easy to move troops to Luanda by air and transport them to the battlefield. There was, however, no logistic structure capable of effectively supporting these initial units and the subsequent ones that arrived by ship with increasing frequency and numbers. To address this problem the Military Region of Angola was forced to adapt quickly to the new situation.[5]

Because the fighting in these early years was concentrated in the northern most of the four tactical intervention zones, the bulk of the support was required there. As a consequence, Angola was divided into two logistic areas, the first covering solely the Northern Intervention Zone (ZIN) and the second covering the rest of the territory in the Central, Southern, and Eastern Intervention Zones (ZIC, ZIS, and ZIL). The area around Luanda was the logical centre for resupply and support with its developed port, airport and road infrastructure.[6] The existence of this natural control point near the fighting meant that logistic support was *de facto* considered and administered from here in the context of the entire Military Region of Angola rather than the intervention zones individually.

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[4]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África*, 198.

[5]Estado-Maior do Exército, *Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)* [Historical-Military Report of the African Campaigns (1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exército, 1989), Vol. I (General Summary), 439.

[6]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 439-440.

Most of the traditional arms of a logistical service did not exist in Angola in 1961. There was no commissariat, and it took the better part of 1961 to establish a functioning depot in Luanda that was capable of serving all of Angola. Matériel distribution and support were initially inadequate and had to be adjusted in size and scope to deliver and maintain matériel with units on the move. The Health Service was centred in the Military Hospital of Luanda, which was embryonic in 1961. By the beginning of 1962 it began to function with some efficiency. There was no transport service organised in 1961. Unloading ships and aircraft and directing cargo and personnel was inefficient, and progress was not made until a Transport Section was established in the 4th Division of the Headquarters, Military Region of Angola in April 1962. Engineering support was propitiously in place and functioning and required only the establishment of a depot as an inventory buffer for its supplies. Communication Battalion 361 did not arrive in Angola until the spring of 1962, and after its arrival communication support improved to wartime needs.[7] As the logistic system was designed, established, and refined, this managerial resource was replicated in Guiné and Mozambique and tailored to the specific requirements of each of these theatres.

Because the armed struggle did not begin in Guiné until 1963, it had the opportunity to benefit from much of the experience gained in Angola. The fundamental adjustments to the Angola-developed system were centred in moving from primarily a land-based operation to a maritime one. Guiné's small size, large fluvial system, and poor roads with mines dictated waterborne distribution as the most practical transportation solution. Another factor affecting logistics was the oppressive climate, which had an adverse effect

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[7]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 440-443.

on health, machinery maintenance, and radio operation. Tropical diseases and infections were constant problems, and thus required Health Service adjustments. The subsistence economy dictated the need to import foodstuffs for the armed forces, rather than buying them locally.[8] This situation contrasted markedly, for instance, with Angola, where in 1962 about 62% of logistic requirements by tonnage were met locally.[9] Bissau was the logistic hub and distribution centre for Guiné. From there in tonnage 84% of all cargo moved over water, 14% by road, and 2% by air.[10] Airlift was reserved for cargo of the highest priority, including casualty evacuation and mail service.

The armed struggle did not begin in Mozambique until 1964, and thus there had been time to upgrade the logistic system by then. It parallelled that of Angola and was adapted to the peculiarities of that country with its great length, lack of north-south communication routes, primary air and sea terminals located a great distance from the fighting, and the civil infrastructure unable to support the war effort.[11] From the beginning the logistic base system in Mozambique was considered inadequate with its single depot in Lourenço Marques some 1,000 kilometres from the war zone in the north. As a consequence depots were established in Beira, Nacala, and Porto Amélia nearer the fighting. This new port network served as the skeletal basis for the logistic structure developed in Angola with identical organisation and functions. It was further modified

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[8]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 444.

[9]Chief of the 4th Division of the Military Region of Angola, Logistic Report/Directive 100 of 15 August 1963, Annex G.

[10]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África*, 312.

[11]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 445.

and refined to coordinate maritime transport along the coast with road and air delivery to the interior.[12]

In Mozambique logistic communications saw cargo and personnel arriving directly from the *metrópole* by ship at one of the several deep water ports or by air to one of the five primary airfields capable of handling the large air transports of the day and their cargo: Nacala, Tete, Lourenço Marques, Beira, and Nampula.[13] They would then be locally distributed by intratheatre airlift, truck convoy, rail, or a combination thereof.

Portugal executed the logistical equation well, never allowing the guerrillas fully to isolate even small posts. This capability required the application of imagination, flexibility, and hard work. While most aspects of logistic communications were routine, there were three that deserve mention for their innovative thinking: airlift, ground transportation, and medical care. These will be explored in the following paragraphs.

Airlift

Prior to 1961 the Portuguese had had for many years relied almost exclusively on their commercial maritime capability as a link with the three theatres, and this resource was used in the opening years of the Campaigns to move the bulk of the troops and matériel to Africa. This process became less and less attractive as the war progressed, for it was increasingly more expensive to operate a ship compared to an aircraft,

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[12]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 475.

[13]Colonel Ivo Ferreira, *Transportes Estratégicos entre as Províncias de Angola e Moçambique* [Strategic Transport between the Provinces of Angola and Mozambique] (Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1964), 9.

particularly in moving people. It cost about £5,000 per day for a chartered vessel underway and £2,700 per day alongside the pier.[14] The troops were unable to perform their duties while on a voyage, and for a nation pressed for manpower and cash, it made less and less sense to have an unusable manpower pool hostage to an expensive transit process. An aircraft could transport troops and priority cargo far more efficiently when all associated costs were considered.

For instance, the approximate cost of transporting personnel to the theatres in chartered ships and commercial aircraft in 1970 was £4,534,038 (312,000 contos). The approximate cost of transporting matériel in commercial ships in the same year was £653,948 (45,000 contos), or a total of £5,187,986 (357,000 contos). After 1971, with the substitution of Portuguese Air Force Boeing B-707 aircraft for the chartered vessels, the cost of shipping by sea was reduced to £1,634,150 (115,000 contos) per year, or only about 32% of the preceding year's cost.[15] While ocean shipping expenses were reduced by shifting to aircraft, the aircraft were also comparably less expensive than vessels.

This shift came relatively late in the Campaigns. The Portuguese began the war with a modest intertheatre airlift capability centred in the Douglas DC-6A (Cargo) and DC-6B (Passenger) model aircraft, which were purchased from Pan American World Airways. Ultimately Portugal operated a fleet of 10 DC-6s. Because of the mechanical nature of

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[14]Colonel Luís Alberto Santiago Inocentes, interview by the author, 14 April 1994, London.

[15]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 449. In 1970 the average exchange rate for a conto was £14.53; in 1971, £14.21; in 1972, £15.78; and in 1973, £16.58.

piston engine aircraft and their consequent high maintenance requirements, availability at any one time never exceeded 6 aircraft. The DC-6 series could carry only about 50,000 pounds of cargo, and thus this small fleet had a limited impact on the overall logistic picture. The Portuguese were always short of spare parts to maintain the aircraft, and while there were measures taken to skirt this problem, such as chrome plating the engine cylinders to retard wear, the situation never improved significantly. These measures were important, nevertheless, in that the aircraft were operated safely at very high utilisation rates and never had an accident. Round trips to the theatres were flown two or three times per week from Lisbon to Mozambique and took 48 tedious hours flying time. These missions always required relief crews stationed enroute to maintain the schedule. Thus with its limited cargo and passenger capacity and its slow speed, it was outdated even by airlift standards of the day.[16]

In 1971 the Portuguese Air Force purchased the last two B-707 models produced by Boeing Aircraft Corporation. These were purpose-built aircraft with a strengthened undercarriage and a mixed cargo and passenger cabin. Flown according to Pan American operating standards, they ultimately realised in Portuguese hands the highest utilisation of any B-707 worldwide, a fact confirmed by Boeing. One of the two aircraft was always on a mission, and the reliability and flexibility of the plane made a dramatic difference in the logistic picture.[17] In 1973 the two B-707s together flew 299 missions

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[16]General Tomás George Conceição e Silva, interview by the author, 3 April 1995, Lisbon. General Conceição e Silva was Chief of Staff of the Portuguese Air Force from 1988 to 1991, and has extensive airlift experience in Africa.

[17]Conceição e Silva interview, 3 April 1995.

alongside 209 missions for the entire fleet of 10 DC-6s.[18] The DC-6s had by then been relegated to the shorter missions to Guiné, the Azores, Madeira, and Europe, and the B-707s were serving Luanda and Mozambique. The B-707 typically left Lisbon at 1130 hours, flew to Luanda, was unloaded, serviced, and loaded, and returned to the *metrópole* by 2230 hours the same day.[19] According to Portuguese Air Force records in 1972, simply transporting passengers and their luggage by B-707 instead of by ship saved the armed forces £4,207,469 (266,633 contos). In 1973 comparable savings were £4,437,355 (267,633 contos). These savings over two years paid for the two B-707s.[20]

Intratheatre airlift was shouldered primarily by the Noratlas aircraft, originally conceived in 1955 by Nord Aviation for this purpose in the French and West German air forces. The Noratlas fleet performed well and served Portugal's needs.[21] Other intratheatre support was performed by a variety of aircraft, including the Douglas DC-3 (C-47), DC-4, and DC-6. This assortment was necessary to accommodate the various site limitations. For instance, by 1964 Angola had 403 airfields and Mozambique had 211, with the following capabilities:[22]

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[18]Commander, 1st Air Region, "Resumo Estatístico das Missões Realizadas e Passageiros Transportados (Ida e Volta), 1972 e 1973" [Statistical Résumé of Missions Flown and Passengers Transported (Round Trip), 1972 and 1973], 30 September 1974.

[19]General Rui Tavares Monteiro, "Transporte Aéreo na FAP, Do zero aos 707" [Air Transport in PoAF, From zero to the 707], *Mais Alto* (Nº 283, 1993): 7.

[20]Commander, 1st Air Region, "Resumo Estatístico das Missões Realizadas e Passageiros Transportados (Ida e Volta), 1972 e 1973" [Statistical Résumé of Missions Flown and Passengers Transported (Round Trip), 1972 and 1973], 30 September 1974.

[21]General Rui Tavares Monteiro, "Recordando os Noratlas [Remembering the Noratlas], *Mais Alto* (Nº 279, 1992): 275-280.

[22]Ferreira, 9.

Field Capability\TO	Angola[23]	Mozambique[24]	Guiné[25]
DC-6/Super Constellation/B-707/DC-8	12	5	1
C-54	5	10	
Noratlas	6	15	
DC-3/C-47	11	30	
Lesser fields (some permit DC-3)	369	156	20
Totals	403	211	21

The majority of the landing strips were so primitive that only helicopters or very light aircraft, such as the Dornier DO-27 or Harvard T-6, could be accommodated. Nevertheless, the airlift capability, as embodied in the numerous fields throughout the theatres, extended as a logistical communication link to virtually every base of the Portuguese Armed Forces.

While the Portuguese began their counterinsurgency operations some twelve years after the Berlin Airlift (June 1948-September 1949), the lessons in this application of logistic power were an integral part of their thinking. The Berlin Airlift had shown that given the machines and bases, air transport was more than a prop for short-term logistic emergencies.[26] The intensive operational techniques developed there showed the way to a sure alternative to surface transport, providing the procedures and infrastructure were in place. General Arriaga, the then Subsecretary of State for Aeronautics, had

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[23]Ferreira, 9.

[24]Ferreira, 9.

[25]Colonel António Fernandes Morgado, *Apoio Logístico na Guiné 1973-1974* [Logistical Support in Guiné 1973-1974] (Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1979), 9-11.

[26]Kenneth Macksey, *For Want of a Nail: The Impact on War of Logistics and Communications* (London: Brassey's Ltd., 1989), 146.

established the infrastructure in the 1950s, and Portugal proceeded to graft these lessons into its airlift operations.[27] Except for U.S. operations in Vietnam, other governments fighting comparable insurgencies seemed less attuned to these airlift calculations. Malaya was the most comparable with its distances and troop numbers and here the British made no such effort. There was an endless stream of British troopships arriving in Singapore to support the war, and one newly commissioned subaltern described this expensive and leisurely process, which was anything but a focused preparation for counterinsurgency warfare or a rapid insertion into the local environment:

> We spent hours eating huge P. and O. meals, and then more hours after them recovering in deckchairs, watching waves sliding past the ship, endlessly, without pause, without ourselves realising that days were sliding past too. Soon they were not days, but weeks. And soon we were in the Indian Ocean, slowly opening our eyes and much surprised to find the system again appearing among us....The system had at least decreed that a troopship should arrive in Singapore every week, and this week it should be the *Empire Fowey* - our troopship.[28]

The Portuguese thus sought the rapid and cost-effective avenue of air transport to move troops and critical supplies, and this choice improved the sustainability of the Campaigns. The shift from high profile troopships arriving and departing with fanfare to the more subtle aircraft reinforced the low-key nature of the Campaign. The low profile of a routinely arriving and departing aircraft providing timely deliveries and a rapid response to needs in the theatres fit the tenor of the Campaigns.

Ground Transportation and Mine Countermeasures

Portugal had military posts established throughout all of the theatres which had to be

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[27]General Kaúlza de Arriaga, interview by the author, 8 November 1994, Lisbon. General Kaúlza served as the Subsecretary of State for Aeronautics from 1955 to 1962.

[28]Oliver Crawford, *The Door Marked Malaya* (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1958), 13-14.

supplied by truck, as there was no other practical means to deliver heavy items. Rail lines were restricted by the route that they took, and airlift by weight limitations. If Portugal was to win its war, then the trucks with their supplies must reach their destinations in sufficient numbers to provide for the soldiers. Truck passage not only had to negotiate an enemy but also some of the most primitive and daunting territory in the world, and thus travel by truck could be a slow and gruelling process in most areas. Paved roads were easy routes but tended to connect the principal towns and not the villages and the more remote sites, outposts that were important in keeping the insurgent separated from the population. To deliver supplies to the more secluded areas required a fleet of supply vehicles negotiating not only the paved highways but poor roads, tracks, and trails. In many cases these latter *pistes* could degenerate into rutted tracks through deep sand. Vehicles could and did become stuck in these primitive roads, requiring hours to extricate. During the rainy season unpaved roads became quagmires of soft mud and sand and were virtually impassable. In the dry season they remained a problem, although the dry river beds baked hard and provided a solid roadway. Some of these trails could follow a dry water course for as much as 50 kilometres.[29]

Trucks travelled these routes generally by convoy when enemy contact was expected. The convoy might be all military or a combination of commercial hauliers and military. When entering an area of known or probable insurgent presence, the trucks would be assembled, and the drivers briefed on convoy procedure for driving, being ambushed, or

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[29]Colonel (Engineer) Luís Valença Pinto, interview by the author, 15 November 1994, Tancos. Colonel Valença Pinto is the Commandant of the Portuguese Army Practical School of Engineering in Tancos and has extensive experience with demining operations in Angola (1971-1972) and Cabinda (1973-1974).

hitting a mine. Mines were used increasingly in all of the theatres as the war progressed. Initially the guerrillas were inept in using them, but their proficiency improved over time, as they acquired the skill of safely handling and effectively placing the devices. Eventually their use far exceeded that in other insurgencies.[30] Mining of the road system was the easiest way for the insurgents to disrupt the Portuguese ground logistic system and create an opportunity for the ambush of a truck convoy almost at their discretion.[31] Widespread mining prompted the Portuguese to adopt a series of countermeasures in the modification and operation of their vehicles and in demining procedures.

The two vital items for a Portuguese soldier were his supply of water and ammunition, and these constraints held true for the insurgent as well. The insurgent was generally forced to bring his munitions with him from his sanctuary country, and with a limitation on what he could carry, so there was a consequent limit to his offensive potential.[32] He might have increased this potential, had he built an arms cache that had remained undiscovered by the Portuguese. Notwithstanding this variation, the average anti-vehicular mine weighed 5 kilograms, and after the insurgent had carried this weight the considerable distance from his sanctuary at substantial danger, he wanted a commensurate return for his risk. Consequently, the mine was planted where it would be activated within a relatively short wait, giving a nearly immediate effect and instant

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[30]Thomas H. Henriksen, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of Independence, 1964-1974* (London: Greenwood Press, 1978), 43.

[31]Valença Pinto interview, 15 November 1994.

[32]Valença Pinto interview, 15 November 1994.

gratification.[33] Because the insurgent mine laying capability was constrained by these logistics, there was no real pattern either as to the minefield or its associated operations. The mine may have been laid as a single or as part of a group. It may have been employed with an ambush, in a hit and run tactic, or simply as an isolated threat. All of these eventualities had to be addressed in Portuguese countermeasures.[34]

First, the trucks were made as safe as possible in the event that they contacted a mine in the roadway. The Berliet truck was designed and built for resupply. Its wheels were well in front of the cab so that the mines would be detonated ahead of the driver and passenger, with the engine providing protection from the blast.[35] The bonnet and the metallic top of the driver's cab were removed. The bonnet had a habit of acting as a guillotine and decapitating the driver and passenger in a mine explosion. The force of the explosion would also throw them both upward against the cab roof with severe injury, if it were not removed. The floor and bed of the truck were also laid with sand bags to protect the occupants from shrapnel coming from the explosion. It was also important for occupants to keep their arms and legs inside the vehicles to achieve maximum protection from the sand bags.[36]

Convoy organisation and truck operating procedures were also adjusted to

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[33]Valença Pinto interview, 15 November 1994.

[34]Valença Pinto interview, 15 November 1994.

[35]General José Manuel de Bethencourt Rodrigues, interview by the author, 9 November 1994, Lisbon.

[36]Valença Pinto interview, 15 November 1994.

accommodate the danger of mines. The lead vehicle was traditionally a Berliet "mine crasher" truck followed by a Mercedes Benz Unimog troop carrier with the 50 metres standard separation. The remainder of the convoy followed. On sandy roads convoy drivers followed immediately in the tracks of the vehicle ahead to be certain of a safe and tested path. Troop carriers were positioned throughout the convoy, and a Berliet concluded the train. Progress was generally irregular, depending on what obstacles the escort found in the road. There could be debris, a suspicion of a mine, or a broken truck. When night came, the vehicles would form a laager, only to be on the road again at first light.[37] The convoys would only travel at night if they met an oncoming convoy that had cleared the road ahead. It would then be important to cover the sanitised route as quickly as possible before the insurgents had the opportunity to plant new mines. The road tarring program made mining much more difficult for the insurgent. Planting mines under a hard-surfaced road meant carefully removing a section of pavement, digging a hole for the mine, and then replacing the section over the explosive. The pavement section had to be retarred artfully to conceal its lethal charge. While no road was thus fully immune, the insurgents preferred the sandy tracks.[38]

Convoys along these highways employed a lookout who assessed the situation in the road ahead. If in his judgment he felt that there was a risk of mines, then the convoy would halt, and a team of from four to eight men would alight from the trucks. These men would begin a line abreast search in the path of the vehicles with pointed probes or

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[37]Manuel Ribeiro Rodrigues, interview by the author, 16 November 1994, Lisbon. Sr. Ribeiro Rodrigues is a military historian with the Portuguese Commission of Military History, Lisbon.

[38]Valença Pinto interview, 15 November 1994.

lances called *picas*. These were wooden rods of about two metres in length with a metallic 50 centimetre point, the name of which was derived from the lance used in bullfighting.[39] These *picadores* or "trail blazers" were rotated every twenty minutes with all soldiers detailed to the convoy taking a turn. The job was tedious as well as dangerous and required uninterrupted concentration.[40] Once a mine was discovered, a combat knife was gently used to clean sand and earth from the device. If the charge appeared to be boobytrapped, then it was destroyed in place. If however, a mine could be recovered intact without exploding it, then it was valuable for study. Most mines were destroyed *in situ*.[41]

Often anti-personnel mines were employed with the anti-vehicular type and placed either around it or in the roadside next to it. The purpose of this pattern was frustrate convoy procedures where personnel would abandon the trucks and seek shelter on the shoulder of the road to avoid the effects of an ambush. By freezing the personnel in their vehicles with the threat of anti-personnel mines, the insurgents would increase their chances for a successful ambush or whipping burst of gunfire known as a *flagelação*.[42] Also anti-personnel mines had the effect of confusing the situation for the *picadores* and making demining more difficult. Mines were also planted in chains, where raising one would cause the others to explode.[43] Under these conditions progress was limited, and

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[39]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África*, 175.

[40]Valença Pinto interview, 15 November 1994.

[41]Valença Pinto interview, 15 November 1994.

[42]Henriksen, 44.

[43]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África*, 176.

18 kilometres a day was not considered inordinately slow.[44] During the rainy season from October to April the roads were a quagmire, and it took a convoy about 10 days to go 80 kilometres.[45] Rain made the job even more hazardous. For the driver it would become almost impossible to follow the tracks of the vehicle ahead, increasing the chances of contacting a mine. For the mine detection squad the job would become suicidal. One method of accelerating the process was the use of captured insurgents, when available. They rarely resisted helping, and after all they knew where the devices were planted because they had laid them.[46]

Electronic detectors were tried but never proved as effective as *picas*. They were not considered reliable because of the non-metallic mine casings and the presence of metal debris in the road.[47] In the instance of the wooden-cased mines, termites would often have eaten the wooden casings and only loose explosives remained in the soil.[48] The Portuguese found that the *pica* in the hands of an experienced *picador* was the most effective and reliable method of locating mines. It was also the most cost effective. Specially trained dogs were valuable aids in detection, but were by no means as reliable as the *picadores*. Many mechanical road flagellation systems were also tested, but they

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[44]Lieutenant Enrico Chagas, interview by Al J. Venter in *The Zambesi Salient: Conflict in Southern Africa* (London: Robert Hale & Company, 1974), 24.

[45]General Rafael Guerreiro Ferreira, interview by the author, 29 March 1995, Lisbon. General Guerreiro Ferreira was head of logistics in Mozambique under General Kaúlza de Arriaga.

[46]Inocentes interview, 14 April 1994.

[47]Chagas interview.

[48]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África*, 176.

were cumbersome and expensive, and none matched a team of four experienced *picadores*. The task of demining was always in a state of flux, as the insurgents constantly adopted new techniques. Consequently, it was the human factor that could adjust most readily to these changes. The magnitude of the demining problem was reflected in an unofficial record held by a team of four *picadores* who discovered 52 mines in a single day.[49]

So mine detecting and destruction was raised to a high art to meet the threat. Like the U.S. Marine Corps noted in 1969 in Vietnam, a conflict characterised by mines and booby traps: "Although a great many detection means, ranging from intricate electronic devices to specially trained dogs, have been developed, experience has shown that an alert Marine, aware of what to look for and where to look, is the most effective detection device."[50] The procedures that the Portuguese developed were an important element in subsequent demining operations by the South African security forces in its Border War (1966-1989).[51]

Evacuation and Hospitalisation

While the advent of modern medical care for the population in the theatres was important, it was relatively mundane. The most dramatic effort occurred in the care of

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[49]*Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África*, 176.

[50]U.S. Marine Corps, *Professional Knowledge Gained from Operational Experience in Vietnam, 1969, Special Issue, Mines and Boobytraps* (Washington: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1969), 2.

[51]Willem Steenkamp, *South Africa's Border War (1966-1989)* (Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing Limited, 1989), 235.

war casualties. Although the Portuguese soldier was largely uncomplaining and took danger in stride, the presence of an excellent health service with its hospitalisation and evacuation capabilities not only represented an important morale factor but also served as a practical measure. Historically armies have suffered more from poor hygiene and sickness than from enemy action. As Colonel P. D. Foxton, a logistician with the British Army explained, "Every seven days an armoured division (about 14,000 men) is on exercise it can expect to have up to 500 soldiers report sick as a result of infection, routine disabilities and accidents. An efficient medical service is, therefore, vital to any army embarking on operations."[52] Angola represents the best starting point, as that is where the Campaigns began.

Portugal designed its medical care and evacuation around certain principles for handling casualties. The first was the "Six Hour Rule" in which a casualty has the greatest chance of surviving if he can receive the proper medical treatment for his wounds within six hours.[53] The primary difficulty lay in removing the wounded to a proper treatment site within the critical period. While many of the combat casualties occurred in the remoteness of the theatres, the combat forces maintained radio contact with headquarters, and help could be summoned. Initial treatment was more often than not from non-medically trained personnel, a fact that highlights the importance of first aid and casualty handling training. Whether by truck or helicopter or a combination thereof, the first treatment by a doctor was most likely at company headquarters,

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[52]P. D. Foxton, *Powering War: Modern Land Force Logistics* (London: Brassey's Ltd., 1994), 69.

[53]Foxton, 70.

although medical personnel did go with a patrol irregularly. In Angola in addition to first aid stations (*postos de socorros*), it was mandated that an infirmary (*enfermarias de estacionamento*) of at least 10 beds be established at company headquarters to make best use of the local medical personnel. Depending on where the unit action had taken place, the casualties could receive treatment here or at the sector level infirmary which had at least a 30 bed capacity (*enfermarias de sector*). These sector infirmaries also served as recuperation sites for those treated at the company level infirmaries but whose condition did not warrant evacuation to a hospital. In both of these instances available civilian hospitals could be used as an alternative. The Military Hospital of Luanda, which had an 800 bed capacity, could treat virtually any case, and served as the ultimate evacuation site for Angola.[54]

Once a casualty had had his initial surgery, the "Ten Day Rule" came into effect. This guideline, based on experience gained in treating casualties generally, suggested that the chances of a casualty surviving his surgery increased markedly if he were given a period of ten days to rest before he was moved.[55] The number of infirmaries and the beds in each were based on the number of anticipated casualties, the "Six Hour Rule," and the "Ten Day Rule." These calculations accounted for the likelihood that, once casualties had been received at an infirmary and surgery performed, they could not be moved for ten days. There was consequently a sense of urgency to evacuate the sick and wounded from the forward areas so that the medical facilities there would be free to

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[54]Headquarters, Military Region of Angola, 4th Division (Logistics), Luanda, "General Plan of the Standard Operating Procedures Issued by the 4th Directorate," 15 August 1963, Section on "General Rules on Hospitalisation."

[55]Foxton, 70.

accommodate new casualties. This process called for the cooperation of both service and combat personnel in executing a prompt move of patients to the general hospital where the long-term nursing and rehabilitation could begin. Accordingly, the movement schedule for recuperating personnel was set:

At the Unit Level Infirmaries	-	10 days,
At the Sector Infirmaries	-	20 days,
At the Civilian Hospitals	-	30 days, and
At the Military Hospital of Luanda	-	60 days.[56]

These same guidelines applied throughout the other theatres and were promulgated by their appropriate authorities.

In Guiné there was the Military Hospital of Bissau with 320 beds and the capabilities of a general hospital. There was also the network of unit infirmaries and first aid stations, but because Guiné was such a small theatre, the intermediate facility of the sector infirmary was omitted and the hospital in Bissau served this purpose.[57] In Mozambique there were three hospitals. The primary was the Military Hospital of Lourenço Marques with 340 beds and the capabilities of a general hospital. The secondary hospitals were the Military Hospital of Beira and the Military Hospital of Nampula with the capabilities of regional hospitals. The Beira facility had 75 beds with

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[56]Headquarters, Military Region of Angola, 4th Division (Logistics), Luanda, "General Plan of the Standing Operating Procedures Issued by the 4th Directorate," 15 August 1963, Section on "General Rules on Hospitalisation."

[57]Colonel Lourenço de Sousa Pereira, "A Integração da Função Evacuação/ Hospitalização nos Três Ramos das Forças Armadas" [Integration of the Evacuation/ Hospitalisation Function in the Three Branches of the Armed Forces], lecture given at the Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, Lisbon, 1968-1969 session of the Course for Senior Command, 19.

a surge capability of 120 beds. The Nampula facility had 240 beds. As in Angola, Mozambique had the network of sector and unit infirmaries and first aid stations.[58] Given the casualties of the Campaigns, these beds were adequate to allow every case during the war 51 days of recuperation in Guiné, 78 days in Angola, and 61 days in Mozambique without evacuation to the *metrópole*.[59] With the exception of the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia, there was no better medical care anywhere in Africa.[60]

In certain cases of orthopaedic corrective surgery, skin graphs for burn victims, or other complicated specialities, arrangements were made with the South African Defense Force for treatment at the military hospital in Pretoria.[61] There was a small ward of about 50 patients in late 1972 until the end of the Campaigns, and these were largely blacks. It was also the policy to evacuate all whites to the *metrópole*, where they could recuperate with their families. There were nine military hospitals on the mainland with a total of 2,615 beds and a surge capability of 2,955 beds.[62] The exception to this general policy was burn cases and other extreme trauma casualties. These were flown to the Portuguese Air Force Hospital at Air Base Nº 4 on the Island of Terceira in the

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[58]Sousa Pereira, 19-20.

[59]Joaquim da Luz Cunha, *et al*, *África, A Vitória Traída* [Africa, Betrayed Victory] (Lisbon: Editorial Intervenção, Lda., 1977), 70-71. Based on figures for sick and wounded from all causes in Guiné of 27,790, in Angola of 48,465, and in Mozambique of 38,950; and days of combat in Guiné of 4,016, in Angola of 4,746, and in Mozambique of 3,647.

[60]Inocentes interview, 14 April 1994. Colonel Inocentes was the Portuguese Military Attaché to the Republic of South Africa from 1972 to 1975.

[61]Inocentes interview, 22 October 1994.

[62]Sousa Pereira, Figure 6.

Azores. This 100 bed facility was separated from the mainland and thus removed the wounded from any use as pawns in the anti-war movement.[63] Because the casualty level was relatively light, it was not a large or difficult job.

Medical Services
Deaths to Wounds Casualty Proportions

Conflict	Proportion
Vietnam	1 to 5.6
Portuguese African Campaigns	1 to 5.4
Algeria	1 to 4.7
Korea	1 to 4.1
Falkland Islands	1 to 3.8
World War II	1 to 3.1
Malaya	1 to 2.4

Compiled from various quoted official sources.

Table 1

The effectiveness of Portuguese medical care is compared to that of other conflicts in Table 1, which represents the proportion of those wounded from all causes to those who died. The highest success rate for medical attention lay with the U.S., whose vast resources overcame most complications. Portuguese medical care was the next best with one chance of dying in every 5.4 men wounded. While these figures are a general indicator, they are also influenced by such factors as medical advances since the beginning of World War II, the intensity of the conflict, and the climatic conditions. In Malaya helicopter evacuation was embryonic, and the jungle conditions posed a problem even for those not wounded. In the Falklands the conditions were filthy and the fighting intense, a difficult environment for wounded. Nevertheless, the Portuguese figure stands as a substantial achievement and carries a message that Portugal was sensitive to the health and morale of its troops, particularly in the context of its manpower shortage.

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[63]Conceição e Silva interview, 3 April 1995.

Paranurses

The Portuguese soldier knew that, while his diet in the bush might be meagre, the tropical conditions oppressive, and danger lurking in his next step, his Army would go to great lengths to speed him to a hospital should he be wounded. Every available resource was sought, and in an era of traditional female roles one of the most important and unique aspects of this effort was Portugal's paranurses. In the field of medical care, the Portuguese had observed that the presence of a woman in the early stages of a physical trauma did much to improve the morale of a soldier, particularly one who had been under the stress of combat conditions for an extended period of time.[64] The Portuguese lesson came from the limited French use of nurses in combat both in Indochina and Algeria. The French Red Cross had originally sponsored the use of three nurses in 1937 to be inserted into areas of public calamity for relief of the injured. Following World War II, the French brought this program under military sponsorship, and in the period from 1949 until the program was closed in 1962, recruited 40 women for the paranurse speciality. There were only about fifteen active at any one time, and of this group only 5 served in Indochina and 7 volunteered for Algeria. While the deployment of paranurses demonstrated the benefits of such a program, it remained largely a French experiment because of its modest size.[65]

Following World War II and the widespread troop demobilisation, women assumed a token role in armed forces generally with the exception of Israel, which was always

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[64]Colonel Luís A. Martinho Grão, interview by the author, 2 April 1995, Tomar, Portugal. Colonel Martinho Grão, a former parachutist, is presently writing a history of the Portuguese paranurses.

[65]Martinho Grão interview, 2 April 1995.

short of manpower.[66] There was a resurgence in the Korean Conflict in which the various U.S. military nurse corps were increased aggregately to a strength of 5,400 through a recall of reservists, and 500 to 600 of these served in the combat zone but were not routinely exposed to fire.[67] For the remainder of the 1950s and the early 1960s the various U.S. services downplayed women, calling them "typewriter soldiers" because of their circumscribed roles.[68] The token female recruiting of the U.S. Marine Corps was even based on beauty as late as 1964, a reflection of the narrow attitude within the U.S. military.[69] The British and French were no more adventurous, although there were small numbers of nurses serving in Malaya, Algeria and Indochina. In the latter theatre there were even some liaison pilots. Consequently, when women were introduced into the Portuguese Air Force in 1961 with the thought of putting them in harm's way, it was considered *avant garde*, particularly in a society where a woman's role was so strongly defined in the tradition of homemaker.

With the establishment of the Portuguese Air Force, it was easier to introduce innovative warfighting concepts. There was little opposition in this new service, where hidebound tradition had not been established and where there was little resistance to

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[66]Binkin and Bach, 134. Women in the predecessor to the Israeli Defense Force made their first substantial appearance in 1936 in the guerrilla war between the Arabs and the Jews. By the end of World War II, 1 in 5 frontline troops was female.

[67]Holm, 228.

[68]Major General Jeanne Holm, USAF (Retired), *Women in the Military: The Unfinished Revolution* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1982), 181.

[69]Holm, 181. Each prospective female Marine had to submit 4 photographs (front, back, right and left side views) and the hiring decision was made at the unusually high level of Head of Recruiting.

change. The Air Force established its own battalion of parachutists in 1955 and later in 1961 created a cadre of 5 officers and 1 sergeant from female volunteers who were designated as a part of the Air Force Health Service (Nursing).[70] These six, whose given names were all Maria, were the first graduates of the program and became known as the "six Marias." Dr. Salazar had originally had some concerns about the nurses serving in isolated environments surrounded by men; however, General Arriaga, then the Subsecretary of State for Aeronautics, assured him that all volunteers would be selected from nursing schools run by the Roman Catholic Church and would thus be imbued with a strong moral influence.[71] Indeed the sisters who ran the schools were very supportive of the plan and were invited to award the distinctive green beret to their former students on their graduation from military training.[72] During the fourteen years that the program existed there were nine courses graduating a total of 48 paranurses, all of whom operated in a combat environment.[73]

This number may not seem significant alongside later figures; however, the only country to mobilise women on any scale prior to the end of the Campaigns in 1974 was the U.S. The British in 1975 accorded women equal pay status with men and by 1976 about 4% of its armed forces were women. Between 1976 and 1977 women were placed

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[70]Decree Law Nº 42 073 of 31 December 1958; and its modifying Decree Nº 43 663 of 5 May 1961.

[71]Arriaga interview, 8 November 1994; and Martinho Grão interview, 2 April 1995. The schools were *Escola de Enfermagem Franciscana Missionárias de Maria* and *Escola de S. Vincente de Paulo*.

[72]Arriaga interview, 8 November 1994.

[73]Luís A. Martinho Grão, "Os Filhos de Belerofonte" [The Sons of Bellerophon], *Boina Verde* (Supplement, April-June 1993): 24.

in a combat role with their assignment to the Ulster Defense Regiment in Northern Ireland.[74] France severely restricted women until 1971 and in 1973 only 2% of its 513,000 troops were female.[75] The U.S. military had remained close-minded in this area until 1967, when it had a manpower shortage for Vietnam. By June 1970 there were slightly more than 5,000 Army nurses on active duty and by the end of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam 5,000 to 6,000 women had been rotated through the combat zone.[76] The theatre level was about 300 from 1967 onward.[77] These women were frequently assigned duty at remote firebases and conducted MEDCAP with other personnel.[78] So when the Portuguese Air Force began recruiting and in 1961 deploying its nurses in the combat environment, it represented the forefront in seeking women to ease its manpower shortage and recognising that there are some things a woman can do better than a man, particularly in providing a link for the wounded to normal life outside of combat.

This effective aspect of trauma care in the Campaigns is a clear example not only of the careful thought that extended to the comforting support as well as the medical care of the sick and wounded but also to the overall message of personal concern that the Portuguese were attempting to deliver to the people throughout the theatres. While the French had had a heroic but small and virtually experimental program, the Portuguese

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[74]Binkin and Bach, 122.

[75]Binkin and Bach, 117.

[76]Holm, 203 and 228.

[77]Holm, 227.

[78]Holm, 227.

had adopted and expanded on the principles of this small success to meet their own requirements for trauma care in the field. The uniqueness of this program lay in the Portuguese commitment to an important medical concept and its implementation in the face of traditional social roles for women and interservice resistance to innovation. Conversely, it is interesting to note that the PAIGC subscribed to the same thinking and on a very limited basis used female nurses in combat for identical reasons. One such nurse, Sofia Biaia from the Base de Morés in Guinea, was captured in Operation "Titão." This PAIGC practise was not thought to be widespread, nor were others encountered in Angola or Mozambique.[79]

Comparative Counterinsurgencies

Portugal long before the wars saw the growth and development of transportation as the key to conducting a counterinsurgency campaign in the *ultramar*. It developed the fundamental road, airfield, and port infrastructure well ahead of the trouble in 1961 and proceeded to expand on this earlier work as the shape of the conflict became more apparent. It also began the Campaigns with a trained cadre of logisticians and expanded this group in the years immediately after 1961. It had developed solutions to the problem of great distances between the *metrópole* and the theatres, and it had successfully avoided France's tight situation in Indochina, where the logistic lines of communication from Europe were overstretched. France also had struggled with a local infrastructure too rudimentary to support an extensive counterinsurgency campaign and with no resources to improve it.[80] Portugal had foreseen this problem and addressed it in its strategy.

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[79]Martinho Grão interview, 2 April 1995.

[80]Macksey, 158.

In logistical operations Portugal was quick to shed the troop transport after the initial surge in favour of aircraft, although it was less quick to upgrade this decision to jet transports. This move contrasted with the British in Malaya, who clung to the troopship for moving personnel even though the fastest of them had become obsolete. In 1957 it cost £120 per person for sea passage to Singapore. The comparable contract airfare was £45.[81] This reluctance to change was inconsistent for a country that had in 1950 developed the first propeller-jet airliner, the Vickers Viscount, and the first turbo-jet airliner in the DeHavilland Comet two years later. It was even more puzzling in that travel by sea voyage separated a soldier from his proper duties for perhaps three weeks compared to 48 hours by air.[82]

In making the intermodal transition from the primary airheads and ports of the theatres to local distribution, Portugal developed an elaborate ground transportation system based on a wide network of roads, protected convoys, and tested demining procedures. These measures were designed to defeat the guerrilla attempts at disruption and to sustain its troops. Portugal's medical response ranked among the best of post-World War II conflicts, exceeding all efforts except that of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. It had applied the proper resources imaginatively to produce these results and collaterally to provide health care to the population. Sound innovations in this field, such as employing helicopters and paranurses in medical evacuation, increased the effectiveness of this care. In summary the Portuguese were able to overcome the threat of having the *ultramar* wilt at the end of slow-moving sea lines of communication. They

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[81]Macksey, 167.

[82]Macksey, 167.

established a system responsive to the conflict and flexible enough to ensure a high degree of sustainability. The Commission on the Study of the Campaigns (1961-1974) established by the General Staff of the Army observed in its report:

> All who participated in the Campaigns, whatever the Theatre of Operations, agreed that never did they lack a ration, a medication, a piece of uniform, a munition, a weapon. There would be no great needs and great abundances, but the essentials, the fundamentals, would never lack, and it has even been confirmed, for example, that in the recovery, evacuation and treatment of wounded the results were superior when compared equally to the statistics of more significant armies.[83]

There were shortages in some remote areas from time to time because of guerrilla action against the road convoys; however, in no case was this disruption more than an inconvenience.[84] Portuguese logistics were timely and tailored in their delivery, and the result of this effectiveness was a sustainable military capability.

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[83]Estado-Maior do Exército, *Subsídios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de África* [Information for the Study of Doctrine Applicable in the Campaigns of Africa (1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exército, 1990), 198. "Todos os que fizeram as Campanhas, qualquer que fosse o Teatro de Operações, acordam em dizer que nunca lhes faltou uma ração, um remédio, uma peça de fardamento, uma munição, uma arma. Poderia não haver lugar a grandes exigências e a grandes abundâncias, mas o essencial, o fundamental, nunca faltou e até se pode afirmar, por exemplo, que no levantamento, evacuação e tratamento de feridos os resultados foram supreendentes, mesmo quando comparados com estatísticas de exércitos mais poderosos."

[84]Inocentes interview, 30 August 1994, London.

X

The Portuguese Way

This thesis has argued that there was a specific Portuguese approach to counterinsurgency which successfully drew on its strengths and which devolved from its national strategy of husbanding its limited resources. Portugal translated this parsimony into policies and practises at the campaign and tactical level that permitted it to conduct a sustained and lengthy war in the *ultramar* between 1961 and 1974. A review of the record reveals that Portugal fashioned a style of counterinsurgency that was distinct from other countries and that enabled it to overcome its major geographical challenges and resource limitations and to grind the nationalist movements to a halt. This Portuguese way focused on a subdued, low tempo style of fighting that was a function of its constrained resources and low technology. Portugal knew from the beginning that it was going to have to fight a long war and thus it would have to fight well and cheaply to sustain the conflict.

In the implementation of this strategy Portugal's activities fell into two primary categories, the management of human and material resources and the specific tactical adaptations for fighting counterinsurgency. The sum of these two areas reflected the Portuguese achievement of fighting a subdued war with minimal resources for a protracted period. Portugal had acknowledged from the beginning that there would be no immediate solutions to its situation in Africa and had proceeded to favour strengths and avoid weaknesses. While it lost its colonies, it did not lose them because of military

reasons. Central to the Portuguese military achievement was the recognition that the role of the military in a counterinsurgency was to buy time to match the guerrilla concept of protracted war, and it was this goal that dictated a long haul, low cost strategy. This aim reflected the generally accepted principle that if the tempo of the conflict could be contained in all of its dimensions - geographical extension, populations affected, technology employed, domestic and international public opinion voiced - then the cost of the war could be made acceptable.[1]

This Portuguese way of fighting focused on maintaining an overall low intensity conflict with its implied low cost. Portugal developed its doctrine to achieve this end after having assiduously studied the French and British experiences and gleaned the lessons that they held for Portuguese Africa. It followed this doctrine in educating and training its troops in the methods of conducting such a conflict. It did so through the establishment of counterinsurgency-specific training and then later moving it to the *ultramar* to provide a more effective acclimatization to the fighting environment. It reorganised its Army into small light infantry units. This type of force was the most effective and proven in counterinsurgency campaigning, as it could maintain the all important contact with the population while fighting small, company-sized bands of guerrillas. Light infantry is also the most basic type of military force in its simplicity and low firepower capability, and as such it has remained relatively inexpensive to equip, train, and deploy. It is also less likely to terrorise the population and alienate this target audience with any massive use of firepower. This force structure embodied Portugal's

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[1]Sir Robert Thompson, *Lessons from the Vietnam War*, Report of a seminar held at the Royal United Services Institute in London, 12 February 1966, 18.

policy of conducting a subdued, low tempo, affordable war.

Portuguese infantry not only hunted the enemy but befriended the population. It concomitantly participated in social projects to elevate the people's standard of living and provide a tangible alternative to insurgent promises. This initiative, which included the redressing of grievances, was supported by psychological operations that promoted these benefits. These operations ranged from troop instruction in the purpose of the war and the individual soldier's importance in Portugal's African mission to the strong promotion of social benefits targeted to selected civilian audiences. These actions too were part of the implementation of Portuguese strategy for a low intensity war in that undermining the will of the enemy and strengthening the will of the armed forces and the population through communication was less expensive than a military offensive. Social projects were also benign and inexpensive alongside military operations and demonstrated a commitment by Portugal to its African citizens. Promoting these benefits through psychological operations enhanced their effectiveness through a broad understanding and appeal to the population.

Further, the local people were enlisted to fight in very significant numbers. This Africanisation of counterinsurgency served to remove recruiting pressure from the *metrópole*, reduce transportation costs, and engage the local populations in their own defense. Again, Portuguese strategy was supported with this reduction of costs and mobilisation of the African population, which helped to dampen domestic public pressure in Portugal and provide sustainability to the conflict. Finally, the Portuguese through the use of turned guerrillas, infiltrators, spies, and refugee troops created adverse diplomatic

pressure and debilitating internal friction within the nationalist organisations. Initiating these relatively inexpensive disruptions to the guerrilla capability to organise offensives reduced pressure on the fighting forces. It also reduced guerrilla intimidation of the population by undermining enemy initiative.

Portugal sought to use relatively simple methods and equipment that could be easily understood and employed by its forces, as they matched the guerrilla opponents with their low technology. High technology was not required to counter the guerrilla and employing it in counterinsurgency increased the cost of fighting exponentially with only a small marginal gain in effectiveness. The Portuguese mastered these principles, and the depth of this understanding was reflected in the comparative management of their resources and direction of their military forces alongside those of other powers similarly engaged.

One of the best comparative indicators in the management of human resources is the number of casualties absorbed in relation to troops deployed in this and other conflicts. In terms of deaths in the Campaigns the overall general level of intensity was low. The measure of this intensity is taken normally by comparing deaths for the entire conflict based upon an average per day of war per thousand combatants. The approximate values of selected conflicts are calculated below using data from various quoted sources.[2]

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[2]Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (New York: Random House, Inc., 1988), 172; Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1987), 538; Alf Andrew Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 175; Joaquim da Luz Cunha, *et al*, *África: A Vitória Traída* [Africa: Betrayed Victory] (Lisbon: Editorial Intervenção, Lda., 1977), 70-71; Harry Miller, *Jungle War in Malaya: The Campaign against Communism 1948-60* (London: Arthur Barker Limited,

Combat Deaths per Day of War per Thousand Combatants

Malaya	0.0017
Portuguese African Campaigns	0.0075
Algeria	0.0107
Vietnam	0.0365
Indochina	0.0691
World War II	0.1400

Malaya was by far and away the least intense, followed by the Portuguese Campaigns. The French and U.S. experiences were more costly and intense. The figures follow generally the style of warfare. The French conducted their reoccupation of Indochina as if it were a conventional conflict, as did the U.S. in its subsequent involvement in Vietnam, and both experienced a high rate of combat deaths for troops deployed because of the intensity. The French *guerre révolutionnaire* as applied in Algeria was military in nature, and this approach, while an improvement over Indochina, still exceeded the intensity of the Portuguese experience. The World War II experience is the classic high intensity conventional conflict and is included as a contrasting reference.

The total number of Portuguese deaths from all causes in the three theatres for the entire war was 8,290, of which 5,797 were recruited from the *metrópole* and 2,493 were recruited from the colonies.[3] The French forces in Algeria (1954-1962) counted 17,456

1972), 17; and *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (Washington: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1994), 362.

[3]Estado-Maior do Exército, *Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)* [Historical Military Report of the African Campaigns (1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exército, 1988), Vol. I, 264-266.

dead from all causes in eight years.[4] The United States experienced 58,135 deaths in Vietnam from 1961-1973, a period of twelve years. Between the years of 1964 and 1969, Portugal's heaviest years of fighting, average annual deaths per thousand of deployed troops was 2.23 and was its highest in 1966 at 2.69.[5] In Vietnam the U.S. experienced between 1964 and 1972 an average annual rate of 14.7 deaths per thousand troops deployed, with a maximum rate of 23.5 in 1968 at the height of the fighting.[6] The French experience for Algeria fell between the two. Portugal in the Great War, its most recent previous combat experience, deployed troops and fought on three fronts: France, the south of Angola, and the north of Mozambique. In France there were 57,000 Portuguese combatants, and in the two African colonies there were 32,000 plus 25,000 local troops, a total of 114,000 men under arms. The war for Portugal lasted two years. The number of deaths was a staggering 7,908 for a death rate per thousand per year of approximately 34.68.[7]

On balance then the death rate during the 1961-1974 period was substantially less than either of the two similar contemporary insurgencies in Vietnam and Algeria and in Portugal's last conventional war experience of 1914-1918. The fact that the Portuguese Armed Forces from 1961 had fewer casualties in a decade than the French in Algeria had in a single year reinforces the achievement of Portuguese policy.

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[4]Horne, 538.

[5]Luz Cunha, 74-75.

[6]*Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 1975* (Washington: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1976).

[7]Luz Cunha, 73.

Low casualty rates in conflicts are generally attributed to thorough training, good leadership, and a sound battle plan that is understood by all parties. The Portuguese constantly sought to improve their counterinsurgency training, and moving much of it to the theatres from 1968 onward made it very effective in that it thoroughly acclimatised the troops to the African battlefield environment. Spirited military leadership was evident in Guiné from 1968 under General Spínola and in Angola from 1970 under Generals Costa Gomes and Bethencourt Rodrigues. Building on earlier foundations, General Spínola introduced an effective counterinsurgency battle plan in his "A Better Guiné," which combined military and social action both to check the guerrillas and to provide a viable alternative to the PAIGC promises. Similar plans were introduced in Angola by General Costa Gomes and in Mozambique by General Arriaga. Implicit in these plans was the restrained use of firepower to avoid terrorising the population and the mix of social action with military protection. Except for the Angola uprisings of 1961 there was no guerrilla army, as in Indochina, Algeria, and Vietnam, which massed troops and employed them in conventional ways. The Portuguese dealt largely with small bands, as embodied in the PAIGC *bi-grupo* of 26 men. An insurgent force of as much as 200 men was rare. As the territories were sparsely inhabited and had difficult, and also in the case of Angola and Mozambique, vast terrain, finding guerrillas was difficult. Where they were encountered, fights were generally brief affairs with limited casualties. The style of war simply would not produce the volume of casualties that were inherent in a more conventional grinding battle of attrition with massed troops and massive firepower. The intent of the Portuguese to conduct a long haul, low cost conflict was well appreciated and born out in the casualty figures.

The financial cost of war is a relative measure, and Portugal's experience must be seen in the context of its economy and alongside that of other similar conflicts. It is estimated that the Campaigns cost approximately £1,461,846,750 over thirteen years or £112.5 million per year.[8] In Malaya the cost from June 1948 until Independence Day on 31 August 1957 was an estimated £700 million or £77.8 million per year.[9] The cost of the French reoccupation of Indochina from 1946 to 1954 was put at £3.6 billion plus another £335 million from the U.S., or about £491.8 million per year total.[10] The war in Algeria for military action alone cost an estimated £4 billion and social operations an additional 25%, or about £667.7 million per year total.[11] By comparison the U.S. involvement in Vietnam is estimated to have cost £50,220,000,000 or £5,580 million per year. Again from these figures it is apparent which belligerents elected to use a low cost, long haul counterinsurgency strategy. Malaya, the least expensive engagement, and the Portuguese Campaigns were both relatively inexpensive and sustainable. The French reoccupation of Indochina and the subsequent U.S. involvement in Vietnam were many times more expensive, as they were both conducted on a largely conventional basis.[12] Algeria, a highly militarised counterinsurgency, cost as much as a conventional conflict. It is readily apparent that the cost of a counterinsurgency is directly related to its tempo

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[8]Luz Cunha, 63. Imputed from General Luz Cunha's figures in contos and converted to Sterling.

[9]Robert Jackson, *The Malayan Emergency: The Commonwealth's Wars 1948-1966* (London: Routledge, 1991), 115.

[10]Bernard B. Fall, *Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu* (New York: Harper Row Publishers, Inc., 1967), viii.

[11]Horne, 538-539.

[12]Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 258-260.

and the type of strategy and tactics that are employed to yield this rhythm. This principle was embodied in the Portuguese approach, allowing its armed forces to sustain the war effort in step with the guerrilla strategy of protracted conflict.

This burden also appeared reasonable when viewed from the overall perspective of the Portuguese national budget; however, there was a cost in increased political dissent. During the period of the Campaigns the expenditures for national defense as a portion of state expenditures ranged between a high of 23% in 1961 to a low of 17.1% in 1973.[13] In absolute terms defense spending increased five fold from 1960 to 1975. These increases, while they remained a declining percentage of the overall national budget, were part of an increasing public financing burden which was funded through increased taxes and inflation, factors that aggravated public dissent as time went on. Comparatively in France in 1965, a period of peace following Algeria, defense expenditures represented 20% of the national budget.[14] Despite the apparent reasonableness of Portugal's expenditure, its political fabric was wearing thin. This situation was beyond the generals to repair, and while it was the duty of the politicians, they were failing.

Nevertheless, the human and economic cost of the war was a powerful burden for Portugal. No matter how contained the conflict and how reasonable its cost financially, the burden on the population after thirteen years was telling. In addition to the 8,290 deaths, Portuguese wounded and mutilated were 27,919.[15] Social services in the

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[13]*Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974)*, Vol. I, 513.

[14]Luz Cunha, 62.

[15]Luz Cunha, 70-71.

metrópole were unprepared for the magnitude of this rehabilitation task. The youth of Portugal had been mobilised in one of the largest and most arduous military conscriptions in the world.[16] The troops required for this ambitious venture had stretched Portugal's capacity. Only conscription first of the *metrópole* population and later of that in the *ultramar* would support a broad occupation of the colonies to maintain order, the momentum of the social initiative, and the flexibility of mobile reserves. While this strategy resulted in one of the largest uses of indigenous troops in any modern counterinsurgency, an important element in the Portuguese way, the *metrópole* was still adversely affected. The burden was extreme in that despite the low casualty figures showing that the military was executing its plans as envisioned, Portugal's force level in Africa in relation to its population was five times higher than the U.S. commitment in Vietnam.[17] Deaths from all causes were on a percentage basis relative to the population about three times as great in Portugal than in the U.S. with its Southeast Asia involvement. This situation created a problem of diminishing public support that was outside of the military's control no matter how effectively troops were deployed. As a result annual emigration had risen to 170,000 in 1971. Over the period of the Campaigns an estimated 1.5 million emigrants reduced the workforce to 3.5 million, and the total population to 8.6 million.[18] Inflation by 1974 was running at 20% per year, and the population was increasingly voting with its feet to avoid the economic and social penalties

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[16]Willem S. van der Waals, *Portugal's War in Angola 1961-1974* (Rivonia: Ashanti Publishing (Pty) Limited, 1993), 244.

[17]van der Waals, 244.

[18]van der Waals, 244.

of the war.[19]

Another approach to measuring the Portuguese way is an examination of the execution of its doctrine. The Portuguese Army made the most important initial step in establishing doctrine before the conflict. It sought to achieve the twin goals of avoiding the cost of relearning the lessons of other militaries that had fought counterinsurgencies, and of committing forces in ignorance of how victory would be attained. In the first instance the Portuguese delved into the literature on guerrilla wars and the doctrinal manuals on the counterinsurgencies of others. They sent missions to French, British, and U.S. schools and on operations relating to the pertinent aspects of "small wars," and sought the voices of experience in counsel with veterans. They found that little had been written on modern counterinsurgency. In the majority of instances there was no easily transmitted doctrine, and security forces in earlier conflicts had been largely left to feel their way along. The literature that was belatedly written for the British action in Malaya, for instance, was only by chance transmitted to Kenya, and neither of the volumes on these two experiences had been well known to the troops in Cyprus.[20] France in Indochina and in the first two years of Algeria was similarly unfocused. The Portuguese assembled counterinsurgency information painstakingly, reduced it to a plan for the defense of their colonies, and committed it to a written doctrine for the

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[19]António de Spínola, *Portugal e o Futuro* [Portugal and the Future] (Lisbon: Editora Arcádia, 1974), 37-38 and 41.

[20]Thomas R. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990), 184.

Campaigns, *O Exército na Guerra Subversiva*.[21] This work described for the entire army the nature of the enemy and the methods to be used to defeat him. The instruction was unusual in that the British and the French only belatedly committed their counterinsurgency doctrine to writing after they had been fighting for sometime.

Portuguese soldiers were sent into battle from the start knowing how victory was supposed to be achieved. Although the doctrine was fresh from its writing and had been neither taught nor tested in the field, it was available and served as a guide in its raw form. In the modern counterinsurgencies of Britain, France, and the U.S. initial hostilities went without the benefit of such guidance. Assembly of the Portuguese doctrine and its transmission had presented a challenge, but the importance of understanding the opposition and its methods in advance was thought to be vital to success. Adjustments were needed when teething problems arose in the early years of the conflict, and Portugal made them in the areas of training and organisation and a relaunched social initiative supported by psychological operations. In doing so it defined the Portuguese character of counterinsurgency in the shape of its forces, their education, and their deployment.

In addition to the timely development of Portuguese doctrine, the Portuguese Army converted itself on a wholesale basis to a counterinsurgency force. The magnitude of this conversion cannot be understated. The upheaval of changing an army from one trained and organised to fight a conventional war in Europe to one primarily structured in small

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[21]Estado-Maior do Exército, *O Exército na Guerra Subversiva* [The Army in Subversive War] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exército, 1963).

infantry units for counterinsurgency in Africa was cathartic. This adjustment was frustrated further by a great influx of conscripts whose ambitions were far different from those of the professional soldiers. Nevertheless, the entire Army did change, and its training was adjusted to address the threat. No such wholesale change was either tried or effected in any other counterinsurgency. While Britain, France and the U.S. were always short of manpower to conduct their counterinsurgencies, and indeed had to rely on conscription to do so, they never regarded these conflicts in the same light as Portugal and consequently did not feel compelled to convert their entire armies to the task.[22] Their counterinsurgencies, while important, diverted resources from their primary military focus, which was a conventional war in Europe against the Red Army. For Portugal the African Campaigns were its main conflict.

Emphasising the tactical flexibility demonstrated by the British as well as their PAIGC opponents, the Portuguese redefined the use of small infantry units and specialised troops. Portugal changed the training of its infantry forces to emphasise in-theatre indoctrination and instruction to make them more familiar with the local combat environment and their adaptation to it more facile. These changes had the effect of shaping the conflict to one of low intensity and of keeping it that way. The French in Indochina and Algeria and the U.S. in Vietnam never sought a truly subdued engagement.[23]

Intelligence in counterinsurgency drives military operations and troop employment, and so to support these actions Portugal developed an efficient political and military

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[22]Krepinevich, 127.

[23]Krepinevich, 192.

intelligence apparatus in the use of agents and informers, police, and air and ground reconnaissance patrols. The information from all sources was processed through a system of intelligence coordination centres and disseminated to support operations. This organisation was copied from the British system in Malaya and adapted to Portuguese Africa with reliable results. Portugal also struggled to coordinate its military efforts with those of the civil sector in an effort to overawe the enemy through its social programs. It sought to present a very tangible alternative of peace and social advancement opposite the promises of the insurgents. Every aspect of the Portuguese organisation for war and deployment of its troops was constructed on the British premise of minimal force, as demonstrated in Malaya, which kept the Campaigns subdued and affordable within the limits of Portugal's resources.

In the final analysis, while Portugal fought an imaginative campaign to retain its colonies in an anti-colonial era, no amount of military verve could overcome the political problem of Portugal's legitimacy in Africa. Because of this circumstance, Portugal lost the war and ultimately its colonies despite its enormous sacrifices. This development reinforced the point that wars are largely resolved politically. General Spínola, in writing his book *Portugal e o Futuro* [Portugal and the Future] in 1971, acknowledged this principle and saw no point in continuing to expend resources at the expense of the overall good of the country in pursuing a dead-end strategy.[24] In a counterinsurgency military action can be used only to support political and social measures. It cannot replace them. By 1971 in all theatres the military had given Portugal credibility and was prepared to provide further time for a negotiated disengagement. By 1970 General Spínola had

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[24]Spínola, 42-43.

checked the PAIGC momentum and generated a stalemate through spirited leadership and his "A Better Guiné" social program. This stalemate began to slip in 1973 as the military realised the needed political solution was not in sight. By 1971 Generals Costa Gomes and Bethencourt Rodrigues had produced a military victory in Angola that remained intact through the end of the war. In Mozambique the nationalist movements were contained until 1970, the conflict having been relatively quiescent until then. After 1970 the situation began gradually to deteriorate from the northern border with Tanzania southward. This fraying could have been corrected with an application of additional troops and matériel again under spirited leadership. Military force could not, however, end the war. No amount of imaginative campaigning could have done so. General Spínola and all of the Portuguese Armed Forces were aware of this fact.[25] Portugal's political leadership, however, remained shortsighted and removed from reality.[26] The true hope for the regeneration of Portugal lay in releasing its colonies to resolve both domestic and international dissent and to embrace the European prosperity then underway.[27] Portugal's position in Africa had been untenable from the start, and the military had recognised this fact.[28] Portuguese military leadership had proved farsighted in both its planning and its conduct of the war. It had conducted a sophisticated campaign in three theatres a long way from home. It had successfully addressed its problems within the context of its limited resources and fashioned a style of warfare that

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[25]Spínola, 42-43.

[26]Marcello Caetano, *Depoimento* [Deposition] (Rio de Janeiro: Distribuidora Record, 1974), 191.

[27]Spínola, 37-45.

[28]Spínola, 235.

ground the enemy to a halt. It had skilfully managed the use of Portuguese lives and treasure. When the politicians failed to provide the necessary complementary support, it was the military that intervened on 25 April 1974 and provided the political solution that not only freed the colonies but ultimately liberated Portugal and made possible a transition to democracy.

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